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“Perceptions of Corporate Annual Reports’ Users toward Accounting 
Information and Voluntary Disclosure and its Determinants: The Case 
of Kuwait.”  
Al Mutawaa, Abdullah 2013. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates four significant dimensions of the corporate annual reports 
(CARs) environment in one of the emerging markets in the Middle East, Kuwait: [1] the 
perceptions of major external users of annual reports regarding current voluntary 
disclosure practices, [2] the identification of voluntary items perceived as useful, [3] the 
assessment of voluntary disclosure levels and their evolvement over the period covered 
by the current study (2005-2008), [4] the impact of a comprehensive set of company 
characteristics and corporate governance attributes on explaining variations in the extent 
of disclosure. A questionnaire survey is used to test the first two dimensions, covering 
four user groups, while hand-collected data from a sample of 206 annual reports of non-
financial companies and other complementary sources are used to test the other two. 
The study employs a theoretical framework (agency, signalling, legitimacy, and 
stakeholder theories) to explore the motivations of companies to release voluntary 
information.  
The 143 received responses are analysed using Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests. 
The analysis brings to light the remarkable agreement among the participants on the 
importance of CARs, interim reports, and advice from specialists as sources of 
information for making judgments. Regarding the level of voluntary disclosure, 
respondents strongly agree that the annual reports of listed companies provide 
inadequate information to users. Participants also indicate their desire for more 
information to be required than companies currently provide, to improve decision 
making and the usefulness of CARs. The results suggest that most users believe that 
there is a necessity to develop sophisticated capital market infrastructure and 
comprehensive regulations to help foster confidence in the capital market and protect 
market participants. 
Although multivariate analysis reveals that the actual level of voluntary disclosure is 
low, the overall level is gradually improving over time. The extent of voluntary 
disclosure tends to be significantly higher as the percentage of government ownership 
increases. Disclosure practices are also positively influenced by cross-listing and 
company size. Conversely, voluntary disclosure practices are negatively influenced by 
cross-directorships, board size, role duality, and company growth, while family 
members, ruling family on the board, and audit committees have no bearing on 
disclosure. Interestingly, the determinants of disclosure vary among the categories of 
information. No single explanatory variable explains the variation in the overall level of 
voluntary disclosure and the variations in the disclosure level of all categories of 
information.     
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The capital market plays a key role in a country‘s economy. Successful economic 
performance is linked to the stability and efficiency of a country‘s capital market. 
Moreover, a number of international bodies consider the capital market as one of the 
major indicators of the performance of a country‘s economy.  
One source of conflict between outside parties and company managers arises from 
differences in their self-interest, since each party attempts to maximise its own interest 
in the company in question. Thus, it is reasonable to expect information asymmetry 
between these parties (Healy and Palepu, 1993). In addition, it can be assumed that 
company managers tend to partially release private information, which they own, 
concerning their companies (Lev and Penman, 1990; Samuels, 1990).    
Corporate information is considered essential for market participants to make informed 
decisions; this information could be obtained through several sources such as corporate 
annual reports (CARs). As a result of globalization and rapid progress in information 
technology, users of information have the opportunity to choose from a number of 
available information sources. In the case of developed countries, there is a wide range 
of alternative sources such as information agencies that work to enhance the quantity 
and quality of corporate information provided to users. However, the sources of 
corporate information are relatively limited and insufficient in Kuwait, as is the case in 
most developing countries. The role of financial reports could be enhanced, therefore, as 
a more dominant source of information for external users in developing countries as 
compared with developed countries (Al-Yaqout, 2006). Additionally, companies use a 
number of channels or sources of information to communicate with their stakeholders 
such as media devices, annual reports, and interviews. However, the disclosure 
literature provides evidence that CARs are considered the most important source of 
information in economically advanced countries (e.g. Chang and Most, 1981) and less 
economically developed ones (Mirshekary and Saudagaran, 2005).  
The regulators of capital markets should set out comprehensive regulations to organise 
the process of obtaining information on a timely basis as well to ensure users have equal 
access to information. This may provide appropriate protection for market participants 
and enhance the level of confidence in the capital market. In this regard, Claessens et al. 
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(1993) stated that investors may be discouraged from investing their savings in 
emerging capital markets, as users of information in those countries do not have equal 
access to corporate information and these market inefficiencies may increase insider 
information. Another barrier to investment of capital in emerging markets is information 
disclosure. Salter (1998) reported that the average level of financial information 
disclosed by companies in emerging capital markets is considered to be relatively low 
compared to other companies listed on developed markets. Thus, if emerging markets, 
such as Kuwait, intend to attract new investors, the foregoing factors need to be 
considered by market regulators (Al-Qenae, 2000).  
Turning to corporate governance (CG), this concept has received a great deal of interest 
from regulator bodies in developed and developing nations equally, especially following 
corporate accounting scandals in the US (e.g. Enron, and WorldCom).  One of main 
reasons for these corporate collapses was the failure in corporate governance practices 
by those companies (Salacuse, 2002). On the international level, some bodies (e.g. the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the 
International Institute of Finance (IIF)) have undertaken to establish and develop 
principles of CG best practice to match changing economy systems worldwide. These 
organizations work hard to contribute to stability in nations‘ economies and to an 
appropriate level of protection for investors, especially minority shareholders, through 
improving countries‘ legal frameworks and CG regimes (OECD 1999, 2004; IIF, 2002).    
On the national level, a number of countries have set out laws and implemented modern 
mechanisms concerning codes of CG to guarantee an appropriate level of confidence in 
their capital markets among participants. These improved systems help provide an 
acceptable level of information transparency for stakeholders, assisting shareholders to 
make sound decisions. That is, however, not the case in many developing countries, 
where some elements exist that slow the improvement of CG practices. For example, in 
countries with a high level of company ownership concentration, company laws that 
aim at protecting the other shareholders are not applied; a considerable number of 
companies are controlled by the major shareholder and a relationship-based system that 
prevents the application of law when mismanagement is detected.  This is the case in 
Kuwait (Al-Wasmi, 2011).   
In the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) context, the regulators in these countries 
realized the importance of the CG concept and its mechanisms in achieving proper 
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protection for shareholders and other stakeholders. For this reason they have introduced 
modern regulations such as a code of best practice on corporate governance, but Kuwait 
still has no such code (Koldertsova 2010; Saidi, 2011; Al-Wasmi, 2011). It is argued 
that there has been considerable progress in Kuwaiti commercial attitudes toward 
corporate disclosure over the last decade. However, there has been little comparable 
parallel development in, and attention to, broader CG issues in Kuwait (Alanezi, 2006).  
The current study of corporate annual reports of listed companies in Kuwait falls into 
four broad areas. The first dimension is to explore the views amongst members of the 
Kuwaiti accounting community concerning current disclosure practices. The second is 
to explore the views and perceptions of target groups toward the usefulness of 
information proposed by the study in improving the quality of voluntary disclosure in 
corporate annual reports (CARs) of companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange 
(KSE). The third is to address voluntary disclosure practices and their evolution in an 
emerging market, namely Kuwait over the study period, while the fourth dimension is to 
determine the causes of the variations in the extent of disclosure among the sample.   
 
1.1.1 A Brief Background of Kuwait  
Kuwait is an oil-rich country with an emerging capital market; it is an important oil 
supplier to Western world economies. Over the past few decades, instead of depending 
on a single income source, the Kuwaiti government has recognised the importance of 
diversifying and taken remarkable steps to prevent the adverse impact of volatile oil 
prices on the country‘s economy. The government‘s strategy toward diversifying its 
income sources took different dimensions. The first − the establishment of the 
Sovereign Wealth Fund in 1953 − makes Kuwait one of the leading, most experienced 
countries in this field with the fund‘s assets estimated at $296 billion (The Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute, 2012). In the 1990s, the Kuwaiti government added another 
dimension to reducing governmental expenditure and to expanding investments and the 
contribution of individuals and the private sector, through the adoption of liberalisation 
and privatisation programmes. The removal of restrictions also gave strategic investors 
an opportunity to enter the market. To this end, it enacted several laws (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.5.1.5). As a part of its strategy to diversify income sources and for economic 
growth, the government allows foreign investors to own and trade shares of companies 
listed on the KSE.  
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These efforts led to an increase in the number of companies listed on the KSE and in the 
quantity of shares traded. Among other Arab capital markets, the KSE, which, having 
been established in 1962, is the oldest capital market in the Gulf region, stands second, 
in terms of the number of listed companies and of the quantity of shares traded, after the 
markets of Oman and Saudi Arabia, respectively (KSE annual report, 2011). Currently, 
there are 225 companies listed on the KSE (KSE‘s website, 2012). Consequently, these 
developments in the market show a need for more detailed and accurate company 
information. This will positively assist in reducing the amount of information 
asymmetry and in ensuring the KSE becomes more open and transparent. Naser et al. 
(2003) declared that company information plays an important role in formulating 
decisions about companies on the KSE. 
  
1.2 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The current study focuses on stakeholders‘ perception toward accounting information 
and voluntary disclosure in CARs of non-financial companies listed on the KSE, as an 
example of an emerging capital market over the period from 2005 to 2008. The 
objectives underlying this study are:  
 To discover the major corporate information sources for user groups in Kuwait. To 
determine how annual reports stood among these sources, and to determine how user 
groups rate annual reports‘ sections. 
 To investigate the extent to which information included in annual reports possesses 
qualitative criteria.  
 To determine how different user groups evaluate the current level of corporate voluntary 
disclosure in Kuwait. 
 To elicit users‘ perceptions on the usefulness of voluntary information disclosure, such 
as its vital role in making a comparison with other companies and making investment 
decisions. 
 To determine the usefulness of a set of proposed information items to be disclosed.  
 To draw a conclusion about the factors that may affect the degree of information 
transparency provided by Kuwaiti listed companies. 
 To elicit users‘ perception of the importance of separation of ‗overseeing‘ aspects from 
‗surveillance‘ and ‗share trading‘ aspects amongst regulatory bodies.  
 To measure the level of satisfaction of major user groups regarding the usefulness of a 
number of procedures that should be set out by the Kuwaiti government.  
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 To measure the level of consensus among major user groups about the degree of 
difficulty associated with the application of some issues related to corporate governance 
in the Kuwaiti business environment.  
 To track changes in the level and categories of voluntary information disclosure during 
the study periods.  
 To explore how the overall level of voluntary disclosure depends on the categories of 
information. 
 To examine the hypothesized influence of company and corporate governance variables 
in explaining the variations in the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
non-financial companies.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To reach the objectives of the study, the following research questions have been 
formulated:  
1. What is the attitude of user groups towards the importance, to their informed 
economic decisions, of CARs as a source of information and their sections?  
2. What are the perceptions of the different user groups regarding the qualitative 
characteristics of information in the Kuwaiti CARs? 
3. How do different user groups evaluate the current level of voluntary disclosure 
in Kuwaiti CARs?  
4. What are the perceptions of different user groups toward the usefulness of 
voluntary disclosure? 
5. How do different user groups rate the voluntary information items, and which of 
these items are preferred or recommended to be disclosed in the Kuwaiti CARs? 
6. What are the most important factors that may affect the degree of transparency 
of information provided by Kuwaiti listed companies?  
7. What are the perceptions of the various user groups in Kuwait regarding the 
importance of reducing overlap in the supervision and monitoring activities among 
regulatory bodies?     
8. What type of regulations or procedures should be set or modified by the Kuwaiti 
legislator to foster levels of competition and investment in the KSE? 
9. What types of issues related to corporate governance best practice are 
considered to be highly difficult to apply in the Kuwaiti business environment?    
10. How does the overall level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Kuwaiti companies change during the study period? 
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11. How do the four groups of information in the level of voluntary disclosure trend 
for Kuwaiti companies in the years 2005-2008? 
12. How do the levels of voluntary disclosure for the four groups of information 
correlate with the overall level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of listed 
companies? 
13. To what extent do corporate characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms contribute to explaining the variations in the overall level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports? 
The first nine research questions will be examined using ten hypotheses (Chapter 5-6). 
The next four research questions are the theme of discussions in Chapter 7 and will be 
examined by the remaining fifteen hypotheses. 
 
1.4 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study attempts to advance understanding of the types of information necessary to 
be disclosed in the CAR in the view of user groups and to enhance knowledge of the 
voluntary disclosure practices of emerging capital markets such as Kuwait in the 
following areas: 
Firstly, the current study contributes to the research avenue (the disclosure literature and 
the corporate governance literature) by introducing up-to-date and additional evidence 
of the association that exists between voluntary disclosure behaviour and corporate 
governance within the context of Kuwait as a Middle Eastern country.  
Most disclosure research has been conducted in the context of Western countries, 
namely: the USA, the UK, European countries, and Australia. Only a few studies have 
been conducted in developing countries, especially in Middle Eastern countries. Thus, it 
can be argued that there is little known about the perceptions and views of user groups 
concerning their information need as well as the level of voluntary disclosure and the 
factors (company characteristics and corporate governance attributes) influencing this 
phenomenon in this part of the world. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the 
first conducted in the Kuwaiti context to examine the influence of company 
characteristics (CC) and CG mechanisms on the disclosure practices for companies 
listed on the KSE. In addition, the present study provides further evidence of the 
relationship between these variables in a different environment such as Kuwait.  
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It must be noted that only two empirical studies were undertaken regarding the 
perception of user groups, in this respect, by Naser et al. (2003) and Al-Mutairi (2004). 
The current study goes further than these studies, and Section 3.10 provides justification 
for the first part of this study. With regard to the second part, two works on corporate 
governance in Kuwait have been conducted by Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) and 
Alanezi (2011). However, the current study goes beyond these studies, not only by 
employing a more comprehensive set of variables, but by employing a new relevant 
variable (e.g. cross-listing) which is also rarely used in disclosure studies conducted in 
the Middle East. This study is also distinguished by employing a new variable, ―the 
presence of ruling family members on the board‖, and by utilizing panel data something 
rarely used in studies conducted in the Middle East and which will be discussed later.   
Secondly, this study contributes to the arguments concerning the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms in improving the level of disclosure and information 
transparency. For example, it investigates whether or not the presence of family 
members on the board influences the extent of disclosure in Kuwaiti annual reports. 
Thirdly, the study realizes the lack of use of a limited theoretical framework by 
employing a comprehensive one which can better explain disclosure practices and 
widen and deepen the scope of analysis as well. Thus, research hypotheses are mainly 
related to agency, signalling, legitimacy, stakeholders, and political costs theories.  
Fourthly, the present study responds to those previous studies that call for more research 
to examine factors contributing to the change in corporate voluntary disclosure over 
time (e.g. Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Samaha, 2010). The study uses panel data 
analysis since it is infrequently used in the disclosure literature (Hassan et al., 2006). In 
this respect, Cheung et al. (2010:261) stated that “…the use of a ﬁxed effects regression 
model for panel data minimizes the endogeneity problem found in cross sectional 
studies based on a single year’s data”.  Moreover, “Panel data give more informative 
data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degree of freedom and 
more efficiency” (Gujarati, 2003:637). Consequently, this type of study gives more 
opportunity to track the trends and improvements in disclosure practices over time. 
Fifthly, the study expands the methods of previous studies (e.g. Meek et al., 1995; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), which are broadly used in the literature, by investigating 
wider groups. This helps to provide a rich description of disclosure practices and their 
variation over the study period, so this analysis is more appropriate with longitudinal 
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studies. It also contributes to the identification of strengths and weaknesses in corporate 
disclosure. 
Lastly, it has been argued that corporate governance practices in Kuwait do not reach 
international and regional guidelines on good practices in this area. It can also be stated 
that the concept of CG and its importance is not widely known in Kuwait. This may be 
due to the fact that the challenges Kuwait faces in embracing corporate governance are 
multifaceted; these include human resource problems, social objections and the lack of a 
proper legal infrastructure (Al-Wasmi, 2011). Consequently, this study has several 
implications. Firstly, the study benchmarks the disclosure practices of listed companies 
in Kuwait in opposition to the international corporate governance regime. This has 
significant implications for regulatory bodies seeking to attract local and international 
funds and for shareholders seeking to improve their protection, enhancing participants‘ 
confidence in the capital market. This also helps to achieve the Kuwaiti government‘s 
desire for the KSE to be an international financial centre among emerging capital 
markets. The outcomes are useful for policy makers in setting out the disclosure 
requirements related to listed companies. Lastly, the findings are valuable for preparers 
of CARs in drawing up their public disclosure strategy.      
 
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Studies are classified as either exploratory in nature or descriptive, or they may be 
carried out to test research hypotheses. Thus, it can be stated that the nature of a study 
depends on the stage to which knowledge about the research topic has advanced. 
Hypotheses-testing studies are undertaken to explain the nature of certain associations 
or to establish the differences among groups (Sekaran, 2003), such as the current study. 
Moreover, the deductive approach followed in this research requires the development of 
hypotheses and expectations upon a theory.   
One of the main objectives in this study is to gain an insight into respondents‘ 
perceptions of the usefulness of a set of information to be disclosed in corporate annual 
reports (CARs), in order to improve the quality of voluntary disclosure in Kuwait. To 
this end, a questionnaire survey, a quantitative approach, was employed in this part of 
the study. The other main objective is to examine the relationship between a set of 
explanatory variables and the extent of voluntary disclosure. This objective can be 
reached through the formulation of a set of testable hypotheses which were statistically 
tested by using secondary data. It is noteworthy that the process of selecting variables 
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was based on either the theoretical considerations (e.g. agency theory and signalling 
theory; cf. Chapter 2) or as a result of potential causal associations to disclosure 
practices.   
The current study is considered to be a single country study, which aims to evaluate the 
voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports of Kuwaiti non-financial companies 
listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE). Furthermore, it is a longitudinal study, 
since it evaluates the voluntary disclosure phenomenon over a period of four years 
(2005-2008), the most recent period when the study was conducted. The rationale 
behind this selection will be discussed in depth in Chapter 5. Following a longitudinal 
design, it is a combination of cross-sectional and time-series analyses employed as a 
good measurement to test the changes occurring over four years. 
In that sense, Bryman and Bell (2007:60) stated that ―longitudinal design can allow 
some insight into the time order of variables and therefore may be more able to allow 
causal inferences to be made”. For example, it allows companies‘ annual reports to be 
examined and a decision to be made as to whether or not the overall levels and types of 
voluntary disclosure differ over years.  
The outcomes of this study will hopefully aid policy makers in attracting more 
investment to the capital market, and this may be achieved through improving 
information transparency and disclosure level in annual reports. 
Beyond that, if the results of this study indicate that the level of voluntary disclosure is 
low, this may imply the need for more financial reporting and disclosure requirements. 
For instance, the research would produce a detailed picture about the items voluntarily 
disclosed in corporate annual reports, which in turn could improve the mandatory 
reporting requirements (Dye, 1986). On the international level, this type of analysis is 
desirable and useful to all bodies that are interested in corporate annual reports in 
emerging capital markets and the levels of disclosure in those reports.  
 
1.6 THE RESEARCH METHODS 
This section outlines the main methods employed in the current study to achieve the 
objectives of research identified earlier in this chapter. In general, the study employed 
more than one quantitative method. Firstly, a self-administered questionnaire was 
constructed to collect the primary data for the study. This was distributed to users of 
corporate annual reports (CARs) in Kuwait to elicit their perceptions and views 
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regarding the crucial topics related to CARs, accounting reporting practices, and 
regulations in Kuwait. In other words, the data was employed to achieve the first nine 
objectives (see Section 1.2). Selected to participate in the questionnaire survey were 
four user groups, representing the key users of annual reports and accounting 
information in Kuwait, as follows: financial advisors (FA), external auditors (EA), 
market regulators (MR), and accounting academics (AC). Most participants are 
professionally qualified and sufficiently well educated to properly answer the issues 
addressed by the questionnaire. 
Secondly, an un-weighted disclosure index was used as a research instrument to 
evaluate the voluntary disclosure level for non-financial companies, which represent the 
research population in the present study. More specifically, this was employed to realize 
the last three objectives of the research (see Section 1.2). To achieve that, secondary 
data was collected from the annual reports of 52 companies, which consisted of the final 
sample with 206 company-year observations, listed on the KSE over the period of four 
years.  
 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
Following the introduction, the thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 
addresses four theories that can be used to explain the voluntary disclosure practices: 
agency theory, signalling theory, legitimacy theory, and stakeholder theory.   
Chapter 3 reviews the academic literature about the perceptions of various user groups 
regarding the usefulness of corporate annual reports (CARs). The review also includes 
those related empirical studies that examined the information needs of different user 
groups of CARs in different parts of the world. Having reviewed the perception of users 
of annual reports, the chapter then moves on to discuss empirical studies focused on 
voluntary disclosure that were conducted in developed and developing countries. The 
review of voluntary disclosure literature takes two main streams: firstly, studies that 
employ company characteristics, some of which are suggested by the theories (e.g. 
agency and signalling theories), to explain the variation in the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. The second stream concerns ‗company characteristics and corporate 
governance attributes‘ and their effect on disclosure practices.  
Chapter 4 provides a brief history of Kuwait and its economic environment as well as a 
detailed review of the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE). It highlights the impact of the 
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legal system and auditing profession on disclosure and CG practices. Then a brief 
description of the emergence of the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) is provided. The 
status of CG in Kuwait is discussed in detail, and the chapter closes with a detailed 
comparison of Kuwait‘s CG practices and international CG guidelines, such as those 
produced by the Institute of International Finance (IIF), with GCC countries and other 
developed countries.   
Chapter 5 discusses the different methods for gathering data in researches and their 
advantages and disadvantages. It also presents the research method used to collect the 
data, which is a questionnaire survey, and the rationale for choosing it. Moreover, it 
introduces the design of the questionnaire and the research hypotheses, and defines the 
user groups who participated in the survey. The part concerning the first empirical study 
ends with a discussion of the statistical techniques employed in the analysis of 
questionnaire data. The chapter then introduces and describes the methodology 
employed in the second part of this study to achieve its objectives regarding ‗assessing 
the voluntary disclosure and determining the variables contributing to the explanation of 
the variations in the voluntary disclosure‘. This includes the necessary steps employed 
in the construction of the data collection instrument, namely a ‗voluntary disclosure 
checklist‘. The chapter identifies the research hypotheses and addresses the motivations 
for each, as well as the definitions and measurements of the independent variables. A 
discussion of the statistical approaches employed to conduct the empirical work related 
to the second empirical study closes the chapter.    
Chapter 6 reports the results and analysis of the questionnaire survey and draws a 
comparison with other previous studies conducted in this research area.  
Chapter 7 evaluates the extent of the voluntary disclosure made in the corporate annual 
reports. It deals with the analysis of voluntary disclosure at three levels: firstly, at 
overall level of disclosure, then at item-by-item level of disclosure, and finally at group-
of-information level of disclosure. In addition, it examines the associations between the 
overall voluntary disclosure index and several explanatory variables as well as 
associations between categories of disclosure information and the explanatory variables. 
The chapter tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter 5. 
The final chapter presents a summary of the main conclusions of the study. It suggests a 
number of realistic recommendations for regulatory bodies and parties interested in the 
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status of corporate annual reporting of listed companies and disclosure practices. In 
addition, it presents the limitations of the study and suggests future research.             
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Theory is considered the framework of accounting research. Remarkably, the empirical 
accounting literature employs different theories as a guide to understanding companies‘ 
disclosure practices. Although many studies in this field have been conducted in both 
developed and developing countries to assess the level of disclosure and to identify the 
determinants of disclosure practices, as yet there is no comprehensive or common 
theory of disclosure, but merely a suggestion that more work needs to be done on this 
issue (e.g. Hopwood, 2000; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001).  
This chapter aims to provide a review of those main theories which attempt to explore 
and explain the incentives that motivate companies to voluntarily release more 
information. These theories are: agency theory, signalling theory, political economic 
theory, legitimacy theory, and stakeholder theory. Following a definition of disclosure 
and its motivations, subsequent sections attempt to explain companies‘ disclosure 
behaviour within the perspective of each theory and to provide an overview of each 
theory. This assists the formation of the research expectation and hypotheses. Finally, a 
summary and conclusion are presented.  
 
2.2 CONCEPTS OF COMPANY DISCLOSURE 
The concept of company information disclosure has received wide attention over 
several decades from researchers interested in financial reporting and disclosure issues. 
There are many views on the importance of disclosure. Some researchers stress its 
importance for investors, some emphasise its role in helping users to predict the ability 
of an economic entity to create profits in the long term, while others see it as a way of 
helping to make an accurate judgement of a company‘s ability to pay its liabilities 
(Hendriksen and Van Breda, 1982). 
According to Choi (1973), financial reporting disclosure is the process of announcing 
economic information, quantitative or otherwise, by an enterprise, which helps investors 
to make investment decisions. Overall, the author concentrates on the link between the 
degree of disclosure and the level of user uncertainty about the information disclosed, 
on the one hand, and the outcomes of future economic events, on the other. However, 
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this definition focuses on specific groups of annual report users, such as shareholders 
and creditors, and ignores the other possible stakeholders who are also interested in 
company disclosure. For instance, a company‘s reported profits may be affected by the 
management‘s choice of whether to purchase or lease an asset; employees and labour 
unions would find this information useful in wage negotiations.   
Wallace (1987:133) defines disclosure as “the publication by a profit-seeking enterprise 
of any information relating to its activities with the hope of influencing the judgments 
and decisions of the users of such information”. This definition is more comprehensive 
than Choi‘s since it includes more groups of people who are interested in information 
about a company‘s operations. Gibbins et al. (1992:5) characterise disclosure as “the 
release outside the organization of information concerning the economic performance, 
position or prospects of the organization, particularly as measured in financial terms”. 
On the other hand, the process of determining what information is to be disclosed by 
companies in their annual reports depends on many factors. One of these which should 
be considered by preparers of these reports is the usefulness to users of information for 
making their decisions. In this regard, Kieso and Weygandt (2010:46) define the full 
disclosure principle thus:  
“It recognises that the natural and amount of information included in financial reports 
reflects a series of judgments trade-offs. These trade-offs strive for (1) sufficient details to 
disclose matters that make a difference to users, yet (2) sufficient condensation to make the 
information understandable, keeping in mind costs of preparing and using it. Information 
about financial position, income, cash flows, and investments can be found in one of three 
places: (1) within the main body of financial statements, (2) in the notes to those 
statements, or (3) as supplementary information”.     
 
Thus, there is no generally accepted definition of the concept of company disclosure. 
The variations could be due to the points of view and judgments of the authors in their 
own studies.  
To sum up, determining the goals of the financial report could improve its effectiveness 
as an instrument for communicating information to its ‗users‘. It is evident that the 
degree of credibility and usefulness for decision making of the information released in a 
company‘s reports about its financial position and performance depends on the 
qualitative characteristics of the accounting information, such as relevance, reliability, 
comparability, understandability, and consistency. In this respect, proper disclosure 
means that financial reports should include a full set of financial statements and all the 
information necessary to fairly represent the financial position of the business entity, its 
17 
 
results, and its cash flows. On the other hand, the preparers of financial reports should 
not include the kind of unnecessary detailed information that can lead to difficulty in 
understanding or to misleading conclusions among users, and which, in any case, 
increases the cost of production. 
 
2.3 MOTIVATIONS AND THEORIES OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 
Many disclosure studies conducted in different parts of the world have employed a 
number of theories (e.g. agency, signalling, stakeholder theories) to help identify and 
explain the incentives that lead companies to disclose information voluntarily. This 
study identifies five theories which attempt to explore the motivations for companies to 
disclose more information than is required by law. These theories must be seen in the 
context of a capital market where information disclosure can play a crucial role in 
helping companies to achieve their goals. For instance, disclosure can be used by a high 
quality company to distinguish itself from lower quality companies or its competitors in 
the capital market, or to obtain additional funds to finance expansion or special projects. 
Consequently, voluntary disclosure can be viewed as a communication device, 
sometimes called ―signalling‖. It can also be seen as a way to reduce motivational 
problems that can result from the different interests of a firm‘s managers and owners. 
From a company‘s point of view, the voluntary disclosure of information can improve 
its reputation with investors in the capital market (Gray and Roberts, 1989) and thus 
increase its value.   
Recently, there has been an improvement in the voluntary disclosure of environmental 
and social issues provided in a CAR. This may partially be attributed to the emergence 
of interest and pressure groups, such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace, whose 
role is to draw attention to the incongruity between organizational actions and the 
values of society (Arnold and Hammond, 1994). Cultural factors, as well as the 
powerful role of ―green political‖ groups, could also help to explain this improvement in 
some countries. It has been argued that the increase in public and political statements 
being made by organizations on environmental and social accounting issues is directly 
related to more intensive social and political pressures being applied by interest groups 
(Millstone and Watts, 1992; Neu et al., 1998; Darrell and Schwartz, 1997; Williams, 
1999). 
Therefore, to improve the quality and quantity of voluntary information included in a 
CAR, it is important not only to focus on assessing the extent of voluntary disclosure 
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and its trend over the financial years, but also to investigate the factors which affect it. 
Hence, there are five main theories that have been employed in literature to explain the 
incentives behind the voluntary disclosure of information by companies; these are 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.3.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory has been employed not only in accounting studies but also in economics, 
finance, marketing; political science, organizational behaviour, and sociology research 
(for example see Eisenhardt, 1989). It is also considered one of the most essential 
theoretical approaches to have been employed in accounting literature during the last 20 
years (Lambert, 2001). It attempts to explain the problems that may appear as a result of 
the separation between the interests of the owners (the principal) and those of the 
management (the agent). Jensen and Meckling (1976:308) define the agency 
relationship as: 
“...a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent”.   
 
Shapiro (2005:266) states that: 
“Agency relationships are contracts, and the incentives, monitoring devices, bonding, and 
other forms of social control undertaken to minimize agency costs constitute the elements 
of the contract”. 
 
Thus, the agency relationship arises because, although the owners or principal of a 
company, often numerous shareholders, supply its capital, they are unable to run its day-
to-day operations and need to employ managers as their agents to do this work. In other 
words, these two parties are in a contract relationship that involves the shareholders 
delegating some decisions and thus places authority in the hands of the managers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Obviously, in return, the shareholders need financial and non-financial information to 
assess the company‘s performance and the value of their own stake in it. The possible 
difference of interests between the two parties in this relationship could create the 
problem of information asymmetry if the managers provide financial information in a 
way that serves their own interests and not those of the shareholders. As Shapiro 
(2005:271) says: 
“The goals of principals and agents may conflict and, because of asymmetries of 
information, principals cannot be sure that agents are carrying out their will”. 
 
19 
 
Consequently, there is an assumption in the agency theory that owners and managers 
exhibit ―opportunistic behaviour‖ to maximize their own wealth. As a result, two kinds 
of conflict arise: firstly, between shareholders and managers, and secondly, among 
managers, shareholders and bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts, 1977). 
These conflicts create ‗agency costs‘, which are categorised into three groups as 
follows:  
1. the monitoring expenditures by the principal to control the agent‘s behaviour; 
2. the bonding expenditures by the agent to ensure that s/he will not take actions to 
harm the principal‘s interest; and 
3. the residual loss which embodies or defines divergence in actions taken by the 
agent and the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts, 1977). 
 
Regarding the factors that create agency costs, Shapiro (2005:281) states that: 
“…Agency costs arise from many sources: the costs of recruitment, adverse selection, 
specifying and discerning preferences, providing incentives, moral hazard, shirking, 
stealing, self-dealing, corruption, monitoring and policing…” 
 
Thus, the principal could set up control mechanisms to evaluate and monitor the agent‘s 
behaviour and the company‘s performance and to align managers‘ benefits with the 
interests of the principal, but such activities would incur agency costs (Shapiro, 2005). 
However, the principal has a great incentive to reduce these costs (Morris, 1987). In 
some cases, where multiple principals and multiple agents exist, this could have the 
negative effect of increasing the information asymmetries and the difficulties of 
monitoring. On the other hand, multiple parties could help to align the imbalance of 
information when information is leaked to selected principals by agents to dominate 
other agents (Waterman and Meier, 1998).   
 
2.3.1.1 Empirical Tests of Agency Theory 
A wide set of accounting literature has used agency theory to explain disclosure 
practices theoretically. Therefore, many hypotheses have been tested and developed 
such as company size, ownership diffusion and financial leverage. Empirical evidence 
in this area suggests that there is the probability of conflicts of interest between owners 
and managers and that this conflict may be greater in companies with a widespread 
ownership structure. Consequently, such companies need to reveal more information to 
the public to achieve the two goals of reducing the agency costs and reducing the 
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information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, the greater the size of the 
company, the greater the agency costs and information asymmetry are likely to be. 
Certainly, agency theory suggests that there is a positive association between disclosure 
and a set of explanatory variables that includes company size and leverage.     
To assess the influence of agency theory, several company characteristics were 
empirically tested in many disclosure studies in different countries, and these 
characteristics were found to influence the level of disclosure. Large companies, with 
highly diffused ownership, seem to have more potential for conflicts between different 
elements, such as owners or shareholders (compensation contracts), creditors (debt 
contracts), and agents, and, to solve these conflicts and reduce agency costs and 
information asymmetries, companies work to disclose more information. DeAngelo 
(1981) suggests that the larger audit firms may employ the information disclosed by 
their clients as signalling to prove the quality of their audit services. In addition, 
selecting the larger audit firms may enable clients to send signals to the market that their 
annual reports are audited by highly professional firms, which may enhance their 
reputation. Since companies audited by the Big 4 audit firms are usually larger and face 
more agency costs, they tend to disclose more information than other companies. 
Agency costs connected to equity arise in two cases: firstly, when shareholders believe 
that managers are not pursuing the shareholders‘ interest, particularly in not choosing 
profitable projects, and so the company‘s share price and value declines; secondly, 
when extra costs of monitoring and bonding managers are incurred to ensure that they 
do pursue the shareholders‘ interest (Morris, 1987).  
In order to obtain some economic benefits, as a motivation, companies voluntarily 
reveal information to the market (Lambert, 2001). However, in some cases, managers as 
agents have significant motives to withhold adverse information from the public or to 
artificially boost the company‘s reported results to maximize their own short-term 
interests (Vlachos, 2001; Ghazali, 2004). Conversely, managers could have strong 
incentives to release more information to distinguish themselves from more poorly 
managed companies (Demski, 1974). Therefore disclosure plays an important role as a 
mechanism to control managers‘ performance (Oliveira et al., 2005). 
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2.3.2 Signalling Theory 
The signalling model theory was developed in economics studies (Akerlof, 1970; 
Spence, 1973, 1976a, 1976b; Riley, 1975) to deal with imperfect knowledge among 
potential buyers about the quality of products or services and the influence of this on 
market performance. In the case of information asymmetry, signalling theory proposes 
that companies with superior company performance employ information specifically 
related to their financial positions to give a signal to the market (Spence, 1973; Ross, 
1977). Information asymmetry links with two perspectives (Spence, 1976b). The first 
relates to cases where high quality sellers withdraw their products from a market 
because they cannot distinguish them from lower quality products, and thus their 
products have to be priced at a lower level. The second perspective relates to efforts by 
sellers to notify the market about the quality of their products to change the initial 
asymmetric information structure of the market. These sellers are motivated to employ 
more resources and effort to notify buyers about the superiority of their products. In 
other words, company managers could have great incentives to voluntarily divulge 
private information in order to provide a signal about the high quality of their company 
performance and their products, thus helping to reduce the problem of asymmetric 
information.     
Referring to this communication process as ―signalling‖, Spence (1973) employs this 
theory to clarify the behaviour of labour markets and the role of voluntary disclosure. 
He gives a famous example of how signalling theory is employed in the labour market 
when the productivity of persons applying for jobs is unknown by the employer. In 
some cases, after employing an individual, the employer gains improved knowledge 
about his or her productive abilities, and this may help to revise the employer‘s 
expectations. The author argues that employers tend to utilise education as a signal of 
potential productivity and base their pay structure on this. Hence, workers sometimes 
attempt to obtain a higher level of education as a signal to potential employers that they 
should be paid more. In short, employers‘ signals about pay lead individuals to obtain a 
higher level of education.       
Signalling theory deals with problems that could occur as a result of the existence of 
information asymmetry in the market. In other words, signalling is considered a reaction 
to the information asymmetry which arises because companies have information that 
their stakeholder groups, such as investors, do not have. These asymmetries can be 
reduced when the party that holds the information signals it to the other interested 
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parties. A number of studies have employed this approach to illustrate the disclosure 
policies and practices followed by companies, as represented by their managers. 
 
2.3.2.1 Empirical Tests of Signalling Theory 
Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) developed a signalling approach to examine a set of 
companies seeking to attract external capital to finance their research and development 
activities. Signalling the necessary technological information to the capital markets 
inevitably also discloses it to their competitors, who might benefit from it. 
Consequently, such companies face a trade-off between raising finance at better terms 
and reducing the value of their information advantage.  
Several empirical studies explore managers‘ motivations to exercise discretion in the 
disclosure of information (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983, 1990). Verrecchia (1983) reveals that 
managers‘ decisions to release or withhold such signals depend upon the impact that the 
release of the information is likely to have on the price of the asset. He concludes that 
there is a threshold level for disclosure: managers are motivated to withhold information 
if reported performance is below traders‘ expectations, and to release information if 
results are better than expected. So, managers exercise discretion by choosing the 
threshold, and the level of disclosure depends on its impact on the proprietary cost. 
Managers decide to withhold certain information when the cost of disclosure is higher 
than that of withholding it. 
In another study, Verrecchia (1990) examines how the quality of information influences 
the threshold level of disclosure. He concludes that there is a negative association 
between information quality and the threshold level of disclosure. Thus, the higher the 
quality of the information, the lower the threshold level of disclosure is likely to be and 
the greater the probability of disclosure.   
This result explains the association between the level of disclosure and proprietary cost. 
Managers do not exercise discretion in the disclosure of voluntary information when a 
proprietary cost does not exist. Moreover, companies in less competitive industries 
might not incur any costs in disclosing information to the public.    
Farrell and Gibbons (1989) argue that a company‘s communication can be influenced 
by the presence of two kinds of audiences: the capital market and a rival company. 
When a company‘s priority is its relationship with the stock market rather than potential 
new entrants to its market, it communicates truthfully even if a rival company gets some 
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benefits from such a disclosure. On the contrary, when a company focuses its attention 
on preventing potential rivals entering its market, it adopts ―cheap talk‖, and credible 
communications and disclosures are impossible.      
Newman and Sansing (1993), similarly, investigate the use of signalling and disclosure 
policies and decisions with three different parties: the incumbent (existing market 
player), the stockholders, and a new entrant (potential competitor). Based on the 
hypothesis that the existing market player works to maximize the wealth of its 
shareholders, the authors argue that disclosure works as a good instrument to help 
stakeholders to make informed decisions regarding investments. However, if the 
company‘s main purpose is to deter market entry, then disclosures are likely to be 
inexact or noisy. They suggest that if this analysis is expanded to involve more kinds of 
users, such as government or lobby groups, then a company‘s communication problems 
are even more complicated. 
Watson et al. (2002) investigated whether the voluntary disclosure of ratios in CARs 
could be explained by agency theory. The same study also tested the ability of 
signalling theory to explain the same phenomena. Drawing on both agency and 
signalling theories, they conclude that there is limited evidence to support the view that 
either signalling theory or agency theory perspectives can explain the voluntary 
disclosure of ratios. It could be that disclosure decisions are based on personal 
considerations and so can never be fully explained by company characteristics.   
As discussed above, voluntary disclosures can be used by managers of a higher quality 
company to differentiate it from average or lower quality companies. However, of 
crucial importance here is that if managers want to signal quality successfully, the 
signals must be reliable. Reliability is achieved if the signal quality is subsequently 
confirmed; the opposite is true if managers send misleading signals and, when this is 
discovered, subsequent disclosures will be perceived as unreliable (Watson et al., 2002).  
A brief look at signalling theory may conclude that it does not explain disclosure of 
ratios because this information is generally available in other sources; hence, it can be 
deemed ―old information‖ and as not providing extra information. On the contrary, the 
disclosure of ratios could indicate best disclosure practice by the company compared to 
rival companies, and such disclosure should be considered as a good signal about the 
quality of CAR. Specifically, signalling theory supports the disclosure of particular 
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types of ratio, such as those related to investment, profitability and efficiency, all of 
which shed some light on a company‘s performance (Watson et al., 2002).     
 
2.3.3. Political Economy Theory 
One theory widely employed in accounting literature, specifically in studies on 
disclosure, is the political economy theory, which is defined as an attempt to understand 
and assess accounting functions within the economic, political, and social structures of 
the society in which they operate (Cooper and Sherer, 1984). Gray et al. (1996:47) 
describe it as “the social, political, and economic framework within which human life 
takes place”.   
Political economy theory can be categorised into two broad branches: the classical and 
the bourgeois. Classical political economic theory concentrates on the sectional interests 
and structural conflicts in society. As Deegan and Unerman (2006:270) state:  
“Classical political economic theory tends to perceive accounting reports and 
disclosures as a means of maintaining the favoured position (for example the wealth and 
power) of those who control scarce resources (capital), and as a means of undermining 
the position of those without scarce capital”.  
 
Therefore, according to this approach, accounting studies should consider conflict and 
power within society; moreover, they should concentrate on the impacts of financial 
reports on the distribution of income and dimensions of wealth and power in society 
(Cooper and Sherer, 1984). On the other hand, Cooke and Wallace (1990) argue that the 
financial reports published in any country are influenced by the surrounding 
environment.  
The second branch emphasises the interaction of parties within a pluralistic world (Gray 
et al., 1996). Within this perspective, there are a number of stakeholder groups in 
society who have the power to influence different decisions by companies and 
government. In this regard, Lowe and Tinker (1977) argued that power is widely 
diffused and that society is composed of individuals who all make their own social 
choices, but no individual is able to consistently influence the society or the accounting 
functions performed therein.  
Based on the bourgeois political economy theory, Williams (1999) argues that 
companies voluntarily disclose environmental and social information about their 
operations to protect their interests from the pressures of the social, political, and 
economic systems in which they operate. These disclosures also focus on the needs of 
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the community and the expectations of government bodies. Consequently, he concludes 
that the significant variation in the level and type of voluntary environmental and social 
disclosures in different countries is a result of their different social-political and 
economic systems. Guthrie and Parker (1990:171-172) had previously come to the same 
conclusion, stating that environmental and social accounting disclosures:  
“...appeared to reflect public social priorities, respond to government pressure, 
accommodate environmental pressures and sectional interests and protect corporate 
prerogatives and projected corporate images”. 
 
While institutional theory can be applicable within either the classical or the bourgeois 
theoretical frameworks, it is noteworthy that both the legitimacy and stakeholder 
theories stem from the bourgeois concepts of political economy, which, according to 
Gray et al. (1996), is because it is wider and deeper than the classical theory.  
Bourgeois political economy theory can be divided into three theories: namely, 
legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, and institutional theory. Based on these theories, 
disclosure policies can be considered as a strategy by companies to help to manage their 
relationships with other entities, such as government, professional bodies, the public, 
and other institutions. In recent studies, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are 
employed as essential instruments to explain why companies voluntarily disclose such 
items as social and environmental information in their annual reports.   
From the perspective of political economy theory, there is a link between social, 
political, and economic factors. Economic issues cannot be investigated fully without 
consideration of the social and political environments in which companies operate. 
Political economy theory does not focus on agent and principal only; other groups 
within society also have a legitimate interest in a company‘s activities. Most of the rest 
of this chapter discusses the perspectives of legitimacy and stakeholder theories.  
 
2.3.3.1 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory is considered the same as systems theory, which studies the 
relationships between systems in general. It presumes that organisations are influenced 
by the society in which they operate and that a company‘s disclosure practices and 
policies should reflect the perceptions of external groups that affect and are affected by 
the company. The link between legitimacy theory and political economic theory is the 
hypothesis that society, politics, and economics cannot be separated from each other. 
Moreover, investigating and explaining economic issues must involve considerations of 
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the political, social, and institutional frameworks of the country being studied. The logic 
behind this theory is that an organisation should operate with respect for the morals, 
bounds, and norms of the society in which it operates; organisations have an obligation 
to the wider society based upon a ―social contract‖. As Schotter put it:  
“Political and economic processes cannot be separated in this context. The New 
Institutional Economics is therefore closely related to the new political economics 
(public choice and constitutional economics) and political science proper”. 
 
From the perspective of legitimacy theory, the existence and survival of an organisation 
as a ―going concern‖ would be threatened if the society perceived that it was breaching 
its social contract (Milne and Patten, 2002; Guthrie et al., 2004).  
Moreover, based on the legitimacy theory perspective, the phenomenon of information 
disclosure is considered an effective mechanism for companies to ensure their operation 
and activities appear to match the norms and value systems of their respective societies, 
thus presenting a vision of their social responsibility in order to obtain social legitimacy 
(Patten, 2002). Therefore, society would not allow an organisation to continue its 
operations if it did not meet the expectations and values of society. As Lindblom 
(1994:2) states, legitimacy is 
“...a condition or status, which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with 
the value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part.  When a 
disparity, actual or potential, exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to 
the entity’s legitimacy”. 
 
Deegan and Unerman (2006) express a similar point of view in arguing that, in a 
society that values a clean environment, companies with a poor social and 
environmental performance could face difficulties in financing their operations or in 
obtaining the resources necessary to secure their existence. Hence, legitimacy theory 
directly depends on social concepts, and, as morals and norms change over time, 
organisations must adapt accordingly. Furthermore, it assumes that successful 
managers are those who react rapidly to changes in society‘s interests and priorities. 
The continued existence of an organisation could be conditional upon the public‘s 
view of its actions and whether or not they fall within the societal values and 
expectations (Rizk, 2006). As a result, this perspective explains how organisations 
work to guarantee their existence by complying with legal and societal frames (Patten, 
1991; Mathews, 1993; Reich, 1998; Deegan, 2002). In other words, the perspective of 
legitimacy theory is that the public keeps an eye on organisations‘ activities. Guthrie 
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and Parker (1990:166) encapsulate the essence of legitimacy, as viewed through the 
political economy perspective, in saying that it  
“...perceives accounting reports as social, political, and economic documents. They 
serve as a tool for constructing, sustaining, and legitimizing economic and political 
arrangements, institutions, and ideological themes, which contribute to the 
corporation’s private interests. Disclosures have the capacity to transmit social, 
political, and economic meanings for a pluralistic set of report recipients”.  
 
In essence, legitimacy is considered a vital resource which organisations need to 
survive. When a company‘s managers consider legitimacy, and hence survival, to be in 
danger, they follow strategies to effect the provision of information to ensure survival 
(Deegan, 2002). These strategies are likely to include targeted disclosure to groups 
considered powerful in conferring legitimacy (Fiedler and Deegan, 2002).   
 
2.3.3.1.1 Empirical Tests of Legitimacy Theory 
A number of accounting researchers have invoked legitimacy theory to explain 
voluntary social accounting disclosure practices and attitudes in different countries (e.g. 
Patten, 1991; Mathews, 1993; Reich, 1998), while others have looked at environmental 
and social information provision in different countries (see for example Gray et al., 
1995a, 1995b; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Patten, 2002). Since the main perspective of 
legitimacy theory concerns the link between society‘s demands and organisational 
activities, there are many studies investigating the level and types of social and 
environmental information appearing in CARs. Brown and Deegan (1998) argue that 
management employs the annual report as an effective tool to legitimise the ongoing 
actions of the organisation. Many other disclosure studies provide evidence that 
disclosure patterns reflect the legitimacy approach (e.g. Patten, 1992; Deegan and 
Gordon, 1996; Deegan et al., 2002; O‘Donovan, 2002; Milne and Patten, 2002). 
However, despite the widespread use of legitimacy theory to explain the variation in 
social and environmental disclosures, a number of studies conclude that it is not an 
adequate primary explanation of social reporting practices (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
O‘Dwyer, 2002; Deegan, 2002), and they recommend further research on company 
social disclosure.  
Hogner (1982) investigates social disclosures in US steel company annual reports over a 
period of 80 years and whether they are derived from a company‘s need to legitimise its 
activities and operations. He concludes that the extent of social information disclosure 
variations over the years could be explained by the community‘s changing expectations 
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of company behaviour. Thus, this study provides empirical evidence supporting 
legitimacy theory for social responsibility information reporting. Further evidence is 
provided by Patten (1992) and Patten and Nance (1998), who examine the impacts of 
the 1989 Alaska Exxon Valdez oil spill on the other petroleum companies regarding 
environmental responsibility information in their annual reports. They reveal a 
significant change in the level and amount of environmental disclosure in the annual 
reports of companies across the petroleum industry after the Alaska disaster. Again, the 
results of these studies support legitimacy theory.  
In the context of corporate environmental responsibility, Deegan and Rankin (1996) 
assess the environmental disclosure practices in annual reports of Australian companies 
that have bad news to report in subsequent years and whether the information disclosed 
relates to their environmental misdemeanours. They argue that, in the absence of 
disclosure regulations and requirements related to environmental issues, companies 
either only disclosed environmental information favourable to their company image or 
chose to disclose environmental information in a ―self-laudatory manner‖. They 
conclude that there is a positive association between companies prosecuted by the 
Australian state for environmental lapses and the increasing level of environmental 
disclosures in their annual reports. In fact, the prosecuted companies disclose more 
environmental information in the year of prosecution than in other years, and this result 
is consistent with legitimacy theory‘s perspective on motivations. Only two of the 
prosecuted companies in the sample provided information related to their environmental 
offences in their annual reports.  
 It has been argued that companies may adopt four strategies to legitimise their 
operations. 
Firstly, they can inform and educate the relevant interested parties about actual changes 
in the firm‘s activities. Secondly, they can attempt to change the perceptions of the 
relevant parties while not changing the organisation‘s actual behaviour. Thirdly, they 
can try to manipulate perception by deflecting attention from the real issue of concern to 
other issues, such as how the company complies with the expectations and values of the 
community in other dimensions of its operations. Lastly, they can attempt to change the 
external expectations of the company‘s activities by arguing that particular societal 
expectations are not reasonable (Lindblom, 1994). In this sense, Watson et al. (2002) 
state that the first and third of Lindblom‘s strategies could be relevant to the disclosure 
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of accounting ratios in two ways. Firstly, the disclosure of ratios could be beneficial in 
helping to educate and inform report users about the changes in the company‘s 
performance, and, secondly, such disclosure might help to deflect attention away from 
information that is unfavourable to the company. 
It is noteworthy that disclosure may play a vital role in Lindblom‘s strategies, but, in 
addition to companies voluntarily disclosing information which could have a positive 
impact on stakeholders and society and thus legitimise company performance and 
activities, managers may have another incentive: to legitimise their own positions and 
reputations. 
There are, in fact, many possible incentives which may affect managers‘ decisions 
concerning the voluntary disclosure of information on corporate environmental policies 
and social responsibilities, but legitimacy of the organisation‘s operations is considered 
a major one. Moreover, the major factor behind legitimising a company‘s activities is to 
align them with society‘s value systems and expectations. Deegan and Unerman (2006) 
declare that there are four other incentives, found in previous studies: namely, to 
confirm compliance with laws and regulations; to attract capital resources; to show a 
company‘s conviction in its accountability or responsibility to report; and to manage or 
improve communication with particular stakeholder groups. 
 According to Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) and Lindblom (1994), the information which 
is publicly disclosed by organizations in their annual reports could be a result of their 
implementing all of the above strategies. For instance, organisations may provide 
information to counteract parallel negative news which is available to the public. On the 
other hand, their main aim might be to provide interested parties with information of 
which they have little knowledge or which was formerly unknown. They may also 
attempt to draw attention to strengths, such as environmental awards won or safety 
initiatives taken, as well as ignoring or understating negative news about pollution or 
workplace accidents. Such strategies could help organisations to manage and control 
news about the direct and indirect societal impacts of their activities or help them to 
avoid or mitigate penalties. All the above conclusions are consistent with Hurst (1970), 
who argues that one of the most important functions of accounting, and accounting 
reports, is to legitimatise the position and actions of entities to guarantee their existence 
by enhancing public confidence in them.  
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It is noteworthy that the value system of the society in which the company exists has 
two side effects: firstly on how a company practises its activities, and secondly on its 
approach to disclosing information related to its performance. Values can, however, be 
society-specific, and Adams et al. (1998:2) cite Douglas & Wildavsky (1982), Muller-
Rommel (1989) and McCormick (1991) in saying that “Cultural factors may also help 
to explain differences in environmental concerns, the strength of green politics and 
demands for corporations to act in socially responsible ways”.  
Rizk (2006) shows some conservatism in her opinion concerning the applicability of 
legitimacy theory in investigating the level of social disclosure by companies in 
developing countries, which tends to be low. This discussion indicates that the 
perspective of legitimacy alone appears to be insufficient to explain the motivations for 
voluntary disclosure of items such as corporate social and environmental information. 
 
2.3.3.2 Stakeholder Theory 
Freeman (1984:46) defines stakeholders as “any group or individual who is affected by 
or can affect the achievement of an organisation’s objectives”. While focusing on the 
ability of stakeholder groups to influence the company‘s direction and decisions, 
Freeman‘s definition also indicates that stakeholder theory is a more comprehensive 
approach than agency theory in terms of company relationships, since it concentrates not 
just on the association between managers and shareholders but also on the company‘s 
relationship with all its stakeholder groups, including shareholders, employees, creditors, 
the community in which it operates, and governmental bodies. Freeman (1984) classifies 
customers, suppliers and special interest groups as stakeholders, while Crowther and 
Jatana (2005) define stakeholders as all individuals who have the right to benefit from 
the business, based on their involvement.  
 
Freeman (1983) suggests that a stakeholder approach requires a company to manage its 
social responsibilities as well as its planning and business policy. Thus, stakeholder 
theory includes moral and managerial branches. The moral perspective requires an 
organisation to deal fairly with all stakeholders and not to violate their rights. Also, the 
actual power of each stakeholder is not the only consideration; all stakeholders have an 
essential right to receive information about the company and especially about how its 
operations and results affect them. From the managerial perspective of stakeholder 
theory, it is part of the manager‘s job to provide accurate information about the financial 
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and social activities of the organisation and to manage relationships with the 
stakeholders in order to gain their support and endorsement, and to mitigate opposition.  
Another classification of stakeholders categorises them as primary and secondary 
stakeholders. Primary stakeholders are defined as those who are necessary to the 
continuation of the corporation as a going concern, such as employees, shareholders, 
investors, suppliers, customers, together with what is defined as the public stakeholder 
group. The latter is made up, according to Clarkson (1995), of the government bodies 
and communities that provide infrastructures and markets, whose laws and regulations 
must be obeyed, and to whom taxes and other obligations may be due.  
There is a high level of interdependence between the corporation and its primary 
stakeholders. If any primary stakeholder group, such as customers or suppliers, becomes 
dissatisfied and withdraws from the corporate relationship, in whole or in part, the 
corporation will be seriously damaged or unable to continue as a going concern. From 
this perspective, the corporation can be defined as a complex set of relationships 
between and among interest groups with different rights, objectives, expectations, and 
responsibilities. The corporation‘s survival and continuing success depend upon its 
ability, represented by its managers, to create sufficient wealth, value or satisfaction for 
those who belong to each stakeholder group, so that each group continues as a part of 
the corporation‘s stakeholder system (Clarkson, 1995). 
Secondary stakeholders are defined as those who have an effect on the firm, and who 
may be affected by it, but who are not involved in the firm‘s transactions and are not 
vital for its survival. Under this definition, the media and various groups who have a 
special interest in organisations, such as lobbyists, are secondary stakeholders. Though a 
company does not depend on secondary stakeholders‘ support for its continuance and 
survival, it could still be damaged by them, so managers cannot ignore such forces.        
Within the managerial perspective of stakeholder theory, managers are likely to focus 
on the expectations of the most powerful stakeholder groups, but they must evaluate the 
importance of meeting the demands of all stakeholders and ―influence groups‖ to 
achieve the strategic objectives of the company (Freeman, 1984). An important part of 
managing relationships with all stakeholders is ―public reporting‖. Moreover, 
organisations have the incentive to disclose information regarding their programmes and 
plans to the respective stakeholder groups to show that they meet with those groups‘ 
expectations and views. Watson et al. (2002) suggest that voluntary disclosure, in 
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particular, can be used as an instrument by managers to gain the support of stakeholders 
and enhance their level of confidence in the company. However, different stakeholders 
have different needs and priorities, and organisations must consider balancing their 
different expectations (Wolfe and Putler, 2002). In this regard, Rowley (1997:906-907) 
states that: “Firms do not respond to each stakeholder individually but instead must 
answer the simultaneous demands of multiple stakeholders”. 
Mitchell et al. (1999) also point out that organisations, in deciding on their reporting 
policies, should take other factors into account, such as information costs, degree of 
competition in the market in which they operate and the power of stakeholders to 
influence the disclosure practices. Further, Unerman and Bennett (2004) argue that 
stakeholder expectations could change over time; hence organisations may need to 
adapt their operating and reporting practices to these circumstances. 
Stakeholder theory provides important and valuable insights into company 
environmental and social reporting including, for instance, issues relating to 
occupational health and safety, recruitment policies and procedures related to fairness 
and discrimination, and participation in government national and social campaigns. 
From a society point of view, the significance of these issues is indicated by relevant 
legislation and regulations but, in a company‘s view, their importance lies in 
relationships with stakeholder groups, such as employees and governmental bodies. In a 
similar vein, social issues regarding product quality and safety, or creditability and truth 
in advertising, may be subject to legislation and regulation, but, from a company‘s 
perspective, they are mainly stakeholder issues in that they relate to obligations and 
responsibilities towards customers and governmental bodies.  
The ultimate question is: ―Are organisations and their managers accountable to all 
parties in society?‖ This suggests the necessity of thinking about developing a 
systematic approach to determining what should and what should not be considered 
social and environmental issues for a company. Moreover, there are various stakeholder 
groups in the society in which a company operates, and the information needs of each 
group is likely to be different, and it is not always easy for a company to assess what 
information each group requires. At the same time, stakeholder groups have power 
differentials, and, thus, they could have different effects on the company. Therefore, a 
wise company might adopt a strategy of disclosing all the information that it can 
33 
 
reasonably be expected to divulge, even if some of it is of no particular interest to every 
stakeholder. In this regard, Gray et al. (1996:45) state that: 
“Here, the stakeholders are identified by the organisation of concern, by reference to the 
extent to which the organisation believes the interplay with each group needs to be 
managed in order to further the interests of the organisation. The interests of the 
organisation need not be restricted to the conventional profit-seeking assumption. The 
more important the stakeholder to the organisation, the more effort will be exerted in 
managing the relationship. Information is a major element that can be employed by the 
organisation to manage or manipulate the stakeholder in order to gain their support and 
approval, or to distract their opposition and disapproval”.  
 
Stakeholder theory can be seen as recognising that various groups have legitimate rights 
in relation to the company (Freeman, 1984; Pearce, 1982). There is an exchange 
relationship between the company and its stakeholder groups. Every stakeholder group 
can be viewed as providing essential resources for the company (March and Simon, 
1958), but each wants something in return. For example, stockholders supply the 
company with capital, but they expect the company to work to maximize their 
investment (Hill and Jones, 1992). Moreover, regardless of its size and power, every 
stakeholder group has an implicit and/or explicit contractual relationship with the 
company (Hill and Jones, 1992). The authors construct and develop a paradigm of both 
the agency and stakeholder theories that they named the stakeholder-agency approach. 
They argue that the stakeholder theory can be considered as an extension of the agency 
approach, though it concentrates on the relationship between managers and all 
stakeholders rather than focusing on the relationship between managers and 
shareholders only.  In this context, managers can be seen as the agents of all 
stakeholders.  
Of course, managers have to evaluate the power and importance of the different 
stakeholder groups and to judge what information to disclose to gain their approval and 
support. In fact, managers have the key role as a result of their position in the 
framework of the contractual relationships, and they are also the only stakeholder group 
that is involved in the nexus of contracts with every stakeholder. Moreover, they are the 
only stakeholder to directly control the process of making decisions in the company 
(Hill and Jones, 1992).  
Accordingly, Hill and Jones (1992) argue that: 
“It is incumbent upon managers to make strategic decisions and allocate resources in the 
manner most consistent with the claims of the other stakeholder groups”.  
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From the stakeholder theory point of view, it is necessary for managers to decide on 
disclosure practices based on an evaluation of the relative importance assigned to each 
stakeholder group. This kind of evaluation is difficult, and it is also likely to differ for 
companies of different size and complexity and for different industrial sectors. Hill and 
Jones (1992:133) state that “The magnitude of an individual actor's stake is a function 
of the extent to which that actor's exchange relationship with the firm is supported by 
investments in specific assets”. The authors define these assets as those that “cannot be 
redeployed to alternative use without a loss of value”.  They give the example of 
employees with general-purpose skills and knowledge who, in the company‘s view, 
have a low stake because they can leave the company and be replaced with relative ease. 
In contrast, employees with uniquely tailored skills have a higher stake because their 
loss to the company would cause substantial exit costs to both company and employee. 
This supports the argument about complexity, in that companies in different industrial 
sectors are likely to attach different weights not only to each of their stakeholder groups 
but also to different segments within each group. Nevertheless, there are some 
environmental issues, such as pollution, overfishing, and nuclear power, that are 
important priorities nationally and internationally and that all companies must address, 
regardless of their particular activities.    
     
2.3.3.2.1 Empirical Tests of Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory has been used to test the capability of stakeholder groups to affect 
companies‘ disclosure decisions and practices relating to their environmental and social 
responsibilities. Roberts (1992) employs the stakeholder framework presented by 
Ullman (1985) and finds that the association between measures of stakeholder power 
and their related information needs may provide evidence about the levels and types of 
social disclosures provided by companies. 
In a Canadian study, Neu et al. (1998) reveal that specific stakeholder groups could be 
more powerful and effective than others in demanding environmental disclosures in 
CARs and in affecting company disclosure policies. Their results also indicate that 
when companies face a conflict of interests or expectations among stakeholder groups, 
they choose to provide information of a legitimising nature to their core stakeholders, 
since these are important to their survival. They show less care to stakeholder groups 
that they consider less important.         
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The essence of the stakeholder theory is that, while managers should evaluate the 
importance of each group of stakeholders in deciding on their disclosure policies, they 
should attempt to maximise the benefit for all their stakeholders. This helps the 
company to achieve its objectives and to prosper, and, in the long term, shareowners get 
the benefits. However, this theory has some critics.   
As an advocate of agency theory, Sternberg (1997) claims that stakeholder theory is 
incompatible with business since it precludes its main purpose, which is maximising 
long-term owner value. She also points out that balancing benefits among stakeholders 
is an unworkable objective, and she asks what should be considered as a benefit. 
Stakeholder theory, she says, provides no guidance in the selection of the appropriate 
individuals or groups with which managers have to deal. Turning to corporate 
governance issues, Sternberg (1997) argues that, if organisations are held accountable to 
all their stakeholder groups, this encourages company managers to violate their prior 
obligations to owners. Thus, stakeholder theory undermines the basic principles of 
private property. Regarding the application of stakeholder theory in the emerging 
countries, Rizk (2006) suggests that stakeholder theory could be relevant and more 
applicable to developing countries which have transitional economies and highly 
regulated industries.    
To sum up, although stakeholder theory does not provide instructions about what 
information should be disclosed, it is a useful framework to help company management 
consider disclosing information that will help it to continue its operations and to avoid 
criticism and penalties. However, it does not answer the ultimate questions of who are 
the most powerful stakeholders, and what type of information they demand.  
Based on the above discussion, it is evident that no single theory can fully explain the 
variation in voluntary disclosure. However, using the perspective of theories could help 
to explain why companies make disclosures for specific types of information or why 
companies should reveal information regarding particular events. For instance, agency 
theory is applicable when there is separation of ownership from control. In other words, 
companies with broadly held ownership are more likely to release more voluntary 
information than those with less diffused ownership. The demand for financial reporting 
is associated with both the presence of asymmetric information problems and agency 
conflicts between managers and providers of capital (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Therefore, in the current study, agency theory can be employed to explore the effects of 
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government ownership on the disclosure practices. Signalling theory can also be 
employed, since managers of profitable companies are more likely to be motivated to 
disclose information voluntarily as signals of the quality of their management, thereby 
maintaining their positions and their compensations, and increasing their companies‘ 
investors.  
According to legitimacy theory, society, politics and economic factors are associated 
and inseparable from one another. Therefore, to ensure their existence, companies 
should comply with the value system of the society in which they operate. Managers 
could employ voluntary disclosures as an effective instrument to defer or mitigate legal 
action in the form of greater regulation against their companies and also to boost the 
community‘s confidence in their companies. As mentioned earlier, both legitimacy and 
stakeholder theories stem from the perspective of political economic theory; therefore 
they are employed here to explore disclosure behaviour, particularly regarding corporate 
social responsibility and environmental protection. The next section addresses specific 
explanatory variables, derived from the preceding theoretical approaches, to explain 
variations in voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti annual reports. 
 
2.4 APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO 
DISCLOSURE 
As previously stated, a large body of academic studies has employed the above-
mentioned theoretical approaches to explain voluntary disclosure in the CARs. So, this 
section sheds light on some specific company characteristics, which represent examples 
of commonly applied explanatory variables in a number of accounting disclosure 
studies as well as being employed in the current study. The variables stem from these 
approaches to explain variation in the level of voluntary disclosure among companies, 
and help to explore the factors that lead companies to provide more information than 
required by regulations such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) 
and/or national disclosure requirements.  
 
2.4.1. Theoretical Approaches Used to Derive Variables that Explain Disclosure 
Behaviour 
1. Company size. There is a general argument that larger firms tend to have a 
higher amount of outside capital and higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). According to this overview, voluntary corporate disclosure could be 
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employed, such as of accounting information, to reduce information symmetry. 
Thus, a positive association between company size and voluntary disclosure is 
expected.  
2. Financial leverage. This explanatory variable may be illustrated by agency and 
signalling theories. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Smith and Warner (1979) 
state that agency costs are higher where companies have a higher rate of 
financial leverage. This could be explained as a result of the potential size of 
wealth transfers from debt holders to shareholders increasing because of the 
increase in the percentage of assets financed by debt. Thus, it could be 
concluded that companies with higher financial leverage have a stronger 
motivation to make voluntary corporate disclosures to reduce agency costs and 
the problem of information asymmetry. This suggests a positive association is 
predicated between voluntary disclosure and financial leverage.  
3.  Profitability. This is considered an indicator of good management (Cerf, 1961) 
and good company performance, so it implies a promising opportunity of 
investment for investors in the capital market. Agency theory suggests that 
information disclosure is used as an effective mechanism to control managers‘ 
performance, and they are likely to reveal more accounting information to 
maintain their positions and benefits (Oliveira et al., 2005).  Also, consistent 
with signalling theory, managers of highly profitable companies have more 
incentive to boost the voluntary disclosure of detailed information, more 
specifically good news, to prevent undervaluation of their companies‘ share 
prices (Oliveira et al., 2005). Thus, a positive association between profitability 
and voluntary disclosure could be expected. 
4. Type of industry. This independent variable could be explained by two 
theoretical approaches (i.e. political costs and signalling theory). There is 
common agreement that the type of industry, e.g. sensitive industries such as oil 
and gas etc., to which the company belongs, or in which it operates, has a great 
impact on the amount of discretionary information that is disclosed by the 
economic entity (e.g. Patten, 1991, 2002). Thus it can be argued that industries 
face greater concerns and pressure regarding general public visibility to disclose 
more information related to corporate environmental and social responsibilities. 
Therefore disclosure practices are used as a legitimating instrument to reduce or 
avoid public pressures from the negative effect of actual company performance 
regarding environmental issues such as pollution. In this context, the current 
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study employs the legitimacy framework to investigate companies‘ incentives to 
disclose social and environmental information. These companies can belong to 
any industrial sector; an association between type of industry and voluntary 
disclosure is therefore expected. 
 
After discussion the most common theories which are employed in the disclosure 
research to explain the disclosure practices by companies, the following diagram 
presents the theoretical framework used in the present study. As can been seen from 
diagram (2.1), the disclosure theories, which are discussed previously in this chapter, 
can be divided into two divisions. While the first division is concerned with economic 
approach, the second one is referred to political economic approach. The former 
includes two theories which are termed: agency theory and signalling theory, while the 
latter involves two theories also and are termed: legitimacy theory and stakeholder 
theory.  
It is noteworthy to mention to what extent these theories can aid our understanding. For 
example, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that the board‘s composition plays an 
important mechanism in diffusing the agency conflicts within company. Moreover, it 
contributes in promoting board effectiveness through providing the important checks 
and required balance of power on management. Thus, this theoretical framework could 
be helpful to explore the potential association between a comprehensive set of CC and 
CG characteristics and voluntary disclosure phenomenon. In addition, it can be argued 
that companies employ the social and environmental information to legitimise their 
attitudes and their existence in society and to affect the perception of stakeholder 
groups. Therefore, the theoretical frameworks of stakeholder and legitimacy theories, as 
complementary theories, are adopted to explore why companies disclose social and 
environmental responsibility information.   
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Diagram 2.1: The Theoretical Framework 
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2.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
This chapter reviewed five theories, employed by previous studies to explain the 
reasons behind companies‘ voluntary disclosure behaviour. In this regard, Oliveira et al. 
(2005:3) state that “There are many reasons why firms provide information beyond that 
which is mandated by regulation. Some theories try to explain those reasons within a 
coherent theoretical framework”. However, as also previously addressed in this chapter, 
there is no single or common theory that completely explains the phenomenon of 
disclosure (Leventis and Weetman, 2000; Deegan, 2002). In addition, there is a degree 
of overlap in the attributes of a number of the theories, and some researchers use more 
than one theory to provide an explanation for particular managerial actions (Fiedler and 
Deegan, 2002). This view is supported by Gray et al. (1995a:52) who state that: 
“The essential problem in the literature arises from treating each as competing theories 
of reporting behaviour, when stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory are better seen 
as two (overlapping) perspectives on the issue which are set within a framework of 
assumptions about political economy…Therefore the differences are in levels of 
resolution of perception rather than arguments for and against competing theories as 
such”. 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, one of main objectives of the current study is to assess the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of companies listed on the KSE and also to 
discover variations in disclosure among the companies over the financial years. 
Therefore, the current study will employ all the previous theories to limit the 
deficiencies of each and utilise their collective insights into companies‘ motivations for 
releasing voluntary information in general. Also they are relevant to the objectives of 
the current study. In other words, because of the limitations associated with each of the 
theories discussed in this chapter, and because decisions about voluntary disclosure 
inevitably involve individual decisions by managers and companies and depend on 
company characteristics, no single theory is therefore used in this study to try to explain 
and illustrate the practices of the voluntary disclosure phenomenon. But neither is any 
theory ignored or rejected. Each will be revisited in the light of the results obtained in 
the empirical research. The next chapter reviews the relevant studies relating to users of 
annual report information. It also focuses on related empirical studies that explain 
variation in voluntary disclosure practices by company characteristics and corporate 
governance attributes. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The corporate report disclosure area receives a great deal of attention in empirical 
studies and is currently growing widely (Beattie, 2005). Researchers are interested in 
predicting the level of disclosure, the types of information that meet users‘ needs and 
also significantly affect their decisions, and the variables that influence corporate 
disclosure practices. Disclosure is considered as an important indicator for accounting 
quality (Marston and Robson, 1997). Murray (1976) states that the quality of corporate 
disclosure affects the ability of the capital markets to assess the value of a company. In 
addition, the quality of disclosure has a great impact on the ability of investors to make 
sound investment decisions (Singhvi and Desai, 1971).  
In order to categorise the corporate disclosure literature, Ball and Foster (1982) 
classified this field of research into four different topic areas, namely: (1) content of 
disclosures and disclosure indexes, (2) variables associated with differential content of 
disclosure, (3) timing of corporate disclosures, and (4) responses to interviews or 
questionnaires. Indeed, it is not practical to cover all prior studies of these categories. 
The central theme of this chapter is to highlight those studies that investigate the user 
perceptions of CARs regarding the importance of sources of information and the utility 
of information items to be included in CARs. Additionally, the studies examine the 
association of selected company characteristics and CG mechanisms with variation in 
the extent of voluntary disclosure in CARs. Thus, it is useful to determine the relevant 
theoretical approaches and some suggested variables that could explain disclosure 
practices. This will help to build the research hypotheses and methodology. Moreover, it 
will aid in determining the limitations and the nature of the gap in the existing literature, 
providing a good opportunity to contribute to the filling of this gap. 
The chapter is structured in the following manner: The first part (Sections 3.2-3.5) deals 
with the empirical studies that examined the perceptions and attitudes of users of CARs 
toward sources of disclosure information and the usefulness of accounting information. 
The second part (Sections 3.6-3.9) introduces previous studies that assess the 
association between company characteristics and the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
its categories. Empirical studies related to the association between some CG elements 
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and the extent of disclosure are presented in the third part. Finally, the gap in the 
literature is presented in Section 3.10.  
3.2 THE USEFULNESS OF SOURCES OF DISCLOSURE INFORMATION  
It is logical to expect companies to use a number of channels and devices to 
communicate with stakeholders. Conversely, investors and other interested parties use 
many sources of information to make their decisions. Different sources of information 
are used to disseminate information to the public: CARs, newspapers and magazines, 
websites, periodic bulletins, special publications, and direct contact with the company. 
Thus, several studies have undertaken to determine which source/s users depend on to 
make their decisions, and to what extent.  
In the developed countries, a wide set of studies have explored the perceptions and 
views of users toward the relative importance of various sources of information and the 
usefulness of CARs. Some of these concentrated on one particular group of users, such 
as individual investors (e.g. Baker and Haslem, 1973; Lee and Tweedie, 1975; 
Anderson and Epstein, 1995; Bartlett and Chandler, 1997); financial analysts (Arnold 
and Moizer, 1984; Streuly, 1994); and investment analysts (Day, 1986; Bauman, 1989). 
Other studies explored the perception of more than one user groups and tested the 
possible variations among these groups toward the usefulness or the importance of 
information disclosed in CARs for making decisions. These involved such user groups 
as individual investors, institutional investors, financial analysts, investment analysts, 
creditors, executives/managers, government officials, and academics. Among them are 
the studies of Firth (1978), Chang et al. (1983), Chang and Most (1985), Wallace 
(1988), Abu-Nasser and Rutherford (1996), Mirshekary and Saudagaran (2005), Zoysa 
and Rudkin (2010), and Nassirzadeh (2011).  
It can be argued that conflict exists in the results of research conducted in this area, even 
though a number of studies were conducted to identify the users‘ perceptions toward the 
importance of sources of information. Some studies in developed countries found 
stockbrokers as a more important source of information (see for example Baker and 
Haslem (1973) and Epstein (1975) in the US; Anderson (1979) and Anderson and 
Epstein (1995) in Australia). The findings of other studies differed from those which 
found financial press reports the most important resource for the majority of external 
users (see for example Lee and Tweedie (1975) in Australia; and Bartlett and Chandler 
(1997) in the UK). In contrast, Epstein and Pava (1993) revealed that shareholders‘ own 
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analysis as a source of information plays a significant role in providing US users with 
the required information for making decisions. In New Zealand, Chang and Most (1985) 
found newspapers and magazines to be an important source. These differences could be 
attributed to the fact that user groups vary in their objectives, which may lead them to 
use different types of information sources.  
Among these, CARs stood as the main information source and the most frequently used 
in the process of decision making by different types of users. This is proved by a wide 
set of studies (see for example Anderson (1981) in Australia; Chang and Most (1981) 
and Chang et al. (1983) in the US, UK, and New Zealand; Vergoossen (1993) in the 
Netherlands). Taken overall, most of these studies indicated that financial statements are 
ranked/rated as the most important section of a CAR.  
Turning to developing countries, limited empirical studies have been conducted, and 
more specifically within the Arab context, to examine the relative importance of 
different sources of information in the decision-making process. In comparison with 
other sources, the CARs are considered the major source of information regarding 
companies (see for example Al-Mahmoud (2000) in Saudi Arabia; Naser et al. (2003), 
Al-Hajji (2003) and Al-Yaqout (2006) in Kuwait; Mirshekary and Saudagaran (2005) 
and Nassirzadeh (2011) in Iran; Al-Ajmi (2009) in Bahrain; Zoysa and Rudkin (2010) 
in Sri Lanka). The reported results are consistent with the argument of Ahmad (1988), 
who stated that, as a source of information, CARs play a more affirmative role in 
emerging markets than in developed ones. The CAR is also an essential legal document 
for company communications (Gray et al., 1995b). This could be attributed to another 
argument presented by Foster (1986) that annual report contents are deemed to be ―a 
more reliable and timely source‖. Moreover, the other sources are expected to be very 
limited in those countries (Haddad, 2005).   
In addition, visits to the company and communication with management, government 
publications, company quarterly reports, and stockbroker‘s/specialist‘s advice were 
identified as important sources by the respondents (see for example Abu-Nasser and 
Rutherford (1996) in Jordan; Abdul Rahman (2001) and Ismail (2003) in Malaysia; 
Stainbank and Peebles (2006) in South Africa; Al-Attar and Al-Khater (2007) in Qatar; 
Al-Abdulqader et al. (2007) in Saudi Arabia). Taken overall, financial statements (such 
as financial position and income statements) were ranked/rated as the most important 
45 
 
section of the CAR (see for example the prior studies: Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004) 
and (2007) in Saudi Arabia; Alzarouni et al. (2011) in the Emirates).  
 
A general conclusion can be drawn from a review of previous studies: although there 
are clear differences among developed and developing countries in terms of the socio-
economic environment, the user groups shared similar views regarding the perceived 
importance of CARs as a source.    
 
3.3 THE USEFULNESS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION IN THE 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Two types of information are commonly disclosed in CARs, namely: voluntary 
disclosure and mandatory disclosure. ―Voluntary disclosure can be defined as 
disclosure in excess of requirements, representing free choice on the part of company 
management to provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to the 
decision needs of users of their annual reports” (Meek et al., 1995:555). Mandatory 
disclosure refers to compliance with compulsory standards. If a disclosure item is 
mandatory, the assumption often made is that the information item will definitely be 
disclosed; otherwise, the company will receive a qualified audit report or some other 
regulatory sanctions. The early studies in this area of research have been conducted in 
developed countries.  
Chandra (1974) surveyed users and preparers (security analysts and public accountants) 
to explore how they rate the importance of various information items and assess the 
adequacy of disclosure in CARs. The study‘s main conclusion was a lack of consensus 
between subject groups regarding the importance of items, implying that types of 
information disclosed by preparers do not meet the information needs of users for 
making decisions. On a different point, Benjamin and Stanga (1977), who compared the 
perceptions of bank loan officers and financial analysts to determine whether external 
users of CARs are homogeneous in their information needs, provided further empirical 
evidence that the information needs of subject groups show great differences. The 
authors argued that differences in information needs result from differences in the 
nature of decision types (lending and investment decisions). Baker and Haslem (1973) 
also found that the information needed by professional users ―financial analysts‖ differs 
significantly from that of non-sophisticated users ―individual investors‖ in the US. In a 
comparative international study, Chang et al. (1983) investigated the perceptions of 
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individual investors, institutional investors, and financial analysts about the utility of 
annual reports in three developed countries (the UK, New Zealand, and the USA) using 
a questionnaire. They documented that the individual investor groups are somewhat less 
homogenous in their information needs as a result of the existence of cultural and social 
variations among countries in this field. 
In the same line, using a wider range of multi-user groups, Firth (1978) questioned 
financial directors, auditors, financial analysts, and bank loan officers in the UK to 
examine the consensus on the perceived importance of a set of information items that 
could be disclosed in CARs. He found substantial agreement in the opinions of financial 
directors and auditors on the one hand and substantial agreement in the opinions of 
financial analysts and bank loan officers on the other. In addition, a higher level of 
agreement existed among the latter groups concerning the importance of releasing most 
of the individual information items included in the questionnaire. In another empirical 
study to examine whether the accounting information needs of loan officers from small 
and large banks are the same, Stanga and Tiller (1983) revealed that the target user 
groups have considerably similar views regarding rating the relative importance of the 
selected information items. Generally, these two studies reached conclusions which 
contradicted those of the previous four studies regarding the information needed by 
users. This may be due to a number of factors such as diversity in decisions and the 
cultural and social impact. It is consistent with the views of Benjamin and Stanga 
(1977) and Chang et al. (1983).   
An extension of previous studies conducted in the US (e.g. Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971; Chandra, 1974) and in the UK (e.g. Firth, 1978), McNally et al. (1982) 
examined the importance of a set of discretionary information to the financial editors 
and stock exchange members in New Zealand who represent the sample of professional 
external users. The interesting finding was a high level of agreement among user groups 
surveyed in three different developed countries regarding the relative importance of 
disclosing certain selected information items. However, there is considerable variation 
in the amount of information disclosed by companies and user preferences reported in 
these surveys. The result is consistent with evidence provided by Chandra (1974) and 
Benjamin and Stanga (1977). 
Another interesting finding was that information related to future dividends and 
dividend policies is considered the most desired items in the view of users. This is 
47 
 
consistent with a study conducted by Buzby (1974) in the US, who declared that the 
users highly ranked the items related to future prospects. Similar results were also 
documented by Baker and Haslem (1973), Lee and Tweedie (1975), and Anderson 
(1979). On the other side, the study found corporate social responsibilities were placed 
as the least important information items. In contrast, Epstein and Freedman (1994) 
revealed that most shareholders surveyed desired US companies to disclose more 
information about different aspects of social activities in their annual reports. This may 
reflect the changes in information needs of user groups over the years, a view reflecting 
community orientations.  
Regarding additional disclosure in the annual reports, Anderson (1979) surveyed 
Australian investors and found that respondents desire more information to be disclosed 
in CARs such as company products and the practical experience and academic 
qualifications of board members. Similar results were documented by Anderson (1981) 
in Australia that institutional investors favoured additional information about 
directorships and company products. Another study by Anderson and Epstein (1995) 
argued that Australian individual investors want more information such as pending 
litigation and change of auditor to be released in the CARs. Similar results were 
obtained from Epstein and Pava‘s (1993) study, which declared that US shareholders 
require disclosure on pending litigation and unasserted legal claims. However, an earlier 
study by Epstein (1975) revealed that US investors prefer disclosure on a budgeted 
income statement. This may confirm the result of Chang and Most‘s (1985) study, 
which claimed that individual investors did not believe that information provided in the 
CARs met their needs.  
In Hong Kong, a famous international financial centre, Ho and Wong (2004) conducted 
an empirical study to explore the perception and beliefs of investment analysts 
regarding the usefulness of a set of voluntary disclosure items that may appear in CARs. 
The questionnaire results revealed that predictive types of voluntary disclosure items in 
annual reports appeared to be the most important in analysts‘ view. However, they 
believed that the amount of information released in CARs remained inadequate to meet 
their requirements. Thus, there is a need to maintain improvement in this area for Hong 
Kong to remain competitive among international financial centres.  
The main conclusion stems from a comprehensive review of previous studies conducted 
in the developed countries that provide contradictory results about the types of 
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information user groups require to be disclosed in the CARs, as well as the level of 
consensus among examined user groups regarding the perceived importance of 
voluntary items.   
 
3.4 THE USEFULNESS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION IN NON-GULF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
In the non-Gulf developing countries, a few studies have been undertaken to explore 
users‘ perceptions toward the usefulness of information disclosed in CARs (e.g. 
Wallace, 1988; Ibrahim and Kim, 1994; Mirshekary and Saudagaran, 2005; Dahawy 
and Samaha, 2010; Binh, 2012).  
In Nigeria, a study conducted by Wallace (1988), to assess the consensus of six different 
user groups about the importance of a set of items presumed to be disclosed in the 
CARs, documented the lack of consensus between accountants on the one hand and 
other professionals, managers, and investors on the other. Also, Wallace‘s (1988:255) 
study indicated that “the perceived needs of Nigerian users are not entirely  identical  
with the  perceived needs of the Board members of the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) and that Nigerian users do not perceive the same set of 
information items as very important as do users in some developed countries‖. On the 
same track, Ibrahim and Kim (1994) surveyed a set of user groups: accountants, 
shareholders, managers, and financial analysts in Egypt. This study suggested a low 
level of agreement among the examined groups about the importance attached to several 
items. The most important conclusion to be drawn from the previous African studies is 
consistency regarding the low consensus among users on the importance of disclosure 
items in published annual reports.  
As a result of the increasing interest in corporate social responsibility and the ambition 
to cover possible limitations in the literature, and more specifically in the Arab world, 
Naser and Abu-Baker (1999), in an extension of Abu-Baker and Abdel-Karim‘s (1998) 
work, examined the perceptions and views of four groups of stakeholders (preparers and 
users) toward the notion and disclosure of social information in Jordan. The results of a 
survey indicated that respondents appear to accept the inclusion of such information in 
the CARs. As part of their responsibility toward the community, companies should 
disclose information related to their social role.  
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Mirshekary and Saudagaran (2005) explored seven different users groups of CARs in 
Iran and found a high level of consensus between stockbrokers and institutional 
investors, while there was a low level of consensus between the auditors and bank loan 
officers pairing and the auditors and the tax officers pairing. This suggests that the 
general information sets included in the questionnaire (which stems directly from 
CARs) may not meet the demands of users or not fully satisfy varied user needs. This 
result is consistent with previous African studies. Following a research instrument 
previously applied by Mirshekary and Saudagaran (2005) in Iran, Dahawy and Samaha 
(2010) examined the perceptions of external users as a sample of the accounting 
community in Egypt. In overall rank, they found the top information items to be from 
the financial position statement, with the respondents rating historical information as 
being of slight importance. The study found a high degree of agreement between the 
institutional investors‘ group and the auditor group with regard to the perceived 
importance of information items. However, consensus between the stockbrokers‘ group 
and the academics‘ group and the bank loan officers‘ group and academics‘ group was 
significantly low regarding examined items. In comparison with Mirshekary and 
Saudagaran (2005), the study indicated that the ranking reported by users in both 
countries is extremely different with regard to individual items of CARs. 
In a more recent study, examining the gap between the views of financial analysts and 
financial managers regarding voluntary disclosure information in Vietnam, Binh (2012) 
found high agreement between both groups about the importance level of voluntary 
items. However, there is a series gap between the views of target groups regarding the 
ability of available information in CARs to meet the requirements of information users. 
The study showed the existence of agreement in the importance that respondents place 
on financial and forward-looking information. Thus, the results of the recent study 
indicate a move in the same direction as previous studies in the developing countries. 
Consequently, preparers and policy makers in emerging markets have a long way to go 
to reach user groups‘ requirements regarding voluntary information disclosure.   
 
3.5 THE USEFULNESS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION IN GULF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
A few studies have been conducted in this part of the world to explore the usefulness of 
accounting information contained in the CARs for making economic decisions (e.g. 
Abdelsalam, 1990; Naser et al., 2003; Al-Khater and Naser, 2003; Al-Ajmi, 2008, 
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2009). Based on a questionnaire sent to Saudi individual investors, Abdelsalam (1990) 
revealed that the respondents rated profit and owners‘ equity as the most important 
items in the CARs (in that order). On the other hand, they want listed companies to 
release more information to support their investment decisions. This includes 
information on management and directors of the company, and potential profits. Later, 
through a questionnaire survey, Al-Mubarak (1997) examined the usefulness of 
additional disclosure to Saudi investment analysts. He revealed that respondents 
preferred more information to be disclosed regarding the expected sales and expected 
amount of sales. These results are similar to those reached by Abdelsalam (1990) in the 
earlier study. Surprisingly, however, the study indicated that users do not pay great 
attention to directors and senior management information, which was ranked as the least 
useful item.  These results reflect users‘ low level of awareness regarding the 
importance of CG mechanisms in improving company performance and ensuring a 
healthy relationship between owners and management in the organisation.  
Two years later, Al Razeen (1999), based on a survey of five major user groups in Saudi 
Arabia, found earnings and details of revenue sources to be considered important among 
a list of 18 items. This is similar to the results of Abdelsalam (1990). Creditors rated the 
importance of these items more highly than individual investors and government 
officials. This may be due to the fact that this group is more sophisticated and more 
aware of their importance in performance measures. Among the 15 voluntary items, 
dividend policy and description of major types of products are considered important in 
the view of respondents and recommended to be disclosed in the CARs. Interestingly, 
the users did not pay great attention to items related to social activities (e.g. donations 
and human resources), ranking them the least important. This may be an indication of 
the low level of public interest in a corporate role in social activities and awareness 
regarding corporate social responsibility. This lends support to Al-Mubarak‘s (1997) 
study. Respondents also perceived a description of pension policy and percentage of 
total wages paid to employees who are Saudi citizens to be the least important items. 
However, among user groups, creditors attached more importance to these items. On the 
other hand, users assigned low importance to the demand concerning the disclosure of 
the names of major shareholders, which may be due to the ability to obtain this 
information from other sources. Another interesting finding is that the government 
officials‘ group gives the lowest rate of importance regarding the disclosure of most 
proposed voluntary items.  
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In another Gulf country, Bahrain, Al-Ajmi (2008) investigated the view of credit and 
financial analysts regarding the perceived usefulness of financial ratios and elements of 
CG for making lending and investment decisions. The survey results indicated that user 
groups are somewhat lacking in homogeneity in their rating of specific indicators. For 
example, financial analysts pay greater attention to CG mechanisms than credit analysts. 
Later, Al-Ajmi (2009) surveyed individual investors in Bahrain to identify the types of 
information they needed for their decisions. He concluded that Bahraini investors 
considered accounting information more important than non-accounting information. 
Surprisingly, respondents preferred companies to disclose information about the volume 
of business between the company and its board of directors, and the number of shares 
owned by board directors, since this type of information plays a significant role in 
investment decisions. Given the results of previous studies, it can be concluded that 
Bahraini investors are aware of the importance of CG mechanisms in enhancing 
company performance and the level of information transparency.  
Within the investment context, Al-Attar and Al-Khater (2007) provided evidence of a 
high level of agreement among user groups regarding the usefulness of accounting 
information appearing in the CARs of listed companies in Qatar for making sound 
investment decisions. This may indicate that Qatari investors are satisfied with the 
amount of information disclosed in CARs. In the same country, Al-Khatar and Naser 
(2003), in an extension of Naser and Abu-Baker‘s (1999) study, attempted to provide 
empirical evidence about the perception of four different target user groups towards 
various aspects of companies‘ social responsibility disclosure and accountability 
principle. The study indicated that respondents prefer companies to disclose information 
about corporate social responsibility in a different manner. This possibly reflects the 
awareness of the Qatari accounting community regarding this type of disclosure and 
corporate accountability toward society.   
In another GCC country, Kuwait, Naser et al. (2003), assessing the information needs of 
eight different user groups, found non-financial information to be less credible and 
important. This is consistent with results documented by Al-Ajmi (2009) and may be 
attributable to the capability of some target groups to utilise only quantitative 
information in making their financial analysis. In addition, a high rating was attached to 
the list of voluntary disclosure items included in the questionnaire such as earnings. 
This is similar to the results documented by Abdelsalam (1990) and Al Razeen (1999) 
for Saudi Arabia. However, respondents attached low importance to some items related 
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to social activities such as recruitment policies and donations. Similar results were 
reached by Al-Mubarak (1997) and Al Razeen (1999). One possible reason for this 
result is ―these issues are unlikely to be of any concern to a rich country like Kuwait‖. 
In a more recent Kuwaiti study, Al-Mutairi (2004) examined the usefulness of 
accounting information to nine user groups. With regard to historical information, 
respondents attached more importance to the past percentage growth of earnings and 
dividend and its growth over the past years. Concerning current items disclosed in 
CARs, the financial strength of the company, quality management, the company‘s social 
standing, and human resources‘ accounting were perceived as important items. The 
results of the last two items are similar to findings reported by Naser et al. (2003) for 
Kuwait; however, they are not ranked at the bottom of the list based on their mean 
scores (although they have received higher weight by respondents). These results may 
suggest a growing awareness in the Kuwaiti accounting community of their part in 
society as a whole concerning this type of disclosure. On the other hand, user groups 
prefer companies to disclose more information regarding the company‘s future. For 
instance, the expected growth in earnings and price of shares received the highest 
attention from users among proposed items. In addition, Al-Mutairi (2004) revealed that 
composition of top management and structure of board were ranked the least important 
items by respondents, which is inconsistent with Naser et al. (2003), who declared that 
Kuwaiti user groups placed considerable importance on these items.   
In the Emirates, a recent study by Alzarouni et al. (2011) explored whether current 
disclosure practices meet the users‘ needs of CARs. The survey results indicated that 
almost 56% of respondents perceived the amount of disclosure to be inadequate and 
thus the need for information by most external major users was not met yet. The main 
groups expressing their dissatisfaction regarding the insufficient information provided 
in the CARs were as follows: institutional investors, bank credit officers, and fund 
managers.   
Despite tireless efforts by researchers in the developing countries represented to involve 
more user groups, a large number of respondents, and/or more information items, a 
number of these studies point to there being no general consensus among user groups 
with regard to their need for information. This could be interpreted as users of 
information having different objectives. However, most of these studies indicate that the 
current information provided in the CARs is not sufficient for the users.    
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With regard to the problems attached to CARs in developing countries, a number of 
survey studies indicated participants having great concerns in some areas. These include 
delays in publishing CARs, lack of credibility or lack of adequate disclosure (e.g. Abu-
Nasser and Rutherford, 1996; Mirshekary and Saudagaran, 2005; Zoysa and Rudkin, 
2010; Dahawy and Samaha, 2010; Alzarouni et al., 2011). In this sense, Naser et al. 
(2003) revealed that the timeliness of corporate reporting is considered an important 
feature that influences users‘ perception about the quality of accounting information. 
However, Al-Mutairi (2004) studied users‘ perception in Kuwait and realised that 
reliability is the most important qualitative characteristic that affects Kuwaiti users‘ 
perception about the quality of information. Therefore, the accounting authorities and 
regulators in developing countries must pay more attention to setting out solutions that 
help to overcome those restrictions, while at the same time focusing on improving an 
adequate disclosure of information.    
 
3.6 OVERALL VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 
The corporate disclosure phenomenon elicits great interest from researchers in 
disclosure literature. This research area stretches from studying the extent of mandatory 
disclosure to studying total voluntary disclosure and/or specific voluntary accounting 
information types such as environmental and social responsibilities‘ disclosure. The 
following sections review previous studies in this research area: studies are divided into 
those conducted in developed and developing countries.  
 
3.6.1 Developed Countries 
Several studies have investigated the association between company characteristics and 
overall level of voluntary disclosure. Firth (1979a) empirically investigates the 
relationship between the extent of corporate financial disclosure and some company 
characteristics in the annual reports of 180 UK companies. The company characteristics 
were company size, stock market listing, and auditor type. The author used a weighted 
disclosure index containing 48 items of information. Firth (1979a) found the level of 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports of the tested sample to be very low, with only 
eight of the 48 information items being disclosed by more than 50% of British 
companies.  
Using data from New Zealand, McNally et al. (1982) empirically tested the association 
between the extent of disclosure and selected company attributes: company size, 
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profitability, growth, audit firm, and type of industry; their study included 103 listed 
manufacturing companies. Study findings showed the level of disclosure was low, with 
50% of 41 items included in the checklist disclosed by only 10 companies. Company 
size had significant power to explain the variation in disclosure among companies. The 
authors‘ key argument was that improvement in disclosure practices among companies 
could be achieved through an extension of disclosure requirements.  
Cooke (1989a) expanded the work of the prior studies by using three new types of 
groups: 38 unlisted, 33 single listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE), and 19 
multiple listed. The study employed four explanatory variables: company size, quotation 
status, parent company relation, and industry type. Based on an index of 146 voluntary 
items, it revealed a significant positive association between level of disclosure and 
quotation status and company size. In addition, multiple listed companies release more 
information than companies listed only on the SSE; however, those single listed have a 
higher level of disclosure than unlisted ones. Also, the study found that trading 
companies disclose less information than those in manufacturing, services and 
conglomerates.  
In the context of Japan, Cooke (1991) examined the association between the levels of 
voluntary disclosure by a sample of 48 companies, using similar methodology to that 
used by Cooke (1989a). Classifying the selected sample into three groups, 13 unlisted, 
25 single listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), and 10 multiple listed, Cooke 
(1991) found significant association between level of voluntary disclosure and company 
size. Also, he found a significantly positive association between extent of disclosure and 
listing status, consistent with Cooke (1989a). In addition, companies classified under a 
manufacturing sector are expected to disclose more voluntary information than others 
(trading and service companies). This result is consistent with Cooke (1989a).  
McNally et al.‘s (1982) methodology was also employed by Hossain et al. (1995), who 
examined the association between company characteristics and extent of voluntary 
disclosure. The five specific company characteristics were as follows: company size, 
foreign listing status, leverage, assets-in-place, and type of auditor. Hossain et al. 
constructed an index of disclosure consisting of 95 items of information, applied to a 
sample of 55 companies publicly listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE). 
The study showed that company size, foreign listing status, and leverage were the only 
significant explanatory variables for the amount of information disclosed in CARs.  
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Raffournier (1995) examined determinants that could explain the variation in voluntary 
disclosure of a sample of 161 Swiss listed companies. To accomplish that, he used an an 
index consisting of 30 information items, derived from the Fourth and Seventh EC 
Directives and expected to be disclosed in annual reports. The independent variables 
tested included company size, leverage, profitability, auditor‘s size, industry type, and 
internationality. Finding a strong association between the level of voluntary disclosure 
and company size, Raffournier (1995) suggested that the forces of outside markets play 
a vital role in making disclosure policies for Swiss listed companies. In addition, the 
author stated that the level of disclosure in the company annual report ―is not used as a 
means of solving monitoring problems between shareholders and managers‖.   
In the French environment, Depoers (2000), who depended strongly on the perspective 
of agency theory and limitations imposed by information costs, examined the impact of 
some economic determinants (company size, foreign activity, ownership structure, 
leverage, auditor size, and proprietary costs) on the extent of voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of 102 non-financial companies listed on the Paris capital market. 
Among these variables, company size, foreign activity and proprietary costs were the 
most important variables in explaining the variation in the disclosure. Possible future 
research recommended by Depoers is to examine the interaction between voluntary 
disclosure and other non-financial agency cost determinants such as CG tools.    
Company characteristics have remained important forces of the disclosure phenomenon 
and still receive a lot of attention in literature. Gruning (2007) explored the influence of 
some driving factors (company size, cross listing, industry, and home country) on 
corporate disclosure practices which are viewed as an interrelated network. The results 
confirmed the hypothesis that these forces are considered interrelated. An interesting 
result is that company size has indirect influence on the corporate disclosure 
phenomenon; however, it plays a mediated role by cross listing.    
Based on the review, it can be concluded that there is general consensus among the 
results of studies that company size is the most important variable in explaining the 
variations in disclosure policies and practices followed by listed companies in the 
developed capital markets. However, regarding the influence of listing status variable 
on disclosure, behaviour is mixed.  
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3.6.2 Developing Countries 
While the previous studies were conducted in economically developed countries, in 
which corporate accounting plays an affirmative role by providing investors with 
relevant information for decision making (Scott, 1968 as cited in Suwaidan, 1997), a 
few similar studies have been done in developing countries. Chow and Wong-Boren 
(1987) investigated the voluntary financial disclosure practices of 52 Mexican publicly 
listed companies. They employed a disclosure index composed of 29 items of 
information to investigate association between level of voluntary disclosure and specific 
company characteristics: company size, leverage and proportion of assets-in-place. 
They revealed that voluntary disclosure varied widely among the sample companies and 
was significantly related to company size only.  
Following the methodology of the Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Gray et al. (1992) 
studies, Hossain et al. (1994) empirically investigated the practice of voluntary 
disclosure in a sample of 67 non-financial companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE). Based on an index comprised of 78 voluntary items, they revealed 
that company size, ownership structure, and foreign listing status are statistically related 
to level of information voluntarily released in CARs. However, assets-in-place, 
leverage, and audit size are found to be insignificant variables.  
Leventis (2001) attempted to examine the voluntary disclosure practice in the annual 
reports of 87 non-financial companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). 
Using a disclosure index of 72 unweighted information items, the study revealed that 
voluntary disclosure practice in Greece is significantly related to company size, type of 
report, listing status, industry, and share yield. However, leverage and profitability do 
not appear to be significant explanatory variables.  Consequently, it can be concluded 
that company size and listing status are significant variables in explaining the variations 
in disclosure practices in developing countries.  
 
3.7 PREVIOUS STUDIES FOCUSED ON SPECIFIC VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE CATEGORIES 
While the above studies concentrated on the relation between a set of specific company 
characteristics and total voluntary disclosure, some studies tend to be more specific, 
concentrating on exploring the association between those characteristics and different 
disclosure categories. Gray et al. (1995) conducted an international study to examine 
whether internationally listed US and UK multinational companies voluntarily disclose 
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more information than those listed on single domestic capital markets. A total of 116 
US and 64 UK companies were examined using a checklist of 128 items of information 
categorised into 12 different groups. Gray et al. found significant variations in 
disclosure practices among international listed companies and domestic listed 
companies. Moreover, international listed companies significantly disclose more 
information than companies listed only in their own countries. This is consistent with 
the findings provided by Cooke (1989a, 1991) for developed countries. Those 
companies also tend to disclose more information related to their strategies.   
In a more comprehensive study, Meek et al. (1995) examined the impact of international 
market pressure on the voluntary disclosure practices of USA, UK, and Continental 
Europe (CE). The current study extends that of Gray et al. (1993), who examined the 
effect of international listing status on voluntary disclosures in the annual reports of US, 
UK and Continental European multinational corporations (MNCs).  A sample consisting 
of 226 companies was chosen, with a checklist composed of 85 items divided into three 
main groups of information, namely: strategic, non-financial, and financial. Variables 
employed were as follows: country, company size, leverage, international listing status, 
multi-nationality, profitability, and industry type. Reporting that company size, country, 
listing status, and industry type were the most important factors that influenced overall 
level of voluntary disclosure, they stated that the factors explaining the extent of 
voluntary disclosures differed by the three main types of disclosure. For example, listing 
status was considered to be a significant variable in explaining voluntary information 
related to strategic and financial. This is consistent with Gray et al.‘s (1995) results, 
which concluded that the international listing variable appears to affect the disclosure of 
strategic and financial information. The largest companies appear to disclose more 
financial and non-financial information; also, the type of industry, specifically oil and 
chemical companies, has a noticeable effect on the release of these two types of 
information. The significant association of industry type and company size over 
disclosure can be interpreted by the facts that larger companies are more likely to be 
sensitive to political costs than small ones (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) and the 
perspective of agency theory, which suggests large companies have higher agency costs 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Ferguson et al. (2002) examined the effect of international stock market pressures on the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports issued by 142 non-financial 
companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Market (SEHK). A disclosure index of 102 
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items, selected from prior studies (Gray et al., 1995; Hossain et al., 1995; Meek et al., 
1995), was used. Five variables were studies: company size, company type, leverage, 
industry type, and listing status. The study concluded that company size is significantly 
and positively related to the level of overall disclosure and to each of three disclosure 
categories. However, the influence of the other variables varied with the categories of 
the disclosure. It is noteworthy that the findings of the study by Meek et al. (1995), 
discussed earlier, are consistent with that.  
In Greece, Leventis and Weetman (2004) carried out research to assess the relationship 
between the extents of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 87 non-financial 
companies listed on the ASE. Consistent with the methodology of Meek et al. (1995), 
the authors developed a self-constructed checklist of 72 information items classified 
into three categories: corporate environment, social responsibility and finance-related 
disclosures. Following disclosure literature (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993), the authors 
classified company-specific-variables into three sets: (1) structure-related variables 
(company size and leverage), (2) performance-related variables (profitability and 
liquidity), and (3) market-related variables (industry type, share return, and listing 
status). They reported that the overall level of voluntary disclosure among listed 
companies is 37.57%, which is considered relatively low. Leventis and Weetman‘s 
results indicate that only company size is most closely associated with total voluntary 
disclosure and with each of the three categories of voluntary disclosure, while industry 
type, share return, and listing status effects varied among voluntary disclosure 
categories. The outcomes of the study are close to those reported by Gray et al. (2001), 
who studied the relationship between corporate social and environmental disclosure and 
company characteristics in the UK.  
Agca and Onder (2007) studied the annual reports of 51 Turkish non-financial 
companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Market (ISE). Following the same classification 
of Meek et al. (1995), they used a checklist of 87 information items to evaluate the level 
of disclosure and to determine which of the factors could affect disclosure practice: 
company size, leverage, auditor type, profitability, and multinationality. Regression 
results declared that company size, profitability, and type of auditor are significantly 
associated with overall level of voluntary disclosure. Similar results were reported by 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006), who examined factories associated with voluntary 
disclosure in Malaysia, that company size and profitability have a positive association 
with the overall level of disclosure, but these studies reach contradictory conclusions 
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concerning type of auditor. In terms of the categories, it can been seen that company 
size and profitability are significantly related to strategic information, while company 
size and type of auditor are significantly related to financial information, and leverage is 
significantly related to non-financial information.  
In Kuwait, Al-Shammari (2008) addressed voluntary disclosure practices in the annual 
reports of 82 non-financial companies whose shares traded on the KSE for the year 
2005. To achieve this objective, a number of variables were employed: company size, 
leverage, type of auditor, type of industry, complexity, company age, profitability, 
assets-in-place, and internationality. Following Meek et al.‘s, (1995) approach, the 
researcher employed a disclosure index consisting of 76 information items which were 
categorised into three groups: corporate environment information, social responsibility 
information, and financial information. Al-Shammari (2008) stated that the overall level 
of voluntary disclosure was low (15%), and, when comparing this result with those of 
prior studies in emerging capital markets (e.g. Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Ghazali 
and Weetman, 2006), it is considered very low. Among these variables, only company 
size was an important variable in effecting the overall level of disclosure in each of 
three categories of disclosure. In addition, other variables (leverage, auditor type, 
industry type, complexity, and company age) varied in their impacts among the 
categories of voluntary disclosure. For example, the result of auditor type is consistent 
with the result provided by Agca and Onder (2007). However, the results of those 
studies are inconsistent regarding company size and profitability. The findings showed 
that Kuwaiti companies disclose significantly more corporate environment and financial 
information than corporate social responsibility information.  
In the Chinese information environment, Wang et al. (2008) studied variables proposed 
to be relevant to the extent of disclosure in advanced market economies: company 
performance, audit type, company size, and leverage. Wang et al. (2008) employed a 
disclosure index composed of 79 discretionary items of information, an expansion of 
Meek et al.‘s (1995) model, to examine the impact of those variables on voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of 109 Chinese non-financial listed companies. The 
overall level of disclosure was 18%, slightly higher than documented by Al-Shammari 
(2008). The study showed a positive and significant association between level of 
voluntary disclosure and companies‘ performance and type of auditor. On the other 
hand, the results showed that type of auditor and company‘s performance affect the 
extent of overall disclosure. Company size is positively and significantly associated 
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with overall disclosure and all disclosure measures, which is consistent with the 
findings of Ferguson et al. (2002) and Al-Shammari (2008).  
 
3.8 PREVIOUS STUDIES FOCUSED ON THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES  
Research topics in the area of voluntary disclosure extend from studying the amount of 
disclosure to studying specific types of disclosure in depth. Naser and Al-Khatib (2000) 
conducted a study to empirically examine the depth of disclosure in the statement of the 
board of directors of a sample of 84 Jordanian non-financial companies listed on the 
Amman Financial Market (AFM). The authors adopted a number of previous studies‘ 
methodologies (such as Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989a) to construct and 
develop a disclosure index of 30 information items. The average level of disclosure was 
54%; some of the variables employed in this study were: size, profitability, leverage, 
government ownership. The results revealed that company size, profitability, and 
leverage alone have a positive and significant influence on the level of disclosure.  
In the Jordanian context, Suwaidan et al. (2004) examined the influence of certain 
company characteristics (company size, profitability, and risk) on corporate social 
disclosure (CSD) practices in CARs. A disclosure index containing 37 items was used 
to assess the extent of CSD in the annual reports of 65 industrial companies. The results 
indicated that company size, profitability, and risk provide an explanation of the social 
disclosure variation in the Qatar environment, consistent with Naser and Al-Khatib‘s 
(2000) findings. On average, the listed companies disclosed approximately 13% of 
items contained in the checklist. This gives an indication that the sample companies are 
not extensively reporting such information in their reports. Although different types of 
social responsibility information was disclosed in CARs, such as human resources and 
community involvement information, the listed companies only released a small amount 
of environmental and goods/services information to customers. In a similar study, Naser 
et al. (2006) tested the effect of company size, growth, business risk, and dividends paid 
on the CSD of 22 companies listed on the Doha Stock Exchange (DSE). Using an index 
of 34 items, they found three variables were significant in explaining the variation in the 
CSD: companies and company size, leverage, and corporate growth. The authors also 
reported that the average CSD index is 33%, which is higher than that reported by 
Suwaidan et al. (2004). They argued that the low level of CSD could be attributed to the 
weakness of pressure groups within society to demand that companies discuss their 
responsibilities toward society. Taken overall, the study‘s outcomes lend partial support 
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to agency theory, political economy theory, legitimacy theory, and stakeholder theory as 
well as to the accountability approach. In this sense, Naser et al. (2006:19) concluded 
that: 
“the support or otherwise to various theories advanced in the literature to explain why 
companies voluntarily disclose information that reflects their involvement in the society is 
related to the stage of economic development reached by the country under study. The 
theories would gain support in developed economies more than in emerging economies”.  
 
Alsaeed (2006) empirically assessed the extent of disclosure of non-financial Saudi 
companies in an emerging capital market. The author also examines the influence of 
several company attributes on disclosure behaviour: company size, leverage, company 
age, liquidity, type of auditor, type of industry, and profitability. Following the previous 
studies (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993), the author categorised those attributes into 
three groups: (1) structure-related variables, (2) performance-related variables, and (3) 
market-related variables. The study covered the financial year of 2003 with a sample 
size of 40 companies, which represented 56% of the total companies listed on the Saudi 
Stock Market (SSM). A disclosure checklist included 20 voluntary disclosure items, and 
an unweighted disclosure index approach was employed to achieve the objectives of 
study. On average, companies released 33% of items included in the index. This low 
level of disclosure could be related to the nature of the information and being left to 
management‘s discretion, since no regulation by professional bodies or system exists 
governing the disclosure of such information by companies. Among variables used to 
explore the variation in the disclosure, only company size was identified as a significant 
explanatory variable.   
Aljifiri (2008) examine the extent of disclosure in the annual reports of 31 listed 
companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and related these to the following 
factors: company size, debt equity ratio, industry type, and profitability. Disclosure 
practices in the UAE were affected by the type of industry. The banking sector discloses 
more information than other industrial sectors (insurance, service, and industry), which 
may be due to the significant role of the central bank in monitoring financial 
institutions. However, there are no statistical differences among other sectors, since they 
have weak legal and institutional enforcement. In the author‘s view, the extent of 
disclosure could be enhanced by improving legal and enforcement frameworks and 
activating the role of governmental bodies. The author revealed that the extent of 
disclosure in the UAE is driven more by regulations than by market. This finding is 
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consistent with Abu-Baker and Naser (2000), who documented that the companies‘ 
disclosure of social information is affected by applied provisions in Jordan. 
In another specialised study, conducted by Rizk et al. (2008) to assess the corporate 
social and environmental reporting practices of 60 Egyptian industrial companies, a 
disclosure index comprising 34 information items was constructed. The results showed 
a low level of corporate social responsibility disclosure in the nine segments, with 
differences among them. Moreover, the nature of disclosure was found to be 
overwhelmingly descriptive. The results suggested that type of industry is a statistically 
significant predictor of category of disclosure. Similar results were reported by Aljifiri 
(2008). Overall results lend support to the predictions suggested by legitimacy theory. 
Rizk et al.‘s (2008) reference to increased amounts of environmental disclosure by 
private companies could be explained as a result of a strategy employed by Egyptian 
organisations to ensure their organisational legitimacy and perhaps even to prevent 
additional regulations. Although Rizk et al.‘s (2008) study is considered to be the first 
exploratory study about corporate social responsibility in an Egyptian context, it can be 
criticized on two bases. Firstly, the investigated sample suffers some shortages since it 
does not include more economic sectors. Secondly, the study does not involve more 
explanatory variables (company characteristics) to explain the variations in social 
disclosure practices.  
In 2009, Hossain and Hammami explored the determinants of voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports for 25 companies, representing 86% of companies listed on the Doha 
Securities Market (DSM). The level of average voluntary disclosure is 37%, higher than 
that reported by Alsaeed (2006). The study revealed that age, size, complexity, and 
assets-in-place are significantly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure.  
A recent study, conducted by Khasharmeh and Suwaidan (2010) to evaluate the extent 
of CSD in the annual reports of 60 manufacturing companies listed on the GCC stock 
exchanges, employed a checklist including 45 items and a regression analysis to 
determine the effect of a number of company characteristics (audit size, company size, 
profitability, government ownership, and risk) on this disclosure. There is a remarkable 
variation in the disclosure of social responsibility information among the sample 
companies. Company size and auditing firm are the main variables explaining variation 
in CSD among a test sample. Moreover, the listed companies disclosed approximately 
26 % of the index items, higher than reported in previous studies in other Middle East 
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countries (e.g. Suwaidan et al., 2004). On the other hand, surveyed companies disclosed 
less information related to environmental and community involvement in their annual 
reports. The findings, stemming from studies conducted in the Arab world, support the 
argument that social and economic development is an important cause for the variation 
in this type of disclosure among countries (Xiao et al., 2005).  
In a more recent study, Al-Janadi et al. (2012) assessed and compared the level of 
voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. To this end, they used the 
unweighted approach and the annual reports of 150 financial and non-financial listed 
companies for the years 2006 and 2007. On average, the overall level is around 36%, 
which is considered low. This result is a little higher than that reported by Alsaeed 
(2006) in Saudi Arabia, but it is similar to the result documented by Hossain and 
Hammami (2009) in Qatar. Also, they revealed that, in both countries, companies 
released very limited information on their social and environmental responsibilities. It 
must be noted that caution needs to be exercised when making comparisons among 
studies for two reasons: (1) the difference in the time frame of the studies and disclosure 
may change over years; (2) each study used a different checklist so this reduces the 
comparability. The following sections will focus on different aspects related to 
corporate governance (CG).  
     
3.9 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 
 
3.9.1 The Concept and Importance of Corporate Governance  
Overall, there is no single accepted definition of CG, and there are noticeable 
differences in the definition based on the point of view of the nature of CG. However, 
the existing definitions of CG fall into one of two streams. The first is ―narrow views‖ 
which concentrates on the association between a company and its shareholders. In other 
words, this approach is restricted to the relationship between a concept of corporate 
accountability toward shareholders which appears to derive from the perspective of 
―agency theory‖. In a narrow agency perception of CG, the Cadbury Report (1992) 
defined CG as “The system by which companies are directed and controlled. Further, 
the Walker Review (2009:23) defines CG thus:  
“The role of CG is to protect and advance the interests of shareholders through setting the 
strategic directions of a company and appointing and monitoring capable management to 
achieve this”.   
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The second stream is ―broad views‖, which relates to corporate responsibility, taking 
into account other stakeholders (e.g. suppliers, customers), rather than only 
concentrating on shareholders; this viewpoint derives from ―stakeholder theory‖. There 
are some definitions have adapted this perspective, for instance, Tricker (1984:6) stated 
that: 
“The governance role is not concerned with the running of the business of the company per 
se, but with   giving overall direction to the enterprise, with overseeing and controlling the 
executive actions of management and with satisfying legitimate expectations of 
accountability and regulation by interests beyond the corporate boundaries”.  
 
In this context, Solomon (2007:14) defined CG as:  
“The system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures 
that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially 
responsible way in all areas of their business activity”. 
 
Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that definitions of CG are varied, 
based on the concentration of different groups of stakeholders. However, the differences 
in CG definitions seem to be governed by corporate accountability: some are restricted 
to the function of accountability toward a company‘s owners only, and others have a 
broad range, involving all a company‘s stakeholders.  
CG is the system by which corporations are directed and controlled. The framework of 
CG identifies rights and duties among different corporate participants and more 
specifically describes the required rules and procedures for making decisions on 
corporate affairs. Moreover, CG works on providing the same opportunity for all major 
stakeholders to get reliable information about: its activities, policies, and the value of 
the firm. They also have the same access to information so the concept of CG grants a 
great amount of transparency and fairness. On the other side, a CG system motivates a 
company‘s managers to work on maximizing firm value as a crucial task instead of 
working for their personal benefit (Luo, 2005). Thus, the main evolution and ideology 
of this framework is toward the perspective of stakeholder protection.  
The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) report (2008) stated that 
there are three complementary main purposes of CG, namely:  
 
1. To ensure the board, as representatives of the organisation‘s owners, protects 
resources and allocates them to make planned progress toward the organisation‘s 
defined purpose; 
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2. To ensure those governing and managing an organisation account appropriately 
to its stakeholders; and  
3. To ensure shareholders and, where appropriate, other stakeholders can and do 
hold boards to account.   
  
Under the heading of CG institutions, Mueller (2006) stated that some institutions are 
common to all companies in a country, such as law and legal institutions, and others 
differ from company to company within a country regarding the required minimum or 
maximum number of directors and percentage of outsiders on the board. Tricker (1984) 
proposed that CG could be categorised into four groups as follows: ownership power, 
corporate director‘s power, management power, and institutional power.   
Luo (2005) stated that the concept of CG works through three mechanisms, namely: (1) 
market-based mechanisms (e.g. board composition, board size, market discipline, board 
chairmanship, executive compensation, and interlocking directorate); (2) culture-based 
mechanisms (e.g. governance culture and corporate integrity); and (3) discipline-based 
mechanisms (e.g. executive penalty, internal auditing, conduct codes, and ethics 
programmes). While Imhoff (2003) stated that accounting and auditing are components 
of the broader system of CG, and cannot be fixed in any lasting way without substantive 
changes in overall governance process, Gul and Leung (2004) argued that the recent 
trend in the accounting literature proposes that the role of corporate governance is best 
examined in the context of a ―package‖ of corporate governance mechanisms such as 
the role of two or more corporate governance attributes (e.g. Kosnik, 1987; Singh and 
Harianto, 1989; Rediker and Seth, 1995).  
However, it can be stated that the effect of CG mechanisms has elicited strong attention 
among researchers, and the accounting literature pays more attention to the first 
mechanism of Luo‘s classification ―a market-based mechanism‖ than to the others. It 
has been argued that the concept of CG continues to expand (Anand, 2005). Thus, a 
more appropriate definition of the corporate governance concept should include 
additional elements such as disclosure of board composition, including the number of 
independent directors on the board; composition of various committees of the board; 
and separation of chair of the board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO).  
CG is considered a mechanism that has an effect on the board of directors which 
controls the process of information disclosure in CARs (Gibbins et al., 1990). Also, 
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good CG plays a significant role in the process of building strong capital markets. It can 
raise public confidence in the capital markets and create confidence among all 
stakeholders of the organisation, so it has a positive impact on providing the required 
investments for existing corporations and also for tomorrow‘s new ones (investment 
report by Middle East and North Africa (MENA )-OECD Working Group 5 (2005)). In 
the investment community, the survey conducted by McKinsey and Company revealed 
that investors pay great attention to investing in companies which have good corporate 
governance practices. The McKinsey and Company survey (2000) defined good CG in a 
corporation as: 
  
 Having a majority of outside directors on the board with no management ties; 
 Holding formal evaluations of directors; 
 Being responsive to investor requests for information on governance issues; 
and  
 Directors holding a significant stockholding in the company and a large 
proportion of directors‘ pay in the form of stock options. 
In this sense, Colley et al. (2005) give an important definition regarding the governance 
model of a successful corporation typically including a number of characteristics such 
as: 
 An effective board of directors that carries out its responsibilities with integrity 
and competence. 
 A competent CEO hired by the board and given the authority to run the business. 
 Selection by the CEO of a good business in which to operate with the board‘s 
advice and consent.  
 A valid business concept created by the CEO and his/her management team, 
and, again with the board‘s advice and consent.  
 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the way in which a CG regime progresses 
is affected by some aspects such as company law, the reliability of the courts, audit and 
legal professions, the powers of the regulatory bodies, and overall the traditions of the 
country and the expectations of its people (Tricker, 2012).  
 
67 
 
After a brief discussion of the concept of CG and its importance, it is necessary to 
provide an overview of the empirical research on CG; this is the task of the next section. 
 
3.9.2 Previous Studies on Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure 
Researchers in accounting literature seem to be more interested in exploring the 
determinants which lead companies to disclose information on a voluntary basis to their 
stakeholders, by involving further factors based on the suggestion of previous studies 
(see for example Meek et al., 1995). In this context, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argued 
that it is important to study the effect of CG attributes and cultural factors to explore 
their influence on the disclosure behaviour since the research studies failed to address 
these issues. As an extension to the disclosure literature, an increasing number of 
studies focus on those attributes in advanced and less developed nations. Empirical 
researches in this area are varied and take different avenues. For example, some 
research studies concentrate on particular types of disclosure such as the quality of share 
option disclosure (e.g. Forker, 1992), while other studies discuss social accounting 
disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) and comprehensive ﬁnancial disclosures (Chen 
and Jaggi, 2000).  
The characteristics of a company‘s board have been used in prior studies. Some have 
captured board leadership and board composition (see for example UK: Forker, 1992; 
United States: Abbott et al., 2000; Hong Kong: Ho and Wong, 2001; Gul and Leung, 
2004; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Leung and Horwitz, 2004; Malaysia: Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Singapore: Eng and Mak, 2003; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; France: Lakhal, 
2005; Australia: Lim et al., 2007; China: Yuan and Xiao, 2007; and Kuwait: Alanezi, 
2011). However, other studies have considered the relationship between audit 
committee and extent of voluntary disclosure (see for example Malaysia: Abdullah and 
Nasir, 2004; Kenya: Barako et al., 2006; Kuwait: Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; 
and Bangladesh: Rouf, 2010).  
Even though ownership structure has been examined as an explanatory variable in the 
disclosure literature (e.g. Switzerland: Raffournier, 1995; and France: Depoers, 2000), 
this variable has been included in the CG literature to explore its influence on the 
process of a company‘s decisions such as voluntary disclosure behaviour. Lemmon and 
Lins (2003:1463) provided evidence that “ownership structure plays an important role 
in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders”. Several types of 
ownership have been addressed, such as managerial ownership (e.g. Singapore: Eng and 
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Mak, 2003; China: Yuan and Xiao,  2007; and Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Taiwan: 
Guan et al., 2007), institutional ownership (e.g. Malaysia: Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Kenya: Barako et. al., 2006), outside ownership (e.g. Hong Kong: Chen and Jaggi, 
2000), governmental ownership (e.g. Singapore: Mak and Li, 2001; Jordan: Naser et al., 
2002), and block-holder ownership (e.g. Singapore: Eng and Mak, 2003: Tsamenyi et 
al., 2007; and Egypt: Samaha and Dahawy, 2010). However, prior research yields 
mixed results. The following sections shed light on common CG mechanisms used in 
the literature.  
 
3.9.3 Board Characteristics  
It has been argued that the corporate governance mechanisms followed by companies 
have a significant effect on the composition and independence of the board as well as 
the establishment of board committees and their composition besides the other benefits 
such as board effectiveness. Company boards of directors, as natural persons, are not 
only agents of a company, but also act as trustees (Crowther and Jatana, 2005). The next 
section addresses some studies testing the influence of role duality on disclosure.  
 
3.9.3.1 Board Leadership (Role Duality)  
The duties and responsibilities of the chairman as a function are typically varied: to 
chair the board, run board meetings, and monitor the process of hiring, firing, 
evaluating, and compensating the CEO (Jensen, 1993). In the board chairman context, 
Jensen argues that chairmen should be independent in order to objectively perform the 
chair‘s functions. It has been argued that the combing the two positions reduces board 
independence since there is no individual powerful enough on the board to face the 
CEO and this may lead to increased CEO entrenchment (Goergen, 2012). Separating the 
titles may reduce agency costs and improve company performance (Brickley et al., 
1997). It is possible that the CEO may not properly carry out leadership tasks apart from 
his/her personal interest, so this leads to the creation of a conflict of interests in this 
case, which represents the perspective of agency theory. The IIF policies for best 
practice and transparency in emerging markets (2002) recognised this and 
recommended that the board chairman should be independent from company 
management. Therefore, separating the positions of chairman and CEO could be crucial 
for the effectiveness of monitoring the function of the board and improving the 
reporting quality (Forker, 1992). Also, separating the functions could help in mitigating 
the control of company management over the board (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 
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2004). In the US, Imhoff (2003) considers this and suggests that the US Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) must prohibit the CEO or any other past or current top 
manager of the corporation from acting as a chairman of the board of directors, from 
being involved in any way in the nomination of directors, or from being responsible for 
setting the board‘s agenda and meeting its requirements at the same time. 
Regarding the separation of the role of CEO and chairman, the OECD principles of CG 
(2004:63-64) stated that: “Separation of the two posts may be regarded as good 
practice, as it can help to achieve an appropriate balance of power, increase 
accountability and improve the board’s capacity for decision making independent of 
management”. The UK Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2006:4) also 
recommended the separation notion and declared that: “There should be a clear division 
of responsibilities at the head of the company between the running of the board and the 
executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. No one individual 
should have unfettered powers of decision”.  
Gul and Leung (2004) studied the effect of role duality and the percentage of expert 
non-executive directors on voluntary corporate disclosures in Hong Kong and realised 
that there is a negative correlation between the role duality and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, which supports the view that the role of chairman and CEO should be spilt. 
This is consistent with Haniffa and Cooke (2002), who studied the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure in Malaysia. The findings also support the literature showing that 
the extent of corporate governance disclosure is lower for Egyptian listed companies 
with duality in position (Samaha et al., 2012). However, the result is inconsistent with 
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), who investigated the association between some CG 
mechanisms and the extent of disclosure in Ireland and reported a positive association 
between those variables. In the Hong Kong context, Chau and Gray (2010) reported that 
the existence of an independent chairman has a positive role in mitigating the impact of 
independent non-executive directors and family ownership levels on voluntary 
disclosures. Further evidence from Hong Kong, the results of Chau and Leung‘s (2006) 
study, provided some important insights that the positive association between 
independent non-executive directors is stronger in companies with an independent 
chairman.  
In an extension of previous studies, Rouf (2010) studied the influence of role duality on 
the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 120 non-financial companies 
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in Bangladesh. He found that the increase in voluntary disclosure was positively related 
to board leadership. This is consistent with Rouf (2011), who conducted a similar study 
in the same country, but contrary to results documented by Huafang and Jianguo (2007) 
in China, who found that role duality was negatively associated with corporate 
disclosure. This is consistent with Cheung et al. (2010), who studied the effect of some 
CG elements on the extent of voluntary disclosure (VD) for major Chinese listed 
companies during 2004-2007. However, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) found that it had 
no effect on the disclosure practices of listed companies in Singapore.  
In Kuwait, a recent study testing the impact of CG mechanisms (proportion of non-
executive directors, proportion of family members on corporate board, role duality, and 
a voluntary audit committee) on the extent of voluntary disclosure was undertaken by 
Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010).  Using 76 items of information derived from 
previous studies (Cooke, 1989b; Meek et al., 1995; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Al-
Shammari, 2008), a disclosure index was constructed and applied to the annual reports 
of 170 non-financial and financial companies listed on the KSE in 2007. The results 
revealed that companies with role duality were not associated with voluntary disclosure. 
This finding is strongly consistent with those of Ho and Wong (2001) in Hong Kong, 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) in Singapore and Ghazali and Weetman (2006) in 
Malaysia.  
The previous study can be criticised for the methodological approach used. In Kuwait, 
the financial companies (banks, investment companies) should create an audit 
committee upon the Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) regulation in 2004 (see Chapter 4). 
Hence, the authors should use an audit committee terminology instead of ―voluntary 
audit committee‖. Another possible approach they could make is a comparison in terms 
of the existence of an audit committee mandatory and voluntary to explore which group 
discloses more information. 
In a more recent Kuwaiti study, Alanezi (2011) attempted to explore the CG 
characteristics that are most closely associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
the annual reports of non-financial companies. The selected variables were: cross-
directorships, CEO duality, and board size. A checklist including 51 items was applied 
to the CARs of 119 companies listed on the KSE at the end of 2007. Among variables 
used in interpreting variation in disclosure practices, cross-directorship was found to be 
the only explanatory variable. The result of duality in position is consistent with the 
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results obtained from emerging markets (see for example, Barako et al., 2006; Al-
Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Ghazali, 2010), that stated that this variable has no 
impact on voluntary disclosure, unlike the results reported for developed countries, such 
as those of Gul and Leung (2004), Lim et al. (2007), and Chau and Gray (2010). With 
regard to the association between board size and the amount of voluntary disclosure, the 
study result is inconsistent with other recent studies on the CG such as and Lim et al. 
(2007) in Australia, and Rouf (2010) in Bangladesh.   
A general conclusion which can stem from an overview of the literature is that the 
relationship between role duality and voluntary disclosure is mixed. Companies with 
duality disclose less voluntary information (e.g. United Kingdom: Forker, 1992; United 
States: Abbott et al., 2000; Hong Kong: Gul and Leung, 2004; France: Lakhal, 2005; 
China: Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). However, some studies reveal that there is no 
association between role duality and voluntary disclosure (e.g. Hong Kong: Ho and 
Wong, 2001; Spain: Arcay and Vazquez, 2005 (audit reference); Singapore: Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006; Malaysia: Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). The following section 
addresses the board composition factor. 
   
3.9.3.2 Board Composition (Non-Executive Directors) 
It is important for a corporation to have an effective board of directors in order to fulfil 
its responsibilities and goals. It is suggested that board composition is significantly 
associated with the incidence of corporate fraud (Uzun et al., 2004). Also, it is argued 
that the presence and involvement of non-executive directors (NED) on the board is an 
essential characteristic for an effective board. In this respect, NEDs on US boards, 
considered one vital approach, have been employed to control the agency problem 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). The main roles of NEDs are rooted in: preventing the 
undue exercise of power by executive directors, safeguarding shareholders‘ interests in 
the board‘s decision-making, contributing to strategic decision-making, and ensuring 
competitive performance (Pye, 2001). In this sense, the UK Combined Code on CG 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2006:3) stated that: 
“Non-executive directors should constructively challenge and help develop proposals on 
strategy. Non-executive directors should scrutinise the performance of management in 
meeting agreed goals and objectives and monitor the reporting of performance. They should 
satisfy themselves on the integrity of financial information and that financial controls and 
systems of risk management are robust and defensible. They are responsible for determining 
appropriate levels of remuneration of executive directors and have a prime role in 
appointing, and where necessary removing, executive directors, and in succession 
planning.”  
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However, the role of NEDs is not simple, and they need appropriate knowledge of the 
markets in which the company operates, skills, experience, and time to help them 
acquire a full understanding of the company‘s activities or environment. Also, some 
important needs should be available for NEDs such as appropriate guidance and training 
to help them discharge their responsibilities, therefore effectively practising to 
contribute to and support the board‘s performance (Ezzamel and Watson, 2005). In the 
United Kingdom, The Higgs report (2003:97) spotlighted the role, skills, and 
effectiveness of NEDs and affirmed that:   
“To be effective, non-executive directors need to be well-informed about the company and     
the external environment in which it operates, with a strong command of issues relevant to 
the business. A non-executive director should insist on a comprehensive, formal and tailored 
induction. An effective induction need not be restricted to the boardroom, so consideration 
should be given to visiting sites and meeting senior and middle management. Once in post, 
an effective non-executive director should seek continually to develop and refresh their 
knowledge and skills to ensure that their contribution to the board remains informed and 
relevant.”  
 
The report also concentrated on some of the personal attributes needed by NEDs: 
integrity and high ethical standards (as a prerequisite for all directors of the board), 
sound judgment, the ability and willingness to challenge and probe, and strong 
interpersonal skills. In this sense, the process of selection of ideal NEDs should consider 
“no crooks, no cronies, no cowards” (The Tyson Report, 2003:5). 
It is evident that an appropriate structure of the board is needed to promote its 
effectiveness and performance. This can be achieved by a balance between the number 
of executive and NEDs who sit on the board, since both groups of directors bring 
different but essential skills to the boardroom (Solomon, 2010). Also, the structure of a 
corporate board should reflect diversity and complementary perspectives. It should 
comprise of a mix of directors with different personalities and educational, occupational 
and functional backgrounds, but they must also be complementary. Moreover, a 
corporate board of directors that appoints ―clones‖ does not work and is even dangerous 
(Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004).    
In a study of independence of NEDs, Clifford and Evans (1997) classified board 
composition into three classes, namely: insider, grey area, and outsiders. They found 
evidence that 35 % of NEDs were engaged in transactions with their companies (i.e. 
grey area directors), which constitute a potential threat to their independence. Moreover, 
compliance with the Australian recommendations through involving NEDs on the board 
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does not mean that the company will not be governed by internal management. A 
similar conclusion can be applied to the combination of the audit committee.    
In this context, Crowther and Jatana (2005) focused on the internecine nature of NEDs‘ 
appointments. They reported that these people know each other as they know the 
directors of the organisation itself before appointment. So, it can be concluded that the 
independence of NEDs is subject to question in this case. One argument is that NEDs 
who sit on the same board long-term are likely to establish personal relationships with 
the managers of the company (or the dominant shareholder) they should monitor (Patelli 
and Prencipe, 2007). However, this criticism could increase in emerging markets, such 
as Kuwait, since the regulations do not offer guidance on the appointment or selection 
and role of NEDs, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.   
Regarding the quality of disclosure in annual reports, it has been argued that outside 
directors could affect the determining of a company‘s voluntary disclosure policy as 
well as having incentives to foster the disclosure of more information with greater 
transparency to the company‘s stakeholders. For example, Chen and Jaggi (2000), Eng 
and Mak (2003), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), and Chau and Gray (2010) documented 
that this type of director fosters the quality of disclosure. Beasley (1996) argued that 
companies with a higher number of outside directors reduce the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud.  On the other hand, Ajinkya et al. (2005) declared that companies with 
a higher proportion of outside directors on the board tend to disclose more information 
about management earning forecasts. Chen and Jaggi (2000) reported that the 
percentage of independent non-executive directors is positively related to the 
comprehensiveness of financial disclosures and this relationship is more likely to be 
weaker for family-dominated companies. Lim et al. (2007) found that companies with 
more independent boards disclose more information related to forward looking and 
company strategy. Another interesting conclusion is that board structure does not 
contribute to improving the level of non-financial and historical financial information. 
This contrasts with the conclusion reported by Samaha (2010), from an Egyptian 
information environment, who declared that the different components of CG disclosure 
are associated with board independence. In contrast, it is inconsistent with Barako et al. 
(2006), who found a negative association between them. On the other hand, companies 
with a higher proportion of independent outsider directors on the board may help to 
reduce the probability of corporate wrongdoing (Uzun et al., 2004).   
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In the Italian context, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) revealed that a positive relationship 
between percentage of independent directors (as an internal control mechanism) and 
extent of voluntary disclosure (as an external control mechanism). Based on a sample of 
104 companies listed on the Singapore Stock Market (SGX), Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006) also reached the same result. The findings of previous studies are consistent with 
the findings obtained from the Spanish, Irish, Malaysian, and Egyptian markets (Arcay 
and Vazquez, 2005; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Samaha 
and Dahawy, 2011). In this respect, Chau and Leung (2006:13) stated that ―the inclusion 
of a higher proportion of independent directors on corporate boards could result in 
more effective monitoring of boards and exert greater influence on management 
decision to set up audit committee”. Chau and Leung (2006) suggested that the 
proportion of independent directors affects the existence of audit committees; these 
results are in line with Huafang and Jianguo (2007) in China. Conversely, the ratio of 
audit committee members to total members on the board is not related to voluntary 
disclosures (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). Concerning the outcomes, in contrast, Barako et 
al. (2006), Eng and Mak (2003), and Rouf (2010) documented a negative association 
between proportion of independent NEDs and extent of voluntary disclosure. On the 
other side, some studies found no significant association between those variables (see, 
for example, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006).    
In the case of Australia, Lim et al. (2007) used data from 181 companies to examine this 
relationship. Following the classification of Meek et al. (1995), the authors developed a 
checklist composed of 67 voluntary items, and the study provided evidence of a positive 
correlation between board size and overall voluntary disclosure which is consistent with 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009).  
More recently, Samaha et al. (2012) studied the effect of a set of CG mechanisms on the 
extent of CG disclosure. They examined annual reports and websites of the most active 
100 companies on the Egyptian Stock Exchange (ESE). The study revealed that a higher 
proportion of NEDs on the board leads to an increase in the amount of CG disclosure, 
consistent with the previous Egyptian studies conducted by Samaha and Dahawy (2010, 
2011) and Samaha (2010). Concerning board size, the result is consistent with Alanezi‘s 
(2011) study, conducted in the Kuwaiti context, referred to earlier and showing no 
association between these variables. However, it is inconsistent with prior studies (e.g. 
Lim et al., 2007; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009).   
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3.9.3.3 The Board Committees (The Audit Committee)  
The audit committee is defined as a key element of an effective CG regime (Gramling et 
al., 2004) and the existence of this committee, as an indicator of the quality of CG, 
encourages the reliability of information provided by the internal audit; in addition, 
sufficient information should be supplied by the audit committee to the board of 
directors (Solomon, 2010). From an agency theory perspective, Haron et al. (2005) 
stated that the audit committee is likely to protect the interests of shareholders and 
works to make sure that managers fulfil their responsibilities upon their contracts. Felo 
et al. (2003) and Brennan and Solomon (2008) concentrated on the importance of audit 
committees as a cornerstone which improves the quality of financial reporting and 
accounting functions. It is argued that the presence of an audit committee and the 
independence of its members have significant influence on reducing the occurrence of 
corporate fraud (Uzun et al., 2004).   Song and Windram (2004) indicated that one of 
the audit committee‘s responsibilities is to act as a final safeguard and approve the 
financial statements prior to their release to shareholders and other stakeholders. The 
audit committee plays an affirmative role as a monitoring mechanism to foster the 
quality level of the information stream from the company as agent to the shareholder as 
owner (Bradbury, 1992). Therefore, the Smith Report (2003:3) highlighted the role of 
this committee: 
“While all directors have a duty to act in the interests of the company, the audit 
committee has a particular role, acting independently from the executive, to ensure that 
the interests of shareholders are properly protected in relation to financial reporting 
and internal control.”    
 
Additionally, the Smith Report emphasised that all members of the audit committee 
should be independent NEDs. CARs should include a separate section providing 
detailed information regarding the role and responsibilities of the audit committee and 
the actions taken to discharge those responsibilities.  
The Cadbury Report (1992) recommended that all companies should establish audit 
committees as the best practice of CG. The key responsibility of an audit committee, as 
a representative of the company board, is overseeing a company‘s financial reporting 
process, auditing the financial statements, enhancing the internal control function. It 
also plays an important role in directing independent communication with both external 
auditors and internal auditors as well as in facilitating communication between the 
board, external auditors and internal auditors (Klein, 2002; Colley et al., 2005; Chau 
and Leung, 2006). Due to a growing awareness of the crucial role of audit committee, a 
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number of companies have voluntarily established an audit committee in order to ensure 
effective communication between the corporate board and its external auditors (Rezaee, 
2002). However, the presence of an audit committee does not guarantee the quality of 
the GC or the reliability of financial reporting. There are some important points to be 
considered in the selection of audit committee members, such as their experience and 
independence in order to ensure the effectiveness of this committee.  
In this respect, Colley et al. (2005:40) stated that “audit committee members must be 
good judges of the character of the managers with whom they deal, and they must 
create a culture that minimizes the risk of strong or deceitful personalities cutting 
corners or not providing full disclosure”. Further, Solomon (2010:187) reveals that 
“the independence of (usually non-executive) directors sitting on audit committees is 
essential if this monitoring role is to be successful”. So, it can be concluded that the 
independence of committee members is necessary to ensure the efficiency of the audit 
committee as one of essential elements of good CG. In this context, CG literature 
provides evidence that companies with independent audit committees are less likely to 
suffer financial statements‘ fraud or earning management (e.g. Abbott et al., 2000; 
Bedard et al., 2004).  Moreover, the results of Jaggi and Leung‘s (2007) study, in Hong 
Kong, lend support to the idea that the effectiveness of the audit committee is 
significantly reduced when family members sit on corporate boards, more specifically 
when these members control the corporate board. Hence, there is a call for academic 
research to assess the effectiveness of audit committees (see, for example, Pucheta-
Martinez and Fuentes, 2007). The audit committee is employed in many developed 
economies, so there is a need to explore the effect of audit committee, as an internal 
monitoring mechanism, on the improvement of the quality of financial reporting in 
developing countries such as Kuwait, since it is still in the early stages of a transitional 
period of adopting CG culture and practices. 
Regarding research into disclosure and CG, there are several studies which seek to 
explore the association between the existence of audit committees and corporate 
disclosure. For example, a study conducted by Barako et al. (2006) to explore the 
correlation between the audit committee and voluntary disclosure was based on a 
sample of 43 companies listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE). They found that 
the presence of an audit committee is perceived to enhance the level of voluntary 
disclosure. This outcome is consistent with results in other recent studies from emerging 
markets (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Samaha and 
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Dahawy, 2010, 2011; Rouf, 2011) as well as with the findings of previous studies from 
economically advanced nations (Ho and Wong, 2001, in Hong Kong; Forker, 1992, in 
the United Kingdom) which provide evidence that the existence of an audit committee 
has a significantly positive impact on the level of voluntary disclosure. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the audit committee is considered a significant factor affecting voluntary 
disclosure practices in annual reports. However, Yuen et al. (2009) found that Chinese 
listed companies with an audit committee tend to disclose less voluntary information. 
Samaha (2010) and Samaha et al. (2012) did not find sufficient evidence to support this 
association.   
 
3.9.4 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure is considered a crucial element of the CG system, and a large set of 
studies examines its impact on voluntary disclosure policy. La Porta et al. (1999) 
classified companies based on ownership structure: a family, the state, a widely-held 
financial institution (e.g. bank, insurance company), a widely-held corporation, or a 
miscellaneous grouping. The argument here is that the legal environment, in which a 
company operates, has a significant impact on the composition or dispersion of 
corporate ownership. More specifically, when a country‘s regulations provide good 
protection of minority shareholders‘ rights, it will be common to find more widely-held 
companies (―diffusion of ownership‖), while less widely-held companies  will be more 
common in economies with poor shareholder protection rights. It has been proven that 
the sizes of capital market and ownership dispersion are positively associated with the 
degree of participants‘ protection (La Porta et al., 1997).  
As noted earlier, several aspects of corporate ownership structure are employed in 
accounting literature as explanatory variables to assess their effects on disclosure 
behaviour around the world. It is worth noting that disclosure literature classifies 
ownership structure into several categories, for instance, institutional ownership 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), outside ownership (Chen and Jaggi, 2000), governmental 
ownership (Naser et al., 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003), and block-holder ownership (Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). Most above 
mentioned studies provide empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that there 
is a significant and positive association between the extent of disclosure and each of 
governmental, foreign, and institutional forms of ownership. However, there is negative 
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association between managerial ownership and disclosure (for example, see Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Yuan and Xiao, 2007; Rouf, 2010). 
Institutional investors such as investment trusts and pension funds are considered major 
holders of equity in companies and their subsidisers. In most cases, this type of owner 
exercises their power to affect the company‘s strategic decisions. It has been argued that 
the large shareholders in some countries play a significant role in CG (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). They are expected to have significant power, which influences capital 
markets and company management as a result of the significant percentage which they 
hold in their portfolio: ―investee companies‖. For example, Mallin (1996) documents 
that in the UK, institutional investors hold between 65% and 75% of quoted companies, 
while the figure is between 47% and 50% in the US.  
In the institutional investors‘ context, the UK Combined Code (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2006:19 and 20) recommends that institutional investors should carry out the 
following points: 
 
1. Dialogue with companies: “Institutional shareholders should enter into a 
dialogue with companies based on the mutual understanding of objectives.”  
 
2. Evaluation of governance disclosures: “When evaluating companies’ 
governance arrangements, particularly those relating to board structure and 
composition, institutional shareholders should give due weight to all relevant 
factors drawn to their attention.”  
 
3. Shareholder voting: “Institutional shareholders have a responsibility to make 
considered use of their votes.”  
 
Hence, the institutional investors should act in the interests of their ultimate beneficiary. 
In fact, they have the responsibility to exercise their right to vote and should consider it 
as ―a fiduciary duty‖ Mallin (2001). Moreover, the power of large shareholders, such as 
institutional investors, derives from the degree of legal protection of their votes 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Consequently, institutional investors could emphasise their 
portfolio or their ownership; this will lead them to more monitoring and control of 
management in investee companies (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
It has been argued that companies with a large proportion of shares held by institutional 
investors may disclose more voluntary disclosure. El-Gazzar (1998) provides evidence 
supporting this. In the context of interim reports, Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) 
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provide evidence of a negative association between institutional ownership and interim 
disclosure. It is argued that managers in companies controlled by a wide set of outside 
shareholders will release more voluntary information to reduce agency costs. One 
common form of CG systems in business worldwide is the outsider system, which refers 
to systems of ﬁnance and corporate governance where the majority of large companies 
are owned by outside shareholders, such as ﬁnancial institutions or individual 
shareholders, whilst being governed by their managers.  This form is widespread in the 
UK and the US. These owners characterise the outsider system and exercise a 
significant influence on the company board (Solomon, 2010). On the other hand, 
Solomon (2010:197) stated that “the UK CG system is taking on the characteristics of 
an insider rather than an outsider system, with institutional investors becoming insiders 
who own and also control companies to some extent”. However, it has been argued that 
the majority of CG systems fall roughly within the insider and outsider models, sharing 
some attributes of both models (Solomon, 2010).  
In a comprehensive comparative study to assess the ownership structure of the 10 
largest corporations in 49 countries, La Porta et al. (1998) revealed that the concentrated 
ownership structure for a sample of 49 countries usually falls in the ―insider system‖. 
Ruland et al. (1990) tested the motivation of managers to disclose information related to 
forecasts of earnings. Their results show that the percentage of insider ownership in the 
company is the most important variable in distinguishing between reporting and non-
reporting companies regarding voluntary disclosure of management forecasts.  
In a regional and comparative study, Chau and Gray (2002) assessed the relationship 
between different aspects of ownership structure (outsider ownership and family or 
concentrated ownership) and the voluntary disclosures of companies listed on the Hong 
Kong and Singapore stock markets. Their results show a positive association between 
proportion of wider ownership and increased voluntary disclosure. They also 
documented that in Hong Kong (HK) the prevalence of ―insider‖ and family controlled 
companies is expected to be associated with lower levels of disclosure. In this context, 
Chau and Gray (2010) state that the family ownership in HK companies has significant 
influence on transparency levels and policy makers should consider this factor when 
developing regulations.  
Eng and Mak (2003) studied the impact of different ownership structure aspects 
(managerial ownership, block-holder ownership, and government ownership) on 
80 
 
voluntary disclosure. Their study concentrates on voluntary strategic, non-financial and 
financial information in the management discussion and analysis in the annual report. 
Their results showed ownership structure has an impact on the voluntary disclosure 
practices of 158 companies listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. Their findings 
support the notion that companies with less managerial ownership are expected to 
release more voluntary information. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and Samaha and 
Dahawy (2010) also reached the same conclusion. This is in line with Yuan and Xiao 
(2007), who investigated the impact of managerial ownership on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in China based on a principal-agent and proprietary costs perspectives. Eng 
and Mak (2003) found government ownership to be positively associated with voluntary 
disclosure. On the other hand, they found that different types of block-holder ownership 
(individuals, institutions/corporations and nominees) are not correlated to disclosure. 
Contrary to their hypothesis, an increase in the proportion of outside directors tends to 
reduce voluntary disclosure.  
In the Malaysian context, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) expanded in the work of 
previous studies by investigating different types of ownership structure: ownership 
concentration, number of shareholders, director ownership, and government ownership. 
Following the approach of Meek et al. (1995), Ghazali and Weetman constructed and 
developed a checklist of 53 items of information, classified into three main categories: 
strategic, financial, and corporate social responsibilities. The overall results showed that 
director ownership had a significant and negative relationship with total voluntary 
disclosure and all three disclosure categories. However, companies with a high 
proportion of executive directors‘ ownership were associated with decreased total 
voluntary disclosure only, consistent with the findings of Eng and Mak (2003) and 
Samaha and Dahawy (2010). Conversely, other ownership types do not appear as 
predictor variables. Family member on the board has a significant and negative 
relationship with overall level of voluntary disclosure only, consistent with Ho and 
Wong (2001) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002). With regard to government ownership, the 
conclusion is consistent with Naser and Al-Khatib (2000), Suwaidan et al. (2004), and 
Samaha and Dahawy (2010, 2011), who reported that companies with government 
ownership do not appear to disclose more information. In contrast, Wang et al. (2008) 
revealed that level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to proportion of state 
ownership, but less disclosure is expected by this type of company in Egypt (Rizk et al., 
2008).   
81 
 
In another study, Ghazali (2007) tested the influence of ownership structure on CSD in 
CARs by employing three ownership structures (ownership concentration, director and 
government ownerships). A checklist including 22 items, constructed based on previous 
studies (e.g. Hossain et al., 1994; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), was applied to annual 
reports of 87 non-financial companies. The results indicated that companies in which 
the executive and non-independent directors ―owner managed companies‖ hold a higher 
proportion of company‘s shares ―closely held companies‖ disclose less CSD 
information in their CARs. Providing further evidence about the role of Malaysian 
corporate boards in promoting voluntary disclosure, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) 
indicated that there is a negative association between CSD and boards dominated by 
executive directors. On the other hand, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) stated that companies 
with a chairman having multiple directorships tend to disclose more information about 
their social responsibilities and activities. Regarding shareholder types, Ghazali (2007) 
also stated that companies in which the government is considered a major shareholder 
revealed more CSD information, which is consistent with author‘s proposition. The 
results also indicate that companies disclosed, on average, approximately 25% of the 
items contained in the checklist which is considered a low level. However, this result is 
consistent with Khasharmeh and Suwaidan (2010) in the GCC countries, referred to 
earlier. Hence, it could be suggested that the preparers of CARs in GCC countries and 
Malaysia may have similar considerations and objectives to disclose social activities in 
their CARs. Moreover, they could employ similar types of social information to express 
their social responsibilities toward societies. However, this result is lower than the 
results reported in other Middle East studies (e.g. Suwaidan et al., 2004).    
Guan et al. (2007) evaluated GC issues in Taiwan by using a sample of 45 listed 
companies. Their study focused on the impacts of ownership structure: managerial 
ownership, block-holder ownership, institutional ownership, director ownership, and 
outside directors on the disclosure level. To test voluntary disclosure practices, an index 
was constructed consisting of 57 information items (including 37 items for CARs and 
20 for websites). The study provided evidence of a negative association of block-holder 
ownership with corporate disclosure, consistent with Tsamenyi et al. (2007), who used a 
sample of 22 listed companies to evaluate CG practice in Ghana. However, institutional 
ownership and director ownership are found to be positively related with disclosure 
levels. The findings of institutional ownership are inconsistent with Donnelly and 
Mulcahy (2008), who find no proof that ownership structure is associated with 
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voluntary disclosure. The findings of director ownership variable are consistent with 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006). On the other hand, they indicate that the institutional 
ownership variable plays a crucial role in enhancing the information transparency level. 
The authors also suggested that the corporate board acts as ―an effective internal CG 
mechanism‖.  
The main conclusion to be drawn from a review of the literature on ownership is that 
every aspect of ownership is distinguished by some shortcomings and may cause serious 
CG problems. For example, insider ownership could reduce monitoring problems. 
However, this type of ownership structure leads to an increase in the levels of control 
over a company by a specific stakeholder group due to the low level of separation 
between management and ownership, and so tends to ignore the interests of other 
groups such as minority shareholders. Additionally, there can be abuse of power 
(Solomon, 2010). Consequently, minority shareholders could suffer problems in getting 
information about a company‘s activities.  
 
3.10 CONCLUSION: THE GAP IN THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of main objectives of the review of relevant literature is to identify the gap and 
limitations in the research. Based on the previous discussion, it can be concluded that 
disclosure in CARs is usually inadequate to meet the needs of user groups for 
accounting information (Alsaeed, 2006; Chatterjee, 2007) and more specifically in 
developing countries.  
This leads to a statement that, to be able to make sound decisions, user groups require 
more information than is available in the CARs. Thus, improved corporate disclosure 
would lead to a reduction in ―the disclosure gap‖ (Rouf, 2010). From a closer look at 
studies exploring the usefulness of information and the importance of CARs, it can be 
inferred that most studies have been conducted in the economically advanced nations. 
The developing countries do not receive great attention from researchers, and few 
studies focus on this part of the world. Therefore, little is known about the behaviour of 
those groups in emerging markets. In the user groups‘ context, Zoysa and Rudkin 
(2010) argued that the majority of previous studies examined very few groups, in most 
cases one or two, resulting in limited knowledge about the perceptions and views of 
user groups.          
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It has been argued that the main user groups of information in developed capital markets 
are different from those in emerging ones (Wallace, 1993). In addition, Ngangan et al. 
(2005) provided empirical evidence supporting Wallace‘s view that user groups from 
developed and developing countries differ in terms of how they rate the importance of 
disclosure items. This might be due to different factors: political, cultural, economic, 
diversity in decisions, and social (e.g. Jaggi, 1975; Firth, 1978; Chang et al., 1983; 
Gray, 1985).  
Although two studies explored the perception of annual report users in Kuwait, there is 
a need for more research in this area. This is based on two reasons. Firstly, the KSE is 
criticised by some international bodies on the following points: commercial regulations 
do not provide enough protection to market participants; the lack of disclosure 
requirements thus lead to the emergence of disclosure problems such as those related to 
the percentage of ownership in listed companies and related parties issues. Hence, the 
Kuwaiti government made some extensive and significant changes in the capital market 
environment (for more details, see Chapter 4). Secondly, from the legitimacy theory 
perspective, societies change over time, so organisations should respond to these 
changes in order to conform to the value systems of the society in which they perform 
their activities. Unerman and Bennett (2004) argued that the expectations of stakeholder 
groups, as a part of society, change over time; hence, organisations must continually 
adapt their operations and report their activities based on these circumstances. In this 
sense, Deegan et al. (2000) argued that companies tend to change their disclosure 
policies over time, based on social events. Therefore, user groups differ in their 
information needs, and these needs may change with time, providing a good opportunity 
to explore users‘ information needs for making economic decisions from one period of 
time to another.   
Regarding voluntary disclosure and CG literature, academic studies in this area have 
largely examined the influence of company characteristics and CG mechanisms on the 
extent of disclosure and the various types of voluntary corporate disclosure. However, 
much prior research has concentrated on developed countries and East Asian countries. 
In contrast, very few studies have examined the voluntary disclosure and corporate 
governance practices in developing countries such as the Middle East, and more 
specifically the Gulf region. 
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It should be noted that most disclosure literature covers a single period of time, e.g. one-
year data only. On the other hand, some studies discuss disclosure practices over two-
year data to evaluate the level of improvement. However, conducting a longitudinal 
study on a yearly basis contributes to a better understanding of a phenomenon such as 
disclosure level and its components as well as tracking trends and changes in the 
phenomenon over the examined years. It has been argued that the difference of 
conclusions in studies suggests the need for individual country studies and comparative 
analysis (Samaha and Dahawy, 2011).    
The present study extends and contributes to prior work by assessing the perception and 
view of four user groups regarding the perceived importance of the corporate annual 
report as a crucial source of information amongst other sources and by exploring the 
usefulness of a set of voluntary proposed information to be included in the annual 
reports. This may improve the quality of disclosure and increase the level of corporate 
transparency in annual reports of listed companies. On the other hand, this study also 
extends previous studies by exploring the effect of a comprehensive set of company and 
governance characteristics on the voluntary disclosure practices in Kuwait as an 
example of an emerging market. This could help to identify the factors that dominate 
the disclosure strategies of companies listed on the KSE.  
In the practical implications‘ context, the study‘s findings would be useful to corporate 
boards, regulators, market participants, and should be of interest to academic 
researchers, policy makers and planners for improving disclosure policies, ensuring a 
higher level of transparency in companies‘ information, and setting up/developing 
corporate governance codes of best practice. Consequently, this may help to increase 
stakeholders‘ confidence in the capital market, especially ―national and international 
investors‖, so may encourage them to invest more in the KSE. On the international 
level, the results may yield sufficiently interesting conclusions to emerging markets, 
especially Middle East countries that have a similar social, political, and economic 
environment.  
The following chapter concentrates on the role of the Kuwaiti government regulatory 
bodies and legislative framework, and on the accounting and auditing profession in 
affecting the shape of financial reporting and the disclosure of information provided by 
companies listed on the KSE.     
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TRANSPARENCY REPORT 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The relative importance of capital markets in different countries varies greatly and is, in 
part, dependent on size. Irrespective of size, however, market success is crucially linked 
to reputation, or degree of confidence attained among the public, investors, and 
governmental bodies. In this respect, capital markets are arguably measured according 
to their level of transparency, the credibility of information provided to current and 
prospective investors, and the ability of monitoring bodies to protect all parties 
involved. Hacimahmutoglu (2007:131) states that: 
 “As the equity capital emerges, as an essential corporate finance mechanism in 
emerging markets and Europe, the regulation of companies that provides adequate 
protection for the minority shareholders’ and investors’ interests enables companies to 
access the equity capital in the global market”.  
     
The amount and types of accounting information disclosed by companies varies from 
one state to another depending on the development and sophistication of the capital 
market, the development of the accounting and auditing profession, and the application 
of legislation in the state (Suwaidan, 1997). Two types of pressures influence 
accounting information, namely: market pressures and regulatory bodies‘ pressures 
(Inchausti, 1997). In this respect, the form of company accounting and reporting 
practices are also affected both indirectly and directly by entry into capital markets 
(Choi, 1973, Cooke, 1989a).   
Chapter 3 discussed accounting research conducted in different countries to explain 
companies‘ voluntary disclosure practices. It also addressed a number of prior studies 
dealing with the adequacy of disclosure in published CARs as a source of information in 
the view of user groups. The main motivation of the current chapter is to provide brief 
background information on Kuwait and its economy, on some aspects of the KSE, and 
on the emergence of the capital markets authority (CMA). Moreover, this chapter 
discusses the role of legislation and the auditing profession as main factors influencing 
the reporting practices of listed companies in Kuwait, providing a fundamental 
backdrop against which to develop further research agendas in transparency and 
governance in the Middle East region.  
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4.2 COUNTRY BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC OVERVIEW 
Kuwait is a Middle Eastern country on the Arabian Gulf bordered on the north by Iraq 
and on the south by Saudi Arabia. Its area is approximately 17,818 square kilometres of 
desert. Kuwait is a small, oil-rich country, governed by a constitutional hereditary 
emirate, with six administrative divisions or governorates, operating a civil law system, 
with Islamic law significant in personal matters. The formation of political parties is 
forbidden by the constitution; however, a number of de facto political groups exist, 
constituting a varied spectrum of legislative blocs operating in the National Assembly 
such as tribal groups, merchants, Shiite activists, Islamists and secular liberals.  
Economically, Kuwait is a relatively open economy with self-reported crude oil reserves 
of about 104 billion barrels, about 7% of world reserves. Oil represents nearly half of 
GDP, 95% of export revenues, and 95% of governmental income. The GDP (purchasing 
power parity) of Kuwait is $155.5 billion with a real growth rate of 8.2% and the GDP 
per capita is $42,200. Kuwait‘s climate limits agricultural development; consequently, 
with the exception of fish, it depends almost wholly on food imports. Agriculture, 
therefore, accounts for 0.3% of the GDP composition, while industry accounts for 
47.4% and services represent 52.3%. The labour force across all sectors represents a 
combined total of 2.243 million, of which only 40% are Kuwaiti nationals. 
Unemployment rates are 2.2%, and none of the population lives below the poverty line. 
Inflation rates have reached 4.7%, while gross fixed investment is 26.1% of GDP. 
Revenues and expenditures in the national budget are $108.30 billion and $58.06 billion 
respectively, while public debt represents 6.5% of GDP. (www.cia.gov, 25 October, 
2012).   
Having provided a general context for the country‘s economic position, the next section 
will review the main aspects of Kuwait‘s regulatory environment.  
 
4.3 THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT: THE KUWAIT STOCK 
EXCHANGE (KSE)  
 
4.3.1 Background 
The KSE, established in 1944, is the oldest stock market in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) region (The Hawkamah Institute (HI) and the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF) Report, 2007), yet its governing legislation, issued in 1983, lags behind 
the developments of its trading activities. The 1983 laws have not been updated to 
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follow the rapid development either of local business or in regulatory environments 
elsewhere in the world. Table 4.1 shows trading activity changes in the KSE for the last 
seven years. In 2009, the KSE achieved a record number of shares traded, 106,332 
million, making  2009 the most active year of trading. It has been argued that increased 
trading volume leads market participants to demand more information from companies 
(Gray et al., 1984; Doupnik and Salter, 1995, as cited in Haddad, 2005).    
 
Table 4.1: Changes in Trading Activities in the KSE during the Period 2005-2011 
Year Market 
index 
Volume of 
shares 
traded 
Million 
Value of  
shares 
traded 
KD 
Million 
No. of share 
dealings 
Thousand 
No. of listed 
companies 
Market 
capitalisation 
KD  
Million 
2005 11,445 52,246 28,422 1,956 162 30,396 
2006 10,067 37,658 17,284 1,486 181 30,979 
2007 12,559 70,438 37,010 2,102 197 33,837 
2008 7,783 80,851 35,747 1,998 205 30,726 
2009  7,005 106,332 21,829 1,939 206 27,722 
2010  6,956 74,692 
 
12,526 1,254 
 
215 33,679  
2011 58,142 38,423 60,683 6,184 215 24,053 
Source: Kuwait Stock Exchange annual reports (2005-2011) One Kuwaiti Dinar (KD) roughly equals $3 
Dollars 
 
Table 4.2 presents data relating to the number of companies listed on the KSE for the 
years 2005-2011. At the end of 2010, the service sector leads other sectors in terms of 
number of companies, representing 28% of total listings. The investment and real estate 
sectors come second and third, with 51 and 39 companies representing 24% and 18%, 
respectively. A noticeable increase in number of companies listed on the KSE is 
observed. This arguably generates more demand for auditing services on the one hand 
and greater monitoring and oversight efforts from regulatory bodies on the other. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the development of capital markets greatly 
impacts the accounting environment (Haddad, 2005).              
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Table 4.2: Changes in Industrial Sectors and Number of Companies on the KSE 
during the Period 2005-2011 
Sector 
Number of listed companies  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Banking sector 8 9 9 9 9  9   9 
Investment sector 39 43 43 46 47 51 51 
Insurance sector 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Real estate sector 28 29 34 35 35  39  39 
Industry sector 23 25 27 28 28 29 28 
Services sector 33 45 53 57 58 60  61 
Food sector 5 5 6 6 6 6  6 
Non-Kuwaiti companies  15 17 17 16 15 14 13 
Investment funds 4 1 1 1 1 - 1 
Total of KSE listed companies 162 181 197 205 206 215 215 
Source: Kuwait Stock Exchange annual reports (2005-2011)  
 
According to the above discussion, the increase in the size of the capital market in 
Kuwait over these years reinforces the need to update the legislation and regulations 
that govern it. 
Together with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) and the Central Bank of 
Kuwait (CBK), the KSE aims to coordinate and integrate financial and economic 
activities and capital movements in Kuwait in order to achieve national economic 
development and financial stability. The KSE‘s continuous development of its share 
trading systems and methods and its adoption of modern techniques has enabled it to 
achieve high financial status at both regional and international levels. Recently, the KSE 
entered into an agreement with the NASDAQ-OMX (the Swedish stock market) to 
develop the KSE‘s trading system and to train its technical staff. The new trading 
system is launched in the second quarter of 2012 (as published on the KSE website, 
2012). However, for the KSE to fully accomplish its responsibilities and duties, and to 
achieve the goals for which it was established on an on-going basis, there is clearly a 
need to continually improve, adapt and refine its regulations and guidelines to facilitate 
a well-functioning and transparent trading environment year after year. The following is 
a brief discussion of the main features of the KSE.  
 
4.3.2 KSE Legislation  
The KSE is organised by the Amiri Decree issued in August 1983, as amended by the 
Amiri Decree No. 158 of 2005, and the Ministerial Decree No. 35 of 1983. These laws 
govern the general framework of the KSE and established a KSE Committee with 
responsibility for setting its rules, general strategies and policies and managing the 
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market. This dual role of the KSE Committee to both monitor and manage the market is 
considered by many bodies and specialists to be a significant defect. In most other 
countries, responsibility for monitoring the market is vested in a separate body from that 
issuing regulations and executing processes. Consequently, it is rare for the KSE 
Committee to disclose any irregularities and defects in the management of the market.  
 
4.3.3 KSE Listing Requirements   
The Kuwaiti legislator has revised the rules and conditions for listing companies on the 
KSE several times in recent years. The latest revision is Resolution No. 2 of 2008, and 
the KSE‘s website publishes the KSE Committee‘s requirements for a company to gain 
listing of its shares on the market. Among the most important of these are the following: 
 
1. The company‘s issued capital should be fully paid and should not be less than $30 
million, and the total of shareholders‘ equity shall not be less than 115% of the weighted 
average of the paid-up capital in the last two fiscal years, according to the annual 
audited financial statements prior to the listing request and approved by the company‘s 
General Assembly (Article 2). 
2. The company shall have achieved a net income in the last two fiscal years, and the 
yearly net income shall not be less than 7.5% of the weighted average of the paid-up 
capital at the end of each fiscal year (Article 4). 
3. Of the company‘s capital, 30% should be distributed to a number of shareholders 
according to the schedule guide accredited by the KSE Committee; otherwise, 30% of 
the company‘s capital shall be offered for private placement by a specialised company 
independent from the company requesting listing (Article 7). 
4. The company should attain the approval of its General Assembly to list its shares on 
the KSE (Article 8). 
5. The company‘s board shall pledge to adhere to all the rules and regulations set by the 
KSE, and to provide the KSE management with all the required data and information 
(Article 9). 
6.  The company shall provide its shareholders‘ registry to the clearing company (CL) 
and adhere to all the instructions issued by the KSE in this regard. (Article 10) 
7. A non-Kuwaiti company must be listed in its country of origin‘s stock market 
(Article 11). 
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4.3.4 The KSE Committee 
The KSE Committee was formed by a resolution of the Council of Ministers (CM) 
based on the proposal of the MCI. It has the authority to issue the necessary rules and 
procedures regarding the following issues: 
 
1. Dealing, supervision, and monitoring in securities. 
2. Reviewing listing requests by brokers and the shares of listed companies, or any 
other securities in the market and reaching a decision regarding the requests.  
3. Monitoring of the deal funds and investment portfolios in securities listed on the 
market. 
4. Monitoring, preparation, and disclosure of financial statements and results for listed 
companies and investment funds. 
5. Making regulations about the acquisition of a significant percentage of company 
capital. 
6. Making regulations to prevent dealing based on inside or undeclared information, or 
conflicts of interest. 
7. Making regulations about professional ethics and the obligation of confidentiality by 
the staff of the market and the companies that operate in securities. 
 
The committee is made up of 11 members representing various bodies, as shown in 
Table 4.3. 
 
Table: 4.3 Members of the KSE Committee 
 
Names of Bodies Member Position 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry Chairman of Committee 
Manager of the KSE Vice Chairman of Committee 
Ministry of Finance  One member 
Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) One member 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) One member 
Council of Ministers (CM) Two members with high level of experience and 
competence chosen by the Council of Ministers upon 
nomination by the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry 
Kuwait Chamber of Commerce & Industry 
(KCCI) 
Four members selected by the KCCI and will include 
a broker  
 
As depicted in Table 4.3, the Minister acts as the Chairman of the Committee, with the 
Manager of the KSE as Deputy. It has a three-year span, which is subject to renewal. 
The CM determines all remuneration and financial rights for the members of the 
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Committee. The Chairman submits to the CM a detailed report every three months on 
the work of the KSE and the status of investors, as well as analysing the KSE‘s 
performance in the light of the general policies of the state over the long term. 
In terms of sanctions against violators, the Amiri Decrees of 1983 and 2005, which 
regulate the KSE, set out penalties and sanctions to be enforced by an independent KSE 
committee. At its own discretion, it can impose any of the following penalties: 
1. Alert. 
2. Warning.  
3. Suspension for a period determined by the Committee, and cancellation of   
transactions following the violation.  
4. Confiscation, all or in part, of bank guarantees.                                                               
5. Imposition of prohibitions on dealing in shares issued by companies or bodies that 
violate the regulations until the causes of the violation are dealt with.  
6. Cancellation of membership. 
7.  If the violator is a buyer, s/he must deposit the cash value of the shares to be traded 
with a clearing company before the buying transaction. 
 
In addition to the previous legislations related to the KSE, the next section discusses the 
disclosure framework covered in the commercial regulations such as the disclosure of 
ownership interests.   
 
4.3.5 Status of Disclosure and Transparency Requirements in the KSE 
Kuwait‘s legal framework asserts that companies are legally responsible for the 
immediate disclosure of all material information to the KSE and to the public via the 
media, such as newspapers. Furthermore, companies are accountable for the accuracy of 
information they publish since it may influence the prices of shares. The KSE listing 
requirements oblige companies to disclose information regarding specific issues 
including: the acquisition or disposal of subsidiary or associated companies‘ related-
party transactions, and changes in ownership structure. 
The KSE Committee Resolution No. 5, issued in 1999 regarding the declaration of 
interest in the shares of companies listed on the KSE, focuses on the minimum 
percentage of ownership required for disclosure. It obliges companies to disclose the 
ownership of any concentrated interest of 5% or more of its shares and to reveal the sale 
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procedures for any deal exceeding 5% of outstanding shares. In 2006, the Committee of 
Promoting Transparency (CPT) on the KSE, which is a part of the public benefit society 
―Transparency Society-Kuwait‖, issued its report on the status of the KSE. This stated 
the resolution‘s limitations, including not specifying the type of information to be 
disclosed, not dealing with conflicts of interest, and not covering any issues related to 
the disclosure of interests in joint ventures. Thus, the deficiencies of the disclosure 
requirements under the current legislation provide an opportunity for the exploitation of 
‗inside information‘, This permits the whole issue of what information is covered by the 
requirements and the correct timings of information disclosure under the requirements 
to be at the discretion of the board or the KSE Committee.  
Furthermore, the CPT also stated another weakness of the disclosure legislation is the 
lack of criminal sanction to deter or punish violators. The only penalties involve 
excluding the shares of the violator from the quorum needed to convene the General 
Meeting, removal of the right to vote on the company‘s resolutions for two elections or, 
in extreme cases, depriving the offender of the right to run for membership of the board 
for two elections. Certainly, these sanctions against the breach of the disclosure law in 
Kuwait are not considered strong enough to act as meaningful deterrents. In fact, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) encouraged Kuwait to adopt its code regarding 
Good Practices on Transparency in Fiscal Policy. However, IMF reports show that 
Kuwait does not currently follow these practices (Estandards Forum, 2009).   
The modernisation of the Kuwaiti disclosure process remains critical. In order to 
develop an efficient and effective regulatory regime, an essential part of ensuring the 
validity of the trading climate both now and in future, there is a crucial need to improve 
the governance and operation of the regulatory authorities themselves as well as a clear 
need for more regulations to achieve the protection of investors and improve 
international confidence in the KSE. Additionally, it seems that “changes need to be 
made to the disclosure regime but this should not be a matter of seeking more 
disclosure, but more useful disclosure” (Dallara, 2008:340). Consequently, the 
existence of effective law relating to the proper and timely disclosure of interests and 
related party transactions, with the accompanying meaningful enforcement of law, 
would help both to protect the stakeholders and to enhance capital market development 
through increasing the amount of truthful and reliable information provided. 
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In the following section, the assessment of legislative and regulatory frameworks in 
Kuwait will be discussed in light of a number of international bodies and studies. 
 
4.3.6 Showcasing the Need to Improve the Legislative and Regulatory Framework  
In 2004, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a comprehensive report 
assessing the general status of the KSE‘s regulations. This stated that Kuwait has only 
partly implemented 25 International Organisation of Securities Commission‘s (IOSCO) 
principles for effective shares regulations, whilst not implementing the remaining five 
principles in any form. These untouched principles are key, as they relate to the role and 
responsibilities of the regulatory body and its independence. The lack of implementation 
is the result of the Kuwaiti regulatory environment not meeting the principles required 
by IOSCO, creating serious gaps in the country‘s legislative framework. Moreover, the 
report states that the key structural shortcoming amongst all others is the absence of an 
independent regulatory body that can supervise the KSE. Thus, the KSE has been 
criticised on the ground that “the exchanges were initially self-regulating − the Kuwait 
Stock Exchange largely still is − but the need for an independent regulatory body was 
soon perceived” Seznec and Kirk (2010: 46).   
The HI and the IIF report (2007:15) stated that: 
“In Kuwait, the enforcement of legal requirements needs improvement. Kuwait’s 
regulatory environment and its enforcement comply with just over one-third of IIF 
corporate governance guidelines. The KSE currently assumes the oversight and regulatory 
responsibilities for the market. However, plans are underway to create an independent 
capital market regulator. The adoption of an independent regulator is crucial to the 
improvement of the regulatory environment in the country”. 
 
In this respect, Bouresli (2009) revealed that there were no real signs of improvement in 
the infrastructure of the KSE between 2004 and 2009. In particular, she argued that the 
KSE needs to rapidly establish a comprehensive body of legislation constructed with 
focus yet with the necessary breadth to solve all shortcomings in its existing laws and 
regulations. Bouresli (2009) highly recommended modifying the organisational 
structure of the KSE, by establishing a monitoring body for the capital market to be 
responsible for overseeing the activity of all participants in the capital market. To be 
effective, however, this body must command all the necessary powers to perform its 
duties and to comply with the standards of the IOSCO. 
International volumes of trade among countries and engagement with international 
organisations have a significant impact on the development of the regulatory regime and 
95 
 
accounting practices adopted in Kuwait. The IMF, The HI, and IIF have all proposed 
suggestions for improving Kuwait‘s regulatory and legislative environment. These 
proposals, even if not implemented immediately, collectively serve to aid the process of 
improving the protection of shareholders and, in turn, thereby enhancing investor 
confidence in the transparency and fairness of the KSE. In 2003, the IMF carried out a 
Financial Sector Assessment Programme regarding Kuwait and in 2004 published its 
Financial System Stability Assessment report. This indicated that the Kuwaiti 
government should focus on the development of its regulatory regime, since current 
legislation is based on outdated laws. The report also highlighted the urgent need to 
establish an independent body to take over the supervision of the capital market and to 
contribute to the development of capital market laws. Consistent with international 
directives, the Kuwaiti government established such a body in the Capital Markets 
Authority (CMA). The next section addresses its introduction.        
 
4.3.7 The Emergence of the Capital Markets Authority and its Objectives  
In early 2010, following approval by the National Assembly, the Kuwaiti legislator 
enacted a law leading to the establishment of a Capital Markets Authority (CMA). 
Overall, the main objectives of Law No. 7 are to solve all the areas of regulatory 
shortfall existing in the legislation covering the KSE and any troublesome overlapping 
in the jurisdiction of monitoring among regulatory bodies, by separating their tasks.  
In addition, the new law includes proposals to establish a new court called the ―Stock 
Exchanges Court‖. In fact, the establishment of such a specialized court to settle 
disputes in capital market affairs would make it easier to mediate and conclude legal 
disagreements that may arise as a result of application of the provisions of this law. 
Supporting this, Lopez-de-Silanes (2004) argued that the development of capital 
markets significantly depends on an important factor: namely the creation of laws that 
help to facilitate enforcement and the improvement of court procedures that allow for a 
more efficient dispute resolution process. The existence of laws and regulations assists 
in providing legal shareholder protection and economic growth; however, this objective 
cannot be reached without quality law enforcement (La Porta et al., 2000). The Kuwaiti 
government should consider this.  
The CMA‘s main objectives can be summarised as follows:  
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 To organise trading in shares through an approach that suitably reflects principles of 
fairness, competitiveness, and transparency.  
 To educate and increase public awareness of the benefits of investment in the KSE, its 
risks, and promote the obligations related to investment in shares to generally 
encourage such investment. 
 To provide protection to market participants involved in the trading of companies‘ 
shares or other securities.  
 To implement policies of full disclosure to ensure fairness and transparency, to 
prevent conflict of interests and to the stop exploitation of internal information by 
individuals who have potential access to non-public information about the company. 
 To ensure compliance with laws and regulations by all market participants in the 
capital market and to specifically enforce rules related to the trading of companies‘ 
shares.  
 
4.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS IN KUWAIT  
Specialist international organisations around the world (e.g. the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] and Institute of International 
Finance [IIF]) have made significant efforts to set universally recognised codes of 
corporate governance. Countries worldwide can adopt these principles as is or as 
guidelines to construct local codes. The key factor why companies prefer to apply 
principles of corporate governance is to enhance their reputations globally and locally, 
to attract well-educated and well-experienced individuals, and to draw positive attention 
from current and expected suppliers and current and future investors. At a government 
level, the application of these codes could aid in obtaining international loans and 
attracting greater local and foreign capital to invest in their capital markets. Therefore, 
the application of these principles becomes a good indicator of strengthening confidence 
in an area and the stability of its capital markets, in addition to the obvious confidence 
which comes from the increase of efficient company performance to achieve greater 
profits.  
The following discussion sheds some light on private international organisations, with 
their essential work and effort to promote the protection of shareholders‘ and investors‘ 
interests in emerging capital markets. In February 2002, the IIF issued policies for 
improving corporate governance and transparency in emerging countries. The practical 
IIF code of corporate governance covers widespread elements: minority shareholder 
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protection, responsibilities of the board of directors, accounting and auditing, 
transparency of ownership and control, and the regulatory environment. In order to 
improve these crucial elements, the IIF established a number of specialised service and 
advisory groups. 
The first type of group is Governance in Equity Markets (GEM), which works to help 
capital markets in emerging countries in the following aspects: improving their 
corporate governance and listing requirements, increasing investor confidence in listed 
companies, and attracting a larger number of issuers. The second type of group, the 
Equity Advisory Group (EAG), attempts to enhance corporate practices in emerging 
market countries by promoting the IIF code of corporate governance (IIF code), 
assessing emerging market corporate governance frameworks (country-specific reports), 
and consulting stock exchanges to improve equity markets (gem assessments) (all of the 
preceding objectives are based on information taken directly from the IIF‘s website).  
In this respect, Gregory (2002:1) stated that “IIF asserts that improving corporate 
governance in emerging market economies is essential for building investor confidence 
and stimulating private capital flows. The IIF policies and code are written from the 
perspective of investors and asset managers in emerging markets, and are intended as a 
flexible guide for securities regulators, stock exchange authorise, corporate boards of 
directors and managements in emerging markets”.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles of 
corporate governance arise from the separation between ownership and control, the 
mainstay of Anglo-American corporate governance strategy (OECD, 2004). The IIF‘s 
principles of corporate governance and transparency in emerging capital markets, 
however, stem from divergent interests between managers and shareholders, and also 
from a desire to reduce the potential for conflicts of interest between them, as company 
shareholders cannot fully monitor and follow the fast changing activities of company 
managers (IIF, 2002). The IIF (2003) asserts that modifications of the IIF code follow 
the latest improvements and changes in corporate governance and in legal aspects by 
developed countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom (IIF, 2003).  
In 2007, the HI and IIF published their report about an empirical study to assess the 
general status of the legislative regime and CG practices in Kuwait. This sheds light on 
the central steps that Kuwaiti regulators need to take to enhance the investment 
environment. It also identifies major gaps in the Kuwaiti corporate governance 
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framework such as the protection of minority interests and the improvement of 
disclosure requirements. 
 
4.5 THE STATUS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN LIGHT 
OF COMMERCIAL REGULATIONS 
All companies listed on the KSE must comply with the regulations and laws issued by 
three bodies: namely, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI), the Central Bank 
of Kuwait (CBK) and the KSE. Listed companies should submit audited annual 
financial statements within three months of the end of the financial year to each of these 
monitoring bodies, which then inspect them for compliance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards‘ (IFRS) requirements and national regulations. Although the 
enforcement authorities endeavour to be active in Kuwait, the short time period 
available to review the companies‘ financial statements − sometimes as little as three 
weeks before the annual general meeting − makes it inherently difficult to perform their 
duties adequately. Additionally, the CBK depends on the audit report for monitoring 
compliance with IFRS and other regulations (Al-Shammari, 2005; Alanezi, 2006). Al-
Shammari (2005) also reported no meaningful co-ordination between the respective 
surveillance departments of the MCI and the KSE. 
In Kuwait, four major sources of laws and regulations are within the scope of this study, 
as they give more attention to the topics of listed companies, the capital market, general 
requirements for disclosure and current CG practices. These are as follows:  
 
1. Commercial Companies Law (CCL) No. 15 of  1960 (as amended) 
2. Law No. 6 of 1962, which was issued to organise the accounting profession and 
amended by Law No. 3 of 1965 and by Law No. 5 of 1981 on the practice of the 
auditing profession 
3. Kuwait Stock Exchange law ―Amiri Decree issued in August 1983, as amended by 
Amiri Decree No. 158 of 2005‖  
4. The KSE Listing Requirements 
 
Overall, there is no separate code for best practice within corporate governance, and the 
CCL contains no formal recommendations that listed companies can use as guidelines 
for their corporate governance policies or strategies recommended to improve the 
board‘s efficiency, company performance, and its internal control systems. Thus, the 
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actual term ‗corporate governance‘ is itself absent from the text of the CCL and KSE 
listing requirements. As highlighted by the IMF (2004), CG principles have not been 
fully adopted in Kuwait. In this vein, Alanezi (2011:140) argues that: 
“Despite the huge development in corporate financial reporting and regulations in 
Kuwait, there has been little comparable parallel development in broader corporate 
governance issues in Kuwait. There is no corporate governance law nor has a code of best 
practices been imposed on Kuwaiti non-financial companies”. 
 
The IMF report (2012) indicates that Kuwait lacks basic corporate governance 
indicators, such as the strength of auditing and financial reporting standards, the 
efficacy of corporate boards of directors, and the protection of minority shareholders‘ 
interest. It may also be confirmed, by a new study about Kuwait, that the KSE suffers in 
different aspects: inadequate legislation to protect minority shareholders, poor 
monitoring practices, lack of disclosures, and a large amount of information asymmetry 
(Al Mutairi et al., 2012). 
According to the HI and the IIF report (2007), the requirements of Kuwait‘s CCL 
comply with around 50% of the IIF code‘s guidelines. Appendix 3 provides a detailed 
comparison between Kuwait‘s corporate governance framework and the IIF code of CG.     
The next sections review CG mechanisms contained in the Kuwaiti regulations (e.g. 
CCL). The HI and the IIF report (2007) discussed the Kuwaiti CG framework from five 
different aspects: minority shareholder protection, structure and responsibilities of the 
board of directors, accounting/auditing, transparency of ownership and control, and 
regulatory environment and enforcement. These aspects are drawn from the IIF code of 
CG, containing five essential principles. Accordingly, the discussions contained in the 
following sections rely on the similar comparative plan of the HI and IIF report and 
concentrate on the issues related to the scope of the research.  
 
4.5.1 Company Shareholders 
 
4.5.1.1 Minority Shareholder Protection 
According to the HI and IIF report (2007), the Kuwaiti CG framework meets 75% of the 
terms contained in the IIF code that relate to the protection of minority shareholders. 
The report highlights a need for further improvement to strengthen the regulations on 
organising shareholder meetings and on voting rights. For example, Kuwait‘s law does 
not currently have any provision about cumulative voting and, moreover, the IMF report 
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(2004) indicated that, to fill serious gaps in the current CCL and listing requirements, 
the Kuwaiti legislator and regulator should promote and strengthen minority 
shareholders‘ protection, standards of disclosure, CG principles including the liability of 
corporate board, and the role of professional auditors in reporting practices.    
It is important to note that under Kuwait CCL, there is a lack of rules that regulate the 
takeover process. As an example, in a scenario where a majority shareholder of a 
company desires to sell their shares, the minority shareholders currently have no right to 
force the majority shareholder to include their share in sales trends. This example 
highlights the law‘s failure to provide the required protection to minority shareholders 
to satisfy accepted international standards.   
Regarding the lack of formal rules, Little and Cunha (2009:47) argue that: 
“Acquisitions in Kuwait in some respects can be conducted on a much more simplified 
basis than other more developed jurisdictions as evidenced by the lack of formal rules 
other than the Block Trading Rules. However, the lack of rules also can introduce some 
uncertainty to the process as well as provide obstacles to acquiring 100% of a company 
as evidenced by the lack of mechanisms to squeeze out minority shareholders. All of this 
combines to make the acquisition process quite interesting and highlights the need to 
engage competent local counsel to assist the acquirer”.    
 
 
4.5.1.2 Voting Rights  
The IIF code strongly advises companies to adopt three significant recommendations 
aimed at ensuring fair voting rights for minority shareholders. These are proxy voting, 
the one-share for one-vote principle, and cumulative voting. Kuwait‘s CCL has only 
adopted the first two recommendations.  
On proxy voting, it declares that ―a shareholder may appoint another person to attend a 
General Meeting as a proxy‖. It also states that each shareholder has the right to a 
number of votes in a General Meeting that equals the number of shares s/he owns. 
However, it does not address cumulative voting, the adoption of which for the election 
of directors would help support minority shareholders‘ rights by giving them a chance 
to use their votes more strategically. It could also help the KSE to gain more confidence 
from investors, especially if such investors can actively see that the regulators want to 
protect them and are taking steps towards doing so. Consequently, it would also help to 
create a better environment for current and prospective investors. 
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4.5.1.3 Corporate Ownership Structure   
For acquisition and merger transactions, the IIF code recommends that companies 
should gain the approval of shareholders or directors for any transactions that would 
change or affect the company‘s capital structure, such as takeovers and mergers. On this 
issue, as discussed previously, Kuwait‘s CCL is consistent with most of the IIF‘s 
recommendations and provisions. It states that ―mergers, acquisitions and major asset 
transaction decisions should be passed only by the General Assembly in extraordinary 
meetings and require approval from shareholders representing 75% of company‘s 
shares‖.   
The HI and the IIF report (2007) stated that CG in Kuwait conforms to almost 75% of 
the IIF guidelines on transparency and on disclosure of ownership and control issues. 
On a different point, the IIF code recommends that a public offer should be made for the 
acquisition of all the shares of a company when ownership by a single entity exceeds 
35%, as this can change its capital structure. In Kuwait, the CCL is silent regarding this 
matter. Kuwait‘s corporate governance practices could certainly be improved by 
adopting this recommendation on triggering a buyout offer, ensuring all shareholders 
are treated equally in a takeover. Correcting this deficiency would strengthen minority 
shareholders‘ rights and enhance investors‘ confidence in the KSE.  
Kuwait‘s legal framework requires the board to win approval from shareholders for any 
increase in capital. On approval, existing shareholders have priority over other 
applicants to obtain new shares in proportion to the number of shares they already own 
in the company in line with a standard rights issue.   
The IIF code encourages companies to disclose details of share buyback transactions to 
shareholders. In Kuwait, companies can buy back their shares at market price, but the 
buyback transaction should not exceed 10% of their shares. Listed companies have to 
inform the KSE within one day of receiving an approval from a General Assembly for a 
buyback and must obtain permission from the KSE before starting any sell and buy 
transactions. Also, listed companies must provide the KSE with a detailed schedule of 
transactions in its shares on a quarterly basis.  
 
4.5.1.4 Shareholder Meetings and Other Rights 
According to the CCL, a General Assembly meeting of shareholders should be held 
annually. The company‘s board has discretion to call other such meetings. Under an 
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article of its listing requirements, the KSE requires a company to hold its General 
Assembly meeting within 45 days of the approval of its audited financial statements by 
KSE, and the proposed dividends should in turn be distributed to all shareholders within 
45 days of the General Assembly meeting. 
For added protection for minority shareholders, the IIF code states that a special 
meeting must be held if shareholders who represent a specific amount of the outstanding 
shares request the meeting. The Kuwaiti CCL requires the board of a company to hold a 
special meeting upon the request of shareholders who represent at least 10% of the 
company‘s capital. Also, it gives shareholders who own a minimum of 25% of a 
company‘s shares the right to call, in writing, for an extraordinary meeting at any point.  
On attendance at general meetings, the IIF code says that the necessary quorum should 
not to be too high or too low; it suggests those present should represent a minimum of 
about 30% of the company‘s shareholding, and should include both independent and 
minority shareholders. In Kuwait, the quorum of the General Assembly meeting is 
reached when those present own more than 50% of the company‘s shares. If the legal 
quorum is not reached, a notice for a Second General Meeting should be sent and the 
members who attend this meeting are considered to be a legally valid quorum whatever 
their number. The CCL in Kuwait also requires that the legal quorum of an 
extraordinary meeting is shareholders who represent 75% of the company‘s shares. If an 
extraordinary meeting quorum is not reached, an invitation to a Second Meeting should 
be sent, and here the legal quorum would be formed only if shareholders attending the 
meeting represent more than 50% of the company‘s shares. Resolutions are approved 
when shareholders who own more than 50% of company‘s shares vote in favour.  
 
4.5.1.5 Treatment of Foreign and Domestic Shareholders  
In general, foreign investors seek to achieve maximum possible profitability, but whilst 
doing this they nevertheless want to see an effective legislative framework that secures 
their rights. Kuwait attempts to remove all possible forms of restriction on the entry of 
foreign investments. The KSE website reports on two laws in particular that have been 
enacted to encourage and regulate foreign investments in Kuwait. Based on Law No. 10 
of 1999, which organises direct investment of foreign capital, an Investment Committee 
was established. This reviews foreign investment applications, promotes available 
investment opportunities, grants incentives to encourage foreign investors and facilitate 
the licensing procedures of the project, removes obstacles that foreign investors may 
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encounter, and safeguards foreign investors in maintaining ownership of their projects. 
Law No. 20 of 2000 allows non-Kuwaitis to own shares in Kuwaiti listed companies. It 
also permits foreign investors to own shares of existing companies or those that might 
be established in the future. The KSE‘s website also mentions other laws designed to 
encourage the participation of non-Kuwaitis in Kuwaiti listed companies, such as the 
Ministerial Resolution (MR) No. 205 of 2000. 
In contrast, the HI and the IIF report (2007:12) revealed that “it is essential for foreign 
and domestic shareholders to be treated equally. In Kuwait, foreign investors can buy 
stock only through mutual funds. Foreign shareholders are thus not given the same 
rights as domestic investors”. This clearly contradicts the published information 
regarding foreign investment on KSE‘s website, but the report gives no supporting 
evidence for this statement. 
Additionally, Estandards Forum (Best Practices Report, 2009:8) documents that: 
 ―Kuwait imposes significant restrictions on foreign investments. Although open to some 
types of foreign investment, certain sectors are restricted or even closed, particularly in 
the area of the oil and gas industries”.  
 
According to the report published by the IMF (2012), Kuwait ranks relatively low 
on business environment indicators. One of the areas that needs immediate 
attention from government is Kuwait‘s ability to attract foreign direct investment, 
which would help the country to derive great benefit from the transfer of 
technology and knowledge that foreign ownership could bring about.  
In terms of foreign investors, MR No. 205 of 2000 allows investors to own and trade 
shares in listed companies and to participate in the formation of listed companies 
(Article 2). 
Under Article 7 of this resolution, foreign investors have the usual voting and 
nomination rights that accompany the shares which they own in Kuwaiti listed 
companies. This resolution encourages the flow of foreign capital into the KSE. On the 
other hand, this MR imposes some restrictions on foreign investors, which may prevent 
investment in the KSE. For example, in terms of the banking industry, the MR allows a 
foreign investor to own and trade shares in banks. However, s/he must get prior formal 
approval of the CBK when s/he wishes to hold more than 5% of the bank capital. In 
addition, foreign investors are required to trade in shares only through brokers and must 
buy or sell shares within the premises of the KSE (Articles 4 and 5).   
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It is worth noting that Kuwait‘s legal framework grants shareholders the right to submit 
cases of prejudice and legality to the local courts. However, there is no provision for 
shareholders to formally present a point of view to a company board. Based on the 
preceding sections, it would seem that the Kuwaiti legislator should strengthen 
provisions regarding minority shareholders‘ interests in order to increase the confidence 
of market participants, and to make the KSE a more attractive environment for 
investment.  
 
4.5.1.6 Investor relations and corporate responsibility  
The IIF guidelines declare that companies should have regard to relations with 
investors, and report on their environmental and social responsibilities toward the 
society. In practice, Pierce (2012) argues that few companies have an investor relations 
department and only a very limited number of Kuwaiti company boards have developed 
any formal process for managing their relationships with stakeholders. The author also 
argues that there is little use of triple bottom line reporting methods (e.g. financial, 
social, environmental performance). The CCL is notably silent about the latter two 
issues, whilst, in contrast in developed countries, such topics enjoy considerable 
attention and focus from governments, capital markets, powerful lobbies, and the public 
at large. Companies react to this pressure by attempting to disclose information about 
their social and environmental responsibilities in different shapes in their annual reports; 
however, as yet, this lacks international consistency. 
The next sections discuss the provisions contained in the CCL to regulate boards of 
directors and enhance our understanding of the role these requirements play in 
promoting the need to improve the framework of CG in Kuwait.  
 
4.5.2 Organisation of Boards of Companies under the Commercial Company Law  
The CCL contains the following provisions and guidelines to organise the boards and 
directors of listed companies:  
 
1- The board regulates the company, and its Memorandum of Association determines its 
formation and the period of membership. A Memorandum of Association may not 
reduce the members to less than three; membership is subject to renewal and may not 
exceed three years (CCL Article 138). 
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2- Board members are not subject to any penalties in cases of violation of honour and 
honesty or bankruptcy (CCL Article 139). 
3- Each board member must be a shareholder and own shares in the company of no less 
than 1% of its capital or $22,500, unless its Memorandum of Association does not state 
a larger quantity (CCL Article 139). 
4- A board member must not be a member of the board of more than three Kuwaiti 
listed companies based in Kuwait (CCL Article 140). In addition, a board member must 
not be a member of the board of a company with similar activities, or a competitor to 
the company (CCL Article 151). Also, s/he must not be a Managing Director or a 
Chairman of more than one Kuwaiti listed company based in Kuwait (CCL Article 140). 
5- Shareholders elect the board members by secret ballot (CCL Article 141). 
6- A board member must not be an employee in a governmental public institution or 
authority. However, if the government own shares in a particular company, s/he is 
allowed to combine her/his two positions, as a government employee and a board 
member, for s/he would be representing the government in that company based on 
percentage of shares owned by the government (CCL Article 142).On the other hand, if 
the board member does not represent a government body, then s/he is obliged to adjust 
her/his working status, [e.g. resign] within a month after election.  
7- A board meeting is not quorate unless half of the board members are present, where 
they are not less than three members, if the Memorandum of Association does not state 
a larger number. The board should hold a meeting at least four times during the 
financial year, unless the Memorandum of Association indicates more often (CCL 
Article 144).  
8-The board secretly elects a Chairman and a Vice Chairman for a year, unless the 
Memorandum of Association indicates another period. The board is permitted to 
secretly elect one or more Managing Directors. The competent governmental authorities 
(KSE, MCI, and CBK) should be informed with copies of decisions to elect the 
Chairman, Vice Chairman and Managing Directors of the board (CCL Article 145). 
9- The Memorandum of Association clarifies a method of remuneration of board 
members, and may not allow the total of these remunerations to be more than 10% of 
the net profit after excluding depreciations, reserves, and the distribution of profit of not 
less than 5% of the company‘s capital to the shareholders or any higher percentage of 
the distribution of profit stipulated by the Memorandum of Association. Shareholders‘ 
approval at an annual general meeting should be obtained for the remuneration of the 
board (CCL Article 150). 
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It can be concluded that the CCL failed to introduce some crucial issues related to the 
implementation of good CG practices. More specifically, the CCL has no provisions to 
discuss the appointment of independent directors or their proportion on the company 
board. In this respect, the common characteristic of Kuwaiti board structure for listed 
companies is that the board is governed by non-executive directors, with the executive 
directors representing a minority. For example, it has been argued that it is important to 
clearly define the role of an independent director. Therefore, the Kuwaiti legislator 
―should first abolish the requirement of ownership of 1% of the company’s capital to be 
qualified to be a company’s director, because such a requirement makes it difficult to 
define the independent director‖ (Al-Wasmi, 2011:250). Moreover, the existence of 
independent directors, as an important corporate governance element, on the board 
enhances the level of company transparency and accountability, since they represent 
shareholders‘ interests (Samaha and Dahawy, 2010).          
In relation to the optimum proportion of non-executive directors on the board, the IIF 
code states that at least 33% of the board should be non-executive directors, the 
majority of them being independent. According to the Global Corruption Report, 
Zinnbauer et al. (2009:93-94) state: 
“A stronger role for independent directors is an important, but not the only, element 
needed for effective corporate governance, especially when independent directors are 
nominated by a controlling shareholder. Additional measures with regard to 
strengthening board independence and accountability should include stronger liability 
of directors for negligence and innovative approaches, such as holding committee and 
board meetings without the presence of executives. This has proved very popular in the 
United States, where the share of firms whose board of directors met without their CEO 
jumped from 41 per cent in 2002 to 93 per cent in 2004”. 
 
The Kuwaiti authorities would be well advised to heed the advice implied in this 
statement if they wish to improve the image of Kuwaiti business. 
Because the current CCL is silent on the need for minimum requirements of business 
experience and/or academic qualifications of directors, believing that this is an internal 
issue for the company‘s Memorandum of Association, the Kuwaiti legislator imposes 
no obligations on listed companies to appoint qualified directors onto their boards. 
Thus, Kuwaiti company boards may at times suffer from being populated entirely by 
individuals lacking business experience and/or any formal business training 
pragmatically required for the proper running of listed companies.   
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In addition to creating a minimum requirement for the relevant business experience and 
academic qualifications of directors, it is highly encouraged that  directors be required 
to attend training and continuous learning courses/programmes, which should be offered 
by regulatory bodies or related bodies to build board members‘ capabilities and keep 
them updated with new regulations. Moreover, the Kuwaiti government may heed 
lessons already learned internationally and benefit from the global knowledge and 
experience of other countries in this field to optimally prepare directors for the 
requirements of their position. This may strengthen the ability of directors to adequately 
run companies.               
 
4.5.2.1 Structure of the Board and Responsibilities of Company Directors 
As previously indicated, Article 138 of the CCL states that there should not be less than 
three directors on the board. The period of membership should not exceed three years, 
but may be subject to renewal. This conforms to the requirements of the IIF code. 
However, the law leaves the articles of the Memorandum of Association of Kuwaiti 
companies to determine the upper limit of directors on the board.  
Overall, the Kuwaiti corporate governance framework complies with about 33% of the 
IIF code related to company directors. The essential weakness of the Kuwaiti CG 
framework lies in not addressing the structure of boards. In particular, the legislation 
should clearly define the concept of independent director, as mentioned in the previous 
section, and determine the composition of the board. Then it can require the listed 
companies to appoint independent non-executive directors.  
Another crucial requirement for consideration is the improvement of the regulations 
relating to listed companies‘ timely and correct publication of information, as a part of 
the board‘s responsibilities. Improvement in this area may raise the reliability of 
information released by listed companies in different communication channels such as 
CARs. Subsequently, this would further strengthen confidence in the KSE and 
contribute towards creating stability in Kuwait‘s economy. Both the IIF and CCL 
concentrate on the company as the entity legally responsible for correct information 
disclosure.   
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4.5.2.2 Board Meeting 
The CCL instructs a company‘s board to meet at least four times per fiscal year, unless 
its Memorandum of Association requires more meetings, matching the frequency 
suggested by the IIF code. Under KSE listing requirements, a company must provide an 
authenticated copy of the minutes of its board meetings to the KSE within two weeks of 
the meeting, so that all important and major decisions taken in the meeting are revealed 
to the public in a timely fashion.   
The CCL states that the quorum needed to hold a board meeting should be at least half 
the members of the board, or three members, unless the company‘s Memorandum of 
Association requires a greater number or percentage. In contrast, the IIF code advises 
that a quorum should comprise of executive, non-executive, and independent members.  
 
4.5.2.3 Board Sub-Committees 
The CCL does not oblige non-financial listed companies to set up any board sub-
committees. The exception is companies in the financial sector, which are supervised 
and regulated by the CBK and are mandatorily required to create audit committees in 
line with accepted international conventions and global anti-money laundering 
principles. Thus companies under the supervision of the CBK are under stricter 
regulation than companies supervised by the MCI and the KSE. The former have to 
meet more onerous requirements relating to the improvement of board efficiency and 
company performance. It is perhaps surprising that these two sets of companies practise 
their operations and activities in the same country, yet face different requirements. 
As recommended by the IIF code, an audit committee‘s functions are to approve 
external auditors, the firm‘s internal controls and risk management, and to prevent audit 
and non-audit services being bought from the same audit firm. Since Kuwait‘s CCL 
makes no mention of an audit committee (except for firms supervised by the CBK), it 
states that the company‘s management must set up systems for internal control system 
and risk management. Additionally, it holds the external joint auditors accountable for 
assuring that a company has sufficient internal control and risk management systems. 
Obviously, placing responsibility for these matters with external joint auditors is a 
direct result of the absence of audit committees. Although Kuwaiti legislation does not 
provide for regulating the relationship and communication between internal and 
external auditors, it clearly forbids obtaining audit and non-audit services from the 
same audit firm. Kuwait, as an example of an emerging capital market, should 
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recognise this deficiency in its regulations and require all listed companies to establish 
an audit committee on similar terms to the IIF recommendations. 
 
4.5.2.4 Other Board Responsibilities 
Both the IIF code and Kuwait‘s CCL agree that information disclosure is important. The 
IIF code requires all conflicts of interest involving a company‘s directors to be fully 
disclosed. Although Kuwait‘s CCL lacks a clear and precise description of director‘s 
conflicts of interest, as discussed earlier in the chapter, it affirms that the board‘s 
chairman and directors should not benefit, directly or indirectly, from contracts and 
deals that the company is involved in, without the explicit approval of shareholders in 
the General Assembly meeting (Article 151).  
In this regard, Kuwaiti company boards tend to obtain approval for their transactions in 
advance of the General Meeting, and it is therefore relatively easily achieved. This is 
especially so since 90 of the companies listed on the KSE are run by the major 
shareholders (Al-Qabas Newspaper, 2010, as cited in Al-Wasmi, 2011).  
It is worth noting that both the KSE listing requirements and the CCL require 
companies to construct rules forbidding any board directors and additional key 
management from using insider information to gain from private transactions. All listed 
companies are also required to comply with IFRS requirements regarding related-party 
transactions. To prevent unfair practices, Kuwait‘s CCL also prohibits directors from 
engaging in the management of a company with similar activities, or any other 
competitor (Article 151). In this regard, the MCI representative announced, in the 
official meeting with Kuwaiti accounting and audit firms, that companies of boards in 
Kuwait violated this article (which was published in Al-Qabas newspaper on 20 
December 2010). 
In order to enhance the protection of shareholders and bolster public confidence, and 
more specifically investors‘ confidence, Al-Wasmi (2011:115) argued that ―the 
director’s Conflict of Interests with the company should be regulated in a more strict 
manner. In other words, the related parties’ transactions must be governed by 
provisions that ensure more transparency through imposing more disclosure 
requirements as regard the related parties’ transactions, which is in turn enhancing the 
supervision of non-controlling shareholders”. 
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After discussing the status of disclosure regulations and the CG practices in the KSE, 
the next sections discuss the regulations and laws regulating the auditing profession, 
enhancing our insight in the effect of this legislation on accounting and disclosure 
practices in Kuwait as an example of emerging market.  
  
4.6 THE AUDITING PROFESSION IN KUWAIT  
It is usual across all markets for an external auditor to have a positive effect on financial 
reporting practices and more specifically on the quality of any public information 
disclosed by the companies they audit. Hence, one mechanism that can improve the 
quality of annual financial reports is the mandatory appointment of an external auditor. 
Such an appointment adds to the effectiveness of applying the accounting regulations, 
since the auditor is responsible for a thorough inspection of the accuracy of a company‘s 
accounts and the financial report ultimately submitted to the public.      
In this context, the Kuwaiti legislator was keen to strengthen the auditing profession, 
and this section describes the major provisions of Decree Law No. 5 of 1981 that 
regulates the auditing profession.  
 
4.6.1 Conditions for Auditor Registration  
The most important conditions and procedures for the registration of auditors are as 
follows: 
1- S/he must hold a bachelor degree in accounting from an accredited university 
(Article 2). 
2- S/he must have five years‘ practical experience in the accounting and auditing field 
in the public sector, or seven years‘ in the private sector in insurance, financial 
companies or banks (Article 2). 
3- S/he must pass the licence test and register in the external auditors‘ register in the 
MCI (Articles 1 and 2).  
4- S/he will comply with professional ethics and professional practices (Article 9). 
 
4.6.2 External Auditor’s Responsibilities and Duties 
 1- A licensed external auditor can audit the accounts of individuals, companies and 
institutions according to technical accounting standards (IFRS) and local professional 
ethics‘ rules (Article 12). 
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2- The appointed external auditor in a company should inform the MCI of his/her 
appointment within eight days of the date of appointment (Article 12). 
3- The external auditor cannot be a chairman of a listed company, or a managing 
director, board member or employee of the company which appoints her/him as an 
external auditor (Article 18). 
4- The external auditor of the company is not allowed to (Article 19): 
a- Be a partner in the company or have an administrative position in it. 
b- Be a relative of a member of the company‘s board even from the fourth degree.  
c- Work in another job which conflicts with the auditor‘s position. Generally, it is not 
permissible to do the following (Article 20): 
1- Practise consultancy. 
2- Work in promoting or establishing new companies. 
3- Be involved in book keeping and preparing financial statements. 
4- Work to promote his/her audit firm or try to get work in a way that violates 
professional ethics. 
 
4.6.3 Penalties   
Through Amiri Decree Law No. 5 of 1981, the Kuwaiti legislator gives the MCI 
authority to send the external auditor to the disciplinary panel if s/he breaks the articles 
of Amiri Decree Law or violates professional ethics or practices. If the MCI holds the 
external auditor to be guilty of a crime, then s/he shall place the matter in the hands of 
the prosecuting authorities or the Public Attorney (Article 21). 
The following disciplinary penalties can be applied to an external auditor who is found 
guilty of any of these offences: [1] Caution, [2] Stopping her/him from practising in the 
auditing profession for no more than three years, or [3] Removing his/her name from 
the licensed external auditors‘ register (Article 23). 
 
4.6.4 Recent Regulations for the Auditing Profession 
The desire of the Kuwaiti legislator to protect the interests of the public, to raise the 
level of professional audit practice, and to encourage and promote the moral values of 
the profession (ethical conduct guidelines) led to the issue of Ministerial Resolution No. 
291 of 2006. Its most important provisions follow: 
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1. The standards of ethical conduct for professional accountants issued by the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) apply to external auditors in Kuwait 
(Article 1). 
2. Based on recommendations from the Permanent Technical Committee for setting 
Accounting and Auditing Standards, the MCI is authorised to determine the 
standards of ethics that are not applicable to the Kuwaiti business environment and 
s/he has the right to identify alternative codes that should be followed by external 
auditors (Article 2).  
3. The Kuwaiti Association of Accountants and Auditors is responsible for the 
compliance of its members with the standards of ethics issued by the IFAC. Also, 
any verified violation committed by an external auditor should be referred to the MCI 
(Article 3). 
 
4.6.5 Challenges Facing the Auditing Profession in Kuwait 
It is clear that, whilst acting to define the majority of responsibilities and duties 
expected for an external auditor, the Kuwaiti legislator has nevertheless overlooked 
some important aspects that may further develop the profession of accounting and 
auditing in Kuwait and may also generally contribute to the professional development of 
external auditors.  
Under Article 161 of the CCL, the Kuwaiti legislator gives the company‘s shareholders 
the right to choose and appoint external auditors for their company and to determine 
their audit fees during the general meeting. In practice such rights are not commonly 
exercised. External auditors are nearly always appointed based on the recommendations 
and direction of the board since the board members mostly govern the voting process 
for the appointment of external auditors as they represent the major shareholders, as 
mentioned previously (see Section 4.5.2.4). In addition, the appointment of auditors is 
sometimes associated with family ties with company management, making it inherently 
difficult to achieve transparency in the auditors‘ appointment process. This may also 
affect their independence and their ability to work as an agent of the shareholders.   
It is worth highlighting that Kuwaiti regulations require the accounts and statements of 
each listed company to be audited by two separate accounting and audit firms. 
According to the Aljoman Centre for Economic Consultancy‘s survey (2008) (published 
in Al-Anba daily newspaper 25 July, 2008) and a separate study conducted by Al-Jarida 
Newspaper (2010) (published 1 August, 2010), which only included the listed Kuwaiti 
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companies, there is a specific number of audit firms in Kuwait that audit the accounts 
and records of companies listed on the KSE. For instance, the report observes that there 
are only three large audit firms (which are all affiliated with international auditing 
firms) that audit 141 out of the 195 companies, representing 72.5% of companies listed 
in the capital market. The survey results also suggest considerable linkage between the 
name of the first audit firm and that of the second for each company and between its 
associated or subsidiary companies. This may be mainly due to the same company being 
appointed for both tasks on the explicit instructions or recommendation of the company 
board or alternatively this association may be simply attributed to the recommendation 
of the first and larger audit firm.  
Moreover, the survey stated that major companies in the KSE tend to appoint the same 
audit firm due to the fact that they feel satisfied dealing with a firm they already know 
and trust and therefore see no benefit in changing. In addition, Kuwaiti companies 
prefer to appoint internationally affiliated audit firms, which may be interpreted on the 
ground as wishing to send a signal to stakeholder groups about the quality of 
information included in their annual reports. From the other side, Kuwaiti audit firms 
attempt to affiliate with large internationals in order to raise their professional 
competence level and to increase the proportion of their audit work in Kuwait as a 
marketing objective, which is consistent with the assumptions of signalling theory and 
literature (see Chapters 2 and 3).    
Accordingly, such practices in Kuwait serve to undermine the independence of external 
auditors, which is considered to be one of the most significant corporate governance 
control mechanisms. In other words, the current practices of Kuwaiti companies may 
impair the concept of independence. Moreover, the appointment of an external auditor 
based on the board‘s recommendations may similarly lack objectivity and hence carry 
inherent questionability regarding the independence of auditors from their clients. This 
is problematic since, in auditing the company‘s accounts, the auditor is normally 
considered to be acting as the shareholders‘ agent rather than being influenced by, or 
biased in favour of, the board. The value of auditing services directly stems from the 
presence of a true independence of the auditor from their clients (Simon and Francis, 
1988; Koh and Mahathevan, 1993). Thus, it can be stated that strengthening the quality 
of independence has a positive impact on strengthening overall supervision over the 
company‘s management and on ensuring that shareholder rights are properly protected 
(Al-Wasmi, 2011).  
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On a different point, the MCI representative announced in the official meeting with 
accounting and audit firms (published in Al-Qabas newspaper 20 December, 2010) that 
one of the most important criticisms directed against external auditors in Kuwait is that 
auditing is not regarded as a full-time role, which restricts the full focus needed to 
practise this vital profession. This stance has an adverse effect on the quality 
performance of audit firms in particular and on the accounting and auditing profession 
in general in Kuwait.   
It has been argued that financial reports in emerging markets are less reliable sources of 
information than those released in developed capital markets (e.g. Jaggi, 1975; 
Saudagaran and Diga, 1997). This may be due to many factors such as a shortage of 
qualified auditors and accountants. It may constitute a restriction in confirming the 
company‘s financial position and the contents of financial statements (Saudagaran and 
Diga, 1997), indicating a need for continuing training and education programmes to 
improve the professional skills of external auditors across emerging markets such as 
Kuwait.  
Regarding the effectiveness of the audit function, Al-Shammari (2005) observes that, in 
2001, the Disciplinary Committee of the MCI was involved in investigating the first 
case of disciplinary action since the application of the External Auditing Law of 1962. 
The case was brought against an auditor as result of violated IFRS requirements. S/he 
gave an unqualified report to a company and in doing so breached the IFRS‘ 
requirements by making incomplete disclosures and releasing inaccurate information. 
The Disciplinary Committee cautioned the auditor and, in light of this action and 
through reviewing companies‘ independent audit reports since this decision, an 
increasing number of listed companies therefore predominantly received qualified audit 
reports. Three of the 50 companies received a qualified report in 1996, three in 1999 and 
seven in 2002.  
According to formal interviews with official representatives of the surveillance 
department of the MCI, in 2009 there were five complaints submitted to the MCI 
against audit firms. Some of these complaints related to the so-called ―Big 4‖ and others 
related to local audit firms as follows: 
 
1. After a review of the annual report of two companies by the surveillance 
department, it was discovered that the appointed auditor as a liquidator was the 
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same for both companies in liquidation.This appears to be breaking the law 
itself, and s/he also evaluated the assets and liabilities for both companies at the 
same value. 
2. For another four complaints submitted regarding four listed companies, the 
content of the complaints mainly included one of the following three points: 
firstly, the external auditor did not comply with the IFRS‘ requirements; 
secondly, the external auditor amended the profits or losses of a company 
according to the wishes of the board and therefore did not accurately reflect the 
actual financial position of the company; and thirdly, it was suggested that a 
relative relationship existed between the external auditor and some of the board 
members of the company audited. 
 
It is clear that Kuwaiti legislation currently neglects the importance of the role of 
external auditor in protecting shareholders‘ interests and improving disclosure practices. 
Under the CCL, the shareholders usually appoint the same company‘s external auditors 
in the annual general meeting each year; however, under a good CG regime, 
shareholders are not permitted to appoint the same external auditors for a period of time 
exceeding three or four years. Such restrictions exist to prevent the possibility of a 
board abusing their power by retaining a favourable auditor indefinitely and to reduce 
the possibility of too comfortable a relationship between the company 
management/board and its auditors. 
The above discussion points out the weaknesses and strengths of the current regulatory 
and legislative environment in Kuwait. However, deficiencies in commercial 
regulations from different aspects such as disclosure and the lack of a CG regime in 
Kuwait mean that the regulators and legislator should pay greater attention to setting out 
suitable and radical solutions to these deficiencies and establish a CG code to be 
followed by listed companies. Previous sections shed some light on the audit profession, 
which also needs more interest from governmental bodies to develop the Kuwaiti 
accounting and auditing profession. This can be done by adopting the best practices in 
other developed countries which match the Kuwaiti business environment. This could 
make the KSE a stronger and more respected market internationally.  
Appendix 3 presents more detail about the comparison between the provisions of the IIF 
code and the Kuwaiti commercial regulations and other information which is beyond the 
scope of this study.  
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A comparison of the State of Kuwait with other GCC countries that have similar 
economic and legal frameworks could help to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the respective strengths and weaknesses of certain aspects of the 
Kuwaiti regulatory and legislative environment and more specifically its corporate 
governance framework. This is the task of the next section. It is important to mention 
that the following sections will be based on the Comparative Survey of Corporate 
Governance in the Gulf Cooperation Council, issued by the Hawkamah Institute (HI) 
and the Institute of International Finance (IIF) (HI and IIF, 2006), unless otherwise 
stated. 
  
4.7 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS: KUWAIT AND THE 
GCC COUNTRIES/THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES     
Overall, the subculture of the respective business environments in GCC countries has 
not contributed positively to the development of effective practices for corporate 
governance frameworks in each country, with the notable exception of Oman and, to a 
lesser extent, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Corporate governance structures in GCC 
countries do not generally meet the minimum standards that international investors seek. 
Amongst GCC countries, developments in corporate governance frameworks come 
slowly and these countries lag significantly behind the best practices in observed 
corporate governance worldwide. In addition, ―the identification of eventual corporate 
governance gaps within the region, as compared to other regions, will increase the 
awareness for the need of regional harmonisation of stock-market regulation‖ (The 
National Investor‘s (TNI) Survey (2008b:16). 
Moreover, there is significant variation in their corporate governance frameworks. In 
illustration, it is worth observing the sizeable drop in international compliance amongst 
the best and worst GCC countries from a CG perspective. Oman has the strongest 
corporate governance framework in the region and complies with roughly 70% of the 
IIF‘s guidelines, whilst Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have around 50% compliance; Bahrain 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have just 40%; and Qatar is classified last among 
the six countries, only complying with a strikingly low 35% of the IIF guidelines. In 
terms of CG in the capital markets of the region, Saidi (2011) and Koldertsova (2010) 
argued that Kuwait remains the only country that does not have CG codes. Table 4.4 
shows the recent and intended improvements in corporate governance practices among 
GCC countries in 2006.  
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In Kuwait, the CG framework is at a transitional stage and meaningful steps are now 
being taken, including reassessing the existing regulatory structure, with a view to 
establishing corporate governance practices. As discussed previously (see Section 
4.3.7), The Authority of Capital Market Law would force KSE participants to commit to 
and comply with CG requirements. The introduction of such a law would strengthen and 
enhance the compliance levels of companies and would thus help the regulatory bodies 
to carry out their responsibilities in a more efficient and optimal way. Furthermore, 
separating the supervisory and monitoring functions and establishing an Independent 
Authority of Capital Market would significantly enhance confidence in the KSE 
amongst international and local investors as well as other participants. Table 4.4 
presents corporate governance frameworks in GCC countries.   
 
      Table 4.4: Corporate Governance Reforms in the GCC as of 2006 
Bahrain  The Ministry of Commerce in Bahrain has drafted a new Commercial Companies 
Law and a new code of corporate governance that will be enforced in the near 
future.  
Kuwait  A new Capital Market Law will incorporate corporate governance-related 
requirements for companies. 
Oman  The Capital Market Authority planned to reassess current corporate governance 
requirements in Fall 2006.  
Qatar  Doha Securities Market would introduce a code of corporate governance by the end 
of 2006. Authorities are strengthening the regulator‘s surveillance, the stock 
exchange and companies, and enforcement procedures; they also created an 
independent regulator in 2005. 
Saudi 
Arabia  
The Capital Market Authority issued a draft code of corporate governance for 
public comment.  It hoped to finalize and implement the code by the end of 2006.  
UAE  The Emirates‘ Securities and Commodities Authority, the regulator for the UAE, is 
currently drafting a code of corporate governance for listed companies.  
Abu Dhabi Securities Market recently issued corporate governance guidelines for 
listed companies for market feedback. 
The Dubai Financial Market drafted corporate governance guidelines for listed 
companies, which should become enforceable by Fall 2006. 
The Ministry of Economy has drafted a new company law which includes corporate 
governance principles. 
Source: Comparative Survey of the HI and the IIF (HI and IIF, 2006)  
 
As a result of globalisation, the economies of GCC countries have naturally integrated 
more with the world economy; as such, there is growing pressure on them to accept 
international standards and practices. However, these standards and practices are 
sometimes considered to conflict with accepted local practices. An example of this is 
the requirement for listed companies to provide quarterly earnings forecasts, which 
would force them to regularly share information that has traditionally been considered 
internal and confidential. Thus, although the level of disclosure and transparency in the 
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Gulf region is improving, progress remains slow with significant subculture obstacles to 
overcome.  
Many listed companies in the GCC region, like companies listed in other emerging 
markets, continue to resist essential changes in corporate governance, especially those 
related to the role and responsibilities of board members, which must be modernised if 
the Kuwaiti economy is to continue to develop. According to a survey (Gulf News, 
2010) conducted in the GCC region, over 63% believed that board directors in GCC 
companies are not fully prepared to fulfil their roles. Accordingly, the GCC Board 
Directors Institute (BDI) was established to promote the professional skills of directors 
to, in turn, increase the effectiveness of boards in the GCC region. This has had a 
positive and effective impact in assisting the directors to implement a range of 
fundamentally sound CG practices within their boards.    
In the GCC, companies have tended to be regarded historically as the private preserves 
of their controlling families. These powerful families often appoint their relatives and/or 
friends as supposedly independent directors and, whilst some influential shareholders 
have persuaded companies to set up audit committees, few companies have progressed 
as far as creating remuneration or nomination committees. 
According to a report issued by Dow Jones Private Equity, more than 90% of 
commercial activity in the Gulf Arab States is run by families who control over 5,000 
companies with combined assets of more than $500 billion. The private sector provides 
70% of employment opportunities and represents a second source for investments, after 
the government sector (published in Al-Watan newspaper 11 December, 2009) (Al-
Watan, 2009b). The concentration of company ownership by government and families 
means that there is no culture of widespread ownership; this tends to result in the rights 
of minority shareholders in listed companies largely being ignored. 
In most cases, the boards of state-owned companies include senior government officials. 
In practice, this further complicates matters and contributes to entrenched conflicts of 
interest and authority problems because regulators and auditors can sometimes prefer to 
neglect their responsibilities in order to avoid embarrassing government officials when 
they fail in their performance of fiduciary duties as board members.   
The survey of the HI and the IIF (HI and IIF, 2006) indicates that older capital markets, 
such as Kuwait and Oman, that were established 44 and 18 years ago respectively, enjoy 
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better corporate governance frameworks than those of Qatar and the UAE. In regard to 
the number of companies listed on the GCC capital markets, The National Investor 
(TNI) Survey (2008a) indicated that the KSE is considered the largest capital market in 
the Gulf region in terms of number of listed companies. In addition, Kuwait has stronger 
minority shareholder protection laws than other GCC countries as a result of its 
experiencing a number of financial scandals in its capital market and in Kuwaiti 
investment abroad in the 1980s. In a shareholder protection context, Pierce (2012) 
observes that Gulf countries tend to have low investor protection compared with 
international best practice worldwide. In fact, Kuwait‘s generally better corporate 
governance framework is probably a positive epiphenomenal result of those 
experiences. Table 4.5 shows the equity market capitalization and concentration for 
each of the six GCC capital markets.   
 
Table 4.5:  Equity Market Capitalisation and Concentration 
Country  Market capitalization as 
percentage of GDP  (July 
2006) 
Top 10 companies 
as percentage of 
total market  (June 
2006) 
Total number of 
companies (March 
2006) 
Bahrain 126% 78% 47 
Kuwait 154% 48% 161 
Oman 38% 71% 124 
Qatar 175% 82% 33 
Saudi Arabia 140% 75% 79 
UAE–Abu Dhabi/ 
Dubai 
106% 64%      92−(59/33) 
Source: Comparative Survey of the HI and the IIF (HI and IIF, 2006)  
 
Listed companies in the GCC region often have strong ties with companies elsewhere in 
the Gulf, mainly because the good investment climate and stability of the Gulf 
countries‘ economic systems make them attractive to capital investors from In addition 
to these strong ties, some companies choose to list on more than one GCC capital 
market. In illustration, one only has to look at the significant correlation between the 
KSE and the Dubai Capital Market (DCM), driven primarily through joint investments 
by many Gulf companies in both countries. Sixteen Kuwaiti companies from a total of 
20 companies are the foundation of the foreign corporate sector in DCM. These 
companies represent the largest companies in the KSE. Moreover, two Gulf companies 
are listed on the KSE and in DCM at the same time, as well as another five Gulf 
companies listed on both the KSE and the Abu Dhabi market (published in Al-Watan 
newspaper 28 November, 2009) (Al-Watan, 2009a).  
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Some issues constitute an obstacle for investment in GCC countries, such as the weak 
enforcement of legal requirements, though Oman is an exception to this. In fact, 
regulatory bodies do not have sufficient power to strictly enforce companies‘ 
compliance with the rules. Hence, the IIF guidelines encourage countries to enhance 
their respective regulatory environments, rendering the GCC stronger and more 
transparent in this regard. This serves to improve corporate disclosure and transparency, 
good accounting and auditing practices, and protect minority shareholder rights. 
Moreover, regulatory bodies should not be under the control or influence of any specific 
parties. So, it is crucial that GCC countries establish independent regulatory bodies to 
gain credibility for the region‘s regulatory environment, certainly an essential issue for 
Kuwait.  
Most GCC countries have set up independent regulatory bodies for overseeing their 
capital market; Table 4.6 summarises the regulatory structures. A clear issue that 
continuously limits the effectiveness of GCC regulatory bodies is the lack of sufficient 
skilled and professional staff. 
 
Table 4.6:  Regulatory Structures in GCC Countries 
Country Regulatory Structure 
Bahrain The Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE) is an autonomous organization that regulates 
itself. Its board of directors is made up of representatives from the Bahrain Monetary 
Authority, Ministry of Commerce, and Ministry of Finance. 
Kuwait Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) is an independent financial institution. The KSE 
Committee regulates the exchange. Kuwait does not have an independent regulator. 
Oman In 1998, Oman became the first GCC country to establish a separate regulatory body  
the Capital Market Authority (CMA).  The CMA regulates the Muscat Stock Market. 
Qatar Doha Securities Market (DSM) has been regulated by the Qatar Financial Markets 
Authority (QFMA) since 2005.  The QFMA is an independent regulatory agency. 
Saudi Arabia Tadawul, Saudi Arabia‘s stock market was established in 2001 and is an independent 
organization. In 2003, the government created the Capital Markets Authority (CMA), 
which regulates the Tadawul. The CMA is a government organization, but has 
financial, legal, and administrative independence. 
UAE  The Emirates Securities & Commodities Authority (ESCA) was established in 2001 to 
regulate the Abu Dhabi Securities Market (ADSM) and the Dubai Financial Market 
(DFM). The ESCA is a government organization, but has financial, legal, and 
administrative independence. The ADSM is a legal entity of autonomous status with 
financial and managerial independence. The DFM is a public institution having its 
own independent corporate body.  
Source: Comparative Survey of the HI and the IIF (HI and IIF, 2006)  
 
Kuwait has a better corporate governance framework than other GCC countries and 
achieved a score of three out of five for compliance against the IIF‘s corporate 
governance guidelines. Despite this, and although Kuwait enjoys strong laws protecting 
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minority shareholders‘ rights, its overall regulatory environment remains undeniably 
weak and in need of modernisation. Some improvements were made to Kuwait‘s CCL 
as a result of financial scandals in the 1980s, but they have since stagnated and not kept 
pace with the remarkable changes in the Kuwaiti business environment during the last 
couple of decades (e.g. remarkable changes in trading activities in the KSE; see Section 
4.3). Currently, there are efforts by governmental regulatory bodies to amend the 
existing CCL and to include corporate governance requirements in the new Capital 
Market Law (CML). The most interesting advantage that Kuwait has among GCC 
countries is its court system. Judges are independent and experienced. Verdicts are also 
provided in a timely manner. Table 4.7 shows a summary of corporate governance 
practices or frameworks in each GCC country compared with IIF guidelines.  
 
Table 4.7: Comparison of Corporate Governance Frameworks in the GCC 
Countries with IIF Guidelines (on scale of 1-5 with 5 being fully compliant) 
Comparative Aspects Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
United 
Arab 
Emirates 
Minority Shareholder 
Protection 
2.0 4.0 3.0 2.5 3.5 2.5 
 Voting Rights 1.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 2 3.5 
 Firm/Capital  Structure 1.5 4.5 1.0 2.0 5.0 2.0 
Shareholder Meetings/Other 
Rights 
3.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 2.5 
Structure and 
Responsibilities of the Board 
of Directors 
2.0 1.5 3.5 1.5 2.0 1.5 
 Board Structure 1.0 1.5 3.5 1.5 2.0 1.5 
 Disclosure 4.0 3.5 5.0 1.5 4.0 3.5 
 Others 1.0 0.5 2.5 0.5 2.5 0.0 
Accounting and Auditing 2.0 2.5 4.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 
 Standards 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.0 3.5 2.5 
 Audit Committee  0.5 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Transparency Ownership 2.5 3.5 3.5 1.0 4.5 2.5 
Regulatory Environment 2.0 2.0 4.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 
Overall Assessment 2.0 3.0 3.5 2.0 3.0 2.0 
Source: Comparative Survey of the HI and the IIF (HI and IIF, 2006)  
 
When reviewing the exercise of the CCL powers and rights and adoption of 
international standards of GC in the Gulf countries, Seznec and Kirk (2010:46 and 47) 
observe that:  
“In the Gulf states there is not only conventional public respect for authorities, but there 
is also a deeply ingrained culture of public politeness and a distaste for public 
confrontation, or fitna, within the community. These established attitudes inhibit the 
robust adoption of international standards of corporate governance along lines set out 
in the OECD principles or the IIF Code.”  
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At the same time, the authors criticise the concept of independent regulatory bodies in 
the GCC countries on the grounds that: 
“While the regulator may be constituted as a separate body independent of exchanges 
itself, it is difficult to see the Gulf regulators as independent from the political 
authorities. In all these countries, the government has a major say in appointing the 
senior officers of the regulatory body. In many, the chairman of the regulatory bodies is 
the competent minister himself.  This naturally attracts criticism internally, since a 
regulator is supposed to be free from political control or influence”.        
  
It will be useful to turn from a regional comparison of Kuwaiti corporate governance 
characteristics to a more international perspective. As previously stated, the Kuwaiti 
legislator does not set out separate codes of corporate governance nor allocate defined 
articles in the CCL to specifically deal with this issue. In contrast, developed countries, 
such as the UK, US, and Australia, give specific attention to establishing well-defined 
corporate governance regimes and go so far as to publish separate codes of corporate 
governance best practice (see Table 4.8). 
 
Table 4.8: Comparison of Kuwaiti Corporate Governance Attributes with those of 
Developed Countries 
No Comparative 
Aspects 
UK, US, and Australia Kuwait 
1 Board of directors Separation of the roles and responsibilities of 
chairman and CEO (UK and Australia). No 
separation between chairman and CEO (US). 
 
The chair should be an independent director. 
(UK and Australia).  However, independent 
to chairman is not necessary (US). 
No separation between 
chairman and CEO or 
managing director.  
2 The composition 
of the board  
A combination of executive and non- 
executive directors as independent (UK); a 
majority of the board should be independent 
directors (Australia and US). 
The non-executive or outside directors are 
appointed by a committee and according to 
specific criteria.  
No provision regarding this 
issue. 
3 The definition of 
independent 
directors 
Independent directors are not involved in 
serious relationships or circumstances that 
may affect the director‘s decision or 
independent status and they are not members 
of the company management. 
Some restrictions on 
directors, to keep the 
independent exercise of their 
judgement, are set out in the 
CCL.  
4 The rights  of    
shareholders 
Encouraging better interaction and 
communication between the boards of listed 
companies and their shareholders. 
Promoting greater understanding of the point 
views of shareholders by the board. 
Requirement to make information publicly 
available and to treat shareholders equally in 
their access to information.  
No provision regarding this 
matter.  
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5 Board sub- 
Committees 
Consists of a majority of independent non-
executive directors. 
 
According to the CCL, 
Kuwaiti companies do not 
have to establish these types 
of committees; the exception 
is companies regulated by 
the CBK.  
Source: Kuwait Commercial Companies Law (CCL) No. 15 of 1960 (as amended); The UK Corporate 
Governance Code June 2010; Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, the second 
edition 2007 as mandated 30 June 2010; ASX Corporate Governance Council, Australia; USA, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 
4.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The empirical literature in the field of accounting suggests that changes in the business 
environment lead to changes in the demand and use of financial information; this 
demand in turn guides the establishment and development of accounting systems 
(Hassan et al., 2003). Riahi-Belkaoui (1985) suggests that accounting does not develop 
in a vacuum but reflects the particular environment in which it is developed. 
Consequently, accounting systems and disclosure practices are markedly different 
among nations (e.g. Riahi-Belkaoui, 1985; Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992).  
The laws and regulations of a well-organised capital market and good CG practice in 
well-run companies would provide adequate protection for market participants, and 
hence enhance public confidence in the capital market, in turn making the capital 
market more efficient. The existence of law is, in itself, however, not enough to reach 
these objectives. Law must be supported by an active and competent enforcement body, 
sustained by qualified employees capable of ensuring compliance with the law. 
The concept of CG elicits a great deal of attention and receives high priority on the 
agenda of those interested in the development of capital markets, including companies, 
investors, and policy makers, in order to enhance and bolster confidence in the capital 
market. This answers the question ―Why is corporate governance important?‖. 
Consequently, it can be fairly stated that, if the Kuwaiti government desires to make the 
KSE a truly prominent market among many other emerging capital markets, it must 
establish a sound corporate governance regime to guarantee the protection of market 
participants in general and of minority shareholders in particular.  A well-established 
CG system would help Kuwaiti companies to access the global market. It has also been 
observed that a crucial requirement for improving the current CG framework is the 
establishment of an independent body solely responsible for monitoring the 
performance and proper participation of KSE companies. This would be a significant 
step, encouraging the flow of investment capital into the capital market on one hand and 
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assisting companies to find easier ways to finance their projects and activities on the 
other.  
The purpose of this chapter was to address the role and impact of influences such as the 
organisational environment, legal environment (e.g. CCL and KSE listing 
requirements), and auditing profession on both the accounting and reporting practices 
followed by companies listed in the KSE, and also on the level of information 
transparency released in CARs. In this sense, it has been argued that listing 
requirements and other related regulations have a great impact on the corporate 
accounting systems and reporting practices of listed companies (Choi, 1973). This is 
intended to provide context and fundamental background information to develop the 
research discussion around ―a voluntary disclosure index‖ (see Chapter 5). 
It can be inferred from the discussion of Kuwaiti accounting regulations that Kuwaiti 
CG mechanisms are limited. Additionally, the legislative requirements of listed 
companies regarding disclosure of corporate information have been addressed in general 
terms. A clear lack of protection for minority shareholders and their rights in the 
corporation has been shown and, as we have seen numerous times in this chapter, there 
are only fleeting examples of CG practices in Kuwait. This is perhaps a result of the 
absence of formal CG codes that could be used as guidelines by companies. In other 
words, there are not many CG practices in Kuwait and CG here could benefit from 
further research in this area. The results of a review of regulations suggest that 
significant effort is still needed to construct good CG codes in Kuwait as a result of their 
growing international importance in increasing the confidence and protection of 
shareholders in the capital market.   
As we have noted, there is no dedicated independent specialised body charged with 
monitoring the accounting and financial reporting practices of listed companies. The 
government regulatory agencies of the KSE are outdated and ineffective, as well as not 
being active enough in the due application of commercial law. In this sense, Alanezi 
(2006:65) reports that “overlapping regulatory functions amongst the regulatory 
agencies, particularly in monitoring Kuwaiti listed companies, hinders the effectiveness 
of the regulation of the market”.  
A timely response to the recommendations of international bodies is needed. To this 
end, the establishment of a CMA was a step in the right direction towards economic and 
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regulatory reforms and this should positively assist in integrating accepted global best 
practice into the Kuwaiti CG framework.  
Furthermore, the existence of a CMA should help to overcome the weaknesses of 
regulatory bodies‘ current structure and set adequate mandatory regulations regarding 
the preparation and submission of CARs. This should also serve to improve the level of 
disclosure of information required by companies listed on the KSE in order to further 
enhance the quality of CARs and the accuracy of disclosed information. For the KSE to 
be a prominent emerging capital market, the CMA should be granted authority to act as 
an independent and neutral body, structurally protected from any political pressures. To 
supplement this, a robust and transparent appointment process should be introduced for 
the appointment of the CMA‘s commissioners. The CMA should also establish an 
adequate mechanism to prohibit the abuse of inside information and ensure that major 
and minority shareholders have the inalienable right to access information on an equal 
basis. Moreover, the formation of a published corporate governance framework would 
give Kuwait a competitive advantage amongst other GCC countries, as well over many 
other developing markets internationally, in improving the flow of international capital 
into the KSE as well as bolstering investors‘ confidence in their underlying protection 
from a CG perspective.   
It has been revealed in the HI and the IIF report (2007), in addition to a report published 
by the IMF in 2004 and some empirical studies conducted in Kuwait, that there is a lack 
of proper law and regulation to properly organise the business environment generally 
and the listed companies of the KSE more specifically. Therefore, there is a clear need 
for the introduction of a proper and up-to-date law with efficient and reliable 
enforcement mechanisms (e.g. quality and quantity of staff) to implement the laws and 
to ensure compliance with the regulations; however, the latter cannot be achieved 
without the existence of an independent and adequate overseeing body and all of these 
factors work together to create more confidence and stability in the capital market. In 
support of this, the IIF report formally recommended a set of solutions and suggestions 
to overcome the obstacles of insufficient disclosure and CG practices across the KSE. 
This provided the necessary background to construct and develop the next research 
instrument, which is a questionnaire survey (see Chapter 5). The importance of these 
recommendations and their applicability to the Kuwaiti business environment will be 
assessed based on the views of expert users of Kuwaiti CARs; this will form part of the 
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task of Chapter 6. In addition, the review of regulations will assist in the construction 
and development of the index to assess voluntary disclosure practices (see Chapters 5).  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The three previous chapters shed light on the theoretical framework and literature 
relevant to this study as well as on the main aspects related to the business, legal, and 
regulatory environment that influences the corporate annual reports (CARs) and 
disclosure practices in Kuwait. In light of this, primary objectives were set out for the 
current study. The first objective is to assess the importance of annual reports and their 
sections in the view of respondents. The second is to investigate the usefulness, in the 
perception of external user groups, of selected items of information to be included in 
annual reports. The third is to evaluate voluntary disclosure practices in the annual 
reports of Kuwaiti non-financial companies listed on the KSE. The last major objective 
is to identify the determinants that explain variations in the voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports.  
This chapter aims to present the research methods used in this study to reach its 
objectives and is structured as follows: Section 5.2 outlines the research philosophy. 
Various research methods used in previous and similar studies are presented in Section 
5.3, while Section 5.4 identifies the research method used in this study. Section 5.5 
presents the questioning technique in the construction of questions and Section 5.6 
provides a comprehensive description of the questionnaire‘s components. Section 5.7 
provides details of research hypotheses related to users‘ perceptions. Details of the pilot 
study and the questionnaire translation are presented in Section 5.8. Section 5.9 outlines 
groups participating in the questionnaire and sampling procedure. Sections 5.10 and 
5.11 discuss the validity and reliability of the questionnaire and statistical techniques 
used in assessing the perception and view of user groups. The procedures followed to 
obtain the research sample and data collection in the second empirical study are 
presented in Section 5.12. Sections 5.13 and 5.14 discuss in depth the construction and 
development of a voluntary disclosure index and its computing. Section 5.15 provides 
the primary background and theories to forming the research hypotheses and 
expectations, while Section 5.16 presents the statistical tests employed to evaluate 
hypotheses and formulated expectations. Finally, the conclusion is offered in Section 
5.17.  
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5.2 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
Research philosophy is defined as the process of scientific practice upon the philosophy 
of people and proposition regarding the world and the nature of knowledge (Collis and 
Hussey, 2009). In this respect, Saunders et al. (2009) described research philosophy as 
the development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge. Thus, research 
philosophy gives a guideline regarding how to conduct scientific research so it can be 
assumed that a philosophy framework has a direct effect on the selection of research 
approaches, methods used in collecting data, and the analysis of results.  
The discussion of paradigms and paradigmatic assumptions are considered a 
cornerstone in any academic research. There are two paradigms in social science 
research, namely: positivistic and phenomenological (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The 
next paragraph discusses the assumptions in view of these paradigms.  
Creswell (1994 and 1998) provided a comprehensive description and general definition 
for the five main assumptions of research philosophy, namely: ontological, 
epistemological, axiological, rhetorical, and methodological assumptions. These 
assumptions support the two main research paradigms or philosophies: positivistic and 
phenomenological. Table 5.1 provides a summary of these two research philosophies 
and their relation to five assumptions. The ontological assumption concentrates on the 
nature of reality. In positivists‘ view, reality is referred to as objective and external to 
the researcher, while it is perceived as subjective and internal to the researcher in the 
view of phenomenologists. The epistemological assumption relates to the study of 
knowledge and the type of knowledge considered valid in the research area. In the 
perspective of positivists, to provide credible and measurable data about the 
phenomenon under study, a researcher should be independent and objective. 
Conversely, a phenomenologist believes that the researcher should be close to what is 
being researched and interact with it to gain an extensive understanding of the 
phenomenon under investigation (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).  
The axiology assumption deals with the role of values in research. In this regard, 
positivists believe that the process of research is undertaken in a value-free and 
unbiased way. From an anti-positivist perspective, research is value-laden, so the 
researcher cannot be independent or distant from the research. The researcher‘s 
interpretations of the phenomenon are derived from her/his values. The rhetorical 
assumption relates to the language of research. In a positivistic context, the style of 
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writing leans towards formality, whilst, in the phenomenological context, researchers 
write in an informal style. The final philosophical assumption is related to the process of 
research. Under the positivistic approach, the methodological steps applied in the study 
should be based on a deductive manner, with the analysis focusing on the association 
between variables and/or causality. The analysis is context-free and aims to reach 
generalisation, which would aid in obtaining some benefits such as: the ability to 
predict, explain, and understand a particular phenomenon. It can be concluded that the 
positivistic paradigm employs quantitative approaches to analyse data statistically and 
explain the association between measurable variables through testable hypotheses and 
theories. In contrast, the phenomenological paradigm concentrates more on induction 
and is context-bound, with the analysis seeking more to understand the phenomena 
under investigating through developing theories (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Collis and 
Hussey, 2009). Thus, the latter paradigm employs qualitative approaches to understand 
a certain phenomenon.  
 
Table 5.1: Research Philosophy 
Assumption Question Positivists Phenomenologist 
Ontological  What is the nature of 
reality? 
Reality is objective and 
singular, apart from the 
researcher.  
Reality is subjective 
and multiple as seen 
by participants in a 
study.  
Epistemological What is the relationship of 
the researcher to that 
researched? 
Researcher is 
independent from that 
being researched.  
Researcher interacts 
with that being 
researched.  
Axiological What is the role of values? Value-free and unbiased.  Value-laden and 
biased.  
Rhetorical What is the language of 
research? 
Formal based on set 
definitions and 
impersonal voice. Use of 
accepted quantitative 
words.  
Informal and 
evolving decisions. 
Personal voice use of 
accepted qualitative 
words.  
Methodological What is the process of 
research? 
Deductive process, cause 
and effect.  
Statistic design 
categories isolated 
before study.  
Context-free 
generalisations leading 
to prediction, 
explanation and 
understanding, accurate 
and reliable through 
validity and reliability.  
Inductive process, 
mutual simultaneous 
shaping of factors.  
Emerging design 
categories identified 
during research 
process.  
Context-bound 
patterns, theories 
developed for 
understanding. 
Accurate and reliable 
through verification.  
 
Source: Hussey and Hussey (1997:48) 
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Watts and Zimmerman (1986) declared that a positive accounting approach aims to 
explain and predict accounting phenomena. Advocates of this approach attempt to 
differentiate positive from normative theories since the latter are concerned with 
prescription and value judgement, while the former depend on empirical data to test 
research hypotheses. Thus, it can be stated that propositions formulated upon the 
positive theory are verifiable. For example, it offers an opportunity to avoid the value 
judgements and theoretical speculations of normative models (Ryan et al., 2002). As 
another example, the implication of the positive accounting theory serves to determine a 
theory and verify the research hypotheses through answering ―What is‖ rather than 
―What ought‖ questions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2002; Ryan et 
al., 2002). This has a positive impact on determining different variables that may affect 
accounting phenomena.  
In light of the above, the present study could be classified as positive and it used a 
positivist approach to examine the variation in perception of different user groups via a 
set of testable hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested using non-parametric analysis. 
On a different point, it attempts to explain the variation in voluntary disclosure provided 
in CARs by employing a set of explanatory variables. The association between these 
variables and disclosure practices are statistically tested through the formulation of a set 
of testable hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested using multivariate regression 
analysis; they either stemmed from the theoretical perspective, as discussed in Chapter 2 
(e.g. agency theory, signalling theory), or have been chosen for their possible causal 
associations to voluntary disclosure behaviour. Furthermore, the empirical approach 
used has normative implications, which may help policy makers to achieve their 
objectives (Suwaidan, 1997). For example, if the results of research reveal that the 
overall level of voluntary disclosure is low, this suggests a need to improve disclosure 
requirements (Dye, 1986) and the CMA must pay more attention to the types of 
disclosure in CARs. 
Above that, as mentioned previously, the current study focuses mainly on two primary 
objectives. First, to explore and evaluate the perception of user groups regarding the 
usefulness and importance of CAR and the improvement of its voluntary information 
besides other issues such as CG. This can be achieved through employing a 
questionnaire survey as a quantitative approach. Second, the study also seeks to 
understand and explore the phenomenon under investigation which is the voluntary 
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disclosure practices in annual reports of listed companies at the KSE, which can be 
reached through employing a voluntary disclosure index as a quantitative approach. 
The present study highlights the status quo of the market, i.e. how it is constructed and 
maintained rather than focusing on how to change it. Burrell and Morgan (1997) 
suggested and developed, based on two perspectives or dimensions and five sets of 
theoretical assumptions as shown in Table 5.1, four mutually exclusive ways or 
paradigms of viewing the social world. These paradigms are commonly used in social 
science research, which are functionalist, interpretive, structuralist, and humanist. 
Figure 5.1 demonstrates the location of each paradigm for the analysis of social theory. 
Thus, it can be stated that the study is carried out within a functionalist paradigm since 
the objectives of study closely fit this paradigm. For instance, the functionalist research 
paradigm is related to quantitative studies. In this respect, Crabtree and Miller (1992:6) 
proposed that a quantitative approach is more likely to fit an ―explanation-testing‖ of 
social order or affairs, and control, while a qualitative method is usually more useful 
and used for ―identification, description and explanation-generation‖. 
 
Figure 5.1 Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory 
 
The sociology of radical change 
                          
Subjective     Objective 
 
The sociology of regulation 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979:22) 
 
5.3 DATA RESEARCH METHODS 
Data collection is considered an essential stage of research since the accuracy of 
research results highly depends on the way data are obtained. Data collection can take 
place through a number of methods as well as from different sources. Specifically, two 
methods are commonly used in previous studies, namely: interviews and questionnaires. 
 
 
Radical humanist Radical structuralist 
Interpretive Functionalist 
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5.3.1 The Interview Method 
One method for gathering data is an interview, either structured or unstructured. 
Interviews can take place over the telephone, face-to-face, or through the medium of the 
computer (Sekaran, 2003; Fink, 2003). Researchers employ this method to obtain the 
views of subject groups in relation to the research topic‘s objectives.  
The interview method has a number of advantages, including a high degree of flexibility 
in the questioning process (Greenfield, 2002). It gives a good opportunity to control the 
interview situation and the line of questioning (Creswell, 2003) as well as assisting 
reading nonverbal behaviour (Sekaran, 2003). Moreover, it presents a good chance for 
clarifying questions and adding new questions during the dialogue between the 
interviewer and interviewee (Sekaran, 2003). Hence, this method is considered one of 
the most effective research approaches which may be preferred when discussing long 
and difficult questions. In addition, the interview may have a positive impact on 
improving the response rate (Oppenheim, 2000). Despite its many advantages, the 
interview method suffers some deficiencies, which are summarised below.  
The first limitation relates to the interview itself. It is considered more costly, for 
example in travel and telephone costs, than other research methods such as mail 
questionnaires (Oppenheim, 2000), particularly in the case where interviews involve 
participants spread over a wide area (Sekaran, 2003). Moreover, this type of data 
collection can be very time-consuming. 
The second limitation concerns errors related to the interviewer. The presence of the 
researcher in this method could cause bias in responses (Creswell, 2003). Other factors 
possibly creating bias in the answers are the researcher‘s personality and tone of voice. 
To mitigate these drawbacks, researchers should be aware of these matters before the 
interviews. In this context, De Vaus (2002) stated that interviewers require careful 
training and suitable personal skills.  
The last limitation concerns the interviewee‘s bias. In some cases participants in 
interviews do not wish to provide accurate information, give correct responses, or 
divulge the truth about the events of interest since the presence of the researcher means 
a lack of anonymity. Moreover, this could be the result of the research topic itself or 
some of the questions addressing sensitive issues. It should be taken into account that 
interviewees are affected by social desirability considerations, preferring to give 
acceptable rather than true answers (De Vaus, 2002).  
134 
 
5.3.2 The Questionnaire Method 
A questionnaire survey is an efficient mechanism to collect information regarding the 
perspectives and beliefs of groups of people as well as changes in their opinions and 
their information needs. It is a highly structured data collection method and consists of a 
set of written questions which are usually highly pre-formulated, so individual 
respondents can complete it by themselves (Fink, 2003). This type of data collection 
technique can be carried out by mail, telephone, electronically distributed, or 
administered personally (Sekaran, 2003). Although interviews allow a researcher 
reasonable space and great flexibility regarding administering and changing the 
questions, the questionnaire is a more efficient mechanism to obtain data, in terms of 
time and cost (Sekaran, 2003; Burns and Bush, 2009).     
The questionnaire is frequently used by researchers in social sciences. It is characterised 
by low cost compared with other research methods such as interviews, particularly 
when the questionnaire involves a wide range of people spread over a large territory. It 
is also helpful in assuring respondent anonymity as well as providing more privacy to 
complete the questionnaire (Nachmias and Nachmias, 2007). Finally, this data 
collection technique helps to reduce ―error bias‖ or ―response bias‖, which could occur 
as a result of the personal characteristics of the interviewer and the variation in their 
abilities and skills. 
Conversely, there are some disadvantages related to this data collection approach. In 
this type of survey, the given response must be accepted as final since the researcher has 
no opportunity to probe beyond it, to correct the misunderstanding of questions, and to 
observe the nonverbal cues of respondents (Oppenheim, 2000). Furthermore, the 
researcher cannot clarify ambiguous responses (Almahmoud, 2000). Moreover, a low 
response rate is considered the most serious problem associated with questionnaires. In 
this respect, Sekaran (2003) stated that a response rate of 30% is generally accepted for 
a mail questionnaire.  
   
5.4 RESEARCH METHOD  
De Vaus (2002:131) argued that “It is impossible to decide which method is the best: 
the relative strengths and weaknesses vary according to the characteristics of the 
survey”. A researcher should take into account some key factors when selecting a 
method of collecting data such as: the research topic, sample size and distribution, the 
135 
 
type of questions, nature of the population, and time and cost constraints (De Vaus, 
2002).   
A ―self-administered‖ or so-called ―drop-off questionnaire‖ is considered the most 
suitable method for this study. With regard to this research method, the study followed 
the recommendation of Sekaran (2003:236), who stated that:  
“When the survey is confined to a local area, and the organization is willing and able to 
assemble groups of employees to respond to the questionnaires at the workplace, a good 
way to collect the data is to personally distribute the questionnaire. The main advantage 
of this is that the researcher or a member of the research team can collect all the 
completed responses within a short period of time”.  
 
On the other hand, the appropriateness of this method can be derived from the type of 
research topic, the nature of the society in which the questionnaire is conducted, and the 
subject groups who participate in the questionnaire. As mentioned previously, the 
questionnaire‘s objectives are to explore the perceptions of different user groups 
regarding different aspects. Consequently, this study deals with different user groups 
and also aims to obtain the views of as many users of annual reports as possible, so the 
interview method would consume the valuable time of the interviewer and interviewees. 
In addition, the questionnaire is an appropriate way to answer the research question 
without the researcher pressurising the respondents. The use of a self-administered 
questionnaire is also expected to be useful and effective in minimising some 
disadvantages related to the mail questionnaire such as low response rate and missing 
data.  
On a different note, it is expected that the workplace environment, in which target 
groups work, creates some restrictions regarding gaining access, specifically if the 
interview technique is employed. Furthermore, members of the Kuwaiti business 
community are characterised by a tendency to be cautious in providing personal 
opinions, due to their cultural background, on sensitive issues since they believe these 
opinions could create conflict with the nature of their work and affect their work future; 
in addition, their personal opinions represent their employers‘ official view. Hence, the 
use of questionnaires is an effective method for protecting the confidentially and 
anonymity of research participants and obtaining the co-operation of participants from 
the Kuwaiti business community.  
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In light of the reasons outlined above, the questionnaire technique was considered the 
best method to reach the main objectives of the study as well as coping with the 
disadvantages of other research methods.  
 
5.5 THE QUESTIONING TECHNIQUE  
There is a general consensus that the wording of questions plays an important role in 
determining the quality and type of data obtained from participants in the study. In this 
sense, Fink (2003:11) clarified that “a straightforward question asks for information in 
an unambiguous way and extracts accurate and consistent information. Straightforward 
questions are purposeful and use correct grammar and syntax”. Consistent with this 
view, when designing the questionnaire, several attempts were made to ensure the 
questions were written in an acceptable and clear way, as well as using simple words 
and common terms.  
 
A. Types of Questions 
The questions were drawn firstly by reviewing a number of previous relevant studies: 
Alrazeen (1999), Al-Mahmoud (2000), Naser et al. (2003), Al-Mutairi (2004), 
Mirshekary and Saudagaran (2005), Al-Ajmi (2009). Secondly, the questions were also 
compiled by reviewing the main reports about the KSE, which were published by 
different national and international bodies (as discussed in Chapter 4).  
 
B. Forms of Questions  
Best (1981:43) stated that ―the closed-form questionnaire usually consists of statements 
or questions with a fixed number of choices. The respondent is asked to check the 
response that best fits the item”. Consistent with this view, the questions were written in 
a statement format and the respondents were given a five-point Likert scale to express 
their perceptions. In some cases, this indicated the importance/agreement level of 
statements and in others, the level of difficulty with specific statements in the view of 
participants. Fowler (1993) declared that a five-point Likert scale gives a reasonable 
opportunity for discrimination among each question. So, this could help to increase 
variation in possible results by coding (e.g. from ―not at all important‖ to ―extremely 
important‖).  
The closed-ended questions are easier for respondents to answer and complete. They 
assist the researcher to code the information easily for subsequent statistical analysis 
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and interpretation (Sekaran, 2003; Fink, 2003). In this context, Greenfield (2002) stated 
that this type of question does not require writing by both researcher and respondents 
and is characterised by its uncomplicated analysis. This is also, “particularly important 
in large surveys because of the number of responses and respondents‖ (Fink, 2003:18).  
Although this type of question helps to save time for both the respondent and researcher 
(Oppenheim, 2000), it is criticised on the ground that it may generate bias and so could 
indirectly force respondents to select from a set of given alternatives. Closed-ended 
questions may suffer other limitations as a result of loss expressiveness (Oppenheim, 
2000). In some cases, they also do not help the researcher to know the reasons behind 
respondents‘ answers. In view of the above discussion, it was decided to use closed-
ended questions in this study.  
To overcome drawbacks, at the end of each section, participants were given free space 
to add further responses, items, comments, suggestions and opinions. Moreover, 
respondents were invited and encouraged to highlight critical topics which were not 
covered or not deeply covered in the questionnaire (see Appendix 4). Overall, the 
comments and suggestions of respondents were edited and documented, as qualitative 
data to strengthen and support the statistical results of this thesis; see Chapter 6.  
 
5.6 COMPONENTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE  
The questions have been constructed in a clear and structured approach to minimize the 
respondents‘ time and effort in completing the questionnaire as well as following the 
ideas and questions step by step. With regard to the sequence of the questionnaire, it is 
useful to lead the respondents from questions of a general nature to those that are more 
specific, and from questions that are easy to answer to those that are more difficult 
(Hoinville et al., 1978; and Sekaran, 2003). 
Initially, the questionnaire began with a short introductory paragraph explaining the 
general objectives of the research topic. Another purpose of the cover page is to 
encourage the respondents to answer questions without bias and to provide more 
comments. The questionnaire in this study was grouped into five sections. 
The first dealt with participants‘ demographic information and other important 
information required for research purposes. This provides a good background regarding 
participants‘ responsibilities and duties. This section includes: place of work, type of 
job, employment record and qualifications. Consisting of three parts, the second section 
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was constructed to investigate the views of different user groups about the importance 
of CARs and their sections for making decisions. It also investigates whether, in the 
respondents‘ view, the annual report contains information that has the qualitative 
criteria that may enhance its quality. The third section consisted of three questions 
assessing the current level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports, according to the 
view of user groups. It also rated the usefulness level of voluntary disclosure and 
selected voluntary items to be disclosed in annual reports. The fourth section 
investigated some factors that could affect information transparency provided by 
companies in the respondents‘ view. Finally, section five comprised of three questions 
representing of a series of statements about the kinds of criticism directed against the 
regulatory and legal environment of KSE (see Chapter 4). It also examined the ability to 
implement CG practices in Kuwait.  
 
5.7 PHASE I: RESEARCH HYPOTHESES RELATED TO USERS’ 
PERCEPTIONS  
In particular, the first stage of this study seeks to test the hypotheses related to users‘ 
perceptions toward Kuwaiti annual report as a source of information and the importance 
of voluntary information along with other issues. 
 
5.7.1 Importance of Information Sources 
A number of academic studies have been conducted to explore the essential sources of 
information employed by users of corporate information. More specifically, a wide set 
of previous studies in different parts of the world attempted to explore the most 
important sources regularly used by different types of user groups in the process of 
making decisions (e.g. Nasser et al., 2003; Mirshekary and Saudagaran, 2005; Zoysa 
and Rudkin, 2010). These show that the most valuable source of information is the 
corporate annual report (CAR).    
Rees (1995) argued that personal contact with companies and publicly published 
information are considered one of the other sources which could help investors to 
follow and anticipate company performance. In this respect, Abu-Nassar and Rutherford 
(1996) stated that external users of financial reports depend more on alternative sources 
of information to CARs as an important instrument for the process of decision-making 
since those sources include more up-to-date information and that which is not available 
in annual reports. 
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The results of these studies revealed different perceptions toward the sources of 
information. For this reason, the present study proposed a similar research question to 
explore the most important sources of information in the views of users of corporate 
information in Kuwait. Given the preceding discussion, the following null hypothesis 
will be tested: 
H1:  There are no significant differences among user groups in the perceived 
importance of different sources of information. 
 
5.7.2 Importance of Annual Report Sections   
According to Rees (1995), accounting information included in a CAR could be 
categorised into two main sections: the first relates to financial information, including 
the statement of financial position and income statement etc. However, some companies 
do not release information specifically about future plans, long-term liabilities, and 
breakdown of profits etc., because this shortness in detailed information could mislead 
users of annual reports. The second section contains information related to the auditor 
report, chairman‘s letter etc., which can be called non-financial information. On the 
other hand, Rees (1995) claimed that the concentration of information provided in 
CARs varies across countries and could be governed by business laws and other 
regulations in each country. Thus, a corporate report is viewed as a product that reflects 
legal and cultural relationships (Senoun 1993).   
The previous research indicated that financial statements, especially the statement of 
financial position and income statement, are the sections most frequently employed by 
users of CARs for decision-making (e.g. Epstein and Anderson, 1994; Naser et al., 
2003; Al-Ajmi, 2009; Zoysa and Rudkin, 2010). In addition, studying the importance of 
the cash flow statement and its data revealed that it is important since it assists in 
providing information regarding the ability of a company to generate cash flow from its 
operations and investment (Neill et al., 1991).  
Turning to the importance of non-financial information, derived from the qualitative 
information, Smith and Taffler (1992) explored the relationship between the chairman‘s 
letter and company performance; they proved a significant association between these 
variables. Hence, a weakness in the ability to read and understand the chairman‘s letter 
reflects the weakness in the company‘s financial performance. Although the contents of 
information included in the chairman‘s letter are not required to be audited by an 
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external auditor, there is a requirement that these contents should harmonise with the 
general context of the annual accounts. Bartlett and Chandler (1997) revealed that the 
chairman‘s message is considered one of the most important sections of annual reports 
(Jamil et al., 2009; Bhana, 2009); it is seen as an introductory section which sets the 
rhythm of the subsequent sections and contents of annual reports. Therefore, it is crucial 
to identify the importance that user groups attach to different sections of the CAR. Thus, 
the following hypothesis will be tested: 
H2: There are no significant differences among user groups in the importance they 
attach to various sections of a corporate annual report. 
 
5.7.3 The Qualitative Characteristics of Corporate Information 
The main objective of corporate annual reports is to provide useful information which 
should meet the needs and perspectives of key users, such as creditors and shareholders, 
for decision making. Also accounting information provided in annual reports could be 
useful for other parties who are interested in business and economic events. In order to 
reach this primary objective, information should have a number of characteristics, called 
qualitative characteristics of accounting information. In terms of completeness, Lewis 
and Pendrill (2003) stated that the benefits of information should exceed its production 
costs. In addition, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC, 1989) 
indicated that information releases by companies should be useful for users in the 
decision process. It must possess qualitative characteristics including being 
understandable, relevant, reliable, comparable, and timely. 
Overall, empirical studies allocated a number of characteristics to gauge the quality of 
CARs. These studies recognised relevance, reliability, understandability and 
comparability, and consistency as the main characteristics that information should 
contain to be judged useful. In addition, accounting information can be considered 
reliable when it has the following characteristics: representational faithfulness, 
verifiability, and neutrality (Wolk et al., 1992). It is, therefore, important to question the 
various stakeholder groups regarding their perception about whether the corporate 
information has the qualitative characteristics that could affect the quality of the annual 
report. Given that, the following hypothesis will be tested:   
H3: There are no significant differences among user groups on agreement level of 
qualitative characteristics that might affect the quality of corporate annual reports. 
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5.7.4. Voluntary Disclosure Practices 
The next sections cover several aspects of voluntary disclosure. Among these aspects 
are: level of voluntary disclosure, the usefulness of voluntary disclosure, and the 
proposed voluntary items to be disclosed in CARs.  
 
5.7.4.1 Existing Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
The overall level of voluntary disclosure and categories of information in emerging 
markets such as Kuwait are criticised for being lower than documented by studies 
conducted in other countries (Al-Shammari, 2008; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that, in the perspective of major user groups, information 
provided in annual reports is not fully satisfactory.  
There is empirical evidence from the literature (for more details see Chapter 3) 
indicating variation in the level of voluntary disclosure and the types of information 
disclosed by companies. This variation could be interpreted on the grounds that 
disclosure practices differ among companies and this creates a great deal of interest in 
exploring the perception of stakeholder groups regarding the current level of voluntary 
disclosures in the annual reports of companies listed on the KSE. This could help in 
investigating whether the results of empirical studies conducted in Kuwait are consistent 
with the perception of well-experienced and knowledgeable users. This would also help 
to gauge the level of satisfaction among the user groups regarding the level of voluntary 
information that companies disclose. Consequently, the participants were asked to 
evaluate the current level of voluntary corporate disclosures. This leads to the following 
hypothesis.  
H4: There are no significant differences among user groups‘ views on the current level 
of voluntary disclosure released in the corporate annual reports. 
 
5.7.4.2 Usefulness of Voluntary Information 
Shaoul (1997) indicated that accounting disclosure is considered a powerful mechanism 
and a crucial source which helps to investigate the company‘s performance and 
financial position and to assess public disputes regarding company strategies and 
policies. Larson and Kenny (1995) stated that that disclosures and accounting reports 
play a central role in the growth of capital markets. Beyond that, Ndubizu (1992) 
asserted that disclosure, as a factor, helps to avoid market failure through reducing the 
level of uncertainty in a stock market. Therefore, issues like these receive much 
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attention from governments and the public. In the disclosure context, Gilson (2000:5) 
argued that ―delivering information to investors is easy; but delivering credible 
information is hard‖. Thus, stakeholders, especially minority shareholders, benefit from 
the disclosure of information when it is accurate and credible as well as timely. 
From the above, it can be concluded that one of CARs‘ main objectives is to provide 
useful information to users through voluntary disclosure. Therefore, companies should 
employ voluntary disclosure in a more efficient way; this could increase the flow of 
capital in the capital markets such as the KSE. Consequently, it is important to explore 
how voluntary disclosure provided in CARs can be useful in making effective decisions. 
The following hypothesis will be tested:  
H5: There are no significant differences among user groups‘ views on the usefulness of 
voluntary disclosure.  
 
5.7.4.3 Proposed Voluntary Items to be Disclosed in the Annual Report 
Among previous studies, conducted in the context of developed and developing 
countries, there is no general agreement on the list of voluntary information, ―the 
checklist‖, to assess the disclosure level. Firth (1978) used 75 information items, some 
of which are mandatory; McNally et al. (1982) used 41 items, some also mandatory; 
Chau and Gray (2002) used 113 items; and Agca and Onder (2007) used 87 items of 
information. More recently, Al-Shammari and Al Sultan (2010) used 76 items and 
Alanezi (2011) used 51 information items. 
In this study, respondents‘ views towards the usefulness of 29 proposed information 
items (if they were regularly published in CARs) were explored. This may help to 
improve the quality of voluntary disclosure in Kuwait. Given that, the following 
hypothesis will be examined: 
H6: There are no significant differences among user groups about the perceived 
usefulness of voluntary disclosed items listed in the questionnaire to improve the quality 
of voluntary disclosure.   
 
5.7.5 Factors Affecting Corporate Information Transparency  
The identification of determinants that may affect the level of transparency of the 
information published is considered a complex process. In fact, information 
transparency may also be influenced by a range of factors: company and corporate 
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governance characteristics, the status of the national economy, the attributes of the 
capital market on which companies are listed, and cultural values.  
Information transparency is most likely influenced by board reputation in terms of the 
professional experience and high level of skills of directors who sit on the board, as well 
as of experienced senior managers who are engaged in making strategic decisions. 
Besides, information transparency is affected by a company being well-established and 
well-known, with a better reputation than other companies which are considered less 
established and with less history in business norms. With regard to auditors‘ reputation, 
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) and Ali et al. (2004) stated that big audit firms influence the 
policy of accounting information disclosure followed by their clients, and so it is 
expected that they encourage transparency in the information released by their clients. 
Moreover, it is argued that the audit profession has a significant role in enhancing 
confidence in the reliability of company information (Nazri, 2011). It is expected that 
the level of information transparency would improve with an improvement in the 
understanding of the factors which influence transparency. Consequently, it is important 
to ask the various user groups about the factors that may contribute to fostering 
companies‘ information transparency. Thus, the following research hypothesis will be 
tested:  
H7: There are no significant differences among user groups‘ perceptions on the factors 
that may affect the information transparency provided by listed companies.    
 
5.7.6 Accounting Regulations and KSE’s Growth 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the KSE was criticised by a number of international bodies 
and studies on the ground that it suffers a lack of regulation, miscommunication and 
poor cooperation between the regulatory bodies, and the absence of regulation 
enforcement. This contributes to a series of problems such as insider dealing and the 
lack of minority interest, hence weakening the confidence of individual investors in the 
capital market (King and Roell, 1988). To make a strong capital market, applicable laws 
and regulations in the market should achieve two fundamental prerequisites: minority 
shareholders should receive good information about the companies, and the company‘s 
insiders should not cheat other company shareholders (Bernard, 2000).  
The regulatory bodies of the KSE are expected to increase their coordination and work 
as a team, as discussed in Chapter 4. This is considered a crucial part of a successful 
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organisation, following the recommendations and standards of international 
organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International 
Organisation of Security Commissions (IOSCO), so could help to achieve their 
objectives. This could aid the development of the capital market, considered one of 
most important objectives for many countries such as Kuwait. Moreover, if this comes 
to fruition it will diversify the income sources and attract a wide range of new investors 
in the KSE. Hence, this could strengthen the competitive position of the KSE among 
other Arab capital markets. 
Under these circumstances, it is important to ask different categories of professional 
users, who are interested in the KSE‘s affairs, about their views on the need to reduce 
the overlap in surveillance and enforcement functions among the KSE‘s regulatory 
bodies. Also, the need to revise/set new business regulations in Kuwait mitigates the 
lack of current laws. It is also important to ask user groups in the KSE about their 
perception regarding the level of difficulty in applying some issues related to corporate 
governance: all statements drawn from Chapter 4. Based on the preceding discussion, 
the following three hypotheses will be investigated:  
H8: There are no significant differences among user groups‘ views regarding the 
reduction of overlapping in the surveillance and enforcement functions among 
regulatory bodies.    
H9: There are no significant differences among user groups about the perceived 
usefulness of a set of procedures to improve the level of confidence and investment in 
the capital market.  
H10: There are no significant differences among user groups‘ opinions on the degree of 
difficulty about the ability to apply some issues related to corporate governance best 
practices.   
 
5.8 PILOT STUDY AND THE QUESTIONNAIRE TRANSLATION 
A pilot study is considered prior to actually using the questionnaire to collect data for 
research objectives and has a positive impact on improving the quality of the 
questionnaire and its contents. Thus, this step could help prevent any potential problems 
in recording the data for subsequent analysis and it also allows questionnaire 
participants to answer the questions without any problems (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Therefore, a pilot study is one of main ways to test the successful questionnaire.    
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In this respect, the study followed the advice of Saunders (2009:394), who argued that: 
“Initially you should ask an expert or group of experts to comment on the 
representativeness and stability of your questionnaire. As well as allowing suggestions 
to be made on the structure of your questionnaire, this will help establish content 
validity and enable you to make necessary amendments prior to polite testing with a 
group as similar as possible to the final population in your sample”. 
 
Based on the above discussion, the questionnaire in this study went through a number of 
preparation and development stages before it reaches the final draft for actual 
distribution. The first draft was piloted to the faculty members of College of Business 
Administration at Kuwait University, who have the relevant theoretical background. 
They were asked to provide their feedback regarding the questionnaire‘s wording and 
order of questions, content and structure, and limitations. Based on their feedback, a few 
items were eliminated. Several amendments were made to the wording of some 
questions, some less relevant questions were eliminated in order to reduce the 
questionnaire‘s length and others were combined. In the next stage, the questionnaire 
was translated into Arabic.  
After reviewing a number of various translation approaches (McGorry, 2000), the 
decision was made to pursue the following method. The questionnaire survey was 
initially written in English, which, in Kuwait, is considered the second main language 
after Arabic for official correspondence in the government and private sector and among 
well-educated individuals. Consistent with Marin and Marin‘s (1991) view, the study 
adopted a double translation manner to avoid potential ambiguities. This involved the 
use of a translation office ―as an independent party‖ to translate and the questionnaire 
into Arabic, thus avoiding any bias in the process if he conducted this task himself. In 
the second preparation phase of translation, copies of the translated to English and 
original questionnaire were submitted to some faculty members at Kuwait University 
Accounting Department to ensure the translation did not affect the original meaning of 
the questions in particular and the questionnaire in general. 
The second piloted stage, as a further step, took place with an experienced group to 
obtain extra comments about the simplicity and sequence of the questionnaire.  
Discussions were held with a number of senior employees at the Ministry of Finance 
since they are similar to the target user groups, having a good knowledge of commercial 
regulations and the contents of CARs. On completion, the final draft was ready to be 
administered to the target groups.     
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5.9 PARTICIPANT GROUPS AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
As previously mentioned, this study concerns the investigation of users‘ perception 
toward information in CARs as a source of information. Hence, the first step in a 
sampling plan or design is to identify the whole population for the target groups. The 
groups of respondents were categorised into four different groups as follows: financial 
advisors, external auditors, market regulators, and academics. As a result of the 
difficulty of identifying the entire population of interest, the culture of the research 
population, the participants being expected to be sensitive to the research topic or some 
of the questions, and time constraints, a decision was made to choose to employ 
judgement and snowball samplings.  
The study sample followed the advice of Neuman (2000), who stated that judgement 
sampling is appropriate if the study aims to obtain better understanding of the research 
phenomenon rather than being generalised to the whole population. On the other hand, a 
snowball sampling method was used: participants in this questionnaire were asked to 
refer other colleagues and/or introduce further elements of the group since Kuwait is a 
small country and society is built on close social relationships between individuals. So, 
in most cases, it is assumed the group of people has a good knowledge and connection 
with each others.  
It is interesting to note that the selection of the following groups is based on a number 
of considerations: a set of relevant studies. Further, it is assumed that the target groups 
are familiar with CARs and their contents as well as issues discussed in the 
questionnaire. Members of financial advisory group were selected and their unlisted 
investment companies‘ addresses were obtained through the Central Bank of Kuwait‘s 
(CBK) website. The list of audit firms was obtained through the 2006 directory 
published by the Kuwaiti Association of Accountants and Auditors. The names of 
highly ranked audit firms, i.e. in terms of number of listed companies audited, were 
obtained from the regulatory bodies. The following discusses the participant groups in 
this study and the reasons and motivations behind their selection.    
 
Financial Advisory Group 
The first group consists of portfolio managers from unlisted investment companies 
involved in activities such as providing investment advice and analysis of different 
types of information to adequately explain the financial position of a company and other 
circumstances needed to reach an informed decision. It is important to include 
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experienced managers since they are more familiar with the contents of annual reports, 
the disclosure requirements, and the regulations of the KSE. They are also 
knowledgeable about companies‘ performance and financial position. Hence, this would 
strongly help to get valuable opinions about the importance of CARs and the usefulness 
of voluntary information in making decisions.   
 
External Auditor Group 
This includes local audit firms which are associated with one of the Big 4 firms or any 
other international firms. Usually these firms are audit listed companies. External 
auditors are expected to have a positive role in promoting compliance with local 
regulations and IFRS along with having a significant influence on the quality and 
credibility of information provided in annual reports. The audit firms are requested to 
pass the questionnaire to professional individuals from different functional levels (e.g. 
partners and senior auditor managers). The selection of auditors, who differ in their 
levels of responsibilities and powers, may help them to give informed opinions and 
valuable comments in different dimensions.  
 
Market Regulator Group 
The market regulator group consists of market regulators from three governmental 
bodies: the MCI, KSE and CBK. The Department of Shareholding under the MCI 
regulates many issues related to companies listed on the KSE. In addressing the 
regulations related to financial reporting, Arnold et al. (1994) revealed that the 
regulators can be considered as working on behalf of shareholders and others. The 
Kuwaiti government owns a significant percentage in companies listed on the KSE, 
specifically leading companies. Consequently, it is important to involve government 
representatives and the Shareholding Companies‘ Departments under these regulatory 
bodies. The departments responsible for supervising the listed companies are requested 
to pass the questionnaire to the qualified individuals such as managers, controllers, 
heads of departments and senior employees. The selection of members of this group, 
who differ in terms of functions as well as practical experiences, could give a 
reasonable opportunity in enhancing the variation in possible results, and to obtain 
valuable comments and suggestions. In addition, it is important to gain the view of 
government toward CARs and voluntary disclosure.  
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Accounting Academic Group 
The fourth group of participants consists of accounting academics in public and private 
universities in Kuwait, who are involved in teaching or their research in financial 
reporting, disclosure practices and CGs. This group has been chosen to participate in 
this questionnaire on the grounds of their specialisation in issues associated with 
disclosure and corporate governance practices. That is because they are assumed to be 
knowledgeable from their theoretical background and well-trained or practised from 
their positions as consultants to various bodies in Kuwait. In addition, they participate 
as experts in setting the accounting and business regulations. The government of Kuwait 
usually appoints members of this user group as ministers so that they can participate in 
setting country policies.           
 
5.10 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY  
In the first part of the current study, two types of tests were employed, namely: validity 
and reliability, to confirm the acceptability and credibility of a research instrument and 
the study results. The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 17.00 was 
used to produce the results and the test of reliability. 
Validity is defined as the ability and accuracy of the measurement instrument to 
measure what it was intended to measure (Saunders et al., 2009). So, the instrument can 
be said to be valid when it measures what it set out to measure. As a matter of fact, the 
quality of research project outcomes is affected by the quality of the data collection 
method (Huck and Cormier, 1996). Consequently, the researcher should depend on 
reliable and valid instruments to collect data, to ensure more reliable conclusions (Reda, 
1992). In this study, the validity of the questionnaire stemmed from several professional 
staff and experienced academics, who participated in the pilot study as previously 
discussed.   
Reliability is represented by the consistency of a measuring instrument. Neuman 
(1997:138) defined reliability of the instrument thus: 
“Reliability deals with an indicator’s dependability. If one has a reliable indicator or 
measure, it gives you the same result each time the same thing is measured. Reliability 
means that the information provided by indicators (e.g. questionnaire) does not vary as 
a result of characteristics of the indicator, instrument, or measurement device itself”.  
 
In fact, it is often difficult to arrange for a collected group of people, such as 
participants, more specifically in surveys, to repeat answering the same questions on 
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two different occasions to assess the consistency of results. However, an alternative 
technique, called the internal consistency reliability, was adopted to measure how well 
the items, which measure the same concept in the scale, are correlated to each other.  
To discover the reliability of the study‘s results, the Cronbach‘s alpha measurement of 
internal consistency was used. This is a common statistical technique in testing the 
reliability of research instruments and widely used in social researches. The Cronbach‘s 
alpha approach aims to assess the correlation between all items; its values range 
between 0 and 1. George and Mallery (2003) gave a general definition of Cronbach‘s 
alpha scores by employing the following scale: higher than 0.9: Excellent; higher than 
0.8: Good; higher than 0.7: Acceptable; higher than 0.6: Questionable; higher than 0.5: 
Poor; and less than 0.5: Unacceptable. Hence, the higher value of coefficient alpha 
indicates a more reliable scale.   
Table 5.2 shows the values of the Cronbach‘s coefficient alpha for the overall user 
groups and for each of the user groups. The scores of Cronbach‘s alpha are above 0.7, 
reflecting good internal consistency reliability of the answers.  
 
Table 5.2: The Values of Cronbach’s Alpha for the Questionnaire 
Name of Groups Coefficient alpha 
All user groups .90 
Financial Advisory .85 
External Auditor .90 
Market Regulator .88 
Accounting Academic .94 
 
5.11 STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES TO TEST USERS’ PERCEPTION 
There are two main statistical approaches to analysing data, namely: parametric tests 
and non- parametric tests. To determine which approach should be used, the collected 
data should satisfy a set of statistical assumptions, including (for example, see Balian, 
1982; Blumberg et al., 2008; Saunders et al., 2009): assumption of normality, which 
means that data observations should be drawn from a normally distributed target 
population; assumption of homogeneity of variance, which means that standard 
deviation of data observations should be equal. It is also presumed that data 
observations should be independent.  
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It is interesting to note that parametric statistics are more efficient than non-parametric 
when all assumptions are satisfied, as well as when collected data is measured on an 
interval scale (Siegel, 1956). Conversely, if all or any preceding assumptions are not 
met by data cases, non-parametric techniques would be the more appropriate approach 
(Balian, 1982). In this sense, non-parametric methods are considered an alternative test 
when any preceding assumptions are not possible to apply to data observations. 
Moreover, Newbold et al. (2003) stated that non-parametric techniques are more 
appropriate for the survey containing ordinal data without the existence of the normality 
assumption. According to the results of normality for questionnaire data, using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests indicated that the p-value was less than 
5%. This suggests that the normality assumption was not met, so non-parametric 
statistics were used in this part of the study.  
The following main statistical techniques were employed in the questionnaire survey: 
Descriptive Measures: To explore the data thoroughly by group response to gain a 
better understanding of the data, descriptive statistics were employed and comprised of 
overall mean values, standard deviation scores, and the ranking for each item in terms of 
level of agreement or importance or difficulties based on the overall mean values.  
Frequencies: These were employed to display simple counts and percentages for 
categorical or ordinal data. 
Non-Parametric Methods: The statistical technique of the Kruskal Wallis (KW) test is 
used to test the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference among user groups‘ 
perceptions. Thus, this test is helpful in exploring the level of consensus among target 
user groups. In case the KW test shows any significant differences among user groups‘ 
responses, the Mann-Whitney (MW) test is used to examine the differences between 
each pair of groups. In other words, the KW is adopted to find out if there is any 
statistically significant difference across factors and if so to pinpoint where the 
differences lie by using the MW. These approaches are commonly used with the Likert 
scale, as data is not normally distributed. 
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5.12 PHASE II: RESEARCH SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
COLLECTION 
This study‘s target research population is all non-financial companies listed on the KSE, 
since the number of listed companies is small. Year 2005 was selected as a base year 
due to the International Monetary Fund Report (IMFR) (2004) regarding the assessment 
of financial sector stability in Kuwait being published for the public at the beginning of 
2004. The IMFR‘s report includes very important recommendations concerning 
inefficiency practice mechanisms in the KSE and time and serious efforts are required 
from regulatory bodies such as the KSE and CBK to mitigate the deficiencies in the 
followed procedures and regulations. Moreover, the present study covers the financial 
period 2005-2008, which was chosen because it is prior to the establishment of the 
Capital Markets Authority (CMA), which was instituted to improve the monitoring 
process on market practices, as one of its main objectives, and to follow the 
recommendations of international bodies such as the IMF (see Chapter 4). Another 
important impetus behind choosing this financial period is to examine voluntary 
disclosure changes over a period of time and without the existence of changes in 
mandatory disclosure requirements. In addition, this was considered the most recent 
data available when conducting the empirical work at the end of 2008 and the beginning 
of 2009.  
According to the Investor Guide and Annual Report of 2005 issued by the KSE, a total 
of 158 companies are listed on the KSE; these are classified into two categories: 
Kuwaiti companies (143) and non-Kuwaiti companies (15). The sample selection 
process involved two important stages. As can be seen in Table 5.3, the initial sample of 
158 companies was reduced by excluding all financial companies which have financing 
and/or leasing activities. Also, they are excluded from the statistical research sample as 
their accounts, by the nature of their operations and activities and information reporting 
practices, are different from those of non-financial companies. On a different point, this 
exclusion is a common technique, employed in most disclosure literature (e.g. Cooke, 
1989a, 1989b; Wallace et al., 1994; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 
2006; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009), and thus would offer a good opportunity to compare 
the research outputs with the results of disclosure studies.  
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Table 5.3: Selection of Companies 
Description Total no. of 
companies 
% of total 
research 
population 
All companies listed on the KSE as of 31 December, 
2005 
158 100 
The first stage (excluding)    
Banks (11) 7 
Insurance companies (9) 5.7 
Investment companies  (41) 26 
Total number of companies excluded 61 38.7 
Total no of non-financial companies represented in 
the research sample   
97 61.3 
 
After the first stage of exclusion, all non-financial companies listed on the KSE in 2005 
are considered the target population of the study since the population size is relatively 
small. It should be noted that the full set of annual reports for some companies are not 
available on their website and also some companies do not have a website, so 
companies were directly contacted to obtain the annual reports for the study period. The 
other research data were gathered through a questionnaire survey submitted to 
companies‘ senior management; questionnaire details are presented in Appendix 5. It is 
noteworthy that the availability of such data was checked through visiting/contacting 
the authorised offices in the KSE and MCI; however, it was not available. Financial 
information, such as company size and leverage, was hand-collected, obtained from 
CARs of the research sample. Information about board composition was also hand-
collected, obtained through using Investor Guides of 2005-2008. 
This study applied criteria, and any company not meeting these is omitted from the 
research sample. Consequently, only data from 52 companies, as a final sample, can be 
used in the empirical section. Table 5.4 provides a breakdown of the main criteria 
employed to reach the final sample.  
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Table 5.4: The Criteria Applied for Sampling the Companies 
Description Total no. 
of  
companies 
% of total  
research                    
population 
 
Total no. of non-financial companies represented in the research 
sample 
97 100 
The second stage (excluding)   
Companies with different fiscal year not ending at 31 December 
(financial year-end in Kuwait) since the financial period may affect 
the extent of voluntary disclosure in CARs and the collecting of 
financial data. 
(8) 8.25 
A company was excluded when the required data for this study was 
not available (e.g. a full set of CARs). 
(7) 7.22 
A company was excluded when the required data for this study 
could not be obtained for several reasons. In the view of 
companies, these types of information are considered to be internal 
information or they tend to be secretive.    
(30) 30.93 
The final sample of research which represents companies with 
complete and usable data to conduct the empirical part. 
52 53.60 
 
The research sample contains 50 companies with four observations and two companies 
with three observations. Table 5.5 illustrates the total number of companies, based on 
the year- observations, to assess the extent of voluntary disclosure. The 52 companies 
are classified into three industry types, following the scheme used by Al Mutawaa and 
Hewaidy (2010), who investigated the extent of compliance with disclosure 
requirements by Kuwaiti listed companies. Since the food sector includes only five 
companies, which is considered a very small sector, adding them to the industry sector 
was suggested  due to their having similar activities. Companies can be classified into 
two types of industry: manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies. 
A number of previous studies conducted in different parts in this world used a different 
sample size. For example, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) used a sample of 87 annual 
reports of Malaysian companies; in Singapore, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) used 104 
companies; Barako (2007) examined 54 Kenyan companies; and, from Turkey, Agca 
and Onder (2007) tested 51 listed companies. The current studies conducted in Kuwait 
covered different numbers of companies: Al-Shammari and Al Sultan (2010) used 170 
companies from financial and non-financial sectors. However, Al-Shammari (2008) and 
Alanezi (2011) used annual reports of 82 and 119 non-financial companies listed on the 
KSE, respectively. Table 5.6 presents the sample distribution based on type of industry. 
It reveals that the majority of the sample companies are treated as manufacturing 
companies (63.59%), followed by non-manufacturing companies (36.41%).  
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Table 5.5: Total Number of Companies per Year Observations 
Description 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total examined observations 
Non-financial 
companies 
52 52 51 51 206 
 
Table 5.6: Component of the Sample by Industry Type 
Sector Frequency   
2005 2006 2007 2008 Total % 
Manufacturing  33 33 32 33 131 63.59 
Non-manufacturing 19 19 19 18 75 36.41 
Total 52 52 51 51 206 100 
 
5.13 CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF A VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE INDEX (DEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
The disclosure index is considered an important tool, widely adopted in disclosure 
literature after the pioneering study of Cerf in 1961 (Marston and Shrives, 1991; 
Hussainey, 2004). The main objective of the disclosure index is to assess the level of 
disclosure in terms of quantity and quality of information provided by companies in 
their annual reports. Moreover, the disclosure index is an effective mechanism for 
explaining the variation in the amount of information disclosed among companies. 
Coy and Dixon (2004:79) stated that the disclosure index is widely used in accounting 
research to ―provide a single-figure summary indicator either of the entire contents of 
reports of comparable organisations or of particular aspects of interest covered by such 
as voluntary disclosures and environmental disclosures‖. To achieve its objectives, the 
process of constructing research instruments should be reliable and valid (Cooke and 
Wallace, 1989). Reliability means the possibility to achieve similar findings if two 
researchers applied the same instrument ―index‖ to assess the extent of disclosure by a 
specific sample at a certain period of time. Wallace (1987) defined the validity of the 
index as the ability of a measure ―index‖ to gauge what the researcher wants to measure.  
In this sense, Wallace (1988) argued that there is no general agreement regarding the 
information items that can be selected to evaluate the level of voluntary disclosure. In 
addition, disclosure literature indicates that there is no general approach to determine 
the process of item selection as well as the number of items that should be included in 
155 
 
the disclosure index (Hooks et al., 2000). Thus, this process depends on the research 
objectives (Wallace and Naser, 1995). Consequently, the components and number of 
items included in the checklist also vary from one study to another. The construction 
and development of a voluntary disclosure index (VDIND) ―checklist‖ has taken several 
steps:  
A good starting point in constructing the disclosure index is the selection of information 
items which could be expected to be disclosed in CARs. To achieve this, a careful 
review of a set of voluntary disclosure studies, applied in different parts of the world, 
was carried out (e.g. Hossain et al., 1994; Meek et al., 1995; Hossain et al., 1995; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; 
Barako et al., 2006; Alsaeed, 2006; Barako, 2007; Al-Shammari, 2008). In order to be 
more relevant to the KSE, some modifications were made to a list of information items 
drawn from previous studies. It should be noted that the majority of items selected were 
used in many studies, reflecting their importance and relevance as a basis for 
formulating business decisions. To ensure the initial checklist included only voluntary 
items, it was checked against the mandatory disclosure requirements imposed on the 
listed companies such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the 
national reporting requirements issued by regulatory bodies (see Chapter 4). As the 
result of the study covers four financial years, it takes into consideration any change in 
the disclosure requirements during a research period to e ensure the checklist is suitable 
and applicable for the examined period.  
The preceding steps generated a preliminary checklist of 64 items. To ensure no items 
required by the IFRS and/or other national requirements were included, it was reviewed 
by three external auditors from three different auditing firms: KPMG, Ernst and Young, 
and the RSM International in Kuwait as a further check. The auditors recommended 
eliminating one item since it is somewhat related to the disclosure requirement of IFRS 
7. Furthermore, they suggested modifying one item to prevent any doubt about its 
validity as a voluntary item (see Appendix 6, Table 1). Thus, the preliminary checklist 
comprised 63 items. 
The checklist generated from the third step was piloted on a random sample of annual 
reports of four manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies for the examined 
period (2005-2008). This step aims to improve or polish and update, as well as serving 
to exclude items of information considered irrelevant, or not commonly disclosed by 
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Kuwaiti listed companies. Consequently, the pre-test suggested dropping 11 items from 
the list (see Appendix 6, Table 2). 
Finally, the checklist from step four was screened by a number of accounting academics 
to enhance the ability of the checklist methodology to be more comprehensive and 
include more important voluntary items and to ensure consistency among items and 
categories of the checklist. They recommended dropping three information items since 
they assumed them to be a replication of the same function, measuring the same issue 
(see Appendix 6, Table 3). 
Moreover, the discussion with accounting experts (a number of accounting academics, 
auditors, and a financial consultant at the company department in the KSE), as 
independent evaluators, confirmed the validity and applicability of items included in the 
checklist, derived from step five, to be valid for use in assessing the extent of voluntary 
disclosure for all companies under investigation. This would enhance the reliability and 
validity of the disclosure scores.   
The final checklist included a total of 49 voluntary items, classified into four major 
categories in terms of content of the information. Table 5.7 presents the list of major 
categories and the distribution of number of voluntary items in each category to the total 
of VDIND. Appendix 7 provides details of quantitative and qualitative information 
items included in the scoring sheet.  
 
Table 5.7: Voluntary Disclosure Index 
Category No. of information items % 
Corporate environment 13 27 
Corporate financial performance and future 
prospects 
9 18 
Corporate governance information 11 22 
Corporate social and environment 
Information 
16 33 
Total 49 100 
 
Following sound research practices in enhancing the validity of the disclosure index and 
avoiding any potential bias relevancy, the recommendations of Cooke (1989a, 1991) 
were taken into consideration as a precautionary step: the entire CAR was carefully read 
to fully understand the nature of the company‘s activities and was scrutinised against 
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the scoring sheet. Accordingly, this helps to determine that the information items 
included in the checklist were applicable for each company under investigation. This 
methodology is widely used in disclosure literature (e.g. Hossain et al., 1995; Meek et 
al, 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).       
 
5.14 SCORING THE DISCLOSURE INDEX (WEIGHTED vs UN-WEIGHTED 
DISCLOSURE INDEXES) 
The next step in constructing a disclosure index is to assign weights to the items of 
information contained in the index. Two main schemes or approaches have been 
employed in the empirical literature to capture the levels of disclosure: weighted and 
un-weighted schemes (Cooke, 1989b). The first scheme, advocated by Copeland and 
Fredericks (1968), relies on the presentation of information. The authors employed the 
number of words to describe an item disclosed. Hence, the weighted scale of disclosure 
varies, stretching from zero to one. However, the weighted approach met some 
criticisms from Cooke (1989b), since it generates personal subjectivity related to the 
procedure of allocation of scores and the author suggests an alternative approach, called 
a dichotomous procedure or an un-weighted approach. Under this approach, an 
information item takes the value of one if it is disclosed in the annual report and zero 
otherwise. As a measurement technique, the disclosure index is debated among 
academics in accounting literature (Barako, 2007; Hassan and Marston, 2010).  
While the essential proposition of the un-weighted disclosure index is that all items of 
information are equally important to the user groups or all items included in the index 
are treated equally, the weighted disclosure index presumes that the relative importance 
of different items included in the disclosure index is not equal in the view of 
information users. It also presumes that the relative importance of information to users 
varies from one item to another. Consequently, this approach concentrates on the 
importance of information items and assigns weights to different items included in the 
index based on the weights given to information items by surveyed user groups (Chow 
and Wong-Boren, 1987; Botosan, 1997). On the other side, researchers who advocate 
the use of a weighted index technique believe that weighted disclosure scores are a valid 
proxy for measuring the extent as well as the quality of disclosure. It also may serve the 
purpose of reducing the problems of subjectivity (Botosan, 1997; Hodgdon, 2004).  
After discussing the general concepts and perspectives of the equal-weighted and 
weighted approaches, it can be concluded that each suffers from several limitations, an 
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issue that has been discussed in accounting research; however, there is no common 
approach. For this study, it has been decided to employ un-weighted approach, and the 
following sheds light on the reasons behind its adoption. 
The relative importance of an information item included in the disclosure index may 
change over time, a proposition consistent with the empirical evidence provided by 
Hassan et al. (2006). Thus, it is not realistic to construct a survey exploring users‘ 
perception regarding the relative importance of different voluntary disclosure items over 
a long period of time. Consequently, it is rational to employ the un-weighted approach 
since one of the grand objectives of the current study is to test the changes in voluntary 
disclosure behaviour of companies over four financial years, which is considered to be a 
relatively long period of time. 
The weighted approach has been criticised on two grounds: firstly, on the subjectivity 
inherent in assigning weights to disclosure items. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) argued 
that the weighted approach contributes to creating subjectivity since rating the 
importance of disclosure items, in the process of item weighting, stems from a survey 
using a point scale methodology and without real economic consequences to the 
respondents. Consequently, it can be concluded that the process of rating may not fully 
reflect actual use of information items as much as it reflects the perceptions of 
information needs of participants in the survey alone. They also argued that some 
respondents may tend to assign a high weight of importance to items that are not 
currently released by companies. Therefore, this would increase the probability of the 
subjectivity problem in developing the disclosure indices and may affect their reliability 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991, 1996). A possible way to overcome subjectivity is to 
employ the un-weighted scores. So, it can be stated that the un-weighted approach helps 
to avoid the problem of the subjectivity inherent in assessing the relative importance of 
each disclosure item across all potential groups of information users (Ferguson et al., 
2002). 
Another criticism directed at the weighted approach is that it frequently tends to depend 
on the perceptions and views of investors to assign weights using point scale 
methodology. Thus, it does not necessarily represent the view of other stakeholders 
regarding the importance of information items. 
The un-weighted approach is assumed appropriate when no importance is assigned to 
specific groups of users (Cooke, 1989a; Hossain et al., 1995; Wang et al., 2008) as well 
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as when voluntary disclosure items are important to all user groups of accounting 
information in making decisions. Another advantage of employing this approach is that 
it gives an opportunity for analysis independent of the perceptions of a particular user 
group (Chow and Wang-Boren, 1987). 
Using an un-weighted disclosure index in this study is based on empirical evidence in 
this area suggesting that using weighted and un-weighted indexes provides almost 
identical results (e.g. Firth, 1979a; Robbins and Austin, 1986; Chow and Wang-Boren, 
1987; Cooke, 1989b; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Marston and Shrives, 1996; Coombs 
and Tayib, 1998). 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) stated that employing un-weighted scores is preferred over 
weighted scores. The results of Spero‘s study (1979 as cited in Lopes and Rodrigues, 
2007) provided support for not using weights. The author claimed that giving weights to 
information items was irrelevant since companies tend to disclose more important 
information as well as disclosing less important information. As a result, companies 
would be scored in the same manner regardless of whether information items are 
weighted or un-weighted (Meek et al., 1995).  
One further justification for choosing the un-weighted approach is its use by a wide set 
of researchers (e.g. Cooke, 1989c; Meek et al., 1995; Chau and Gray, 2002; Alsaeed, 
2006; Al-Shammari, 2008; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009) (see Chapter 3). This approach 
helps to avoid subjectivity in assigning weights to the items of disclosure information 
included in the index, as mentioned previously. In this respect, Ahmed and Courtis 
(1999:36) stated that “the un-weighted approach has become the norm in annual report 
studies because it reduces subjectivity‖. In addition, this approach emphasizes the extent 
of overall disclosure instead of emphasizing particular items (Riahi-Belkaoui, 1994 as 
cited in Abdelsalam and Weetman, 2007), so this serves to reach research objectives. 
After discussing the construction and development of a voluntary disclosure index and 
the motivations and justifications of employing the un-weighted approach for this study, 
it can be stated that the final disclosure checklist or ―voluntary disclosure index‖ 
(VDIND) consisted of 49 factors (see Appendix 7). The checklist was further divided 
into four main information categories (see Table 5.7). The information items included in 
the VDIND were classified into classes: financial and non-financial information and 
scored numerically based on a dichotomous procedure. Based on that, each of 49 
disclosure items included in the checklist received a score of one if disclosed in the 
160 
 
CAR and zero otherwise. The following section provides a detailed description of the 
calculation of VDIND. 
5.15 COMPUTING THE DISCLOSURE INDEX   
Once the scores for disclosure items in the VDIND were identified or assigned, the total 
VDIND could be calculated. The total VDIND, the dependent variable in regression 
models, for each company, represents the ratio of the total actual scores to the maximum 
expected disclosure scores. The total VDIND for each company was calculated as 
follows: 
 
1. The expected disclosure scores were calculated by summing items scored as one 
and zero to derive the number of information items that each company in the 
study is expected to release in its annual report. The expected maximum number 
of items disclosed by a company is 49. 
2. The actual disclosures were calculated by summing items scored as one to derive 
the total number of items that each company actually disclosed in its annual 
report. Also, the actual maximum number of items disclosed by a company is 
49.  
       
The following equation was used to compute the level of disclosure for each company 
in the study sample: 
VDIND = ACVD ÷ EXVD 
Where: 
VDIND = The value of the voluntary disclosure index for each company 
ACVD =  The number of items each company actually disclosed 
EXVD =  The expected maximum number of items disclosed by each company (= 49) 
It is important to point out that the value of the index stretches from zero to one, with 
the higher value of the index indicating the higher level of voluntary disclosure. The 
same procedure was used to compute the voluntary disclosure index for each of the four 
information categories. 
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5.16 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
Following the current direction taken or followed in the disclosure literature, the present 
study explores the association between company characteristics and corporate 
governance attributes and voluntary disclosure practices. Fifteen independent variables, 
as a comprehensive set, were used in this study and they can be divided into two groups. 
The first group is corporate governance (board size, cross directorships, role duality, the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board, the presence of an audit committee, 
the percentage of family members on the board, government ownership, and the 
presence of a ruling family member on the board). The second group is company 
characteristics (company size, type of auditor, leverage, type of industry, profitability, 
company growth, and cross listing). The data regarding these variables were obtained 
from corporate annual reports and from other complementary sources for each of the 
four years. Table 5.8 provides a summary of independent variables and their proxies. 
 
5.16.1 Corporate Governance Attributes  
 
Board Size (Bsize) 
Information disclosure is an important communication channel between the company 
and its stakeholders. Board size may affect the level of voluntary disclosure in CARs. 
So, it can be suggested that level of disclosure is a strategic decision, which the board of 
directors dominates. It is believed that the board of directors is the basis in a corporate 
governance system (Finkelstein and D‘Aveni, 1994). The total number of members on 
the board may affect the manner in which directors carry out their responsibilities 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). On the other hand, the board sets the policies and strategies to 
be employed by company management, and a larger board may lessen the probability of 
the information asymmetry problem (Chen and Jaggi, 2000).   
A greater number of directors on the board may reduce uncertainty and the lack of 
information (Birnbaum, 1984). It is also expected that board size influences the ability 
of the board to monitor and assess management as well as the executives (Zahra et al., 
2000). Beasley (1996) stated that financial fraud decreases with an increase in board 
size. In contrast, a small board has limited information-processing capabilities 
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). On the other hand, Denis and Sarin (1999) provided 
evidence of a positive association between board size and board composition. Lim et al. 
(2007) and Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) found a positive significant association between 
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board size and the level of voluntary disclosure. In contrast, a number of studies 
revealed that there was an insignificant association between these variables (Arcay and 
Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006).  
According to the Commercial Company law (CCL), the board of directors shall consist 
of not less than three members (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2). Thus, the Kuwaiti 
legislator gives listed companies an opportunity to choose the appropriate board size, 
consistent with their needs and strategies. Consequently, the size of the board varies 
among Kuwaiti listed companies. With more directors on the board, it is expected that 
combined experience, expertise, and qualification will increase so this may affect 
disclosure policies. It could also increase the presence of independent directors on the 
board, so increasing the ability to release more voluntary information in their annual 
reports. Moreover, a larger number of directors may increase the ability to represent a 
wide range of stakeholders. According to the findings of the survey of GCC boards, 
conducted by The National Investor (TNI) (2008a), larger companies in the Gulf region, 
such as in Kuwait, tend to have larger boards which are above the market‘s average. 
The large companies may have more activities, operations, and responsibilities than the 
others leading a large company to have a larger board to absorb such activities.  From 
the above discussion, it can be concluded that there are different views regarding the 
influence of board size on the extent of disclosure; therefore the following hypothesis is 
proposed to test the effect of board size:  
H11: There is no significant relationship between board size and the extent of corporate 
voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports.  
 
Cross Directorships (Crossd) 
Cross directorship is an important corporate governance mechanism, addressed in 
governance literature. It is defined as directors who are engaged in or appointed on 
more than one board. Dahya et al. (1996) stated that cross directorships may enhance 
the level of information transparency since comparisons could be made upon knowledge 
of other companies. Moreover, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argued that cross 
directorships have a positive impact on disclosure practices since directors have greater 
access to information in more than one company. Conversely, some critics have 
questioned the influence of cross directorships on the independence of directors. For 
instance, the existence of directors on more than one board will influence directors‘ 
independence as well generating a competitive disadvantage to their companies (Davis, 
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1993). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) reported no association between cross directorships in 
Malaysia and the extent of voluntary disclosure.   
In Kuwait, the CCL forbids being a member on the board of directors of more than three 
listed companies based in Kuwait at the same time. In addition, it prohibits being a 
member of the board of a company with similar activities, or of a competitor to the 
company (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2). In case of Kuwait, cross directorships are 
common among listed companies, especially in a number of companies that invest in 
each other. This may give a special nature to the composition of the board in Kuwait. 
Specifically, Kuwait has received the highest rank among the other countries of the Gulf 
region in terms of the number of board positions and directors (The National Investor 
(TNI), 2008a). 
As a result of the above discussion, it can be predicted that companies with cross 
directorships may be more transparent and tend to reduce confidentially. The following 
specific hypothesis has been proposed to test the relationship between cross 
directorships and extent of corporate voluntary disclosure practices:  
H12: There is no positive significant relationship between cross directorships and the 
extent of corporate voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports.  
 
Role Duality (Rdual) 
In the context of corporate governance, the key issue usually discussed is whether the 
chair of the board and the CEO position are held by one individual or by two 
independent individuals. When one person possesses the authority of the board‘s 
chairman as well as the leadership of the top management, this generates a ―unitary 
leader structure‖. In this sense, the CEO is likely to withhold bad or unfavourable 
information from the stakeholders, which may cause a limitation on information 
disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001). Agency theory suggests that the combined functions 
may impair the ability of the board to perform its main functions such as monitoring, 
discipline, compensation of senior managers (Molz, 1988). Moreover, this leads the 
CEO to become involved in opportunistic behaviour since s/he controls the board of 
directors. Applying agency theory, Forker (1992) declared that a dominant personality 
in both positions influences the quality of monitoring function and this threatens the 
quality of disclosure. Fama and Jensen (1983:314) declared that the combined role of 
chair and CEO ―signals the absence of separation of decision management and decision 
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control”. The combination of both these positions in one person may affect that 
person‘s ability to conduct the responsibilities and duties of both posts appropriately 
since s/he may not have enough time. Hence, the separation of these positions induces a 
system of checks and balances on the power of the management (Chaganti et al., 1985). 
A number of studies show that one individual serving as both chair and CEO may affect 
the independence of the board and impair the power of its monitoring and governance 
roles which include information disclosure strategies. Empirical studies conducted in 
Malaysia and Hong Kong by Haniffa and Cooke (2002), and Gul and Leung (2004) 
declared a negative association between role duality and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Donnelly and Mulcahy‘s (2008) study suggested weak evidence regarding 
this association. In role duality, Gul and Leung (2004) claimed the existence of the 
expertise of non-executive directors on the board helps to mitigate the negative 
association between role duality and the extent of voluntary disclosure. On the other 
side, some studies provide no empirical evidence of a significant relationship between 
these variables (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006).  
In case of Kuwait, the CCL does not require listed companies to separate the positions 
of chairman of the board and CEO, which is contradictory to the best corporate 
governance practice followed by many countries. In 53% of Kuwaiti companies listed 
on the KSE, the chairman is not the CEO (Alenazi, 2011). In view of prior empirical 
results, the influence of role duality can be predicted on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Considering this the following hypothesis is suggested to test the 
relationship between the role duality and the extent of voluntary disclosure: 
H13: There is no negative significant relationship between role duality and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports. 
 
Non-Executive Directors on the Board (Nexed) 
In general, the board consists of executive and non-executive directors. Its composition 
represents a proportion of non-executive directors to total number of directors. The 
importance of non-executive directors has been discussed in different aspects. The 
major shareholders appoint non-executive directors to monitor company performance 
(Yuen et al., 2009). Thus, a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the board 
means they control this process (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). 
165 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that the board‘s composition is an important 
mechanism to diffuse agency conflicts within the company. Moreover, it contributes in 
promoting board effectiveness through providing the important checks and required 
balances of power on management. It is expected that the higher percentage of non-
executive directors on the board may help in the disclosure of more voluntary 
information and thus may reduce the possibility of withholding information (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Yuen et al., 2009). However, Rouf (2010) claimed that executive (inside) 
directors may be more useful to a company than non-executive (outside) directors since 
they possess specific knowledge and expertise regarding their company. Patelli and 
Prencipe (2007) stated that board composition is an important mechanism that may 
reduce agency conflicts between managers and owners. In addition, a board with a 
higher percentage of expert non-executive directors tends to be more effective in board 
monitoring as well as in enhancing higher levels of corporate transparency (Gul and 
Leung, 2004).   
Previous research provided evidence of a negative association between the percentage 
of non-executive directors on the board and the level of disclosure (e.g. Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Gul and Leung, 2004; Barako et al., 2006). On the other side, evidence of 
a positive relation between these two variables has been provided by Chen and Jaggi 
(2000), and Akhtaruddin et al. (2009).  In contrast, Ho and Wong (2001) were unable to 
prove such an association. 
In case of Kuwait, there are no regulations that organise the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board, and the Kuwaiti legislator left it to the board‘s decision to 
determine the appropriate proportion. Boards of Kuwaiti companies are characterised by 
a large number of non-executive directors, which may reduce the agency cost. It is 
expected that they work to maximize the shareholders‘ wealth and control the 
opportunistic behaviour of executive directors. The following hypothesis is suggested to 
examine the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure: 
H14: There is no positive significant relationship between the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti 
corporate annual reports. 
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Audit Committee (Audc) 
An audit committee is one of the dynamic monitoring mechanisms that companies 
should have to assist the board in its internal responsibilities as well as to enhance its 
effectiveness. The responsibilities of an audit committee include overseeing the process 
of financial reporting. Consequently, the existence of an audit committee enhances the 
internal control system, which improves the quality of disclosure (Forker, 1992) as well 
as the reliability degree of CARs (DeZoort, 1997; Wolnizer, 1995). It is necessary to 
consider which factors make this committee more effective. Wallace and Zinkin (2005) 
argued that audit committees act effectively when they include a small number of 
members, ranging between three and six. Chtourou et al. (2001) and Xie et al. (2001) 
provided evidence that getting involved in extra monitoring activities leads the audit 
committee to be more active and efficient. Similarly, DeZoort and Salterio (2001) 
reported that the committee should be independent, with sufficient experience and 
knowledge, well-educated in financial aspects to be able to effectively perform the 
monitoring role. On a different point, the structure and responsibilities of committee 
should be in harmony with corporate governance codes.        
The earlier literature (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Barako et al., 2006; Yuen et al., 2009; 
Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010) indicated a positive association between the 
presence of an audit committee and the extent of voluntary disclosure. In contrast, 
Forker (1992) reported no association in the United Kingdom.  
In Kuwait, the CCL does not obligate listed companies to establish an audit committee; 
however, the CBK‘s regulations mandate companies under its supervision, such as 
investment companies, to establish this committee (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2.3). 
Nevertheless, there are number of companies listed on the KSE which have established 
these committees, and most audit committee members are non-executive. Given the 
impact of the audit committee on voluntary disclosure practices, it is expected that the 
existence of an audit committee would encourage the company to disclose more 
information. Moreover, it is predicted that the board of directors tends to improve 
monitoring systems and lessen the amount of information withheld from stakeholders 
such as company‘s shareholders, leading to an improvement in the level of company 
transparency. The following hypothesis tests the association between the presence of an 
audit committee and the extent of voluntary disclosure in this study:  
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H15:  There is no positive significant relationship between the presence of an audit 
committee and the extent of voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports. 
 
Family Members on the Board (Fmem) 
Family members consist of executive and non-executive directors and may influence the 
amount and quality of information released by companies. In addition, they may have 
significant power to affect the process of electing the chairman and also other board of 
directors. They may control the process of appointing key management such as the CEO 
and senior managers. Applying the agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested 
that when the company‘s capital is widely held, this would lead to a potential conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders. To reduce this potential conflict, the 
company attempts to disclose more information. In contrast, companies with more 
concentrated ownership are expected to disclose less information since there is less 
demand for information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). There is a common concept that 
substantial owners of companies are usually less interested in public disclosure since 
they have much greater access to internal company information than the other owners 
(Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992). It can be concluded that the higher the percentage of 
family, or family companies, on the board, the lower the motivation to release 
information to the public. Thus, the amount of voluntary information provided by these 
companies is expected to be lower. On the other side, Chen et al. (2008) argued that 
family owners have greater litigation and reputation cost concerns. In addition, potential 
investors suppose that companies dominated by family owners are unattractive 
investment opportunities. Consequently, based on the proposition of signalling theory, 
these companies have a great motivation to disclose more information to prove them a 
promising investment opportunity, protect and build their family reputation in the 
business community, and promote their company‘s success. Within legitimacy theory, it 
is assumed that active companies with family members on the board may be of concern 
in the eyes of the public and government. Thus, they have a greater motivation to 
legitimise themselves by releasing more information and being more transparent.  
Hossain et al. (1994) and Chen and Jaggi (2000) found a positive association between 
ownership structures, measured in the ten largest shareholders, and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in Malaysia, while the available research evidence from disclosure 
literature (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Ghazali and Weetman, 
2006) revealed a negative association between these variables. However, Al-Shammari 
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(2008) and Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) reported no association between the 
percentage of family members on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
Kuwait. 
One important phenomenon distinguished in Kuwait is that several listed companies are 
controlled by the family system. As reported in the TNI (2008a), almost 33% of listed 
companies have at least two board members from the same family. Some of ―the top 
families‖ hold up to 100% of a company‘s board seats. The findings have also revealed 
that the top ten families own different proportions of companies listed on the KSE. It 
can be suggested that ―families with the largest number of board seats will be ranked as 
the most powerful‖ (TNI, 2008a:26). In the case of Kuwait, the KSE requires 
individuals, companies, or bodies to disclose their ownership in listed companies when 
the percentage of ownership is 5% or more (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.3). On the other 
side, there is no information regarding the number of shareholders. It can be predicted 
that companies with a high percentage of family members on the board have less 
motivation to release information to shareholders since they believe that information is 
private or that the demand for company information is low. Thus it is important to 
explore the influence of this variable on the extent of voluntary disclosure. This 
discussion suggests the following testable hypothesis:  
H16: There is no negative significant relationship between the percentage of family 
members on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti corporate 
annual reports. 
 
Ownership Structure 
Within the context of corporate governance, the key topic frequently addressed is the 
effect of ownership structure on the extent of disclosure practices. Ownership structures 
have been empirically studied in corporate governance literature from different 
dimensions such as foreign ownership, institutional ownership, government ownership, 
managerial ownership, and block holder ownership. This study tests one dimension of 
company capital structure only, namely: government ownership.  
 
Government Ownership (Govo) 
There is a number of perspectives regarding government ownership. Companies with a 
high level of government ownership have a better opportunity to finance their 
operations and expansions since they usual obtain the required funds from their 
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government. In this case, these companies do not need to attract investors, so it can be 
suggested that they have less motivation to disclose additional information. An 
alternative view is that higher government ownership in companies puts them under 
pressure to take some non-profit issues, such as ―social and environmental 
responsibilities‖, into consideration as part of their social contract, as well as the main 
business objectives. Thus, these companies are predicted to disclose more information 
to the public. From a perspective of legitimacy theory, the public keeps an eye on the 
activities of organisations, more specifically of companies in which government has a 
high percentage of ownership, so it is expected that this type of company tends to 
disclose additional information.  
Empirical research provides mixed evidence on the impact of government ownership on 
voluntary disclosure practices. Suwaidan (1997), Eng and Mak (2003), and Jiang and 
Habib (2009) presented evidence of a positive relationship between the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and government ownership in Jordan, Singapore, and New 
Zealand, respectively. In contrast, Naser et al. (2002) and Yuen at al. (2009) found no 
significant association.  
Government and family ownerships are two major shareholder groups which own 
significant stakes in companies listed in the KSE as an example of an emerging market. 
Government ownership is considered a feature of the KSE. In addition, the government 
owns a number of leading companies through a number of governmental agencies. In 
the context of large shareholders (institutions, government bodies, and large individual 
shareholders), government ownership is the only large shareholder type affecting 
dividend decisions (Al-Kuwari, 2010). Thus, government ownership by these agencies 
may have a significant influence on company disclosure policy, since they have a 
noticeable presence on the board of directors in themselves or through their 
representatives, as well as having greater access to internal information from formal 
channels than other types of shareholders. The presence of government members on the 
board would increase the confidence level of investors in the capital market. However, 
the state shareholding companies may have high principal-agency problems as a result 
of the contradictory objectives between the profit goals of the company on one hand and 
the non-profit goals of the community on the other. In the context of state owned shares, 
it has been argued that company value increases as the size of the government 
ownership stake increases (Tian, 2001). However, it could be expected that companies 
with a government shareholder stake may face agency problems as a result of the 
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separation between ownership and control, as in other companies with different 
ownership structure. This may lead to an increase in the amount of information withheld 
from stakeholders such as the shareholders of a company. In this respect, the following 
is hypothesised:  
H17: There is no positive significant relationship between the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and government ownership in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports.   
 
Ruling Family Member on the Board (Rmem) 
There are some aspects distinguishing the GCC countries‘ boards, such as Kuwait, from 
other countries. The ruling family controls 4.1% of the board seats of listed companies, 
receiving the highest rank among the top ten families in terms of the number of board 
seats held by one family. The selection of the ruling family variable derives from 
signalling theory considerations. For example, ruling family members tend to 
distinguish their board and their company, as well as themselves, as directors qualified 
to run a business, and this could be achieved through different mechanisms such as 
superior company performance and disclosure policy. Taking into consideration the 
potential impact of such members, it may affect the company‘s strategies and policies 
such as on disclosures. So a possible causal association is expected between the 
presence of a ruling family member on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Consequently, the following hypothesis is proposed to test this relationship: 
H18: There is no positive significant relationship between the presence of a ruling 
family member on the board and the extension of voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti 
corporate annual reports. 
  
5.16.2 Company Characteristics  
 
Company Size (Csize) 
From the perspective of agency theory, agency costs exist in companies as a result of 
the separation of management from principles. This problem is more likely to increase 
in large companies. Larger companies attract greater attention and are more visible to 
government authorities and the public than smaller ones. Larger companies may also be 
subject to more rules regarding social and environmental responsibilities. Moreover, 
managers of larger companies are more likely to work to obtain the confidence and 
interest of investors, as a result of the continuing need to finance their operations and 
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projects, than smaller companies. On the other side, managers of smaller companies 
have an incentive to disclose less information than larger ones since this may affect their 
competitive position. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) suggested that managers of larger 
companies have more incentives than smaller ones to disclose more information to 
enhance their companies‘ reputations.  
A wide set of studies tests the relationship between company size and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. Most disclosure literature considered company size an essential 
determinant of voluntary disclosure levels, with a positive association between company 
size and extent of voluntary disclosure being found in a large number of studies (e.g. 
McNally et al., 1982; Cooke, 1989a, 1991; Ferguson et al., 2002; Al-Shammari, 2008; 
Hossain and Hammami, 2009). In the context of company size, a number of proxies 
such as number of employees, market capitalisation, and total assets are used in 
different studies to measure this variable. However, there is no common principle to 
select the best measure of company size (Hassan et al., 2006). An extensive review of 
disclosure literature concludes that total assets is considered a common proxy of this 
variable and will be used in the current study. Based on the above discussion, the 
following hypothesis investigates the association between company size and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. 
H19: There is no positive significant relationship between company size and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports. 
 
Type of Auditor (Taud) 
Audit firm size is considered an important factor affecting the amount and quality of 
information disclosed in CARs, even though financial statements and their components 
are the responsibility of the company‘s management. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
argued that the process of auditor choice may help to mitigate the conflicts of interest 
within management and ownership. Larger audit firms play a vital role in minimising 
the opportunistic behaviour of a company‘s managers through monitoring (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Moreover, larger audit firms are characterised as being independent 
from their clients, so this may have a positive impact on information disclosure. 
Moreover, the independence of auditors may help to meet users‘ needs as well as 
serving to protect their own reputations. On the other side, larger audit firms are 
correlated with clients that release more information in their annual reports (DeAngelo, 
1981). 
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Signalling theory, considered  complementary to agency theory (Morris, 1987), suggests 
that the process of auditor choice may be employed as a signal of company value as 
well as a signal to the capital market regarding the quality of information included in 
CARs (Datar et al., 1991). Prior empirical studies from developed and developing 
countries found a positive association between audit size and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in CARs (e.g. McNally et al., 1982; Xiao et al., 2004; Agca and Onder, 2007; 
Wang et al., 2008; Al-Shammari, 2008). On the other side, some studies found no such 
association (for example, in Switzerland: Raffournier, 1995; in Malaysia: Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Alsaeed, 2006).  
Under CCL requirements, each listed company should have at least two independent 
external auditors (see Chapter 4, Section 4.6.5).  With regard to this law, foreign audit 
firms are not allowed to practise the auditing profession in Kuwait unless affiliated with 
a local firm (for more details see Chapter 4, Section 4.6). Consequently, audit firms are 
mainly divided into two groups: large audit firms affiliated with one of the Big 4, while 
the other group carries out auditing tasks without affiliation with one of the Big 4. 
Based on theoretical perspectives, the following hypothesis is proposed to test the 
association between type of auditor and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
H20: There is no positive significant relationship between type of auditor and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports.  
 
Leverage (Lev) 
Leverage explains the proportion of debts in a company‘s capital structure. It also 
indicates the ability of the company to meet its obligations represented in interest 
charges and principles‘ repayments. Thus, the management of a company should 
balance two important factors, financial risk and return, before making financing 
decisions. According to agency theory, if a company has large debts in its financial 
position statement, this would lead to increased monitor costs and so the company tends 
to release more voluntary information in order to lessen these agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Wallace et al., 1994; Depoers 2000). To protect debt holders, 
companies tend to increase the level of monitoring through voluntary disclosure in their 
annual reports (Hossain et al., 1995). In contrast, Camfferman and Cooke (2002) argued 
that such an effect could be different and could depend on the power of elements (the 
debt holder, banks or capital markets). Moreover, the agency costs of leverage can be 
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controlled through the restrictive covenant that could be included in debt contracts 
instead of employing more disclosure in published annual reports (Eng and Mak, 2003). 
Empirical results are mixed. A number of studies found a significant positive 
association between leverage and the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
(e.g. Hossain et al., 1995; Ferguson et al., 2002; Al-Shammari, 2008). In contrast, Meek 
et al. (1995) provided no evidence of such an association. Some studies found no 
statistically significant association between leverage and voluntary disclosure (e.g. 
Chow and Wong- Boren, 1987; Raffournier, 1995; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). In the Kuwaiti business environment, banks are considered to be a 
primary source of company funds, and they play an important role in corporate 
borrowings. Moreover, the regulatory bodies, such as the CBK, concentrate on a 
company‘s debts. In this regard, companies with higher leverage may face more 
demands from regulatory bodies regarding their debts in order to assess their financial 
positions to discover their ability to meet their financial obligations as well as to 
continue in business − the ―going concern principle‖. For these justifications, it is 
expected that companies with higher leverage will disclose more voluntary information 
than companies with lower leverage. Thus the following hypothesis can be suggested:  
H21: There is no positive significant relationship between leverage and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports.  
 
Type of Industry (Tind) 
It is expected that the type of industry in which a company practises its operations and 
activities could influence management decisions regarding the amount of information 
released in its annual reports. Wallace et al. (1994) argued that companies involved in a 
specific type of industry may face some situations which have a dramatic impact on 
their disclosure practices and reporting. Moreover, Owusu-Ansah (1998) argued that if a 
company operates in a sensitive and regulated industry, ―the nature of work‖ could 
affect its disclosure practices, while Ball and Foster (1982) suggested that industry 
membership is an appropriate proxy for capturing sensitivity to the political costs which 
may not be captured by other proxies. A number of previous studies provided evidence 
that the type of industry explained variations in voluntary disclosure (e.g. Cooke, 1998b, 
1991; Meek et al., 1995; and Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Leventis and Weetman, 2004). 
In other words, these studies proved that companies in the manufacturing sector tend to 
disclose more information than non-manufacturing companies. On the other hand, 
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studies conducted by (Raffournier, 1995; Naser et al., 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Alsaeed, 2006) did not provide evidence regarding this association. In order to test the 
association between type of industry and the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure the 
following hypothesis is tested: 
H22: There is no significant relationship between type of industry and the extent of 
corporate voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports. 
 
Profitability (Prof) 
From the perspective of agency theory, Inchausti (1997) stated that the management of 
larger profitable companies tends to employ information to receive personal benefits. 
Consequently, they may disclose more information to justify their position and 
compensation (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). Thus, it can be expected that less profitable 
companies may disclose less information in their annual reports to hide poor company 
performance from market participants, more specifically their shareholders. Another 
motivation can be derived from signalling theory, which suggests that highly profitable 
companies may disclose more information to the public to distinguish themselves from 
companies with low profitability, regarding their superior performance. Also, it can be 
interpreted that larger profitable companies are more likely to disclose more information 
in their published annual reports to the public to enhance their sense of their 
performance (Galani et al., 2011). It should be noted that stakeholder theory suggests 
that the purpose of disclosing information is to satisfy all stakeholders, not just focusing 
on the company‘s shareholders. Previous disclosure studies have shown mixed results 
regarding profitability influencing disclosure practices in corporate annual reports. A 
positive association was found in some studies (such as Naser and Al-Khatib, 2000; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Naser et al., 2002; Suwaidan et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2008), 
while it was insignificant in others (such as Raffounier, 1995; Meek et al., 1995; 
Alsaeed, 2006; Hossain and Hammami, 2009) or negative in yet other studies (Chen 
and Jaggi, 2000). Drawing on the theoretical and empirical evidence from disclosure 
literature, the following hypothesis has been used to test the company profitability: 
H23: There is no positive significant relationship between profitability and the extent of 
corporate voluntary disclosure. 
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Company Growth (Cgrow) 
Signalling theory predicates that there is an information asymmetry problem between 
companies and principles. So, it can be assumed that high growth companies would 
voluntarily disclose information as a signal to market participants of their superior 
performance and promising growth opportunities. Moreover, signalling theory indicates 
that company management has more incentives to reveal good information to the market 
to enhance its value. With regard to opportunistic behaviour, agency theory also implies 
that the managers of these companies will be interested in releasing such information to 
the public to obtain personal benefits such as compensation as well as supporting the 
continuance of their positions. Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) 
argued that information asymmetry and agency costs are more highly correlated with 
growth companies than non-growth ones. In this context, Core (2001) indicated that 
high growth companies employ more voluntary disclosure; however, they may have 
greater information asymmetry than low growth companies. Thus, companies tend to 
lessen the occurrence of information asymmetry as a result of high growth by releasing 
more voluntary information (Frankel et al., 1999). On the other hand, fast growing 
companies attempt to pay fewer dividends as well as needing to find finance providers 
from the outside market, so they have a strong incentive to disclose more information to 
the public (Rozef, 1982). Naser et al. (2006) found a positive and significant association 
between growth and variations in corporate social disclosure by companies listed on the 
Doha Stock Exchange. Given the effect of company growth on the voluntary disclosure 
practices, the following hypothesis is proposed to test the company growth and the 
voluntary disclosure practices‘ association: 
H24: There is no positive significant relationship between growth and the extent of 
corporate voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports.  
 
Cross Listing (Crossl) 
A common phenomenon of capital markets is the growing number of companies that are 
listed, whether on the home capital market or abroad. There are several advantages that 
companies can obtain from listing on foreign capital markets. Licht (2001) argued that 
one important benefit of listing abroad is to be seen to be credible in their commitment 
to a better legal regime. However, financial motivation is considered the most important 
reason. Biddle and Saudagaran (1991) noted the key advantages to listing on foreign 
capital markets as follows: financial, marketing and public relations, political, employee 
176 
 
relations. It is commonly agreed that companies, which have a dual listing, face a 
greater burden and costs. These costs occur as a result of differences among countries in 
accounting and auditing practices, disclosure, financial reporting, and listing 
requirements (Biddle and Saudagaran, 1991). Thus, it is expected that companies with 
dual listing face more pressure to release additional information than in their home 
market regime (Lang et al., 2003). 
In general, the level of corporate disclosure in developed countries is higher than in 
developing countries. This may lead companies with dual listing to disclose more 
information than companies listed only on the home capital market since they are more 
familiar with the disclosure concept. Using signalling theory, companies with dual 
listing, as a benchmark, may employ their experience in the application of foreign 
disclosure policy and disclose additional information to distinguish themselves from 
other companies in the home capital market.  
It is predicated that a company which lists its shares in more than one capital market 
will deal with a wider set of stakeholders and may create diversity in its policy of 
dealing with them, reflecting a trend in stakeholder theory. It should be noted that the 
disclosure policy may be captured by the effect of culture and the norms of society in 
which a company exercises its operations. A number of disclosure studies revealed a 
positive association between extent of voluntary disclosure and listing status (Hossain et 
al., 1995; Meek, 1995; Cooke, 1998; Ferguson, 2002).  
At the end of 2005 and 2008, the total number of Kuwaiti companies listed on the 
Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE) constituted three out of 45 companies [7%] and two of 
49 companies [4%], respectively; and these Kuwaiti companies represented 43% and 
33% of registered foreign companies on this market, respectively. In addition, the 
number of Kuwaiti companies listed on another Gulf market, the Dubai Financial 
Market (DFM), was two out of 30 companies [7%] by the end of 2005; however, 
Kuwaiti companies made a remarkable jump in 2008, when they had greater weight in 
the DFM as a result of having 16 out of 65 listed companies [25%] on this market 
(Annual reports [2005 and 2008] for BSE and DFM) (for more details, see Section 4.8). 
It can be proposed that companies with dual listing tend to disclose more information in 
their annual reports. Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed to explore this 
relationship: 
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H25: There is no positive significant relationship between cross listing and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports. 
At the end of this chapter, a summary of the independent variables and their proxies are 
shown in Table 5.8. 
To verify the research hypotheses, the research model takes the following form: 
 
VDIND = β0 + β1 Bsize + β2 Crossd + β3 Rdual + β4 Nexed + β5 Audc + β6 Fmem, β7  
Govo + β8 Rmem + β9 Csize + β10 Taud + β11 Lev + β12 Tind +  β13 Prof + β14 Cgrow + 
β15 Crossl + ε 
 
5.17 STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES TO ASSESS VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 
PRACTICES  
Prior to performing the regression analysis, many assumptions will be examined.  These 
include: normality, absence of multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, non-autocorrelation, 
and the regressors are exogenous. In addition, it is also checked through Hausman test 
whether or not the model will use random effects or fixed effects. If the assumptions are 
violated, certain precautions will be taken or alternative analyses will be conducted 
based on the violation. 
 
1. Normality 
Each variable used in the analyses was examined for normality, which will be defined 
as having a skew between +2 and -2 and kurtosis between +7 and -7 (Kline, 2005).  If 
normality is not met, transformations will be made to the variables based on guidelines 
from Tabachnick and Fidell (2006). The results of previous tests suggest a data set of 
this study violated the normality assumption, and so the data was transformed using a 
logarithmic transformation.   
 
2. Absence of Multicollinearity 
To assess for multicollinearity among the independent variables, Pearson and Spearman 
correlations will be conducted between all the variables in the regression. Correlation 
coefficients greater than .80 and .90 would indicate that multicollinearity is present 
(Stevens, 2009).  If so, the variables with the large correlation coefficients will be 
averaged together to create a single variable or removed. Another check will be done to 
assess for multicollinearity through Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs).  VIFs will be 
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calculated for each of the independent variables. Those above 10 would indicate that 
multicollinearity is present and that the variable should be removed. The results of both 
tests suggest that the multicollinearity does not exist among the variables.  
 
3. Heteroscedasticity  
Among the assumption checks for the regression model, was one for heteroscedasticity.  
Heteroscedasticity is present when the variance of errors differs at different values of 
the independent variables.  For the regression assumption to be met, the variance in the 
residuals should be equal among all values of the predictor variables of the regression.  
This would mean that the distance between the observed value and the predicted value 
would be consistent throughout the data set. Heteroscedasticity occurs when the 
distance between the values varies among the points of the data set.  This can lead to an 
error in the model chosen to predict the outcome (Stevens, 2009).  
Typically, a residual scatterplot is examined to compare the observed residuals with the 
predicted values. For the residuals to display homoscedasticity, the points should be 
rectangularly distributed on the graph around the origin (0, 0).  Any patterns among the 
points indicate heteroscedasticity. However, a simple examination of the plot shows no 
clear met/not met distinction, making it open to misinterpretation. Another way of 
checking for the presence of heteroscedasticity is through the Breusch-Pagan test and 
White‘s (1980) test, which is significant if the variance in the residuals does not follow 
the chi square distribution with the number of predictors as the degrees of freedom. The 
results of the both tests indicate that the heteroscedasticity does exist. Since the 
important assumption of homoscedasticity is not met for the regression, it is appropriate 
to use the General Least Square (GLS) regression (Beaver, 1997).  
 
4. Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation can occur when using repeated or panel-type data. It is when same-
variable observations are correlated between each other. This is typically present when 
the data are repeatedly gathered from the same source in multiple times. Using data that 
is related to each other violates the assumption of independence among the 
observations. The Durbin-Watson test can be used to detect autocorrelation in a data set.  
Its results range from zero to four. Values that are close to two represent no 
autocorrelation present. As the values become closer to zero, a positive autocorrelation 
is indicated; as they get closer to four, a negative autocorrelation is indicated. Durbin‘s 
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alternative test and the Breusch-Godfrey test are also used to test for autocorrelation. 
Both of these use the chi square distribution, and significance indicates the presence of 
autocorrelation. The results of the three previous tests show that data do not exhibit the 
presence of autocorrelation.   
 
5. Endogeneity Problem 
The issue of endogeneity rises when some of the independent variables may also be 
determined by outcome variable [dependent variable]. The endogeneity also occurs 
when a potential external shock affects both dependent and independent variables. In 
addition, endogeneity takes place when relevant explanatory variable(s) are missing. 
Moreover, the endogeneity may also occur as a result of potential error in measuring 
variables. In short, when the model fails to satisfy the orthogonality condition, it is 
concluded that the model is endogenous. In case of the presence of endogeneity, the 
model produces inefficient and spurious results (Baum, 2006). Therefore, the detection 
of endogeneity through standard statistical test(s) is required. In case of the presence of 
endogeneity, different models such as Generalized Method of Moments (GMM-IV) and 
Two Stage Least Square 2SLS may be applied. In order to test the presence of 
endogeneity GMM C test and Wu-Hausman test are applied. The results of these tests 
indicate that endogeneuity problem does not exist in the regression model.   
 
6. Random/Fixed Effects Models 
The random effects model for panel data assumes that the individual predictors are 
random variables that are uncorrelated with each time point. The fixed effects model for 
panel data allows for the individuals predictors to be correlated at each of the time 
points. The Hausman test can be conducted to discover which type of model should be 
used. It compares the subset of coefficients at each one of the time points for both 
model types. The null hypothesis of the test assumes that each predictor at each time 
point is uncorrelated with the other time points. The alternative is that the predictors are 
correlated and that the fixed effects model should be used. The result shows that the 
random effects should be applied as a more appropriate model.  
Based on the above discussion, the main statistical analyses applied in the second part 
of this research are as follows: 
A. Descriptive analysis: This includes the analysis of the overall mean values, 
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for all variables in the model.   
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B. Multivariate analysis: Given the test results for normality, heteroscedasticity, 
and Hausman, GLS regression-random effects are used as the original model and 
followed by two sensitivity tests: fixed effects and pooled regression – robust with best 
for heteroscedasticity. 
 
5.18 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
The main objective of this chapter is to present the research methods adopted in this 
study. The chapter presents the main methods used to investigate the attitudes of groups: 
interview and questionnaire. After a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of 
previous methods, it was decided that a self-administered questionnaire method, as a 
quantitative approach, was the most suitable for the empirical investigation related to 
the first part of study. Justifications of the chosen method among others are presented. 
The reliability and validity of a research instrument is evaluated through the Cronbach‘s 
coefficient alpha, the opinion of academics, and piloting. The outcomes of a self-
administered questionnaire are discussed and reported in Chapter 6.   
The chapter also introduces the rationale for the design of a voluntary disclosure index 
to assess the variation in disclosure practices among a period of study (2005 to 2008) 
and determines the extent of disclosure in CARs of non-financial companies. The 
disclosure index comprises 49 voluntary disclosure items, which are selected based on 
the disclosure literature and applicability to the Kuwaiti business environment; all items 
included in the index are given equal weight. The index items are divided into four main 
categories to help examine different sections of an annual report as well as the level of 
disclosure of different types of information included in an annual report. By employing 
two techniques: Cronbach‘s coefficient alpha and the opinions of accounting experts, 
the validity of the index was confirmed.   
This study examines the association between a number of explanatory variables and 
disclosure level, and this association is formed based on disclosure theories identified in 
Chapter 2, the relevant studies discussed in Chapter 3, and reporting and disclosure 
regulations applied in Kuwait presented in Chapter 4. It covers 52 non-financial 
companies with a total of 206 investigated observations. Thus, it can be concluded that 
the study follows the deductive approach which requires that research hypotheses be 
built and developed upon a theory. Chapter 7 reports how the explanatory variables 
influence a company‘s voluntary disclosure levels. 
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Table 5.8: Summary of the Variables and their Proxies 
Variable Proxy Expected sign  
  Dependent variable   
Overall voluntary 
disclosure index  
The ratio of the total actual items disclosed by a 
company in its annual report to the maximum 
number of voluntary items a company is expected to 
disclose 
 
Independent 
variables 
  
Non-executive 
directors on the board 
The proportion of  non-executive directors to the 
total number of directors on the board 
+ 
Cross directorship The proportion of directors with cross directorships 
in other companies to the total number of directors 
on the board 
+ 
Family members on 
the board 
The proportion of family members to the total 
number of directors on the board 
- 
Board size
®
 The total number of directors on the board  
Government 
ownership 
The percentage of shares owned by the government + 
Role duality 1 if the chairman is also the CEO and 0 otherwise - 
Audit committee 1 if the audit committee exists and 0 otherwise + 
Ruling family 1 if there are ruling family on the board and 0 
otherwise 
+ 
Cross listing 1 if the company is listed on other markets and 0 
otherwise 
+ 
Company size Total assets at the end of the financial year + 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities to total assets + 
Company growth The percentage of change in company‘s assets + 
Profitability  Return on total assets (ROTA) + 
Type of industry
®
 1 if the company is a manufacturing company and 0 
otherwise 
 
Type of auditor 1 if companies being audited by accounting firms are 
associated with one of the Big 4 and 0 otherwise 
+ 
®According to disclosure literature, it has been suggested that these variables have significant effect  
On the voluntary disclosure practices, however, since the results of previous studies are mixed, the 
current study did not give the direction of this association. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF USERS’ PERCEPTION TOWARD 
INFORMATION IN CORPORATE ANNUAL REPORTS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the analysis of the perception of respondents in Kuwait regarding 
the importance of annual reports and the usefulness of accounting information. Beyond 
that, the questionnaire survey is intended to seek opinions on the usefulness of adding 
some voluntary items to enhance the quality of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of 
companies listed on the KSE. Moreover, it investigates the factors and procedures that 
may increase confidence in the capital market and improve the protection of capital 
market participants. To accomplish these objectives, four groups were invited to 
participate in this questionnaire: Financial Advisor (FA), External Auditor (EA), Market 
Regulator (MR), and Accounting Academic (AC). The sections of this chapter proceed 
as follows. Section 6.2 deals with background information on the respondents. It also 
presents and discusses the main outcomes of the questionnaire analysis. A summary and 
conclusion of this chapter‘s discussion is provided in Section 6.3. At the end of this 
chapter, a summary of objectives, research questions, and hypotheses is presented in 
Table 6.21.  
 
6.2 SURVEY RESULTS 
 
6.2.1 Respondents’ Demographic Aspects 
It is essential to give a general description of participants‘ personal background 
information before presenting the outcomes of this survey. Respondents were requested 
to provide information regarding their place of work, user groups, employment record, 
and qualifications.  
Originally, the total number of questionnaires distributed to four groups of respondents 
was as follows: Financial Advisors (FA) 60, External Auditors (EA) 50, Market 
Regulators (MR) 60, and Accounting Academics (AC) 50, respectively. The 
questionnaire was submitted in person, and the main objectives along with the contents 
of the questionnaire were discussed with the respondent. At the end of the survey, 143 
out of 220 questionnaires were collected. Consequently, the analysis of data in this 
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study is based on 143 usable responses which were fully completed with a response rate 
of 65% of total questionnaires distributed.  
Figure 6.1 provides detailed information about the distribution of respondents according 
to their user groups. It indicates that the largest percentage of user groups participating 
in this survey was the FA group, followed by the AC, EA and MR groups.  
It is obvious from these results that the MR group‘s response rate was lower than that of 
the other three target groups. This finding was expected and consistent with the fact that 
the MR group, as a part of the Kuwaiti accounting community, in the Middle East, tends 
to be more secretive and reluctant to participate in a survey since they believe their 
personal opinions represent the official view of their respective governments, which 
could create a conflict of interest. This is consistent with Gray‘s (1988) view that 
developing nations are classified as secretive. In Arab countries such as Egypt, for 
example, it has been argued that secretive and conservatism policies are deeply rooted 
in Egyptian culture (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2007).      
 
Figure 6.1: The Distribution of Respondents According to their User Groups 
 
Respondents were asked about their place of work and their responses are presented in 
Table 6.1. As can be seen, the majority of participants worked in the private sector 
(62%), while 38% worked in the public sector. When asked about the length of their 
work experience in the field, Table 6.1 shows that the vast majority of respondents had 
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more than 10 years‘ experience. This finding was expected because in most cases 
working in the role of FA, EA, MR, and AC requires considerable work experience. 
Table 6.1 also illustrates the distribution of respondents based on their highest academic 
qualification. Half of the participants hold a Bachelor degree, 27% a PhD degree, and 
22% a Master‘s degree. Regarding professional qualification, the distribution of 
respondents in Table 6.1 shows that about 39% of the participants hold a professional 
accounting/business certificate, such as the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) from 
Kuwait/USA, or the Certified Internal Auditor (CIA). The high percentage of certificate 
holders could be explained by the fact that individuals in high-level positions, such as 
EA, are usually required to possess such qualifications.  
   
Table 6.1: The Distribution of Respondents 
Place of Work % 
Government 38 
Private 62 
Total 100 
Years of Experience % 
Less than 5 years 13 
6-10 years 22 
More than 10 years 65 
Total 100 
Academic Qualification % 
Diploma 1 
Bachelor 50 
Master 22 
PhD 27 
Total 100 
Professional Certificate % 
No 61 
Yes 39 
Total 100 
 
6.2.2 The Primary Sources of Information for Kuwaiti User Groups 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the second section of the questionnaire consisted of three 
parts related to the following subjects: (1) sources of information, (2) content of 
corporate annual reports (CARs), and (3) the qualitative characteristics of corporate 
information.  
To explore the importance of information sources, the participants were given nine 
different sources that are commonly used to obtain the information needed for making 
economic decisions and/or recommendations regarding a listed company (see Appendix 
4). The chosen sources of information were as follows: corporate annual report (CAR), 
corporate interim report (IR), company‘s website (CW), KSE‘s website (KSEW), 
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newspapers and magazines (NM), market rumours (MR), personal expectations (PE), 
recommendations from a friend (RF), and advice from specialists (AS). The respondents 
were asked to rate, in terms of their importance, the previous sources of information by 
employing a five-point Likert scale, ranging from ―extremely important‖ to ―not at all 
important‖. 
 
Descriptive Analysis    
Table 6.2 presents the overall mean scores of the importance of nine sources of 
information and its standard deviation (SD), with the results of Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) 
tests being represented by p-value. It should be noted that the sources are ranked based 
on their mean scores in descending order, and this technique will be employed in the 
rest of the questionnaire responses. As indicated in Table 6.2, user groups rated CAR 
(as expected), IR, AS, and PE as the four most important sources of information (in that 
order) for the process of making economic judgements.    
In the context of CARs, Gray et al. (1995:45) stated that “the annual report is a 
significant element in the overall disclosure process, given that it is the most widely 
disseminated source of [company] information”. The finding of the importance of CAR 
as a primary preferred source of information for users in Kuwait, is consistent with 
previous empirical studies of developed countries (e.g. Chenhall and Juchau, 1977; 
Chang and Most, 1977; Lee and Tweedie, 1981; Vergoossen 1993; Epstein and Pava, 
1993; Ho and Wong, 2004; Stainbank and Peebles, 2006). Moreover, the result of this 
study is in line with similar studies in emerging markets, (e.g. Abu-Nassar and 
Rutherford (1996) in Jordan; Abdul Rahman (2001) in Malaysia; Naser et al. (2003) in 
Kuwait; Mirshekary and Saudagaran (2005) in Iran; Al-Attar and Al-Khater (2007) in 
Qatar; Al-Ajmi (2009) in Bahrain; Zoysa and Rudkin (2010) in Sri Lanka; Dahawy and 
Samaha (2010) in Egypt; Nassirzadeh (2011) in Iran). A strong consistency in results 
confirms the argument of the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) (1978) that 
the CAR is considered a main information source for both internal and external users in 
making informed decisions. However, there is no common consensus that information 
included in these annual reports can serve all user groups/users in making their 
judgements (Ho and Wong, 2001; Meek and Thomas, 2004).  
It is also important to note that the IR result is consistent with those reported by Al-
Mahmoud (2000), Al-Hajji (2003), Al-Mutairi (2004), and Al-Yaqout (2006). In 
addition, Naser et al. (2003) reported that user groups in Kuwait used the corporate 
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interim report (IR) as a major source of information about the company; however, they 
ranked it fifth. One financial advisor pointed out:  
“The interim report, for quarter annual or the first/second months, is considered an 
important instrument which assists in following and assesing company performance. At 
the same time, it gives some space to forecast for the next financial period.”    
 
A comparison of the AS result with surveys (e.g. Al-Mahmoud, 2000; Abdul Rahman, 
2001; Mirshekary and Saudagaran, 2005), conducted in developing economies provides 
slightly different results. The result is inconsistent with findings documented by 
Nassirzadeh (2011), who revealed that Iranian external users do not rely on AS for 
making economic decisions. One possible explanation for the variations in results is that 
the participants have different educational backgrounds, and different lengths of 
experience. Conversely, the respondents hold a neutral outlook on the importance of the 
MR and CW as sources of information, reflected by the overall means of 2.76 and 2.71, 
respectively. The low rate of MR, showing it as a less reliable source in users‘ 
viewpoint, was documented by Abu-Nassar and Rutherford (1996), Al-Ajmi (2009) and 
Nassirzadeh (2011) in their surveys of Jordanian, Bahraini, and Iranian users, 
respectively. These results are also consistent with those documented by Mirshekary 
and Saudagaran (2005), Al-Yaqout (2006), Al-Abdulqader et al. (2007), Zoysa and 
Rudkin (2010), and Dahawy and Samaha (2010) for emerging markets. This may be due 
to the fact that the respondents, as well-educated and professional, depend heavily on 
more reliable sources rather than on one such as this. The result of CW can be attributed 
to the fact that it does not meet the user groups‘ needs. One financial advisor indicated 
that: 
“In most cases companies’ websites do not provide any valuable and up-to-date 
information about companies’ performance and activities. Moreover, some companies 
do not have websites.”  
 
This comment is consistent with the findings of Al-Shammari (2007:16), who 
investigated the use of the Internet for disseminating financial reporting by companies 
listed on the KSE in 2005, revealing that: “...77 (110 of the 143 companies) had 
websites. However, 30 (33) of companies did not provide any financial information.” 
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Table 6.2: The Importance of Different Sources of Information 
 
Source of information 
Whole Sample 
 
K-W  
   Mean   SD Rank   P-Value 
Corporate annual report (CAR) 4.818 .3870 1  
Interim report (IR) 4.273 .6630 2  
Company‘s website (CW) 2.713 1.059 9 ** 
KSE‘s website (KSEW) 3.497 1.113 5 *** 
Newspapers and magazines (NM) 3.231 1.019 6 ** 
Market rumours (MR) 2.761 1.128 8  
Personal expectations (PE) 3.619 .838 4  
Recommendations from a friend (RF) 2.832 1.017 7  
Advice from specialists (AS) 4.007 .764 3  
  Note. * p < 0.10;  ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01. These criteria will be used for remaining tables.  
The result here also suggests that respondents are neutral in respect of NM as a source 
of information. This can be explained by the fact that specialised magazines that meet 
the aspirations of well-educated and professional people do not exist in Kuwait. 
Although daily newspapers include a specialised section covering international and 
domestic business news, this is not enough to satisfy sophisticated readers. In this 
respect, an accounting academic argued that: 
 “Most local newspapers and magazines concentrate on local and GCC region 
business news; however, the international newspapers and business magazines are 
more comprehensive, have specialised publications, more cover of the local and 
international economic events. Moreover, they provide more accurate and credible 
information than the local ones.” 
 
In this sense, one financial advisor declared:  
“There is a shortage of newspapers and magazines which are specialised in the 
business field and are published in the English language; for this reason it is difficult to 
depend on this type of information source even though it is considered as a crucial 
instrument in developed countries where it is more developed compared to Kuwait.”    
 
6.2.2.1 Other Sources of Information Used by Participants 
The differences in opinions among users regarding the importance of information 
sources indicate the variety of information needs as well as the failure of some sources 
to provide the amount of information required for making economic judgements. 
Therefore, users employ several sources of information. To explore these, additional 
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space was provided, at the end of section two, for participants to suggest any other 
sources of information not included in the questionnaire. Some respondents referred to 
other sources which are necessary to have a clearer vision about a specific economic 
event or a particular company; they are as follows. Three members of financial advisory 
group agreed with the sentiment that:  
“It is preferable to directly contact companies and more specifically make personal 
interviews (e.g. by phone or face to face) with CEO/key management such as financial 
managers as an essential source of information when making economic decisions. This 
source of information also helps to get information related to the company’s current and 
future projects, its major customers and its suppliers etc.”.  
 
Another financial advisor indicated that: 
“The CBK’s website is considered one of most important and useful sources of 
information to obtain annual and semi-annual statistical reports etc., published by the 
CBK. It could help to more deeply understand the Kuwaiti economic status and market 
conditions”.  
 
It is worth noting that the MR group is similar to the FA group to some extent in terms 
of the nature of their information needs and the sources of information on which they 
depend. One market regulator who shared the same view reported that: “Periodic 
statistical reports published by governmental bodies form one important information 
source which assists in the decision process”. On the other hand, another market 
regulator pointed out that: 
 “The work scope of monitoring bodies is broad, so we require companies to submit 
internal audit reports in order to verify the reliability of financial reporting and 
compliance with laws and regulations”. 
 
Two financial advisors noted that: “Analysis reports, which are published by consulting 
companies and leading listed companies regarding assessing the KSE performance for 
different periods, are considered important sources of information”. That view was not 
supported by another financial advisor, who made a criticism that:  
 “In general, analysis reports in Kuwait are usually discussed and investigated after the 
financial crises and they do not provide warning signs or give prior indications for the 
possible occurrence of such crises”.   
 
Websites earned a special place in the views of Kuwaiti users as a relatively important 
information source since they provide information needed by various user groups for 
making economic decisions. A set of financial advisors gave examples of frequently 
used websites: (e.g. zawya, Gulf base, Bloomberg, CNBC News, and Reuters).  
Possible reasons for the Kuwaiti user groups‘ dependence on different sources is that 
some sources may not provide current company information or enough information to 
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meet their needs. Thus, it can be concluded that users vary regarding the importance 
attached to different information sources, and reasons for this are associated with a 
number of factors such as the nature of the job, the type of decisions, the required 
information and its availability.  
 
Hypothesis Testing 
A further advanced statistical analysis is required to assess the extent of difference in 
how four user groups perceived the importance of these sources (H1). Since our data is 
ordinal, the previous objective can be approached by using a non-parametric test called 
the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test. These K-W tests were independently employed for each 
of the nine different sources of information.  
The results of the K-W tests are summarised in Table 6.2. It can be concluded that there 
are no statistically significant differences among user groups regarding the CARs, IRs, 
MR, PE, RF, and AS. However, there are statistically significant differences among 
users about CW, KSEW, and NM. Hence, the results of the study (with the exception of 
CARs, IRs, MR, PE, RF, and AS) do not support the hypothesis that there is no 
significant difference among user groups in the perceived importance of different 
sources of information. In order to highlight these significant differences among user 
groups, further non-parametric tests called Mann-Whitney U tests (M-W) were 
conducted between all possible pairs of groups, to determine the nature of the 
significant differences found through the K-W tests. Consequently, these tests were 
carried out for six possible pairs of user groups and for nine sources of information.  
Table 6.3 presents the mean scores for each user group and illustrates the consensus 
among each pair of user groups. The results of M-W tests show that the FA pairing with 
MR and AC, as well as the MR and AC pairing, are similar in their agreement regarding 
the importance of CW as a source of information. However, there is statistically 
significant difference among the EA group and the other three groups regarding the 
perception of the importance of CW, which was confirmed by the overall mean score 
for each group. This may be due to the fact that the EA group believes this source of 
information to be more useful than the other groups do. With regard to KSEW, FA and 
EA groups have a similar view regarding the importance of this source. An interesting 
result: KSE‘s website is a significantly more important source of information about the 
company for the MR group than for FA and EA and AC groups, reflected in the overall 
mean score for each group. One possible explanation is that MR group members 
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consider that information published on the KSE‘s website meets the information needs 
of market participants. The FA group differs significantly from the AC group regarding 
the importance of KSEW. On the other hand, results indicate significant differences 
among the EA and AC pairing about the perceived importance attached to KSEW. They 
also show no significant difference between the MR group and the three other groups as 
well as the FA and EA groups regarding the relative importance attached to NM. 
However, the highest level of significant differences belonged to the FA and AC pairing 
and the EA and AC pairing regarding the agreement level about the importance of NM 
as a source of information. The remarkable difference in importance may be due to 
members of FA and EA being more interested than AC members in tracking the daily 
company news and economic events.    
 
Table 6.3: Comparison of Importance of Sources of Information by User Group 
Sources of 
information 
Means by Subject 
Groups 
M-W Test  
 FA EA MR AC FA 
(sig) 
with 
EA 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
MR 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
Company‘s 
website 
2.74 3.12 2.50 2.47 *   **  **  
KSE‘s website 3.46 3.76 4.17 2.71  ** ** * *** *** 
Newspapers and 
magazines 
3.43 3.33 3.23 2.85   **  **  
 
6.2.3 The Importance of Corporate Annual Report Sections 
The objective of Question 2 in Section Two was to explore the perceptions of target 
groups regarding the importance of different sections of the CAR. This could help 
determine which parts of annual reports user groups rely on when making decisions 
and/or recommendations. Therefore, the CAR was divided into nine parts as follows: 
chairman‘s letter/message (CLM), management report/management discussion and 
analysis (MRD), independent auditors‘ reports (IAR), statement of financial position 
(SFP), income statement (IS), statement of cash flow (SCF), statement of changes in 
owners‘ equity (SCOE), accounting policies (AP), and notes to the financial statements 
(NFS). Participants were asked to rate the importance they attach to each of these 
sections CAR on a five-point scale where five indicates ―extremely important‖ and one 
indicates ―not at all important‖.  
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Descriptive Analysis    
Based on the overall mean scores, most CAR sections were perceived as important to 
user groups, with the exception of the CLM and MRD, which fall in the neutral rating, 
and this was reflected by overall means of 3.18 and 2.68, respectively (see Table 6.4).  
From Table 6.4, for the whole sample, it can be seen that the three most important 
sections of the annual report were the SFP, IS, and SCF, respectively. These findings are 
similar to those documented by Al-Mubarak (1997), Al-Mahmoud (2000), Al-Hajji 
(2003), Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004, 2007), and Zoysa and Rudkin (2010) in their 
surveys of Saudi Arabian, Kuwaiti, and Sri Lankan users, in which they revealed that 
user groups rated SFP and IS as the most important and primary sections of a CAR. 
However, comparing this study‘s results with those of a previous study conducted in the 
KSE, Naser et al. (2003) reported that users attached less importance to SFP compared 
with IS and SCF, respectively. Additionally, the results of the current study are 
inconsistent with those of Chang and Most (1985), Vergoossen (1993), Epstein and Pava 
(1994), Epstein and Anderson (1994), Abu-Nassar and Rutherford (1996), Abdul 
Rahman (2001), Al-Mutairi (2004), Ho and Wong (2004), Al-Abdulqader et al. (2007), 
Al-Ajmi (2009), and Nassirzadeh (2011), who revealed that the IS was ranked the most 
important section of the annual report. These differences may be explained on the 
grounds that most of these studies focused on investor groups, who are interested in 
information related to a company‘s performance. In addition, most investors tend to 
invest in profitable companies and such information is provided by IS. Concerning the 
results of financial statements, this may reflect the confidence of users in these 
statements since they are prepared in accordance with sophisticated standards (IFRS).   
The low rate of CLM can be explained by the fact that the information included in this 
statement may not be relevant to users‘ needs. Although this result contradicts the result 
documented by Jamil et al. (2009), who declared that CLM is an important section in 
the CAR and a useful device for Malaysian institutional investors in investment decision 
making, it is nevertheless consistent with other studies in developing countries (e.g. 
Mirshekary and Saudagaran, 2005; Dahawy and Samaha, 2010). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the CLM section was perceived to be less read and the less preferred part 
among other parts of annual reports in the view of users. This is in line with results 
reported by Abu-Nassar and Rutherford (1996) and Al-Ajmi (2009) for developing 
countries. Similar results were obtained in other empirical studies (e.g. Al-Mutairi, 
2004; Al Attar and Al-Khater, 2007; Al-Abdulqader et al., 2007; Zoysa and Rudkin, 
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2010; Alzarouni et al., 2011). In contrast, the current finding is inconsistent with other 
studies (e.g. Lee and Tweedie, 1981; Day, 1986; Anderson and Epstein, 1997; Bartlett 
and Chandler, 1997; Stainbank and Peebles, 2006).  
The low importance of MRD reported in this study is consistent with results reached by 
Epstein and Pava (1993, 1995). Similar findings also were reported by Al-Attar and Al-
Khater (2007), who surveyed user groups in Qatar. Another possible justification of the 
low rating given to CLM and MRD is the quantity and quality of information included 
in these sections. In the case of Kuwait, it provides a brief summary about company 
achievements for the last financial years and includes little information about its future 
plans. One financial advisor argued that: “Information released in the management 
report and the chairman’s letter should be improved to include more significant 
information regarding a company’s future performance and a management’s vision 
about expansion plans.”  
It should be noted that IAR, based on the outcomes of mean important values, was 
ranked the sixth important section of the CAR in the target group‘s view. This reflects 
some users attaching less importance to this section and is probably due to the fact that 
the company board intervenes in the appointment of external auditors, which may affect 
their independence, as mentioned in Chapter 4.    
  
Table 6.4: Perceived Importance of Different Sections of Corporate Annual Report 
Different sections of corporate annual reports 
Whole Sample 
 Rank 
 K-W 
 
     Mean    SD        P-Value 
Chairman‘s letter/message (CLM) 2.678 1.085 9 *** 
Management report/Management discussion and 
analysis (MRD) 
3.175 1.146 
8 
*** 
Independent auditors‘ reports (IAR) 4.455 .803 6 ** 
Statement of financial position (SFP) 4.811 .393 1  
Income statement (IS) 4.790 .457 2  
Statement of cash flow (SCF)  4.755 .534 3  
Statement of changes in owners‘ equity (SCOE) 4.573 .666 5  
Accounting policies (AP) 4.427 .764 7 ** 
Notes to the financial statements (NFS) 4.720 .523 4  
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Hypothesis Testing 
Table 6.4 presents the results of K-W tests conducted for each of the nine different 
sections of CAR to determine any significant differences among the four groups 
regarding the importance of these sections (H2). The results indicate significant 
differences among examined groups concerning four sections of the CAR only, at the 
level 5%: the CLM, MRD, IAR, and AP. Consequently, the results (with the exception 
of SFP, IS, SCF, SCOE, and NFS) do not support the research hypothesis that there is 
no significant difference among user groups in the importance they attach to various 
sections of a CAR. The results imply that user groups differ in the importance attached 
to different sections of a CAR. Table 6.5 presents descriptive statistics by each group 
for the aforementioned four sections. The M-W Test was used to gauge the extent of 
differences in how user groups perceived the importance of these four sections. 
The results indicate that EA group differs significantly from all other groups, in that it 
appears to place a greater weighting on the CLM section than all other groups. 
However, the results indicated no statistically significant differences among the FA and 
MR pairing, the FA and AC pairing, and the MR and AC pairing regarding the 
importance of the CLM section. The EA group placed greater emphasis on the 
importance of MRD and IAR sections than all other groups. Conversely, the results 
revealed no statistically significant differences among the FA and MR pairing, the FA 
and AC pairing, and the MR and AC pairing regarding the importance of these two 
sections. On the other hand, the AP section was significantly more important for EA and 
MR groups than for FA and AC groups. The high level of reliability that EA and MR in 
Kuwait attached to the IAR and AP can be interpreted on the grounds that these sections 
reflect the extent to which companies comply with reporting regulations.  
Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003) claimed that, by adopting a specific accounting 
policy, company management can send signals to stakeholders. In addition, it may 
employ accounting systems as a communication channel or signalling mechanism to 
affect the view of stakeholders such as investors (Nelissen, 2007). On a different point, 
it may help investors as market participants to make informed decisions (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990; Holthausen, 1990). Fung et al. (2003) provide evidence that 
accounting policy and voluntary disclosure, as communication channels, are considered 
to complement each other. The results showed no statistically significant differences in 
the FA and AC pairing. The results also indicate a remarkable similarity between the 
EA and MR pairing.  
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Table 6.5: Comparison of Importance of Sections of Corporate Annual Report by 
User Group 
 
Different sections of corporate 
annual reports 
Means by Subject 
Groups 
M-W Test  
FA EA MR AC FA 
(sig) 
with 
EA 
FA 
 
(sig) 
with  
MR 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
MR 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
Chairman‘s letter/message 2.24 3.67 2.53 2.44 ***   *** ***  
Management 
report/Management discussion 
and analysis 
3.09 4.00 2.90 2.74 **   *** ***  
Independent auditors‘ reports 4.26 4.85 4.57 4.24 *** *  ** ***  
Accounting policies 4.13 4.70 4.73 4.29 *** ***         *  ** 
 
6.2.4 Qualitative Characteristics of Corporate Information  
The third question in Section Two aims to identify and evaluate the extent of significant 
difference or agreement existing among user groups about a set of qualitative 
characteristics of information that could affect the usefulness and quality of the CAR as 
a source of information. To achieve this objective, the respondents were requested to 
indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement on whether accounting information 
included in CARs possesses six characteristics (see Appendix 4). According to Samuels 
et al. (1999:193), ―Good-quality accounting information is necessary to ensure that 
capital markets remain efficient”. Botosan (1997:324) argued that the disclosure quality 
of such information is considered to be ―very difficult to assess‖. Hence, to reach this 
objective, a Likert scale was employed for the answers to this question, extending from 
five, ―strongly agree‖, to one, ―strongly disagree‖. 
 
Descriptive Analysis    
The results in Table 6.6 indicate that most respondents (85%) either agree or strongly 
agree that accounting information included in CARs has the characteristic of being 
―consistent with accounting methods over time‖. In addition, a high proportion of 
respondents (76% and 71%, respectively) believed that accounting information found in 
CARs is ―capable of making a difference in a decision‖ and possesses ―comparability of 
information‖. It is not surprising that information released in annual reports possesses 
‗comparability‘ as a useful criterion, since CARs are prepared based on uniform 
standards (IFRS), giving users, such as investors, the chance to make a comparison 
among investment opportunities.   
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These results may reveal that user groups feel satisfied with current accounting 
information included in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports in terms of these previous 
characteristics. They are inconsistent with the finding of Abu-Nassar and Rutherford 
(1996), who discovered that lack of comparability and lack of consistency are 
considered major weaknesses in the view of user groups of annual reports in Jordan. In 
contrast, respondents were generally neutral in their views concerning the reliability 
criterion expressed in terms of ―representational faithfulness and neutrality of 
information‖, with an overall mean of 3.27. It has been argued that unreliable 
information could play an important role when reliable information is not available to 
users (Imbun and Ngangan, 2001).   
These results suggest that participants show general concern toward the level of 
credibility of information released in the annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies, 
and this has been an important area of concern to user groups since the study conducted 
by Naser et al. (2003) in Kuwait. These results are also consistent with those of previous 
studies in emerging economies (e.g. Abu-Nassar and Rutherford, 1996; Mirshekary and 
Saudagaran, 2005; Dahawy and Samaha, 2010; Alzarouni et al., 2011), which 
concluded that a lack of trust in information appears to be a major problem facing the 
different user groups. The strong consistency in results may be due to the fact that 
Middle Eastern countries are similar in a number of characteristics such as socio-
economic environments, and financial reporting is poorly regulated (Alzarouni et al., 
2011). This suggests that participants of this study were unsatisfied with the current 
level of transparency of information provided by listed companies in their annual 
reports and so these reports are somewhat not be trusted by external user groups such as 
investors. In the context of qualitative characteristics, Stainbank and Peebles (2006) 
stated that comparability, faithfulness, and relevance are considered dominant 
characteristics for evaluating the usefulness of accounting practices in the viewpoint of 
South African users. It is important to mention that caution should be taken when 
interpreting the findings and making a comparison with different studies in different 
countries for various reasons: the differences in sample size, user groups, time frame of 
the study, and type of countries. 
On the other side, the analysis results showed a low level of agreement (20%) among 
user groups regarding the ―timeliness of corporate annual reports‖. This was reflected 
by the low reported mean for all groups and supported by a high standard deviation. 
Interestingly, the findings for the long delay in publishing CARs and the lack of 
197 
 
availability of annual reports are similar to those observed in some emerging countries 
(Abu-Nassar and Rutherford, 1996; Mirshekary and Saudagaran, 2005; Dahawy and 
Samaha, 2010; Zoysa and Rudkin, 2010). Thus, it can be inferred that, as well as the 
users of these reports facing similar problems, developing countries are similar in their 
financial reporting environment.  
On the basis of this result, it appears that user groups assess the qualitative 
characteristics based on their perspectives of current accounting practices in the 
business environment. This corresponds with the reality that some companies listed on 
the KSE are not able to submit their audited annual financial statements at the end of 
March for the financial year to a monitoring body (e.g. the KSE). For this reason, some 
listed companies‘ shares are temporarily suspended from trading at the KSE. The KSE‘s 
website declared that 36 and 26 listed companies did not submit their audited annual 
financial statements to the KSE at the end of March for the financial years, 2009 and 
2010, respectively. One financial advisor argued that: 
“Delay in published corporate quarterly/annual reports could be one obstacle that 
prevents consulting companies from providing a good service for their clients or 
publishing up-to-date reports about the status of the KSE in public media.” 
 
With regard to the publication of annual reports and their timeliness, a number of 
financial advisors and accounting academics who participated in this survey suggested 
that they: 
 “...prefer and encourage regulators to allow listed companies to publish their annual 
reports, as a full set, in an electronic form via their websites after receiving a final 
approval from external auditors. This could help all users to have equal opportunity to 
access this information at the same time and this could speed up the availability of this 
source of information.”   
 
In this regard, a number of financial advisors and accounting academics indicated that 
they “prefer the publication of corporate annual reports within 60 days after year-
end”.  
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Table 6.6: Users’ Opinions of the Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information 
Characteristics Level of agreement Whole 
Sample 
 
 
 
 
Rank 
K-W 
 
1 
% 
2 
% 
3 
% 
4 
% 
5 
% 
Mean SD P-  
Value 
Capable of making a 
difference to your 
decision 
0.0 6.3 17.5 67.8 8.4 3.78 .683 2  
Available on a timely 
basis 
5.6 66.4 7.7 17.5 2.8 2.45 .940 6  
Faithfully represents 
what really happened 
or existed (or 
representational 
faithfulness of 
information) 
2.8 16.1 36.4 40.6 4.2 3.27 .882 5      *** 
Unbiased (neutral: 
cannot favour one user 
group over another) 
3.5 17.5 29.4 47.6 2.1 3.27 .897 4  
Comparable (you can 
compare one company 
with another) 
0.7 7.7 20.3 62.9 8.4 3.71 .758 3  
Consistent over time 0.7 2.8 11.2 77.6 7.7 3.89 .595 1     *** 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
To examine whether the different user groups, statistically, have similar or different 
perceptions on whether accounting information provided in CARs possesses qualitative 
criteria that may affect the quality of these reports (H3), K-W tests were conducted for 
each of six qualitative characteristics separately to test this hypothesis. Table 6.6 reveals 
that the significant differences between the respondents‘ opinions concentrated on two 
criteria of information, namely: ―representational faithfulness of information‖ and 
―consistence of the information with accounting methods over time‖ only. Thus, the null 
hypothesis was not supported for the previous criteria only.  
As depicted in Table 6.7, the results of M-W tests revealed that the EA group believes 
that information provided in the annual reports possesses the ―representational 
faithfulness of information‖ criterion more than the FA and AC groups. On the other 
hand, the MR group is more in agreement that information provided in annual reports 
has ―representational faithfulness of information‖ than the AC group. These results are 
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expected since the EA group plays an important role in preparing the annual reports and 
the quality of information contained in these reports. In addition, the MR group believes 
that companies comply with the IFRS and other local regulations when they prepare 
financial reports and also they deem these requirements concentrate on improving the 
transparency of information disclosed in annual reports. However, a high similarity was 
found between the FA and MR pairing and the FA and AC pairing regarding this 
criterion.   
Conversely, the EA and MR groups attached a high degree of consensus to the 
―consistency‖ criterion (companies using the same accounting methods over financial 
years) than the FA group. In addition, the EA group is in more agreement on the 
existence of companies‘ consistent use of accounting principles from one accounting 
period to another than the AC group. However, results indicated that consensus between 
the pairings of FA and AC, EA and MR, and MR and AC is relatively high in this 
matter. 
 
Table 6.7: Comparison of Agreement Level of Qualitative Characteristics of 
Corporate Information by User Group 
 
6.2.5 Voluntary Disclosure Practices in the KSE 
One main objective of this survey is to explore the usefulness and materiality of 
voluntary disclosure in CARs. Thus, the third section of the questionnaire concentrated 
on different aspects of voluntary disclosure as follows.  
 
6.2.5.1 Level of Voluntary Disclosure  
To explore the perception of user groups regarding the level of voluntary information in 
annual reports of listed companies, the participants were asked to rate the extent of the 
Characteristics 
Means by Subject Groups M-W Test  
FA EA MR AC FA 
(sig) 
with 
EA 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
MR 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
Representational 
faithfulness of 
information  
3.087  3.727  3.400  2.971  ***   ** *** * 
Consistency of the 
accounting methods 
over time 
3.696  4.152  4.000  3.794  *** **       **  
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current level of voluntary disclosure on a five-point Likert scale, where five indicates 
―very high‖ and one indicates ―very low‖.  
 
Descriptive Analysis  
Analysis indicates relatively high levels of consensus between user groups with regard 
to the current level of voluntary disclosure investigated. This is clearly reflected by the 
mean score, which registered less than two, as well as the low value of standard 
deviation. From Table 6.8, most respondents (87%) agree that the level of voluntary 
disclosure is low. It should be noted that “lack of adequate disclosure can create 
ignorance in the securities market and can result in misallocation of resources in the 
economy” (Baumol, 1965, cited in Chandra, 1974:733).   
This result is consistent with the existing voluntary disclosure literature for Kuwait (Al-
Shammari, 2008; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Alanezi, 2011), which revealed 
the overall level of voluntary disclosure as 15%, 19%, 22%, respectively, among 
Kuwaiti listed companies. Although there are noticeable improvements in the level of 
voluntary information disclosure, it is still considered lower than observed in other 
developing countries, such as 31% and 33% in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, respectively 
(Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Alsaeed, 2006). A senior auditor with a Big 4 audit firm 
indicated:  
“I have been working in Kuwait as an external auditor for more than ten years and I have 
noticed that there are some improvements in the quantity and quality of voluntary 
information released in corporate annual reports”. 
 
Table 6.8: The Perceived Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
Statement 
Percentage 
Whole 
Sample 
 
K-W 
 
     1 
     % 
    2 
    % 
    3 
     % 
     4 
      
% 
     5 
     % 
     
Mea
n 
    SD       P-
Value 
Voluntary disclosure of annual 
reports 
27 60 13 0.0   0.0  1.86 0.623 .279 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
To determine any significant differences of view among sophisticated user groups on 
the current level of voluntary disclosure (H4), K-W tests were carried out. The results 
reveal no significant differences among user groups‘ views on the current level of 
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voluntary disclosure released in the CARs. Accordingly, the null hypothesis 4 is 
supported by the survey results.  
 
6.2.5.2 Usefulness of Voluntary Disclosure  
The CAR provides two types of information: mandatory and voluntary for different 
users such as present and potential investors, consulting companies, and creditors. This 
information is assumed to be useful to users of annual reports in making informed 
economic decisions. The second question in Section Three aims to explore the aspects 
in which VD can be useful in the perspective of various user groups. Thus, respondents 
were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each of nine statements. A Likert 
scale was used to calibrate the response, with five indicating ―strongly agree‖ and one 
indicating ―strongly disagree‖.   
 
Descriptive Analysis 
Overall, respondents were in agreement regarding all the proposed statements related to 
the usefulness of VD, and the overall mean values, which were 3.76 or above, provide 
remarkable support for these results. Specifically, they indicate that voluntary disclosure 
was useful in three areas, namely: ―improving the usefulness of the annual report as a 
source of information for decision making‖, followed by ―improving the level of 
confidence in decision making‖, and then by ―supports minority investors in monitoring 
their investments‖. Overall, the results, in terms of investment, are in line with those of 
Chang and Most (1985), Al-Mahmoud (2000), Naser et al. (2003), Al-Hajji (2003), and 
Al-Yaqout (2006), who revealed that the information provided in annual report helps in 
making investment decisions and in assessing corporate performance over time.  
 
Table 6.9: Users’ Perceptions on the Usefulness of Voluntary Disclosure 
Statements 
Whole Sample 
  
Rank 
 K-W 
 
    Mean     SD  P-   
Value 
Improving the usefulness of the annual report as a source of 
information for decision making 
4.364 .564 1  
Improving the level of confidence in decision making 4.315 .523 2  
Supporting minority investors in monitoring their 
investments 
4.119 .644 3 ** 
Assisting in making new or additional investments 3.951 .632 6  
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Helping users to make comparisons regarding a specific 
company‘s performance over periods of time, such as the 
last five fiscal years 
4.021 .726 4  
Helping as a benchmark in comparing the company‘s 
performance with competitors  
3.832 .796 7  
Helping as a benchmark in comparing companies‘ 
performance  on the KSE 
3.762 .796 9  
Aiding  in preparation of more ratios and analysis 3.979 .707 5  
Enhancing the ability of users to forecast the expected 
revenues, profits, and cash flow of a company 
3.776 .859 8  
 
Hypothesis Testing 
K-W tests were carried out to discover whether there is any significant difference in 
views among target groups for each of the identified purposes or benefits of voluntary 
disclosure (H5). The results indicate significant differences among the groups, at the .05 
significance level, concerning the usefulness of VD in ―supporting minority investors in 
monitoring their investments‖ only. Consequently, the result does not support this 
proposition. Overall, this result lends some support to that of the previous question 
regarding the level of voluntary disclosure. Thus, the general conclusion drawn is that 
the current level of voluntary disclosure in the CARs may not meet the expectations of 
user groups such as minority investors, which implies a disclosure gap between the 
providers of information and its users. In other words, this may suggest that the 
information provided by Kuwaiti listed companies is insufficient for users‘ 
requirements. This confirms that demand for ﬁnancial reporting and disclosure arises 
from information asymmetry and agency problems (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
In addition to K-W tests, pairwise Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted between all 
possible pairs of groups, to ascertain which group(s) differ(s) from the others. Table 
6.10 shows a relatively high level of consensus between FA, MR, AC groups regarding 
whether VD could contribute to helping minority investors monitor their investment. 
Based on a mean weight to this statement by each group, it can be inferred that the MR 
group assigned the highest usefulness mean to this statement, whilst the EA group 
assigned the least usefulness mean to it. This may be because of general concern from 
the EA group about the current voluntary disclosure level and the types of voluntary 
information included in the annual reports.  
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Table 6.10: Comparison of the Perceived Usefulness of Voluntary Disclosure by 
User Group  
Statement  
Means by Subject 
Groups 
M-W Test  
FA EA MR AC FA      
(sig) 
with   
EA 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
MR 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
Supporting minority 
investors in monitoring 
their investments  
4.20 3.85 4.30 4.12  **    ** **   
 
6.2.5.3 List of Proposed Voluntary Items  
It is expected that various annual report user groups are varied in their perspectives and 
purposes, generating variation in information needs. Empirical evidence suggests a 
difference in how users rate the importance of information items and their disclosure 
from developed and developing economies (Ngangan et al., 2005). Moreover, the 
disclosure of additional information may enhance the quality of annual reports and 
increase the confidence of capital market participants, such as investors, in their 
investee companies. On the other hand, improvement in the quality of information could 
be useful in planning and making decisions as well as in investing more capital in stock 
markets. Therefore, Question 3 of Section Three presents a list of 29 proposed items, 
with the various classes of corporate voluntary disclosures categorised into: corporate 
governance practices, human resources information, social and environmental corporate 
responsibilities, and goods/services to customers (see Appendix 4).  
To determine the types of information and identify the information that sophisticated 
users recommend should be released by preparers of annual reports, respondents were 
asked to register their level of agreement or disagreement that releasing these items may 
improve the quality of voluntary disclosure in Kuwaiti CARs. To achieve this objective, 
an item-by-item procedure was carried out to assess the mean values of 29 items of 
voluntary information for all respondents. Also, a five-point scale was used which 
ranged from five for ―strongly agree‖ to one for ―strongly disagree‖.  A summary of the 
responses is provided in Table 6.11. Table 6.12 presents descriptive statistics related to 
the respondents‘ level of agreement on these items. It also provides the results of the K-
W tests, while Table 6.13 reveals the results of the M-W tests.  
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Descriptive Analysis  
Table 6.11 shows that all proposed information items in the questionnaire were 
perceived as being useful, in the view of the majority of respondents, to be contained in 
the CARs. This was reflected by the mean scores which were 3.61 or above. The 
following items of information are considered the most useful and rated as the top 10 
voluntary items in the view of respondents: 
 
1. Description of major products/services produced 
2. Cross directorship 
3. Names of senior executive management 
4. Names of non-executive board members 
5. Biography of senior executive management 
6. Biography of board members 
7. Types of board committees                
8. Developments regarding products/services 
9. Receiving awards as a result of increase in the quality of the company‘s 
products/services 
10. Conservation of energy and material resources‘ consumption in company 
operations 
 
Table 6.11: Level of Agreement of Proposed Voluntary Items by Means 
Items of information  Mean   Rank      
Description of major products/services produced 4.40 1 
Names of board members who have directorships in other Kuwaiti and/or overseas 
listed companies  
4.34 2 
Names of senior executive management  4.29 3 
Names of non-executive board members 4.27 4 
Biography of senior executive management (education qualifications and practical 
experience) 
4.26 5  
Biography of board members (education qualifications and practical experience) 4.25 6  
Types of board committees                4.22 7 
Developments regarding  products or services 4.20 8 
Receiving awards as a result of increase in the quality of the company‘s products or 
services  
4.15 9 
Conservation of energy and material resources‘ consumption in company operations 4.13 10 
Conservation of natural resources (e.g. recycling) and waste management 4.11 11 
Sponsoring public health and social projects 4.10 12 
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Complying with national standards and national regulations concerning health and 
safety at work 
4.06 13 
Description of marketing network for finished goods/services   4.06 13 
Board committees‘ responsibilities 4.04 15 
Contribution by companies of products/services to support the national economy 4.02 16 
Name of board committees‘ members 4.00 17 
Remuneration per member and other benefits per member  3.95 18 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) regarding environmental 
audit/ISO14000 
3.95 18 
Sponsoring educational seminars and conferences 3.92 20 
Process for appointing board committees‘ members 3.92 20 
Giving financial assistance to employees to obtain or build upon academic/professional 
qualifications  
3.92 20 
Responsibilities assigned to executive members 3.86 23 
Number of employees trained yearly 3.83 24 
Budget assigned to training and development programmes 3.75 25 
Top management‘s salaries per key manager and other benefits per key managers 3.73 26 
Part-time employment of students  3.73 26 
Number of training hours covered by each employee 3.71 28 
Providing low cost health insurance for employees 3.61 29 
 
These findings are consistent with those of Al-Ajmi (2008, 2009), who found that 
Bahraini users of financial reports prefer companies to disclose information related to 
the name of board directors and other relevant information that helps to explain the 
relationship between the board and the company. Similarly, Naser et al. (2003) reported 
that user groups in Kuwait attached a certain degree of agreement to a list of directors 
and management names; however, they are not ranked at the top of the list based on 
their mean scores, in contrast to what was documented by Al-Mutairi (2004). On the 
other hand, Stainbank and Peebles (2006) found that users did not give a high ranking to 
information related to the corporate governance report. On a different point, Ho and 
Wong (2004) found that investment analysts in Hong Kong rated the responsibilities of 
directors/senior management item as low importance in annual reports. Overall, the 
process of comparison of different studies should be treated with caution as there are 
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differences in the time frame of research, the sample size, the examined information 
items, the user groups, and the type of country.     
The current study‘s results can be interpreted as showing that user groups strongly 
believe that listed companies should release much information related to corporate 
governance practices in their annual reports, and this suggests how interested 
respondents are in CG and the importance of it being applied in the Kuwaiti business 
environment. It is expected that the low level of CG disclosure indicates that listed 
companies‘ exercise of global good practices in CG is slight. On the other side, it can be 
concluded that respondents believe it is vital that this type of information is included in 
CARs to build up the confidence of annual report users regarding corporate information 
as well as to express corporate success.  
The responses of user groups indicated that releasing information about ―the summary 
of products/services produced‖, as an indicator by companies, is useful information to 
users of annual reports, such as present and potential investors, for assessing the ability 
of companies to generate their major income from operations. Naser et al. (2003) also 
found strong agreement among target groups on the importance of disclosing detailed 
company product information. In addition, investment users in Hong Kong view that as 
one of the most important items of voluntary information for making decisions (Ho and 
Wong, 2004). Also, these results partially support the studies of Mirshekary and 
Saudagaran (2005) and Dahawy and Samaha (2010), which surveyed external users in 
emerging markets.  
With regard to the disclosure of corporate environmental responsibility information, the 
result suggest that respondents would prefer companies to release in their CARs some 
information related to their environmental responsibility instead of concentrating on 
revealing performance information. In addition, the result indicated that listed 
companies should take more significant roles in ―conservation of energy and natural 
resources‖ to justify their existence within the society through their compliance with 
society values. This is consistent with the prediction of legitimacy theory. This result 
gives some empirical support for the conclusions reached in previous studies (e.g. Naser 
and Abu Baker, 1999). In contrast, this result does not support the findings of Stainbank 
and Peebles (2006), who declared that environmental report received low ranking from 
South Africa users.    
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Table 6.11 shows the following four information items rated as the lowest desired by 
the user groups in terms of their usefulness to be disclosed in Kuwaiti listed companies‘ 
annual reports to enhance the quality of corporate voluntary disclosure: 
 
1. Top management‘s salaries per key and other benefits per key managers 
2. Part-time employment of students 
3. Number of training hours covered by each employee 
4. Providing low cost health insurance for employees 
 
User groups assigned a low level of agreement regarding ―number of training hours 
covered by each employee‖. With regard to human resources information, the results 
from the present study are similar to those in a number of previous studies (e.g. Naser et 
al., 2003; Al-Mutairi, 2004; Mirshekary and Saudagaran, 2005; Dahawy and Samaha, 
2010). The lowest rating of the ―part-time employment of students‖ item could be 
attributed to the respondents‘ deeming that the education service is free in Kuwait at the 
same time the Kuwaiti government gives financial support to university and college 
students. It is also expected that user groups do not give the highest weight of agreement 
to providing information related to ―low cost health insurance for employees‖ because 
they believe that the Kuwaiti government provides a free health service for all citizens 
as well as at a reasonable price for foreigners.  
Above and beyond the descriptive statistical analysis represented by mean and SD 
scores, separate K-W tests were conducted to explore any significant differences in the 
level of consensus among the four groups regarding the usefulness of proposed 
voluntary items to be included in the CARs (H6). Furthermore, the M-W tests were used 
for six possible pairs of user-groups to find differences among them. The following 
sections present the results of K-W and M-W tests for proposed information items and 
test the research hypothesis. In general, the K-W test results revealed statistically 
significant differences among the four user groups regarding 14 out of the 29 (48%) 
voluntary items included in the questionnaire. However, for the 15 remaining items 
(52%), which were divided into five different types of voluntary disclosure, no 
significant differences were found. This suggests that respondents rated these items as 
being useful for inclusion in Kuwaiti listed companies‘ CARs to improve the quality of 
VD, and they may constitute an area of interest and focus for the participants in this 
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survey. The hypothesis of no difference between target groups is not supported, with the 
exception of 15 items.  
Table 6.12: Level of Agreement of Proposed Voluntary Items by Category 
Items of information Whole 
Sample 
  K-W 
 Mean SD Rank P-
Value 
A. Information Related to Board     
Names of non-executive board members 4.27 0.571 2  
Biography of board members (education qualifications and 
practical experience) 
4.25 0.697 3 *** 
Names of board members who have directorships in other 
Kuwaiti and/or overseas listed companies and/or oversees listed 
companies 
4.34 0.649 1  
Remuneration per member and other benefits per member 3.95 0.981 7  
Types of board committees 4.22 0.683 4 ** 
Board committees‘ responsibilities 4.04 0.934 5  
Names of board committees‘ members 4 0.839 6 * 
Process for appointing board committees‘ members 3.92 0.931 8 ** 
B. Information Related to Key Management     
Names of senior executive management 4.29 0.698 1 * 
Biography of senior executive management (education 
qualifications and practical experience) 
4.26 0.757 2 * 
Responsibilities assigned to an executive members 3.86 1.018 3  
Top management‘s salaries per key managers and other benefits 
per key managers 
3.73 1.144 4  
C. Information Related to Employee     
Complying with national standards and national regulations 
concerning health and safety at work 
4.06 0.674 1 * 
Providing low cost health insurance for employees 3.61 1.000 6  
Giving financial assistance to employees to obtain or build upon 
academic/ professional qualifications 
3.92 0.792 2 * 
Number of training hours covered by each employee 3.71 1.013 5  
Budget assigned to training and development programmes 3.75 0.93 4  
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Number of employees trained yearly 3.83 0.833 3 ** 
D. Social and Environmental Information     
Conservation of natural resources (e.g. recycling) and waste 
management 
4.11 0.583 2  
Conservation of energy and material resources‘ consumption in 
company operations 
4.13 0.56 1  
International Organization for Standardisation (ISO) regarding 
environmental audit/ISO14000  
3.95 0.808 4  
Sponsoring  public health and social projects 4.1 0.653 3  
Part-time employment of students 3.73 0.841 6  
Sponsoring educational seminars and conferences 3.92 0.779 5 * 
E. Information Related to Products/Services     
Description of major products/services produced 4.4 0.595 2 *** 
Description of marketing network for finished goods/services 4.06 0.743 5 *** 
Contribution by companies of products/services to support the 
national economy 
4.02 0.791 6 * 
Developments regarding products or services 4.2 0.667 3  
Receiving awards as a result of increase in the quality of the 
company‘s products or services 
4.15 0.695 4 * 
 
A. Board of Directors Items 
Table 6.12 (part A) shows that significant differences among the groups regarding four 
voluntary items: ―biography of board members‖, ―types of board committees‖, ―names 
of board committees‘ members‖, and ―process for appointing board committees‘ 
members‖. Consequently, M-W tests were conducted to explore the nature of these 
differences found through the K-W tests. M-W tests demonstrated that FA and MR 
groups have a higher level of agreement than the EA group that ―biography of board 
members‖ should be included in CARs as useful voluntary information which may 
enhance the quality of corporate voluntary disclosure (see Table 6.13-part A). However, 
the results revealed no significant differences among the pairings of FA and MR, FA 
and AC, and EA and AC for the level of agreement attached to this item. M-W tests also 
revealed that the reported differences in views were statistically significant between the 
MR and AC pairing regarding the usefulness attached to this item. The MR group has a 
significantly higher level of agreement than FA and EA groups that ―types of board 
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committees‖ should be included as useful voluntary information. Conversely, the 
pairings of FA and EA, FA and AC, EA and AC, and MR and AC have similar levels of 
agreement regarding the usefulness of this item.  
Regarding ―names of board committees‘ members‖, the FA group is in higher 
agreement than the EA group concerning the usefulness of disclosing this item in the 
CARs; it also receives higher agreement from members of the MR than from the EA 
groups. This indicates that MR and FA groups are more interested in exploring the 
board committee composition and as well as the structure of the board for different 
economic decisions. In contrast, the pairings of FA and MR, and FA and AC are similar 
in their views regarding this item as is the case between the EA and AC, and the MR 
and AC pairings. With regard to the information item, ―process for appointing board 
committees‘ members‖, MR and AC groups assigned higher agreement than the EA 
group that it is useful to include this information, which is considered one of the most 
important CG mechanisms. In addition, there is significant difference between the FA 
and MR, and the FA and AC pairings. However, a clear similarity exists between how 
FA and EA groups as well as between MR and AC groups rate the usefulness of this 
item. 
An interesting result is that the four previous items received a higher rating from the 
MR group than the other groups, implying that regulator group members are more 
interested in companies adopting and practising the best CG since they may believe in 
the importance of CG mechanisms in improving healthy relationships between owners 
and management, besides the other benefits of these mechanisms such as company 
value. Regarding the materiality of information about board members, one financial 
advisor stated: 
“We highly recommend companies disclose more information in their annual reports 
which clarify the volume of business between the company and their board members 
since we believe in most cases the decision of disclosure is dominated by the board”.  
 
Another financial advisor gave an example regarding this critical information: 
“Some listed companies rent buildings to run their business, related to board members 
who are considered the major shareholders without announcing this information in 
their annual reports”.  
 
These comments are consistent with a prior study undertaken by Al-Ajmi (2009), who 
claimed that investors using corporate reports in Bahrain believed it is important that 
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companies disclose this type of information in their annual reports. Another response 
from an academic at Kuwait University reported the following: 
“I have reviewed the names of external auditors and the names of board members for a 
set of listed companies; I can conclude that some companies audit by external auditors 
who are relatives of some members of the board, which is not allowed by the 
regulations of the auditing profession in Kuwait”.  
 
The above results and responses clearly show that Kuwaiti listed companies do not 
provide a lot of information about their corporate governance practices. These results 
can be interpreted on the grounds that, as well as seeming wary of revealing such 
information, companies have little incentive to voluntarily disclose information to meet 
the needs of users of annual reports regarding this issue. In short, user groups prefer the 
disclosure of information pertaining to that area in the annual report and, more 
specifically, corporate governance disclosures including the structure of the board, 
board committees, and ownership structure.  
 
B. Key Management Items  
As can be seen from Table 6.12 (part B), for the whole sample, the results of statistical 
K-W tests revealed significant differences in perceptions regarding: ―names of senior 
executive management‖, and ―biography of senior executive management‖. Therefore, 
M-W tests were carried out to verify the nature of these differences found through the 
K-W tests.  
With regard to names of senior executive management, M-W test results indicate that 
FA group members differs from the EA group in their views with respect to this item, 
but the FA group agrees with MR and AC groups on the relative usefulness of this item. 
There is remarkable difference between EA and MR groups on this item; however, the 
results do not show any significant difference between EA and AC groups and between 
MR and AC groups.  As shown in Table 6.13 (part B), EA group do not rate ―biography 
of senior executive management‖ as highly as FA and MR groups. A statistical 
difference was found to exist between the FA and AC pairing concerning this item. 
However, FA and MR groups have similar opinions regarding the rating of usefulness 
of voluntary information in the CARs, as do EA and AC groups, and MR and AC 
groups.  
It is noteworthy that, among the other examined groups, members of the MR group give 
the highest rate to these two types of disclosure (parts A and B), which may suggest that 
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this group considers it important to disclose such information in the CARs to meet the 
needs of stakeholder groups and that it is the right of stakeholder groups to know more 
about a company‘s CG practices.  In addition, the MR group may be more aware of the 
importance of CG mechanisms in strengthening market participants‘ confidence.   
 
C. Human Resources Items 
Significant differences in perception among the four groups were found concerning the 
usefulness of ―complying with national standards and national regulations concerning 
health and safety at work‖, ―giving financial assistance to employees to obtain or build 
upon academic/professional qualifications‖, and ―number of employees trained yearly‖ 
information items to be included in the CARs (see Table 6.12-part C). To provide 
empirical evidence on the variation in perception among groups, M-W tests were 
employed. As found in Table 6.13 (part C), members of the FA group award a much 
higher score to the ―complying with national standards and national regulations 
concerning health and safety at work‖ item than the EA group, while the EA group has 
a similar view to other groups (MR and AC). On the contrary, the pairings of EA and 
AC and of MR and AC are similar in their perceptions concerning this information. 
However, the EA group differs greatly from the MR group. There is no significant 
difference between FA, MR, and AC groups, but members of the EA group show a 
lower level of agreement to disclosing ―giving financial assistance to employees‖ as a 
voluntary information item in CARs than FA and MR groups, whilst they are similar to 
AC. The analysis of ―giving financial assistance to employees‖ leads to the same 
conclusion as the previous item.    
With regard to ―number of employees trained yearly‖, the MR group rated this item for 
inclusion in the corporate reports more highly than FA and EA groups. In contrast, the 
pairings of FA and AC and of MR and AC are close in their opinion regarding the 
usefulness of this voluntary item. Significant differences in the rating of this item were 
found to exist between the FA and EA pairing and the EA and AC pairing. Some 
participants in this questionnaire provide evidence that the disclosure of this type of 
voluntary information is increasing and becoming of material interest to listed 
companies over time. One external auditor reported that: 
“Several listed companies have started paying attention to disclosing information 
related to their employees; this action could be attributed to building their reputation 
and image among other listed companies”. 
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The above comment clearly proves that signalling theory provides an explanation for 
companies seeking to disclose additional information voluntarily in annual reports. 
Similarly, one external auditor documented that: 
 “Images are the typical technical approach which is usually used by companies to 
release employee information”.  
 
One accounting academic who shared the same opinion indicated that:   
“Usually companies concentrate on releasing information about awards of elite 
employees in their works, celebration of training courses, and the board and key 
management participate with employees’ social and religious events to build up their 
reputation”.   
 
Using the prediction of signalling and legitimacy theories, one financial advisor also 
indicated another type of voluntary information which listed companies disclose:  
“Financial listed companies are interested in the dissemination of information related 
to the percentage of Kuwaiti employees and encouraging the employment of this 
category of staff rather than other categories. In my opinion, the reasoning behind this 
is an indicator of its commitment (compliance with the national regulations, e.g. the 
CBK’s instructions), regarding the appointment of citizens, as well as a message to the 
community that they are interested in and prefer to appoint Kuwaitis than other 
nationalities”. 
 
This implies that banks and investment companies may disclose this type of information 
to match the regulator‘s, stakeholders‘, and society‘s expectations. It is worth 
mentioning that Kuwaiti listed companies employ public media ―newspapers‖ to publish 
this type of information about their employees, specifically the recent events. This could 
be explained by the fact that companies are expected to use different channels of 
communication to give signals to interested parties and/or target groups. This source of 
information helps to regularly monitor company position and activities as well as 
keeping stakeholders up to date on significant events. Moreover, companies may use 
this type of source to disclose this type of information for business incentives and 
reducing political costs.    
 
D. Social and Environmental Items 
The results of K-W tests show statistically significant differences between user groups 
regarding the role of the company in ―sponsoring educational seminars and 
conferences‖ item only (see Table 6.12-part D). Therefore, M-W tests were undertaken 
to define these differences. The results of M-W tests in Table 6.13 (part D) showed that 
this item receives stronger agreement from the MR group than the EA group. 
Conversely, FA and MR groups and FA and AC groups have similar attitudes about the 
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usefulness of this item to be included in CARs. The results also revealed that pairings 
EA and AC, and MR and AC are similar in their perceptions regarding this item. In 
contrast, similarity in rating does not exist in the FA and EA pairing. Overall, the results 
of parts C and D indicate that user groups are more likely to want companies to release 
detailed information about their social activities as proof of their social accountability. 
In the corporate voluntary disclosure context, specifically corporate social and 
environmental responsibility, one market regulator stated: 
“It is noticeable that listed companies tend to increase their disclosure of social and 
environmental issues as a part of their responsibility toward the community and they 
report their social and environmental practices in different sources of information such 
as annual reports and newspapers”.   
 
Listed companies are active in releasing more information about their social and 
environmental practices. That view is supported by a financial advisor who indicated 
that: 
“There is a strong degree of competition among listed companies to publish 
information related to their social and environmental practices, specifically between 
leading companies from banking and services sectors (e.g. telecommunication 
companies), in newspapers. The reasons for this competition can broadly be attributed 
to give a good image about the company and board, increase of competitive position of 
the company in the market, increase deal and value of their shares, and political and 
social motivations.” 
  
Following official published announcements in daily newspapers, some companies 
disclose through their chairmen that they comply with local regulations in areas in 
which their activities operate and that they fully meet society‘s expectations in terms of 
religious norms and values. For example, one listed company in the service sector 
announced that it complies with local regulations and the social contract regarding 
boycotting dealing with various products produced by some countries as well as not 
dealing with products that do not match the values of religion (published in Al-Watan 
newspaper 8 and 9 August, 2010) (Al-Watan, 2010a, 2010b). This lends support to the 
prediction suggested by legitimacy and stakeholder theories that companies attempt to 
release more information regarding their social and environmental responsibilities in 
order to continue successful business. 
 
E. Product/Services Items 
There are statistically significant differences among user groups regarding four 
proposed information items, namely: ―description of major products/services produced‖, 
―description of marketing network for finished goods/services‖, ―contribution by 
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companies of products/services to support the national economy‖, and ―receiving 
awards as a result of increase in the quality of the company‘s products/services‖ (see 
Table 6.12-part D). The results of M-W tests, as shown in Table 16.13 (part-D), suggest 
statistically significant differences among FA and EA groups and FA and AC groups 
about the usefulness of the item, ―description of major products/services produced‖ to 
be included in CARs. Moreover, the results indicated statistically significant differences 
between MR and EA groups and MR and AC groups, while there was a high level of 
consensus between FA and MR groups and EA and AC groups.  
With regard to ―the description of marketing network for finished goods/services‖ 
information, the AC group has a significant lower mean value in their rating of the 
usefulness of involving this item in annual reports than any of the other user groups. In 
addition, the results revealed significant differences in the MR and EA pairing about 
this item. More specifically, the MR group registered significantly higher agreement 
than the EA group with respect to this item, while no significant differences in views 
were found among the pairings of FA and EA, and FA and MR.  
Concerning ―contribution by companies of products/services‖, there is no difference 
between FA, AC, and EA groups in the usefulness attached to this item, while there is 
significant difference among the pairings of FA and MR, EA and MR, and MR and AC. 
There is significant difference between three pairings, FA and MR, EA and MR, EA 
and AC, in relation to ―receiving awards‖. In contrast, the pairings of FA and EA, FA 
and AC, and MR and AC hold a similar view on the usefulness of this item. A general 
conclusion is that Kuwaiti users are probably more interested in the release of 
information about social corporate responsibility in the annual reports to satisfy their 
information needs.  
 
Table 6.13: Comparison of Rating of Proposed Voluntary Items by User Group 
 
Items of information 
Means by Subject 
Groups 
M-W Test  
FA EA MR AC FA 
(sig) 
with 
EA 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
MR 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
A. Information Related 
to Board 
          
Biography of senior 
executive management 
(education qualifications 
4.37 4.03 4.57 4.03    ***  ** 
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and practical experience)   
Types of board 
committees                
4.11 4.18 4.47 4.18  **  **   
Names of board 
committees‘ members 
4.02 3.79 4.30 3.91 *   ***   
Process for appointing 
board committees‘ 
members 
3.80 3.64 4.20 4.09  *  ** **  
B. Information Related 
to Key Management 
          
Names of senior executive 
management 
4.35 4.21 4.30 4.21 **   *   
Biography of board 
members (education 
qualifications and 
practical experience) 
4.46 4.06 4.40 4.06 ***  * **   
C. Information Related 
to Employee 
          
Complying with national 
standards and national 
regulations concerning 
health and safety at work 
4.17 3.85 4.17 4.03 **   *   
Giving financial 
assistance to employees to 
obtain or build upon 
academic/professional 
qualifications 
3.98 3.58 4.20 3.91 *   **   
Number of employees 
trained yearly 
3.83 3.48 4.13 3.88 * *  *** *  
D. Social and 
Environmental 
Information 
          
Sponsoring educational 
seminars and conferences 
4.00 3.67 4.17 3.85 * 
 
  ***   
E. Information Related 
to Products/Services 
          
Description of major 
products/services 
produced 
4.54 4.27 4.67 4.09 **  *** ***  *** 
Description of marketing 
network for finished 
4.13 4.06 4.30 3.76   ** ** ** *** 
217 
 
goods/services   
Contribution by 
companies of   
products/services to 
support the national 
economy 
3.93 3.91 4.33 3.97  **  **  * 
Receiving awards as a 
result of increase in the 
quality of the company‘s 
products or services 
4.02 4.06 4.37 4.24  *  ** *  
 
Regarding the quality of voluntary information, one financial advisor argued that: 
“We are not looking for companies to disclose a lot of voluntary information as much 
as we prefer to obtain useful information which helps us to make investment decisions 
and/or recommendations”.   
 
In this context, one accounting academic made a general criticism: 
“To be able to use the voluntary information to make comparisons between companies 
regarding their performance, we need to standardise the types of voluntary information 
that could be released by companies in their annual reports”.  
 
That view is shared by another accounting academic who indicated: 
“The KSE could set out a list of voluntary information, as an optional list, and a clear 
system that listed companies may use and follow as a guideline when they would like to 
voluntarily reveal information about the company’s aspects.”   
 
This criticism can be answered with careful consideration of the definition of disclosure. 
Disclosure is actually a two-way mirror: mandatory and voluntary. Voluntary disclosure 
is defined as information, released in CARs, that is not specified by reporting 
requirements. Therefore, the existence of a guideline and standardisation on disclosure 
practices, as an indicative list, would transfer different categories of voluntary 
disclosure to categories of mandatory information. However, regulatory bodies may 
encourage listed companies to disclose more important information to users of annual 
reports to minimise the variations and the lack of voluntary disclosure among 
companies, so this may help to make an effective comparison between them. 
 
6.2.6 Factors Affecting Corporate Information Transparency 
According to Fung et al. (2003:36) ―transparency is an effective regulation only if it 
influences the performance of targeted organizations in the direction of a specified 
policy goal”. In the context of transparency, Nelissen (2007:15) claimed that ―when a 
market is transparent, all the players in the market possess the same information and 
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thus have the same knowledge regarding some asset. However, the capital market is not 
a perfect one and therefore it is not entirely transparent‖. Thus, it is expected that 
corporate transparency enhances confidence in the fairness of the capital markets and 
the value of listed companies. It has been argued that more voluntary disclosure of 
information increases the transparency of the company, reducing the information 
asymmetry between the company and outsiders (Cheung et al., 2010). Hence, the 
disclosure gap could be reduced by improving the level of disclosure as well as the level 
of information transparency provided by companies in their annual reports. To achieve 
this objective, information disclosed by companies should be reliable and 
comprehensive (Jaggi and Low, 2000).  
The impetus of this question was to explore a set of factors that may influence the level 
of transparency of information released by KSE listed companies, in the view of user 
groups. Therefore, respondents were requested to rate their degree of agreement or 
disagreement about these factors (see Appendix 4). A five-point scale was used, where 
five indicates ―strongly agree‖ and one indicates ―strongly disagree‖.  
 
Descriptive Analysis  
It could be determined from Table 6.14 that the factors listed in the questionnaire 
received a considerable level of agreement from participants. This is clearly shown by 
the mean scores of factors, which reported above or around four and were confirmed by 
standard deviation (SD) scores. For the whole sample, the three main factors that may 
affect transparency on the KSE in the view of subject groups were as follows: 
―increasing mandatory disclosure requirements‖, ―application of corporate governance 
best-practices‖, and ―external auditors‘ reputation‖. The first two results are consistent 
with the view of Osei (1998), who stated that listed companies fulfil the regulations 
related to information disclosure, so it is expected that tighter disclosure requirements 
and corporate governance mechanisms have an important role in enhancing the 
transparency of information, leading to more protection of market participants, 
particularly minority shareholders (Meier-Schatz, 1986), and the fostering of confidence 
in capital markets as well. Thus, it is assumed that mandatory disclosure regulations 
have a beneficial impact on providing a better quality of information and this may 
promote confidence and fairness among market participants as well as facilitating 
informed decision-making. This is consistent with the main recommendations of 
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international bodies regarding minority shareholder protection in Kuwait as an example 
of emerging markets (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.1.1).  
On the other hand, it is expected that the non-disclosure of important information may 
negatively influence investors‘ confidence in the capital market. In contrast, timely and 
accurate public disclosures of information enhance the economy‘s efficiencies (Baamir, 
2008). Thus, it can be suggested that “well-established disclosure requirements would 
in turn make fraudulent acts difficult to commit” (Al-Wasmi, 2011:209).  
Moreover, it is argued that the lack of CG guidelines and the lack of transparency levels 
contribute to the occurrence of financial crises such as the Asian crisis (Stiglitz, 1998; 
Harvey and Roper, 1999). Consequently, one important characteristic of a good capital 
market is the establishment of a good CG regime that may provide suitable protection 
for companies‘ shareholders‘ rights and maintain high levels of transparency and 
information disclosure (a Corporate Governance Survey of Listed Companies and 
Banks across the MINA, International Finance Corporation, 2008).    
On the other hand, the result of ―external auditors‘ reputation‖ lends support to the 
disclosure literature, showing that large audit firms are considered an important 
mechanism to reduce agency costs ―the potential conflicts of interests‖. In addition, the 
role of auditors in auditing and monitoring companies‘ accounts contributes to 
minimising the opportunistic behaviour of company managers. Moreover, it seems that 
large audit firms are correlated with companies releasing more information in their 
annual reports (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Signalling 
theory suggests that companies acquire two types of benefits from their engagement 
with large audit firms. Firstly, the selection of an audit firm serves as ―a good signal‖ 
for companies to strengthen their value and image among other companies. In this 
sense, Titman and Trueman (1986) and Craswell and Taylor (1992) stated that listed 
companies tend to select a Big 6 audit firm. Secondly, this selection serves as a signal 
that their financial statements are prepared in accordance with the IFRS and audited by 
an independent external auditor, which is also a signal to the participants of capital 
market of the quality of their annual report‘s contents. However, as mentioned in 
Chapter 4 (see Section 4.6.5), in Kuwait, an external auditor‘s appointment mostly 
depends on the recommendations of the board which represents the major shareholders 
of the company. As a consequence of this mechanism, the concept of independence may 
be impaired and so the regulatory authorities should revise the regulation related to this 
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issue to strengthen the role of the auditor as a means to improve information 
transparency. This confirms the fact that the more voting shares held, the greater the 
potential power of the shareholder (Tricker, 2012).   
Overall, groups of users registered least agreement with ―the ability of market 
participants to assess the reliability of companies‘ disclosure policies‖ and ―capital 
market confidence‖ with mean values of 4.09 and 3.94, respectively. These results can 
be interpreted on the basis that user groups have some doubts about the disclosure 
policies adopted by companies, and an effective and efficient regulatory body ―the 
capital market‖ may lead to improvement in the degree of information transparency. For 
example, one daily newspaper published news that a listed company won a tender. At 
the same time, the KSE denied this on its website; on a later day, the KSE confirmed 
this news. Such events influence the transparency of information (published in Al-
Watan newspaper and on KSE‘s website, 3 and 4 January, 2011) (Al-Watan, 2011a, 
2011b). An interesting comment from a director with one of the ―Big 4‖ audit firms 
stated that: “The confidence of the capital market stems from transparency of 
information”.  
 
Table 6.14: Level of Agreement on Factors Affecting Corporate Information 
Transparency  
Factors 
Whole Sample  
Rank 
 K-W 
    Mean      SD      P-
Value 
Board reputation   4.31 .859 6    * 
Senior executive management reputation 4.32 .793 5  
Company reputation            4.32 .737 4  
External auditors‘ reputation 4.33 .870 3  
Capital market confidence 3.94 .866 9  
Source of information 4.18 .766 7  
Increasing mandatory disclosure requirements 4.52 .740 1 ** 
The ability of market participants to assess the reliability 
of companies‘ disclosure policies 
4.09 .592 8  
Application of corporate governance best practices 4.48 .701 2  
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Hypothesis Testing 
The K-W tests have been performed to identify whether there are statistically significant 
differences among target groups in terms of the usefulness attached to proposed factors 
(H7). The results suggest significant difference between the selected groups regarding 
two factors only, and this difference was related to ―board reputation‖ and ―increasing 
mandatory disclosure requirements‖ (see Tables 6.14). Thus, H7 is supported by the 
research results, with the exception of the two previous factors.  
The results presented in Table 6.15 show no significant difference in opinion between 
the pairings of FA and EA, and FA and AC regarding the factor ―board reputation‖, 
while there is a clear difference between FA and MR groups and EA and MR groups 
regarding this factor. However, EA and AC groups as well as MR and AC had a similar 
view about this factor. The results also indicated that members of the FA group gave 
more attention to this factor than the other three groups, implying that it plays an 
important role in their decisions. The MR group has a stronger belief that ―increasing 
mandatory disclosure requirements‖ positively affects the level of corporate information 
transparency than EA and AC groups. However, there were no significant differences 
between the FA group and all other groups and EA and AC groups with regard to this 
factor. The transparency of accounting information in the Kuwaiti business environment 
has been characterised by the questionnaire participants in different aspects. A market 
regulator argued that “accurate disclosures of information and on a timely basis are the 
dynamics of transparency. In addition, the existence of adequate laws and regulations 
regarding disclosure permits higher levels of transparency”. Another response from an 
audit partner with one of the ―Big 4‖ audit firms implied that:  
―The stringency of information transparency policies are influenced by different factors 
such as regulatory, political, economic, and competitive environment and the stage of 
capital market development. It may also be affected by ethics and norms of community, and 
principles of religion”.   
Table 6.15: Comparison of Rating of Information on Factors that Affect Corporate 
Transparency by User Group 
 
 
Factors 
Means by Subject 
Groups 
M-W Test  
FA EA MR AC FA 
(sig) 
with 
EA 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
MR 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
Board reputation   4.52 4.39 4.10 4.15  **  *   
Increasing mandatory 
disclosure requirements 
4.61 4.39 4.80 4.29    ***  ** 
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6.2.7 Accounting Regulations in Kuwait 
As discussed in Chapter 4, a number of international organisations, as well as academic 
researchers, have criticised the surveillance and enforcement bodies of the KSE since 
they intermingle with each other regarding their responsibilities and duties toward the 
KSE, and they have a shortage of powers. The first question of Section Five aims to 
explore the compatibility and consistency of the views of sophisticated users of annual 
reports with the conclusions of empirical studies that have been conducted to evaluate 
the legislative, regulatory, and financial reporting environment in Kuwait. It also aims 
to determine the importance of separating overseeing aspects from surveillance and 
trading aspects amongst regulatory bodies. To accomplish these objectives, all groups 
were given five options to convey their perception of importance, a five-point scale was 
used, five being ―extremely important‖ and one ―not at all important‖.  
 
Descriptive Analysis  
Table 6.16 presents the results of collected data regarding the importance of the 
separation of monitoring and surveillance among Kuwaiti regulatory bodies. The 
perception of importance ―to reduce overlapping in the surveillance and enforcement 
functions among regulatory bodies of the KSE‖ is high (M = 4.11). This suggests high 
consistence with empirical research which, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, was 
conducted in Kuwait (e.g. Al-Shammari, 2005; Alanezi, 2006; HI and IIF, 2007). It 
should be noted that well-organised regulatory bodies have a positive impact on the 
verification of compliance with financial reporting and disclosure requirements and 
therefore this helps to guarantee the quality and quantity of accounting information 
included in CARs. In this regard, Fung et al. (2003:44) claimed that:  
 “The lesson of the recent financial disclosure crisis is abundantly clear. Without 
constant political oversight, careful attention to the benefits and costs surrounding 
disclosers and users, awareness of the impact of changes in the market and regulatory 
environments surrounding the disclosure system, and vigilant and well-funded 
enforcement efforts, the disinfecting power of disclosure soon fades”. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
As can be seen from the result of K-W tests, there were no significant differences 
among the user groups (see Table 6.16). Thus, the result supports the null hypothesis 
that there is no statistically significant difference among user groups regarding the 
importance to ―reduce overlapping in the surveillance and enforcement functions among 
regulatory bodies of the KSE‖ (H8). This indicates that the participants confirm the 
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presence of interference in the work of the KSE‘s regulatory bodies. It also suggests that 
the responsibilities of the KSE Committee should be limited to administrative and 
organisational aspects of the Stock Exchange alone. However, monitoring and 
legislative tasks shall be assigned to another independent body such as a proposed 
Capital Markets Authority (CMA), as discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.6).   
 
Table 6.16: Importance of Separation of the Monitoring and Surveillance among 
Regulatory Bodies 
Statement  
Whole Sample 
 
K-W 
 
     Mean       SD 
      P-
Value 
The importance level related to reduce overlapping in the 
surveillance and enforcement functions among regulatory bodies 
4.11 .972 .509 
 
The second question of this section explores the extent of agreement with added or 
modified procedures. These procedures were proposed by international organisations and 
developed to investigate their usefulness to strengthen the confidence of the KSE. 
Respondents from all groups were given five choices to express their level of agreement, 
using a five-point scale where five is ―strongly agree‖ and one is ―strongly disagree‖.  
 
Descriptive Analysis  
Table 6.17 shows general agreement that all proposed regulations and procedures in the 
question were considered crucial for enhancement of the KSE‘s confidence, in the 
opinion of participants. This can clearly be observed by the overall mean values of all 
statements, which reported above 4.45. On the other side, results indicate that ―the 
improvement of skills of regulatory bodies‘ staff‖ was unanimously selected as the most 
useful procedure that can contribute to enhancing the confidence of the KSE, followed 
directly by ―the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) should act as an independent body‖ 
and ―an increase in the national disclosure requirements‖.  
The establishment of the CMA is considered an important step toward avoiding the 
overlap of jurisdiction between the KSE, CBK, and MCI, and this is strongly consistent 
with the result of the previous question and the main outcomes of Chapter 4 (Section 
4.8). For example, it should be efficient in terms of its capability to set rules and 
regulations which were not taken into account by the legislator. As another example, the 
CMA must have the ability to develop frameworks based on changes in the 
circumstances of the capital market, and rules can be developed to match and keep pace 
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with the rapid developments taking place in other capital markets. It should not be 
overlooked that the establishment of the body and the selection of its members must be 
separate from the political process. In this sense, Fung et al. (2003:36) declared that: 
“Systems that do not keep pace with changing markets and public priorities can become 
counter-productive”. 
There is also a high level of consensus among the respondents about the importance of 
an ―increase in the national disclosure requirements‖. This could be attributed to some 
listed companies not fully applying the law related to the disclosure of ownership 
structure and related parties. This also gives an indicator of weak laws enacted or 
published in this regard. Moreover, it could be interpreted that the failure of regulatory 
bodies to ensure the implementation of such laws is a result of the lack of qualified staff 
with enough practical experience to take over these tasks. The second reason is the 
shortage of staff, as mentioned in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.8). In general, these results 
move in the same direction as Al-Wasmi‘s study results (2011:115), regarding the 
regulations and laws that regulate the GC practices in Kuwait, which revealed that “the 
related parties’ transactions must be governed by provisions that ensure more 
transparency through imposing more disclosure requirements as regard the related 
parties transactions, which is in turn enhancing the supervision of non-controlling 
shareholders”. In this sense, it can be stated that good law may reduce the principle-
agent problem (La Porta et al., 1997). 
In effect, disclosure rules regarding ―ownership structure and related-party transactions‖ 
may facilitate the control of self-dealing transactions and prevent opportunism or abusing 
in someone exercising her/his rights. On the other hand, disclosure requirements are 
considered a source for creating confidence in capital markets (Fung et al., 2003). 
According to Bushman and Smith (2003:1), “Developing and maintaining a sophisticated 
financial disclosure regime is not cheap. Countries with highly developed securities 
markets devote substantial resources to producing and regulating the use of extensive 
accounting and disclosure rules that publicly traded firms must follow”. In a disclosure 
context, a financial advisor indicated that ―there are three types of violation usually listed 
companies fall into as follows: related parties disclosures, breaching its main activities, 
and delay in submission of audited financial statements in a timely manner according to 
the laws governing this issue”.  
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In contrast, ―an upgrade of the KSE website‖ and ―setting up more precise/systematic 
procedures for listed companies‖, among other procedures, were rated the least preferred 
procedures, in the point of view of user groups, to foster the confidence and competitive 
status of the KSE.  
Given that, it can be concluded that most user groups strongly believe that the proposed 
legislations were areas of concern, indicating that crucial steps should be taken by the 
Kuwaiti legislative and regulatory bodies to strengthen the confidence of the capital 
market as well as its competitive position among other emerging markets. In other words, 
the regulatory bodies of the KSE should commence a number of efforts and take major 
steps to develop and better regulate the KSE‘s regulatory environment as well as develop a 
legal framework related to the economic environment. For example, as addressed in 
Chapter 4, the CMA should be granted the power to act as an independent and neutral 
body; it should also be distanced from any political pressures. In this respect, it has been 
suggested that regulatory bodies such as the CMA should work as a single, independent 
authority away from the political sphere (Carmichael et al., 2004). The CMA should also 
have the power to set new regulations and/or amend existing regulations regarding the 
trading transactions in the KSE, listing rules, and disclosure requirements and so on. This 
may lead to achieving optimal protection of capital market‘s participants. Moreover, these 
regulations shall be precise and consistent with other existing resolutions such as the CCL 
in order to avoid any potential contradiction.  
 
   Table 6.17: Level of Agreement of Proposed Regulations’ Influence on the 
Confidence Level of the KSE 
Statements  
Whole Sample 
  
Rank 
 K-W 
 
     Mean      SD 
    P-
Value 
The Capital Market Authority should act as an independent 
body to give strength to the monitoring function of the 
KSE‘s performance  
4.66 .691 2  
The improvement of skills of regulatory bodies‘ staff  that 
enhance the bodies‘ abilities to supervise and monitor in 
order to verify extent of compliance by KSE participants  
4.67 .637 1  
An increase in the national disclosure requirements (e.g. 
ownership structure and related-party transactions) 
4.59 .642 3    *** 
An upgrade of the KSE website to provide financial data 
and current company-specific information on a more timely 
basis  
4.51 .542 4  
Setting of more precise/systematic procedures for listed 
companies to disclose information through the 
company/KSE‘s website 
4.47 .637 5    * 
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Hypothesis Testing 
K-W tests have been carried out to determine whether there are statistically significant 
differences in the amount of agreement among user groups regarding the assessment of 
a set of proposed statements or regulations (H9). As can be seen from Table 6.17, the 
results of K-W tests were significant at the 1% level with a value of .000. So, it can be 
concluded that there were significant differences between the selected groups regarding 
―an increase in the national disclosure requirements‖ and ―setting up more 
precise/systematic procedures for listed companies to disclose information through the 
company/KSE‘s website statement‖ only. Hence, the results of the study support the 
hypothesis for all except the two previously proposed statements.  
M-W tests were conducted to test the nature of the significant differences found through 
the K-W tests. The results (see Table 6.18) indicate that FA and MR groups have 
significantly higher degrees of consensus than EA and AC groups regarding the need 
for ―setting up and/or revision of regulations regarding the national disclosure 
requirements on listed companies‖. In other words, there were statistically significant 
differences among the pairings of FA and EA, and of FA and AC, as well as among MR 
and EA, and MR and AC pairings with regard to this statement. It can be concluded that 
FA and MR groups strongly believe that disclosure proposals, in other areas such as 
disclosure on large transactions and major shareholders, would contribute to the build-
up of public confidence in the KSE and that the application of tighter disclosure 
requirements would push the capital market toward better participants‘ protection and 
rights.  
There is no statistically significant difference between the FA group and the other three 
groups on the usefulness of ―setting up more precise procedures for listed companies to 
disclose information‖ as well as EA and AC groups, while the greatest differences 
between groups is between EA and MR groups and AC and MR. The results show that 
MR and FA groups assigned a high usefulness mean above 4.50 on this statement, 
indicating strong agreement on the usefulness of setting up more procedures to organise 
the dissemination of company information.  
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Table 6.18: Comparison of Rating of the Influence of Regulations on the 
Confidence Level of the KSE by User Group 
 
Statement 
Means by Subject 
Groups 
M-W Test  
FA EA MR AC FA 
(sig) 
with 
EA 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
FA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
MR 
EA 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
MR 
(sig) 
with 
AC 
An increase in the national 
disclosure requirements 
(e.g. ownership structure 
and related-party 
transactions) 
4.83 4.39 4.77 4.32  ***  *** ***  ** 
Setting of more precise/ 
systematic procedures for  
listed companies to disclose 
information through the 
company/KSE‘s website 
4.52 4.30 4.70 4.35          **  ** 
 
Based on respondents‘ answers, it can be stated that the development of the audit and 
accounting profession and the development of the annual reports‘ environment have a 
positive impact on, as well as playing a significant role in, improving the quality level 
of annual reports as well as the transparency level of information provided in them. 
Moreover, participants‘ responses and comments clearly show that the regulations 
regarding the audit profession need to be more organised and activated on the one hand 
and that there is a need for more co-operation between the regulator bodies and 
accounting and audit firms on the other. This could increase the level of investment in 
the KSE and make it a more competitive capital market among others in the region and 
Middle East. Thus, the results of Questions 1 and 2 in Section Five show convergence 
with the main conclusions of Chapter 4 concerning a need to improve the KSE‘s 
regulatory and legislative environment.    
The last question of this section aims to explore the views of user groups regarding the 
ability to apply some issues which were recommended by an international organisation 
(e.g. The HI and the IIF CG survey (2007) in Kuwait; see Chapter 4) and developed 
based on their importance for the growth of the capital market. Moreover, these issues 
were recognised as an important gap in the development of the legislative and economic 
environments in Kuwait. To achieve this end, subjects were asked to rate the degree of 
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difficulty of ten proposed statements on a five-point scale, five being "no difficulties" 
and one ―very difficult‖. Table 6.19 provides a summary of responses.  
Descriptive Analysis  
Looking at the means in Table 6.19, survey respondents show considerable worry on the 
ability of application of ―restriction of the role of family members in senior 
management‖ and ―a mechanism should be established that would stimulate a public 
offer when ownership exceeds 35‖. This was clearly reflected by the mean scores, 
which reported around 2.75 or less. This may be due to the fact that the Kuwaiti 
legislator grants companies the freedom to recruit appropriate persons for their 
management, and regulations like these need to be revised or some existing resolutions 
cancelled in the CCL to avoid any possible contradiction.   
On the contrary, respondents show limited concern regarding the ability of application 
of eight remaining statements. For example, the result of ―investor education 
programmes‖ is consistent with the view that investors, as shareholders in Kuwait, an 
example of an emerging market, suffer from lack of experience regarding the capital 
market issues, their duties and rights as shareholders, and the best corporate governance 
practices and benefits (Al-Wasmi, 2011). So there is a need for such programmes to 
educate them. A number of participants noted some critical remarks that should be taken 
into account by the regulators of the capital market as follows: one Accounting 
Academic commented on the educational programmes:  
“There is no problem in setting up educational programmes, but the problem lies in the 
acceptance of the proposed ideas and suggestions in these programmes by participants, 
since the acceptance of proposed recommendations is usually dominated by a number 
of factors such as interest of parties, cultures, norms, and educational level of the 
participants of the capital market”.  
 
One financial advisor revealed that: 
“The educational programmes should be directed to develop the knowledge of 
individual investors who should learn many important issues such as which companies’ 
shares they can buy, when they can buy shares and the logical reasons which lead to 
changing the prices of companies’ shares instead of depending on imprecise news and 
rumours to buy/sell shares”.  
 
One market regulator highlighted the role of government in corporate governance and 
suggested that: 
“The principles of corporate governance are imported through international bodies 
and developed capital markets, so it is normal that there are some obstacles in applying 
these principles. In addition, regulatory bodies of the KSE need to consider the 
possibility of practically applying corporate governance. They should also link with the 
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ability of the participants involved and be consistent with the local regulations and 
rules. Hence, it is important to run some orientation and educational seminars in order 
to understand the perceptions of expert and well-educated persons regarding the 
proposed frameworks”.  
On the other hand, one external auditor provided a useful suggestion for the way in 
which most auditors view the Kuwait Association of Accountants and Auditors as 
follows:      
“Regarding the Kuwait Association of Accountants and Auditors, the law did not give it 
the required legal status as a professional and independent body like the rest of the 
associations in the region. Furthermore, the law did not provide the required and 
necessary powers to practise its responsibilities properly, so a Kuwaiti legislator 
should reconsider with respect to the important role of this association in the 
development of the accounting and audit profession”.   
 
The above responses and results may be explained by the following: there are only 
limited difficulties in applying these educational programmes and seminars in the 
Kuwaiti business environment. In addition, the Kuwaiti shareholder needs more 
attention from regulatory bodies, professional unions, and public associations to be able 
to understand the shares culture and be aware of the rights guaranteed by the legislator 
in order to exercise her/his rights in the General Meetings of companies in which s/he 
owns shares. In fact, the Kuwaiti legislator concentrates on equality and fairness in the 
treatment of shareholders of listed companies; however, the government and other 
interested parties still need to promote and activate this culture among Kuwaiti 
investors.  
Regarding appropriate environment for applying the corporate governance code, 
participants from the financial advisor, external auditor and accounting academic groups 
have pointed to listed companies needing around three years or slightly less to be able to 
harmonise with new code requirements. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.5.2), Kuwaiti law is silent on board 
composition and the balance between executive and non-executive directors. Based on 
the CCL, the processes of appointing directors and voting for important resolutions 
require approval from a specific number of shareholders who attend the General 
Meeting. However, these issues are governed by major shareholders since they own a 
significant percentage of the company‘s shares. Some participants have a different 
opinion in this regard. One financial advisor indicated that: 
“A balance of executive and non-executive directors on the board can be achieved 
through government ownership since it owns a significant percentage of shares in a 
number of leading companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange.” 
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In this sense, the appointment of independent and non-executive directors on the 
company‘s board is deemed one of the important CG mechanisms that should be 
considered by regulatory bodies in capital markets such as the KSE. The OECD 
Steering Group on Corporate Governance suggested that the existent of this type of 
directors on the board would enhance fairness in making board decisions (2010:10):    
“The board should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board 
members capable of exercising independent judgments to tasks where there is a 
potential for conflict of interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are ensuring the 
integrity of financial and non-financial reporting, the review of related party 
transactions, nomination of board members and key executives, and board 
remuneration”. 
 
Another financial advisor suggested:  
“The establishing union of minority interest can help to integrate their perspectives, 
work for their interests, and protect their rights. Indeed, it guarantees the existence of 
representatives of minority interests in the board rooms and in the General Meeting.” 
 
Table 6.19: Level of Difficulty of Application of Proposed Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms  
Statements 
Whole          
Sample 
 
 
Rank 
 K-W 
 
     Mean      SD 
    P- 
 Value 
Corporate governance codes that are designed to strengthen board 
practices should be implemented, and they should be modified to match 
the Kuwaiti business environment, if necessary 
3.57 .990 7 ** 
The Kuwaiti Association of Accountants and  Auditors should be  
involved in the process of adopting governance codes 
4.17 .966 3  
Education programmes should be set up to enhance the education and 
awareness of boards regarding the importance of corporate governance 
4.35 .841 1  
Education programmes should be set up to foster a culture of shared 
awareness among investors  
4.22 .883 2  
A mechanism should be established that would stimulate a public offer 
when ownership exceeds 35 
2.72 1.207 9  
Senior management and board remuneration should be linked with 
company performance  
4.17 1.000 4 ** 
One-third of board members should be non-executive, and the majority 
of them should be independent 
3.57 1.248 8  
Independent and non-executive directors should be present to form a 
quorum for board meetings 
3.65 1.182 6  
There should be audit, nomination and compensation committees for all 
companies listed in the KSE 
4.08 1.058 5 * 
Restriction of family members‘ role in senior management  1.99 1.094 10  
 
Hypothesis Testing 
K-W tests were carried out for each of the ten statements to determine whether there 
were significant differences in the agreement scores among the four groups regarding 
the possibility of implementing the proposed statements (H10). The results in Table 
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6.19 show statistically significant differences among respondents regarding their 
opinions about the possibility of implementing three issues only, namely: ―CG codes‖, 
―senior management and board remuneration should be linked with company 
performance‖, and ―board committees‖. But there were no statistically significant 
differences in users‘ opinions regarding the remaining seven statements. Consequently, 
H10 is supported by the research findings, with the exception of the previous three 
issues. To verify the nature of the significant differences found through the K-W tests, 
M-W tests have been performed between all possible pairs of groups. 
It can be noticed from Table 6.20 that the MR group has significantly higher degrees of 
consensus than FA and EA groups regarding the possibility of implementing the ―CG 
codes‖. However, the MR group is similar to the AC group concerning this issue. There 
are no significant differences among FA, EA, and AC groups.  
On a different point, the MR group has significantly higher degrees of consensus than 
EA and AC groups regarding the ability to apply ―linkage of senior management and 
board remuneration with company performance‖. Moreover, the results indicated no 
statistically significant differences among FA group and other subject groups as well as 
among the EA and AC pairing regarding this topic. M-W tests illustrated that MR group 
and the others differ significantly in their perception concerning the ability to ―the 
establishment of board committees‖. From this, the fact can be reinforced that the MR 
group has more faith than the others regarding the possibility of the application of board 
committees in Kuwait. However, there were no significant differences among user 
groups, FA, AC, and EA, in terms of this item.       
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 Table 6.20: Comparison of Difficulty of Application of the Proposed Corporate 
Governance Mechanisms by User Group 
Statements 
Means by Subject 
Groups 
M-W Test  
FA EA  MR  AC FA  
(sig)  
with  
EA 
FA  
(sig) 
with  
MR 
FA 
(sig)  
with  
AC 
EA 
(sig)  
with  
MR 
EA 
 (sig)  
with  
AC 
MR  
(sig) 
with 
AC 
Corporate governance codes that 
are designed to strengthen board 
practices should be 
implemented, and they should be 
modified to match the Kuwaiti 
business environment, if 
necessary 
3.35 3.33  4.07  3.65  ***  ***   
Senior management and board 
remuneration should be linked 
with company performance  
4.20 4.06  4.60  3.85    *  *** 
There should be audit, 
nomination and compensation 
committees for all companies 
listed in the KSE 
4.09 3.82 4.47 4.00  *  **  ** 
 
6.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this part of the study was to examine the importance, of the annual 
reports of Kuwaiti listed companies and their sections, to the users of information in 
making decisions and/or recommendations. Moreover, this study explored groups‘ 
perceptions toward the usefulness of voluntary disclosure and of proposed voluntary 
disclosure items to be included in annual reports. Finally, it explored the effect of these 
proposed factors on information transparency and of different aspects such as regulatory 
bodies and regulation environment on improvement in KSE confidence. Four user 
groups were invited to participate in this survey: (1) financial advisors, (2) external 
auditors, (3) market regulators, (4) accounting academics. 
The major findings indicated that the majority of participants strongly agree that annual 
reports of Kuwaiti listed companies are an important primary source of information in 
the decision-making process. The statement of financial position was unanimously 
selected as the most important section of the annual report, followed by the income 
statement, then the statement of cash flow. Non-financial sections of the reports, such as 
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chairman‘s letter and management report, were rated less important. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that non-financial sections do not provide useful information to help annual 
report users in making decisions.   
Regarding the essential qualitative characteristics of accounting information contained 
in companies‘ annual reports, most respondents considered that corporate information 
has the following characteristics: ―consistency, relevance, and comparability‖, which 
positively influence the quality of annual reports. However, a delay in ―timeliness‖ in 
publishing annual reports by companies listed on the KSE was clear from the results, 
possibly indicating great concern among user groups regarding the extended time lag in 
some listed companies‘ current practices. As a consequence, this could affect the quality 
of information as well as the annual report as a source of information.  
The majority of respondents strongly agree that the current level of voluntary 
information disclosed by listed companies is low. Results clearly implied that voluntary 
disclosure is useful to users of accounting information in different areas, such as in 
improving both the usefulness of corporate annual reports as a source of information for 
decision making and the level of confidence in decision making.  
Overall, the analysis of collected data supports all proposed information items included 
in the questionnaire as being useful to be shown in the CARs. There is a notable level of 
agreement among target user groups about the need for extra voluntary items to be 
included. This may help to fill the disclosure gap between the preparers and the 
information needs of the majority of users, as well as leading to a sense of there being 
sufficient information. These items were essentially related to different aspects of 
corporate governance disclosure (e.g. board and key management) and company 
products/services which respondents expect to improve the quality of disclosure in 
annual reports. However, the results suggest some differences in the views of 
respondents regarding the usefulness of specific items.   
On the other hand, all the factors included in this questionnaire were seen to affect 
transparency, in the view of respondents. However, ―increasing mandatory disclosure 
requirements, ―application of corporate best practices‖, and ―external auditors‘ 
reputation‖ were deemed the three most significant factors affecting the degree of 
information transparency.  
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Finally, a well-established legal and regulatory system was considered to be a 
cornerstone of any capital market, since, by imposing proper penalties, it can provide 
sufficient protection for market participants against any violation in practices. Results 
also indicated a consensus among groups regarding the need for both a sophisticated 
capital market infrastructure and comprehensive regulations to help foster confidence in 
the capital market and protect market participants. Despite this agreement among 
respondents, there was a sense of concern and suspicion regarding the ability to apply 
some of the proposed issues. The next chapter discusses the extent of voluntary 
disclosure practices in the annual reports of non-financial companies listed on the KSE 
for the years 2005-2008. It also shows the results of the impact of explanatory variables 
on voluntary disclosure.     
 
Table 6.21: The Association between Objectives, the Related Research Questions 
and the Developed Hypotheses 
The objective The related research question    The developed  
hypothesis 
To discover the major corporate information 
sources for user groups in Kuwait. To 
determine how annual reports stood among 
these sources, and to determine how user 
groups rate annual reports‘ sections.  
1.  What is the attitude of user groups 
towards the importance, to their informed 
economic decisions, of CARs as a source 
of information and their sections?  
H1 and H2 
To investigate the extent to which 
information included in annual reports 
possesses qualitative criteria. 
2.  What are the perceptions of the 
different user groups regarding the 
qualitative characteristics of information 
in the Kuwaiti CARs? 
H3 
To determine how different user groups 
evaluate the current level of corporate 
voluntary disclosure in Kuwait.  
3. How do different user groups evaluate 
the current level of voluntary disclosure 
in Kuwaiti CARs?  
H4 
To elicit users‘ perceptions on the usefulness 
of voluntary information disclosure such as 
its vital role in making a comparison with 
other companies and investment decisions.  
4. What are the perceptions of different 
user groups toward the usefulness of 
voluntary disclosure? 
 
H5 
To determine the usefulness of a set of 
proposed information items to be disclosed.  
5. How do different user groups rate the 
voluntary information items, and which  
of these items are preferred or  
recommended to be disclosed in the  
Kuwaiti CARs? 
H6 
To draw a conclusion about the factors that 
may affect the degree of information 
transparency provided by Kuwaiti listed 
companies.  
6. What are the most important factors 
that may affect the degree of transparency 
of information provided by Kuwaiti listed 
companies?  
H7 
To elicit users‘ perception on the importance 
of separation of ‗overseeing‘ aspects from 
‗surveillance‘ and ‗share trading‘ aspects 
amongst regulatory bodies. 
7. What are the perceptions of the various 
user groups in Kuwait regarding the 
importance of reducing overlap in the 
supervision and monitoring activities 
among regulatory bodies? 
H8 
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To measure the level of satisfaction of major 
user groups regarding the usefulness of a 
number of procedures that should be set out 
by the Kuwaiti government.   
8. What type of regulations or procedures 
should be set or modified by the Kuwaiti 
legislator to foster levels of competition 
and investment in the KSE? 
H9 
To measure the level of consensus among 
major user groups about the degree of 
difficulty associated with the application of 
some issues related to corporate governance 
in the Kuwaiti business environment.  
9. What type of issues related to corporate 
governance best practice are considered 
to be highly difficult to apply in the 
Kuwaiti business environment?  
 
H10 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: DISCLOSURE LEVEL AND ITS DETERMINANTS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the last three objectives of the study (see 
Chapter 1, Section 1.2). It aims to examine the research hypotheses in relation to a set of 
factors (CG mechanisms and company characteristics). In other words, it analyses the 
factors influencing voluntary disclosure practices in Kuwait. This chapter also assesses 
and analyses the level of and trend of voluntary disclosure practices in the annual 
reports of Kuwaiti listed companies through using a developed self-constructed 
checklist for the years 2005-2008. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the checklist consists of 
49 information items; they are organised into four main categories of information to 
cover different forms of voluntary disclosure. The assessment of voluntary disclosures 
takes three dimensions. Firstly, it provides a comprehensive description and analysis of 
overall voluntary disclosure. Secondly, it covers the extent to which individual items 
included in the index are disclosed in the annual reports of the study sample. Thirdly, it 
focuses on the categories of information.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 presents the reliability and validity of 
the disclosure index. Section 7.3 provides the analysis of voluntary disclosures levels 
and trends (based on the three dimensions mentioned above). Section 7.4 presents a 
descriptive analysis of the independent variables. A summary evaluating the validity of 
the regression models is reported in Section 7.5, while Section 7.6 presents the 
statistical results and discussion of multivariate regressions. Section 7.7 offers a 
summary of the regression analysis of the categories of information. Finally, 
conclusions are summarised in Section 7.8. At the end of this chapter, a summary of 
objectives, research questions, and hypotheses presented in Table 7.12. 
 
7.2 ASSESSMENT OF THE VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE 
DISCLOSURE INDEX 
Following the design and construction of a study instrument(s), the most important step 
is to assess the ability of the instrument to measure what it is intended to measure. This 
can be achieved through employing reliability and validity tests. It is noteworthy that ―a 
measure cannot be valid unless it is reliable, but a measure can be reliable but not 
valid‖ (Tharenou et al., 2007:152). In this context, studies attempt to maximise the 
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reliability and validity of their measures, and this is considered an important part of 
empirical studies (Tharenou et al., 2007).  
One of the major objectives of the second empirical study in this research is to assess 
the overall level of voluntary disclosure and its categories in the annual reports of 
Kuwaiti companies. Consequently, a disclosure index is a useful technique to assess the 
extent of information released in annual reports, as it meets the conditions of validity 
and reliability tests (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Disclosure studies have employed 
different forms of validity and reliability tests to make useful inferences about the 
goodness of a measuring instrument.  
The objective of this section is to assess the validity and reliability of the voluntary 
disclosure index (VDIND). The validity assessment is performed by content validity. 
This refers to whether VDIND includes adequate information items that tap the areas of 
study interest. Content validity can be estimated through several methods such as a 
review of literature and discussions/interviews with individuals who have knowledge 
about the phenomenon under study. Attestation of content validity of the VDIND was 
carried out and discussed in Chapter 5 (see Section 5.13).  
The reliability of an instrument means its ability to provide similar results over time 
when the study is conducted under similar circumstances (Joppe, 2000). In addition it 
indicates the capability of different items to hang together as a set in an index measuring 
the same concept (Sekaran, 2003). The Cronbach‘s coefficient alpha (α) is a common 
approach in gauging the reliability of an index and is frequently used in the disclosure 
literature. It is defined as ―internal consistency reliability among a group of items 
combined to form a single scale. It is a reflection of how well the different items of 
information included in the index complement each other in their measurement of 
different aspects‖ (Litwin, 1995:24). It is important to indicate that testing the internal 
consistency of the disclosure index provides some indications regarding the validity of 
the disclosure results (Hussainey, 2004). Thus, the reliability of the constructed VDIND 
was assessed by using Cronbach‘s coefficient alpha.  
Cronbach‘s alpha reliability is an internally consistent instrument and Cronbach‘s alpha 
coefficients are computed upon the average correlation among the items. Therefore, the 
closer Cronbach‘s alpha is to 1, the higher value of coefficient alpha indicates the higher 
the reliability of scale (Sekaran, 2003). Cronbach‘s alpha was calculated for the full list 
of items of information (49 items and 206 observations); the alpha value was .79. 
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According to guidelines by George and Mallery (2003), this is a good subscale when 
rounded to .80. In other words, the result indicates a good degree of the reliability of the 
internal consistency of the study‘s instrument. Table 7.1 presents the Cronbach‘s 
coefficient alpha (α) for the VDIND.  
Consequently, it can be concluded that the VDIND satisfies the requirements of 
reliability and validity tests, which provides a considerable degree of confidence and 
credibility to conduct the second part of this empirical study.  
      
Table 7.1: Cronbach’s Alpha for Voluntary Disclosure Index 
Scale No. of items α 
Voluntary disclosure index 49 .79 
 
7.3 THE STUDY RESULTS  
 
7.3.1 The Descriptive Statistics [Dependent Variable] 
 
7.3.1.1 The Assessment of Overall Voluntary Disclosure 
Before examining the effect of corporate governance attributes and company 
characteristics on the voluntary disclosure practices of listed companies, it is wise first 
to analyse the change in the trend of the overall level of voluntary disclosure over the 
study period.  
Several descriptive statistics are calculated for the overall index (VDIND) including the 
mean, median, standard deviation (SD), minimum, and maximum of the scores over the 
years. Table 7.2 shows that the overall levels of voluntary disclosure scores are 
generally low, although they gradually improve over the years. It also indicates that the 
mean of overall voluntary disclosure level over the four years is 23%. In other words, 
on average, a company disclosed 23% of the 49 items included in the disclosure index. 
In general, this is considered to be low, as compared with disclosure scores reported in 
literature (see the next paragraph). This result suggests that Kuwaiti companies release 
specific items of information as well as preferring not to disclose a great deal of 
information. In addition, Kuwaiti companies are part of the Kuwaiti business 
environment, so they can be influenced by the culture and norms of the community in 
which they operate. Therefore, these companies tend to be conservative in their 
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disclosure choices. Dahawy and Conover (2007) declared that national cultural values 
and secrecy in a country may affect accounting practices, more specifically the policy 
and extent of disclosure.  
The statistical results also provide some useful insights into the change trend on the 
overall level of voluntary disclosure of non-financial listed companies from 2005 to 
2008. Over the course of four years, the level of overall mean voluntary disclosure 
ranged from 20% in 2005 to 26% in 2008. This indicates some improvements in the 
overall level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti companies under 
investigation. The SD ranged from 0.07 in 2005 to 0.11 by 2008. Overall, the minimum 
score was 10% in 2005 and 2006, while the maximum score was 69% in 2008 with a 
range of 59%. The high values of the SD and minimum and maximum over the study 
period suggest a large variation in the amount of information disclosed voluntarily by 
companies. Figure 7.1 displays the levels of overall mean voluntary disclosure over the 
years. 
When compared with previous studies, the level of overall voluntary disclosure is 
similar to that shown by Alanezi (2011), who found the average level of voluntary 
disclosure by Kuwaiti companies in 2007 was 22%. However, it is slightly higher than 
reported by Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan‘s (2010) study (19%), which was also 
conducted in Kuwait. Neverthess, in comparison with other countries, this level of 
voluntary disclosure is lower than that reported in previous studies (e.g. Leventis and 
Weetman, 2004 in Greece (37%); Ghazali and Weetman, 2006 in Malaysia (31%); 
Alsaeed, 2006 in Saudi Arabia (33%); Hossain and Hammami, 2009 in Qatar (37%); 
Al-Janadi et al., 2012 in Saudi Arabia and UAE (36%)). It is higher than Ferguson et 
al.‘s (2002) Hong Kong study (13%). A comparison among studies must be made with 
caution, since the checklists of components differ and the studies were conducted in 
different periods of time.  
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Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics for Disclosure Index 
Year No. of Comps. Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
2005 52 0.20 0.20 0.07 0.10 0.45 
2006 52 0.21 0.20 0.07 0.10 0.36 
2007 51 0.26 0.24 0.09 0.14 0.53 
2008 51 0.26 0.24 0.11 0.12 0.69 
Overall 
(Pooled) 
206 0.23 0.22 0.09 0.10 0.69 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Trends of Disclosure Index across Four Years 
 
7.3.1.2 Disclosure Level of the Individual Item  
Table 7.3 lists all 49 items comprising the VDIND, which are organised into four 
categories of information. It also provides the total number of companies reporting each 
item as well as the level of disclosure of each item. In other words, it presents a 
frequency distribution of information items. The table indicates the following: 
1. The level of disclosure of individual information items ranges from .005% to 97%. 
2. Seven items out of the total 49 items, which comprise the VDIND, were disclosed by 
80% or more of the examined companies. Examples of such items of information are as 
follows: ―name of directors‖ and ―positions held by executive directors‖.  
3. Only one item was disclosed by 65% of companies; this was ―information on major 
types of products/services produced‖.  
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4. Four items were disclosed by 45% to 50% of the companies. Examples of such items 
are: ―general outlook of the economy‖ and ―statement of strategy and objectives‖. 
5. Only one item was disclosed by 39% of companies. This item was: ―leverage ratios‖. 
6. Three items were disclosed by 24% of companies such as ―financial 
highlights/financial summary‖ (3 yrs/+). 
7. Only two items were disclosed by 20% of companies, and these were as follows: 
―planning for introducing new products/services‘ development‖ and ―description of 
marketing network for finished goods/services‖.  
8. Thirty-one items, representing 63% of items included in the index, were disclosed by 
17% of companies or less. 
The above results clearly indicate considerable variations in the disclosure scores of the 
49 items, leading to the conclusion of significant variation in the amount of voluntary 
disclosure by companies in their annual reports as well as the extent of disclosure 
among the voluntary items included in the index. The next section presents an additional 
discussion regarding the disclosure practices in the CARs and this is achieved through 
the analysis of disclosure for the four categories of information that make up the 
VDIND.   
 
Table 7.3: Number of Companies Disclosing an Item and Disclosure Level of Items  
 Voluntary Disclosure Items No. of 
comp. 
disclosing 
an item 
Dis. 
level 
of 
items 
(%) 
A Corporate Environment     
 General Information about the Surrounding Environment     
1 General outlook of the economy 97 0.47 
2 General outlook of the industry 182 0.88 
3 Information about political developments 18 0.09 
 General Corporate Information   
4 Brief narrative history of company/company profile (other than legal history) 98 0.48 
5 Description of organizational structure 6 0.03 
 Specific Corporate Information and Strategy   
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6 Statement of strategy and objectives 93 0.45 
7 Discussion of competitive position of the company 23 0.11 
 Market Related Information and Investor Relations   
8 Market capitalization at year end 2 0.01 
9 Market capitalization trend 1 0.005 
10 Share price at year end 8 0.04 
11 Share price trend  7 0.03 
12 Web page address 188 0.91 
13 Geographical distributions of shareholders 2 0.01 
B Corporate Financial Performance and Future Prospects   
 Financial Review Information   
1 Profitability ratios   188 0.91 
2 Liquidity ratios 102 0.5 
3 Leverage ratios 80 0.39 
4 Financial highlights/Financial summary (3 yrs/+) 50 0.24 
5 Information on the company‘s dividends policy 200 0.97 
 Forward-Looking Information   
6 Sales (revenues)/profit forecast 4 0.02 
7 Adopted basis underlying the forecasts 1   
0.005 
8 Planning for introducing new products/services development 41 0.20 
9 Planned capital expenditure 164 0.80 
C Corporate Governance Information   
 Information About Board of Directors   
1 Name of directors 182 0.88 
2 Education and/or professional qualifications of the executive directors 3 0.01 
3 Education and/or professional qualifications of the non-executive directors 3 0.01 
4 Business experience of the non-executive directors 3 0.01 
5 Business experience of the executive directors 4 0.02 
6 Positions held by executive directors   180 0.87 
 Information about Top Management   
7 Top management‘s names (e.g. CEO, CFO, COO [Operating Officer], FM,  
Head of Internal audit [HID]) 
49 0.24 
8 Management‘s education and/or professional qualifications 2 0.01 
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9 Business experience of top management 2 0.01 
10 Positions held by top management 49 0.24 
11 Responsibilities and authorities assigned to top management 2 0.01 
D Corporate Social and Environment Information   
 Employee Information   
1 Recruitment policies (e.g. equal opportunity, diversity, supporting national  
manpower) 
13 0.06 
2 Number and categories of employees by department for the last two years/ + 4 0.02 
3 Percentage of Kuwaiti employees in the company 4 0.02 
4 Company policy on learning & education programme (L & E) and  
required continuous education programme (CEP) points for each employee 
 
14 0.07 
5 Statement on employees‘ training programme provided by the company 11 0.05 
6 Number of employees trained yearly 4 0.02 
7 Information about employees‘ workplace health and safety, also data  
on workplace accidents 
1 0.00 
 Community Involvement and Environmental Information   
8 Statement of corporate social responsibility 17 0.08 
9 Information on community involvement/participation (e.g. sponsoring/ 
donations of social, education, health campaigns/programmes) 
 
13 0.06 
10 Statement of environmental policy 8 0.04 
11 Information on environmental activities/participations (e.g. ISO/ 
environmental, energy, and recycle campaigns/programmes) 
 
7 0.03 
 Product/Service Information   
12 Information on major types of products/services produced  133 0.65 
13 Description of marketing network for finished goods/services 41 0.20 
14 Contribution by companies of products/services to support the  
national economy 
 
5 0.02 
15 Developments regarding products/services 34 0.17 
16 Receiving quality awards as a result of increase in the quality of  
the company‘s products/services 
 
16 0.08 
 
7.3.1.3 Categories of Information  
The objective of this section is to provide an assessment of disclosure practice scores for 
each category of information included in the VDIND. As previously discussed, this 
index is split into four main categories. Category A, including 13 items, concerned the 
surrounding environment, background of companies, and capital market information 
(see Table 7.3). As seen from the results reported above, ―web page address‖ was the 
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highest disclosed item of this category by companies under investigation. This was 
followed by ―general outlook of the industry‖. In the competitive context, it may be 
argued that competitors do not pay attention to the disclosure of information regarding 
the surrounding environment and general corporate information since they do not have a 
significant value in the concept of competition. However, companies may be able to 
produce this type of information at low cost and it is already available to the public in 
other sources of information. These reasons may explain why Kuwaiti listed companies 
have a high level of disclosure of this information in their annual reports. In contrast, 
the item of lowest disclosure in this category was ―market capitalization trend‖, 
followed directly by ―market capitalization at year end‖. It is obvious that non-financial 
companies do not pay enough attention to capital market information since they may 
believe users of CARs obtained this type of information from other sources such as the 
KSE‘s website or bulletins, or the company‘s website. In addition, company 
management may expect that this information is known by user groups. They may also 
consider that this type of information is out-dated when annual reports are published. 
However, CARs are deemed an important source of information for users of accounting 
information in all capital markets such as the KSE.  
Category B, regarding financial information on the company and forward-looking 
information, included 9 items. Among these, ―information on the company‘s dividends 
policy‖ was the item registering the highest amount of disclosure by companies. This 
was followed by ―profitability ratios‖. This is because this type of information is 
associated with low proprietary costs; also, financial ratios are already produced by 
companies for internal objectives such as evaluating company performance over the 
years. The item, ―adopted basis underlying the forecasts‖ showed the lowest disclosure. 
The second worst item was ―sales/profit forecast‖. Overall, the group regarding 
forward-looking information seems the weakest point of voluntary disclosure in 
Category B. There are two possible explanations for this. Firstly, forward-looking 
statements involve a lot of assumptions and predictions; Kuwaiti companies do not pay 
much attention to releasing information about their plans and expectations since they do 
not want to bear responsibility toward any parties in the case of failure to achieve those 
expectations. In other words, the most important reason for the weakness in disclosing 
this group of information is to avoid potential political effect. Secondly, Kuwaiti 
companies tend not to release forward-looking information for competitive reasons. A 
further explanation is that, as well as being affected by world economic instability, 
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Kuwait has suffered some internal political instability, making it difficult to give an 
accurate assessment on projections of future performance.   
Category C involved 11 items of information related to the educational and practical 
background of company key personnel including board of directors and management as 
elements of good CG. Evaluation of individual disclosure items under this category 
indicated that the ―name of directors‖ item was disclosed the most by companies in their 
annual reports over the years. The second most-disclosed item was ―positions held by 
executive directors‖. Most of the other items were disclosed by less than 5% of the 
companies over the years. The exceptions were ―top management‘s names‖ and 
―positions held by top management‖. On average, levels of disclosure for category C are 
about 21% for a period of four years (2005-2008), representing almost 5% of the total 
items of the index. This category was expected to receive the lowest level of disclosure. 
From one side, it suggests that the disclosure level of category C neither reaches 
stakeholders‘ aspirations nor satisfies their needs, especially those of minority 
shareholders, and on the other side, Kuwaiti companies in the sample make limited 
effort to disclose information regarding CG in their annual reports since they may 
consider such items as internal information. Therefore, companies listed on the KSE 
should pay more attention to disclosing detailed information on their CG practices since 
CG disclosure is a topic of interest to a great deal of users of annual reports. 
Management will definitely find high demand among shareholders regarding this 
information.  
Category D, which contained 16 items, concerned corporate social and environmental 
responsibilities. The most highly disclosed item in this category was ―information on 
major types of products/services produced‖, while the least-disclosed were as follows: 
―Information about employees‘ workplace health and safety‖, ―number and categories 
of employees by department for the last two years/+‖, ―percentage of Kuwaiti 
employees in the company‖, ―number of employees trained yearly‖, and ―contribution 
by companies of products/services to support the national economy‖. The results also 
indicate that most non-financial companies do not report or declare information 
regarding their social responsibilities and environmental policies. A possible 
explanation is the lack of awareness in Kuwaiti companies concerning their 
responsibility toward society and the environment. In other words, management may 
consider this group of information as less important for themselves. Another possible 
reason is that companies do not pay enough attention to social and environmental 
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responsibilities information since they recognise that it is not relevant to making 
economic decisions. Given this and based on the fact that the mean of overall voluntary 
disclosure value is only 23%, it can be suggested that Kuwaiti companies have a long 
way to go. More effort must be made to achieve competitive levels of voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports such as those of companies listed on different capital 
markets. 
 
Table 7.4: Trends of Categories of Information over Time 
Year Category A Category B Category C Category D 
2005 0.26 0.34 0.20 0.08 
2006 0.26 0.35 0.21 0.09 
2007 0.27 0.56 0.21 0.11 
2008 0.29 0.54 0.21 0.10 
Overall (Pooled) 0.27 0.45 0.21 0.10 
 
Table 7.4 presents a summary of mean values for each category of information over 
time. Category B had the highest mean score in the VDIND in each year. In other 
words, it was considered the most frequently disclosed category in CARs, followed by 
Category A. The direction of disclosure related to the latter category is consistent with 
previous disclosure studies conducted in developing countries (e.g. Barako, 2007; Al-
Shammari, 2008; Hossain and Hammami, 2009). However, companies listed on the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) disclose more information of this type (Leventis and 
Weetman, 2004). Regarding the second group under Category B, ―the voluntary 
disclosure level of forward-looking information‖ was poor; a similar result was found in 
the disclosure literature of others, such as McNally et al. (1982) and Barako (2007). An 
interesting result is that Kuwaiti companies released more financial review information 
than their competitors in Greece (Leventis and Weetman, 2004). Concerning Category 
C, companies did not disclose a lot of information about their CG practices, a result 
which is consistent with Barako (2007) and Hossain and Hammami (2009). Conversely, 
this score is lower than reported in other developing countries (e.g. Al-Janadi et al., 
2012). Category D had the lowest mean category in the VDIND in each year. This trend 
was reported by Al-Shammari (2008) and Hossain and Hammami (2009). This low 
level of social disclosure is similar to the results reported by Al-Janadi et al. (2012) 
concerning listed companies in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. However, Kuwaiti 
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companies tend to release more information about their social responsibilities than other 
companies listed in the Egyptian Stock Exchange (Samaha and Dahawy, 2010; Samaha 
and Dahawy, 2011). Year 2008 marked the highest amount of disclosure for Category 
A, with 2007 marking the high point for categories B and D. Figure 7.2 below confirms 
the results presented in Table 7.4 and shows considerable variations among the different 
categories of information over years. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Trends of Categories of Information over Time 
 
7.4 THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OF THE STUDY 
 
7.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
To conduct the second part of this empirical study, 15 independent variables were used. 
These were divided into two types: continuous and discrete or categorical variables. The 
continuous variables were percentages of the corresponding attributes, except for the 
board size variable which is a count variable (see Table 7.5), whilst the other variables 
are defined as binary variables, which take on the value one if the corresponding 
attribute is present and zero if it is absent (see Table 7.6). These variables were selected 
to determine the factors influencing the voluntary disclosure practices of Kuwaiti 
companies, which may be called the dependent variable.  
Table 7.5 presents descriptive statistics for independent continuous variables for overall 
period. The percentage of non-executive directors on the board ranged from 60% to 
100%. The average was 87% (SD = 9%). This enables the effect of this variable on the 
extent of voluntary disclosure to be explored, since it is expected that the higher the 
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proportion of non-executive directors on the board the more voluntary information is 
released by the company. Regarding the cross directorships, these ranged from 0% to 
100%, averaging 56% for the sample companies (SD = 34%). This indicates a 
remarkable percentage of directors who are involved in more than one board. The 
percentage of family members on the board ranged from 0% to 100%, averaging only 
31% for all companies (SD = 20%). This offers a good opportunity to explore the 
significant role of family members in explaining the deviations in annual reports‘ 
disclosures. The total number of directors on the board ranged from three to 11 
members. The mean of board size was 6.44, with SD 1.65. The percentage of 
government ownership ranged from 0% to 30%, averaging only 2%, with SD 7%.  
Company size ranged from KD 3406 thousand to KD 5500000 thousand, with an 
average of KD 250048 thousand (SD = 620146.70). Leverage for the companies ranged 
from 1% to 78%, averaging 37%, with SD 19%. Growth of the companies ranged from 
only 0.30 times to 42.10 times, averaging only 1.61 (SD = 3.08).  The profitability 
variable ranged from 41% to 66%, averaging only 7%, with SD 12%. The probability 
statistics indicated a negative return on assets (ROA) as an accounting performance 
measure, implying that a number of sample companies achieved a loss on specific 
year/s.  
The individual independent variables were examined for normality. Normality is 
defined as having a skew between +2 and -2, and kurtosis being between +7 and -7 
(Kline, 2005). The variables ―proportion of government ownership‖, ―company size‖, 
―company growth‖, and ―profitability‖ violated the normality assumption, and had 
skew/kurtosis values outside the acceptable range. The largest offenders, ―company 
size‖ and ―company growth‖, were transformed with the natural log to bring them closer 
to normality. Concerning the logarithm transformation of company size variable, it is a 
common transformation used in relevant research such as Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan 
(2010) and Alanezi (2011). 
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Table 7.5: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Continuous Variables 
Continuous Variables Mean SD Skew Kurtosis Min. Max. 
Corporate Governance Attributes       
Percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board 
0.87 0.09 -0.25 3.32 0.60 1.00 
Cross directorships  0.56 0.34 -0.03 1.75 0.00 1.00 
Percentage of family members on the 
board 
0.31 0.20 0.49 3.19 0.00 1.00 
Board size 6.44 1.65 0.55 3 3 11 
Percentage of government ownership 0.02 0.07 2.95 10.77 0.00 0.30 
Company Characteristics       
Company size 250048 620147 5.65 40.08 3406 5500000 
Leverage 0.37 0.19 -0.07 2.09 0.01 0.78 
Company growth 1.61 3.08 11.61 148.94 0.3 42.1 
Profitability 0.07 0.12 -0.18 8.47 -0.41 0.66 
Company size (transformed) 11.35 1.37 0.37 3.13 8.13 15.51 
Company growth (transformed) 0.25 0.47 3.11 20.92 -1.2 3.74 
 
Turning to discrete variables, descriptive statistics were conducted on the discrete 
independent variables for each year and overall. Table 7.6 presents the frequency and 
percentages for these variables. Overall, 43% of the sample companies had the chief 
executive officer (CEO) appointed as the chairman of the board of directors at the same 
time. On average, only 17% overall had an audit committee. In 2007, for example, there 
was a significant increase in the number of sample companies that had established an 
audit committee. Of companies‘ boards, 22% included directors who belonged to the 
ruling family. Overall, only 11% of the companies under investigation are cross listed, or 
11% of the research sample is listed on more than one capital market. The results in 
Table 7.4 also show that cross listing made a sudden jump in 2007 since it increased from 
0% to 13% and continued to increase gradually during the years of study. Companies 
were categorised into two economic sectors: manufacturing and non-manufacturing. 
While 64% were manufacturing companies, the remaining were non-manufacturing 
companies. Most of the companies (60%), overall, were audited by an audit firm 
affiliated with one of the Big 4 international audit firms, which the remaining were not.   
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Table 7.6: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Discrete Variables 
Discrete Variables 2005 2006 2007 2008 Overall 
(Pooled) 
 Corporate Governance 
Attributes 
No. 
Comp. 
% No. 
Comp. 
% No. 
Comp. 
% No. 
Comp. 
% No. 
Comp. 
% 
Role duality 23 0.44 24 0.46 22 0.43 20 0.39 89 0.43 
The existence of audit 
committee 
3 0.06 3 0.06 14 0.27 14 0.27 34 0.17 
The presence of ruling 
family on the board 
14 0.27 13 0.25 9 0.18 10 0.20 46 0.22 
Company 
Characteristics 
          
Cross listing 0 0.00 7 0.13 8 0.16 8 0.16 23 0.11 
Type of Industry 33 0.63 33 0.63 32 0.63 33 0.65 131 0.64 
Type of auditor 33 0.63 30 0.58 32 0.63 29 0.57 124 0.60 
 
It must be noted that the results related to the ―percentage of non-executive directors on 
the board‖, ―role duality‖, and ―the establishment of an audit committee‖ show variation 
in corporate governance practices among the examined companies, since the 
Commercial Company Law (CCL) does not specify any corporate governance 
provisions as guidelines that organise these practices (as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). 
This is despite the commissions of capital markets in developed countries and 
international bodies calling for these mechanisms to be involved as a vital part of the 
promotion of good corporate governance implementation.  
 
7.5 EVALUATING THE VALIDITY OF THE MODELS  
In the previous two sections the statistical analysis aimed at a description of the 
dependent and independent variables, capturing their main features. In this section, our 
objective is to explore the impact of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable. Recall that the dependent variable involved several measures of the voluntary 
disclosure behaviour of listed companies (the overall disclosure level and measures of 
four categories of information, as indicated earlier). The independent variables, on the 
other hand, were several measures of corporate governance attributes and company 
characteristics, of which nine variables were of the continuous type and six were of the 
discrete type.     
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Before choosing a suitable regression model, it is important to carry out a set of 
regression diagnostic tests to examine the dataset collected; those are represented by the 
multi-collinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF), heteroscedasticity, and 
autocorrelation tests. This is followed by the Hausman test to determine the relevant 
statistical model, as the main method (fixed effects [FE] or random effects [RE] 
regression models) of performing the analysis of collected data. The next section 
discusses these issues.  
 
1. Correlation Matrix 
Pearson and Spearman correlations are conducted between the independent variables 
and dependent variable. Pearson correlations are typically conducted between 
continuous variables, while Spearman correlations are typically conducted between 
ordinal variables. Spearman correlations are the non-parametric alternative to the 
Pearson correlation that uses the ranks of the values instead of the values themselves 
(Pallant, 2010). Table 7.7 presents the output of a correlation matrix for these variables. 
In this respect, the results of correlations of both types may assist in assessing the linear 
and non-linear relationships among examined variables. 
The Pearson and Spearman correlations agreed on significance and direction (if 
significant) for all correlations except for the proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board and board size with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Table 7.7 shows a 
positive correlation for the Spearman correlation only at the 5% level. Pearson and 
Spearman coefficients indicate that seven out of fifteen independent variables are 
correlated with the dependent variable, as represented by the overall level of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti non-financial companies. The initial 
conclusion is that those variables may explain the variation of the VDIND. Three of 
them are related to corporate governance mechanisms: ―percentage of government 
ownership‖, ―the existence of an audit committee‖, and ―the presence of the ruling 
family‖. The other four independent variables are represented by company 
characteristics, namely: ―cross listing‖, ―company size‖, ―leverage‖ and ―type of 
auditor‖. Those variables are all positively correlated with the overall level of voluntary 
disclosure. This implies the existence of potentially useful relationships between the 
extent of voluntary disclosure and those seven independent variables. In other words, 
this suggests that, as the independent variables increased, the amount of voluntary 
disclosure in the CARs also increased. 
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To examine whether the independent variables in the regression models are dependent 
on each other, Pearson and Spearman correlations were used again. Table 7.8 presents 
the correlation coefficients (r) of Pearson and Spearman for all independent variables, 
where Spearman correlations are reported above the diagonal and Pearson correlations 
are shown below. The table shows that the correlation coefficients of Pearson and 
Spearman were quite similar except for a limited number of independent variables. For 
the Pearson correlation, for example, there is a positive correlation between ―percentage 
of non-executive directors on the board‖ and ―type of industry‖, while the Spearman 
correlation does not reveal this relationship. As can be seen from Table 7.8, correlation 
coefficients (r) between independent variables range from 0.00 to 0.54 with p-values (p) 
from 0.99 to 0.00. Since the largest correlation coefficient among independent variables 
is 0.54, this suggests that multi-collinearity does not exist among those variables. In this 
regard, the multi-collinearity in the data is severe and affects the regression analysis 
when the correlation coefficient between the independent variables exceeds 0.80 
(Gujarati, 2003), or it can be considered that a multi-collinearity problem exists when 
the correlation between the two variables is 0.90 or above (Bowerman and O‘Connell, 
2003).   
     
Table 7.7: Pearson and Spearman Correlations: Overall Voluntary Disclosure and 
Independent Variables 
Independent Variables Pearson 
(r) 
Pearson 
(p) 
Spearman 
(r) 
Spearman 
(p) 
Percentage of non-executive 
directors on the board  
 
0.07 0.34 0.14* 0.04 
Cross directorships  -0.02 0.82 -0.06 0.40 
Percentage of family members 
on the board 
0.04 0.57 0.04 0.61 
Board size 0.08 0.24 0.14* 0.05 
Percentage of government 
ownership 
0.42* 0.00 0.28* 0.00 
Role duality -0.07 0.32 -0.01 0.90 
The existence of audit 
committee 
0.18* 0.01 0.17* 0.01 
The presence of ruling family 
on the board  
0.19* 0.01 0.15* 0.03 
Cross listing 0.29* 0.00 0.24* 0.00 
Company size
®
  0.48* 0.00 0.40* 0.00 
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Note. * p < 0.05. 
® The company size and company growth variables are expressed in natural logarithm. 
 
 
 
Leverage 0.33* 0.00 0.32* 0.00 
Company growth
®
  -0.06 0.38 0.01 0.92 
Profitability -0.03 0.63 0.07 0.34 
Type of industry -0.08 0.25 0.02 0.75 
Type of auditor 0.18* 0.01   0.20* 0.00 
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Table 7.8: Pearson and Spearman Correlation Results 
Ser. Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Percentage of non-
executive  directors on the 
board 
- 0.03 -0.07 0.50*  0.18* -0.30* 0.07 0.19* -0.12 0.08 -0.16*   -0.17* 0.00 0.11 -0.03 
2 Cross directorships   0.06 - -0.10 -0.01 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.06 -0.07   0.25* 0.00 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 
3 Percentage of family 
members on the board 
-0.11 -0.08 - 0.11 0.06 0.16* -0.09 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.24* -0.03 0.11 0.04 0.06 
4 Board size    0.23* 0.00 0.04 - 0.35* 0.03 0.11 0.22* 0.02 0.38* 0.11 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
5 Percentage of government 
ownership 
 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.30* - 0.10   0.15* 0.22*   0.27* 0.50* 0.12 0.07 0.10 -0.03 0.10 
6 Role duality  -0.32* 0.07 0.19* 0.04 0.06 -  -0.15* -0.02   0.22* 0.16* 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.07 -0.09 
7 The existence of audit 
committee 
 0.05 0.03 -0.12 0.12  0.18* -0.15* - 0.04    0.09 0.10 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.15* -0.01 
8 The presence of ruling 
family on the board 
   0.16* 0.06 0.09 0.20*  0.30* -0.02 0.04 - -0.19* 0.28* 0.06 -0.06 0.10 0.02   0.32* 
9 Cross listing -0.11 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.11 0.22* 0.09 -0.19* - 0.33* 0.25* 0.13 0.00 0.01 -0.18* 
10 Company size
®
 0.02    0.27* 0.00   0.36* 0.54* 0.14* 0.09   0.28* 0.34* - 0.45*   0.24* -0.12 0.08 0.03 
11 Leverage -0.21*  0.00   0.17* 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.24* 0.43* - 0.03 -0.27* -0.30* 0.17* 
12 Company growth
®
 -0.13 -0.04 -0.11 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 0.05 0.16* -0.08 - 0.38* 0.04  -0.12 
13 Profitability  0.01 -0.04   0.14* 0.00 0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.26*    0.30* - 0.04 0.12 
14 Type of industry    0.14* -0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.12 0.07 -0.15* 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.29* -0.07 0.04 - -0.26* 
15 Type of auditor -0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.18* -0.09 -0.01 0.32*   -0.18* 0.04 0.16* -0.10 0.10 -0.26* - 
Note. * p < 0.05.  
® The company size and company growth variables are expressed in natural logarithm. 
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2. The Variance Inflation Factor  
Variance inflation factors (VIFs) were further used in the current study to detect the 
existence of a multi-collinearity problem in the dataset. In other words, this gauges the 
extent to which every independent variable in the model can be explained by the other 
independent variables. If VIFs are above 10, multi-collinearity is present (Stevens, 
2009). The VIFs ranged from 1.14 to 3.15 for the variables and the mean VIF is 1.52; 
thus the VIF result verified the absence of multi-collinearity. Table 7.9 below shows the 
variance inflation factor for each of the explanatory variables. 
 
   Table 7.9: Variance Inflation Factors for Independent Variables 
Independent Variable VIF 
Percentage of non-executive directors on the board  1.37 
Cross directorships  1.24 
Percentage of family members on the board 1.20 
Board size 1.32 
Percentage of government ownership 1.77 
Role duality 1.31 
The existence of audit committee 1.14 
The presence of ruling family on the board  1.41 
Cross listing 1.45 
Company size
®
  3.15 
Leverage 1.95 
Company growth
®
  1.38 
Profitability 1.33 
Type of industry 1.40 
Type of auditor 1.36 
Overall Mean VIF 1.52 
          Note. ® The company size and company growth variables are expressed in natural logarithm. 
 
3. Heteroscedasticity  
To assess for heteroscedasticity in the model, a Breusch-Pagan test and White‘s (1980) 
test were conducted. The results of both tests were significant at 1%: χ2 (1) = 69.31, p < 
.001 and χ2 (1) = 192.49, p < 0.0002, respectively. This suggests that the assumption of 
homoscedasticity is not met for the regression.   
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4. Autocorrelation 
To assess for autocorrelation, a Durbin-Watson test was conducted. The results showed 
a d-statistic of 1.72. A d-statistic of 2 indicates no autocorrelation present, while there is 
cause for alarm with a statistic of less than 1 (Gujarati, 2003).  As the statistic is 1.72, 
there is no cause for alarm and no autocorrelation is assumed.  To confirm these results, 
a Durbin‘s alternative test was conducted and the results were not significant, χ2 (1) = 
1.17, p = .281, suggesting no autocorrelation present. Further, a Breusch-Godfrey LM 
test was also conducted; again, the results were not significant, χ2 (1) = 1.26, p = .261, 
suggesting no autocorrelation present. 
 
5. Endogeneuity problem 
To detect for endogeneuity, GMM C test and Wu-Hausman test were employed and the 
results of statistics were significant. The GMM C and Wu-Hausman tests respectively 
with χ2 (11) = 13.83, p = 0.243 and F (11) = 1.242, p = 0.266 suggest that model is 
exogenous.  
 
6. Hausman Test for Random or Fixed Effects 
A Hausman test was conducted to assess whether a fixed effects model or a random 
effects model should be used as the main regression model in the present study. The 
results were insignificant, χ2 (15) = 11.80, p = .694, suggesting that the random effects 
model is more appropriate to use in this case. 
 
7.6 ANALYSIS OF REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
7.6.1 Random Effects Model (The Main Model) 
The random effect (RE) regression model was conducted, and its results, which suggest 
a significant relationship between the dependent variable (voluntary disclosure) and the 
core independent variables, are presented in Table 7.10. A Wald test with χ2 (15) = 
125.47 (p < 0.00) and 40% (R
2
) suggested that the variance in voluntary disclosure is 
largely explained by the index of independent variables included in the model. The 
explanatory power of the regression model is considered to be higher than reported by 
Eng and Mak (2003) [20%], Ghazali and Weetman (2006) [36%], and Chau and Gray 
(2010) [29.3%]. However, it is lower than reported by other relevant studies, such as Ho 
and Wong (2001) [42%], Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) [56%], and Al-Shammari and Al-
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Sultan (2010) [61%]. The individual predictors in the regression model were examined 
and their significance levels are also reported.  
Unexpectedly, the direction of the association between ―cross directorships‖ and overall 
level of voluntary disclosure was found significant and negative at the 10% level. This 
suggests that a company with a higher proportion of directors who have directorships on 
other companies‘ boards tends to have a lower level of voluntary disclosure in their 
annual reports. The results therefore do not support rejection of the null hypothesis 
(H12). This contradicts the findings of Alanezi (2011), who reported a positive 
association between the extent of voluntary disclosure and cross directorships for the 
listed companies in Kuwait. Also, it is inconsistent with Haniffa and Cooke (2002), who 
reported no association between those variables. One possible explanation for this is 
that board members with cross directorships in other companies, who are expected to be 
knowledgeable about the implementing of voluntary disclosure practices by other 
companies listed on the KSE, and have the power to apply these practices in their 
companies, seem to be more interested and focused in monitoring their interests in other 
companies as well as positively contributing to the company management and board 
supervision, than in taking benefits from their positions to improve the voluntary 
adoption of better disclosure policies and practices.  
The next significant corporate governance variable in the model was ―board size‖. It 
was found to be negatively associated with the overall level of voluntary disclosure, 
suggesting that as the number of directors on the board increased, the companies tended 
to have a lower voluntary disclosure level. The null hypothesis (H11) is rejected at 1% 
level of significance, suggesting a negative correlation in between board size and the 
level of VD practices. Previous relevant studies showed a positive influence (e.g. Denis 
and Sarin, 1999; Lim et al., 2007; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Ghazali, 2010). In contrast, 
some empirical studies (e.g. Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Alanezi, 2011; Samaha et al., 
2012) did not reveal a significant effect of ―board size‖ on voluntary disclosure 
practices. An inference might be drawn that, at a practical level, the priorities, concerns, 
and responsibilities of company boards in Kuwait, especially companies with larger 
boards, are to help to improve the performance of the company and activate the role of 
board supervision. Thus it can be suggested that the larger boards of listed companies in 
Kuwait do not pay enough attention to the importance of implementing voluntary 
reporting and its quality.  
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The ―percentage of government ownership‖ is an important predictor of the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. It is considered to be the most significant variable among other 
corporate governance variables and the second most important variable in the model. 
This result lends to support for the suggestion that ―companies with a higher level of 
government ownership released a higher level of voluntary information in their annual 
reports‖, indicating better corporate governance practices. This association is consistent 
with the results of Eng and Mak (2003); and Jiang and Habib (2009) regarding 
Singapore and New Zealand listed companies, respectively. Considering this, the null 
statement (H17) of no relationship between government ownership and the level of VD 
is confidently rejected at 1% level of significance. i.e. there exists a positive association 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure and government ownership in Kuwaiti 
corporate annual reports. In this respect, it can be stated that the Kuwaiti government 
should do act to activate its important role in improving the adequacy of voluntary 
disclosure and its transparency through the remarkable existence of their representatives 
on boards in a number of leading companies listed on the KSE.   
The evidence stemming from the RE regression model leads us to reject the null 
hypothesis (H13) of no negative relationship between role duality and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure behavior in Kuwaiti corporate annual reports at 5% level of 
significance. It suggests that companies appointing the CEO as board chairman are 
more likely to disclose less information in their annual reports than companies with no 
such position. Literature offers some empirical evidence concerning the negative 
relationship between those variables (for example, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Gul and 
Leung, 2004; Chau and Gray, 2010). In contrast, this variable did not appear to be 
statistically significant in explaining the VD practices of companies (e.g. Arcay and 
Vazquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Yuen et al., 
2009; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Alanezi, 2011). This result leads to the 
conclusion that the regulator, such as the Capital Markets Authority (CMA), should set 
a regulation that focuses on separating the positions of the board chairman and the CEO, 
as an optimal mechanism which is followed by many listed companies in different 
capital markets and in line with best corporate governance practices. Thus companies 
will be more likely to be motivated to disclose more information to stakeholders, 
leading to greater transparency.   
Among explanatory variables included in the RE regression model, four predictors 
belonged to corporate governance (―percentage of non-executive directors on the 
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board‖, ―percentage of family members on the board‖, ―the existence of an audit 
committee‖, ―the presence of ruling family on the board‖) were not significant in 
explaining the variation in voluntary disclosure practices. Therefore, the results‘ study 
fails to reject the null hypotheses (H14, H15, H16 and H18) at 10% level of 
significance. It is noteworthy that ―the presence of non-executive directors on the 
board‖ and ―the existence of an audit committee‖ are considered important corporate 
governance mechanisms that a number of international bodies, as discussed in Chapter 
4, call for or encourage companies to pay attention to. This is because they have a 
positive impact on companies and stakeholders in different ways, such as providing 
adequate protection for minority shareholders‘ interests and ensuring the timely flow of 
relevant information to the public. In the case of Kuwait, as an example of an emerging 
country, the appointment of non-executive directors is more likely due to their personal 
connections or family ties than their skills, practical experience, and level of academic 
education. This may affect the directors‘ effectiveness, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. 
The obtained results seem to confirm the previous conclusions and show some doubt 
about the reality of the non-executive directors‘ concept, as independent members, on 
Kuwaiti company boards. This insignificant relationship may also open the door for 
Kuwaiti regulatory bodies to pay more attention to the composition of boards and sub-
committees in order to activate the crucial role of those variables in improving the 
monitoring of financial reporting, the level of VD and its transparency, and control 
systems (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Cheung et al., 2010; 
Samaha et al., 2012). On this topic, Lim et al. (2007) declared that companies with more 
independent boards tend to disclose more voluntary information that is forward-looking 
and strategic.  
From the other side, it is expected that the ―percentage of family members‖ variable did 
not appear to influence voluntary disclosure practices, since family members have the 
power to obtain all relevant information about the companies by virtue of their positions 
so they tend not to disclose information above the mandatory requirements in CARs. 
Thus, Kuwaiti companies with more family members on the board lean more to the 
conservative side in dissemination of information.   
As expected, the results indicated that ―cross listing‖, the second most important 
company characteristic, was statically related to the extent of voluntary disclosure in the 
CARs. Therefore, this result is consistent with the proposition that VD may be driven 
by cross listing. Thus, the null hypothesis (H25) of no positive relationship between 
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cross listing and the level of VD is rejected at 5% level of significance. This suggests 
―cross listing‖ had a positive impact on the level of disclosure in annual reports of non-
financial companies in the KSE. Consequently, the result is consistent with the studies 
of Hossain et al. (1995), Meek et al. (1995), Cooke (1998), Ferguson (2002), Gul and 
Leung (2004), and Cheung et al. (2010). It has been argued that governance practices 
are significantly influenced by ―cross listing‖ (Arcay and Vazquez, 2005). ―Company 
size‖ was dominated and strongly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure, 
which leads to rejection of the null hypothesis (H19) of no relationship between 
company size and the extent of VD at 1% level of significance. Among the significant 
variables, it was the most significant predictor for level of overall disclosure. This is 
consistent with results in other recent studies, such as those of Ferguson et al. (2002), 
Gul and Leung (2004), Al-Shammari (2008), Hossain and Hammami (2009), and Chau 
and Gray (2010).  
Lastly, there was a negative association between ―company growth‖ and overall level of 
disclosure. In other words, as company growth increased, the voluntary information 
provided by companies in their annual reports tended to decrease. This result does not 
lend support to the theoretical prediction or mechanism that companies tend to disclose 
more voluntary information to the public to reduce information asymmetry and agency 
costs and to obtain more stakeholders‘ confidence regarding their superior performance 
and information reported in their annual reports. Moreover, this result does not support 
the view that a great deal of information is disseminated by companies in other sources 
of information such as the media, shown later in annual reports (Lang and Lundholm, 
1993). Consequently, the null hypothesis (H24) of no positive association between 
company growth and the level of VD is rejected, suggesting that there is a negative 
association between the company growth and the VD. The magnitudes of the estimates 
were used to rank the significant variables with respect to their relative 
increase/decrease in voluntary disclosure levels. ―Company size‖ appeared to have the 
largest effect of all independent variables, followed by ―percentage of government 
ownership‖, then by ―cross listing‖, and so on (see the figures between parentheses in  
Table 7.10). It should be noted that further discussion and explanation regarding 
obtaining the previous results will be provided in Section 7.7.    
Moreover, none of the other predictors belonging to company characteristics 
(―leverage‖, ―profitability‖, ―type of industry‖, and ―type of auditor‖) appear to be 
significant as well as not appearing to be significant in influencing disclosure behaviour. 
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However, based on the above discussion, it can be declared that the RE model supports 
the rejection of the null hypotheses [11, 13, 17, 19 and 25].    
263 
 
Table 7.10: The Results of Random Effects Model vs Fixed Effects Model and Pooled Regression Model 
 Random Effects Fixed Effects Pooled Regression–Robust with best for 
Heteroscedasticity 
Independent Variables B Z P B t P B t P 
Percentage of non-
executive  directors on the 
board 
0.06 0.89   0.37 0.04 0.64 0.52 0.06 1.04   0.30 
Cross directorships -0.03 -1.97 
(4) 
0.05* -0.03 -1.80 
(4) 
0.07* -0.03 -2.17 
(6) 
     0.03** 
Percentage of family 
members on the board 
0.01 0.49 0.62 0.01 0.32 0.75 0.01 0.56   0.58 
Board size -0.01 -2.47 
(7) 
   0.01** -0.01 -2.14 
(6) 
  0.03** -0.01 -2.44 
(7) 
0.02** 
Percentage of government 
ownership 
0.25 2.54 
(2) 
   0.01** 0.30 3.00 
(2) 
    0.00*** 0.25 1.95 
(2) 
    0.05* 
Role duality -0.02 -2.13 
(6) 
   0.03** -0.02 -2.22 
(7) 
 0.03** -0.24 -1.72 
(4) 
    0.09* 
The existence of audit 
committee 
0.02 1.35  0.18 0.00 0.31   0.76 0.02 1.03   0.31 
The presence of ruling 
family on the board 
0.00 0.22 0.82 0.01 0.64   0.52 0.00 0.24   0.81 
Cross listing 0.04 2.28 
(3) 
 0.02** 0.04 2.27 
(3) 
 0.02** 0.04 1.54 
(3) 
  0.13 
Company size
®
  0.03 4.04 
(1) 
  0.00*** 0.02 3.43 
(1) 
   0.00*** 0.03 3.75 
(1) 
       0.00*** 
Leverage 0.05 1.26   0.21 0.04 1.17   0.24 0.05 1.46   0.15 
Company growth
®
  -0.02 -2.02 
(5) 
0.04** -0.02 -1.80 
(4) 
 0.07* -0.02 -1.76 
(5) 
    0.08* 
Profitability 0.03 0.72 0.47 0.07 1.33 0.19 0.03 0.82   0.41 
Type of industry 
(manufacturing sector) 
0.00 -0.28 0.78 0.00 -0.42 0.68 0.00 -0.25    0.81 
Type of industry 0.02 1.51 0.13 0.01 1.25 0.21 0.02 1.61    0.11 
Note. The figures between the parentheses represent the rank of variables based on its z/t-value. The higher the value, the higher the relevance of the variable to disclosure practices. * p < 
0.10;  ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01. ® The company size and company growth variables are expressed in natural logarithm. Robust standard error is applied in all models.  
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7.6.2 Additional Tests  
 
7.6.2.1 Fixed Effects Model 
The fixed effects (FE) model was conducted for a sensitivity test; its results are reported 
in Table 7.10. The results for the RE model were compared to the FE model; 
comparisons of coefficients and p-values for each predictor are presented in the Table 
7.10. The R
2
 for the FE model was slightly less than the random effects: the fixed 
effects model‘s R2 was approximately 39%, compared to almost 40% for the random 
effects model. When comparing the RE coefficients to the FE ones, there were 
differences in the level of significance. The FE model results were similar to that of the 
RE model with respect to significant variables that affect the disclosure practices, 
except for ―cross directorships‖, ―board size‖, ―the percentage of government 
ownership‖ and ―company growth‖ variables. ―Cross directorships‖ and ―company 
growth‖ showed conservative behaviour under the FE model, but not under the RE 
model, since they had significant effects on the overall level of voluntary disclosure at 
the 10% level. Moreover, the outcomes of the FE model showed the coefficient 
estimates for the ―percentage of government ownership‖ variable significant at the 1% 
level in the FE model instead of 5% level in the RE model. However, the opposite 
conclusion can be drawn for the ―board size‖ variable. Aside from this, there were only 
minimal changes in the beta coefficients; however, the directions of the signs of the 
estimates of all independent variables in both models were consistent with each other. 
 
7.6.2.2 The Pooled Regression Model 
For a further robustness check, the pooled regression model was conducted and its 
results were compared with the random effects model. The 40% (R
2
) value for the 
pooled robust model was the same as obtained for the RE model. Comparing the RE 
coefficients to the pooled regression ones shows some differences in terms of the level 
of significance of the explanatory variables. The results of the RE model were similar to 
those of the pooled regression model in terms of significant variables that had an impact 
on disclosure practices, except for some explanatory variables. ―Board size‖ and ―the 
percentage of government ownership‖ were significant predictors in the RE model with 
a 1% significance level; however, the level of significance of these variables in the 
pooled model was 5%. ―Duality‖ and ―company growth‖ were significant predictors in 
the RE model at the 5% level, but they seemed to have conservative behaviour, since 
they were significant in the pooled robust model at the 10% level. Lastly, ―cross listing‖ 
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was a significant predictor in the RE model at the 5% level, but not significant in the 
pooled model. Comparisons of coefficients and p-values for each predictor are 
presented in Table 7.10.  
 
7.7 REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE CATEGORIES   
Four additional random effects regression models were conducted to determine the 
factors (independent variables) that may influence the components of voluntary 
disclosure (Categories A, B, C and D of information were presented as a dependent 
variable, alternatively; see Section 7.3.1.3 for more information). These investigating 
factors were related to corporate governance attributes and company characteristics. 
Table 7.11 presents the coefficient of R
2
, beta coefficients, and p-values for the RE 
regression models. 
As can be seen from Table 7.11, the explanatory power, as indicated by the respective 
R
2
, of each regression model varied among the four categories of information. The R
2
 
ranged from 23% for Category C to 37% for Category D, whereas 25% and 34% were 
recorded for Categories A and B, respectively. Consequently, these statistics show that 
the ability of the regression models in explaining the deviation in the individual 
categories of information as well as the overall level of voluntary disclosures. The 
empirical findings also showed many differences in significance within the explanatory 
variables. Moreover, the results indicated that determinants of voluntary disclosure 
behaviour varied among the four categories of information that are included in the 
disclosure index. Meek et al. (1995), Al-Shammari (2008), and Chau and Gray (2010) 
found similar results with respect to listed companies in  the US, the UK, Continental 
Europe, Kuwait and Hong Kong.  
With respect to corporate governance attributes, the results of four RE regression 
models showed that ―percentage of non-executive directors on the board‖ was 
negatively related to Category A ―voluntary disclosure of corporate environment 
information‖ at the 5% level but positively related to Category C ―voluntary disclosure 
of corporate governance information‖ at the 1% level. The positive association indicates 
that having a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the board positively 
contributes to improving corporate governance disclosure in CARs. Most importantly, 
this type of director pays more attention to the importance of CG attributes and so may 
assist company management to implement best corporate governance practice, helping 
to provide a higher level of disclosure and greater transparency. The ―cross 
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directorships‖ variable was negatively related to Category A only at the 5% level and 
not related to any other categories of information. The ―board size‖ variable had a 
negative association with Category A at the 1% level, whilst it was negatively 
associated with Category D ―voluntary disclosure of corporate social and environment 
information‖ at the 10% level. The negative association between the three previous 
variables and categories of information (A/and D) raises a question about the 
independence of non-executive directors in the KSE, and the results further suggest that 
the priority of boards‘ responsibilities in Kuwait leans to improving company 
performance and board supervision more than concentrating on improving or enhancing 
the quality of disclosure and the transparency of information provided annual report 
users.   
―The percentage of government ownership‖ was positively related to Category D at the 
1% level, while the ―role duality‖ variable was negatively associated with this type of 
voluntary disclosure at the 5% level. A possible explanation for this positive association 
might be that companies are motivated to disclose such information as it may help them 
to obtain the necessary financial resources and facilities from government to finance 
their operations. This type of voluntary disclosure is also consistent with the perspective 
of legitimacy theory which assumes that companies release information regarding their 
social performance to obtain the required support to continue their operations within 
society and guarantee their existence since they comply with social values and 
expectations. In other words, companies employ disclosure as a device to legitimise 
their business.         
―The existence of an audit committee‖ was positive and significant, not only for the 
voluntary disclosure of ―corporate financial performance and prospective information‖ 
(Category B) at the 1% level, but also for Category C at the 5% level. Agency theory 
suggests that the audit committee is considered an effective monitoring device which 
contributes to reducing agency costs as well as improving the level of corporate 
disclosure (Forker, 1992). These results suggest that ―the existence of an audit 
committee‖ may improve the level of disclosure and corporate transparency. However, 
the important issue that should be considered is that the Kuwaiti regulatory bodies must 
require listed companies from all economic sectors to establish such committees. The 
other important consideration is the composition of audit committees; members of these 
committees should have adequate qualifications and practical experience in the business 
field, and the majority must be independent non-executive directors.  
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In this study, signalling theory was used to explain the level of voluntary disclosure for 
categories of information. This theory suggests managers of more highly profitable 
companies are motivated to disclose more information to distinguish themselves than 
managers of less profitable companies. In the same view, it is expected that boards with 
members of the ruling family on them may be more interested in revealing additional 
information voluntarily in CARs to distinguish themselves than other boards. Although 
this was found negatively associated with Category D at the 5% level, it was positively 
associated with Categories A and C at the 1% and 5% levels. This is consistent with the 
predictions of signalling theory.   
With respect to other results related to company characteristics, the ―cross listing‖ 
variable had a positive association with the disclosure of information in Categories C 
and D at the 10% and 5% levels. A company with cross listing is expected to be subject 
to more requirements and so required to release more information than companies 
which are only listed in the home capital market. Signalling theory predicts that 
companies with cross listing, being benchmarks, may tend to employ their experience in 
the application of foreign disclosure policy and disclose additional information to 
distinguish themselves from other companies in the home capital market. Overall, the 
results support the predictions suggested by signalling theory.  
―Company size‖, which is considered a significant predictor in a great number of 
disclosure studies, was positive and statistically significant, at the 1% level, with 
Categories A and B; however, it was associated with Category D at the 5% level. These 
results are consistent with the predication of agency theory, in which agency costs rise 
as a result of separation of management and principles. It has been suggested that 
agency costs are greater in larger companies (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). 
Consequently, the larger companies tend to release more information in their annual 
reports to reduce these costs. Another possible explanation may be that large companies 
are subject to more pressure from different external powers and are required to comply 
with more regulations than smaller ones so they tend to disclose more information to 
reduce the political costs (e.g. public intervention), enhance their image (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978), and facilitate external financing. For example, larger companies are 
more likely to disclose more detailed information regarding recruitment policies (e.g. 
equal opportunity, diversity, national manpower supporting). Lastly, larger Kuwaiti 
companies tend to adopt social disclosure practices to enhance the confidence of the 
shareholders and influence the perception of stakeholders.  
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―Company growth‖ was negatively related to Category A only. This was explained on 
the grounds that this type of information may be available in other sources of 
information such as the KSE‘s and/or the company‘s website so high growth companies 
do not concentrate on this type of disclosure as it may not add value to the company. 
The profitability variable (ROA) had a negative association with Category B at the 10% 
level, whilst it positively associated with the voluntary disclosure of Category D. The 
positive association can be illustrated by the fact that highly profitable companies have 
a strong incentive to disclose more information about their social and environmental 
responsibilities to the public to distinguish themselves in different perspectives: to give 
a good interpretation of superior performance and to give a good signal regarding the 
company‘s contribution to social projects, thereby strengthening the company‘s 
reputation.  
Lastly, ―type of auditor‖, the measurement of audit quality, was found to be not 
significantly associated with the different categories of voluntary disclosure except for 
Category D at the 10% level. Large audit firms are an effective mechanism to reduce 
agency costs, and they play a key role in monitoring company accounts (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Audit firms tend to influence the level of information, which predicts 
that the process of auditor choice may be employed as a signal of company value as 
well as a signal to the capital market regarding the quality of information included in 
CARs (Datar et al., 1991). This result may also be interpreted on the grounds that 
Kuwaiti audit firms positively encourage their clients to discharge information on 
corporate accountability toward the society. As noted in Chapters 4 and 6, selecting an 
external auditor for the company is the board‘s decision, not that of the shareholders 
who attend the annual meeting. This creates some doubts regarding two concepts: the 
independence of external auditors as well as their loyalty to act as an agent for 
shareholders. Conversely, ―the percentage of family members on the board‖, ―leverage‖, 
and ―type of industry‖ had no bearing on the voluntary disclosure of the four categories 
of information.  
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Table 7.11: Regression Results for the Relation between Voluntary Disclosure Categories and Independent Variables 
Independent Variables Category A Category B Category C Category D 
 B P B P B P B P 
Percentage of non-executive directors on 
the board 
-0.18 0.02** 0.09 0.41 0.37 0.00*** -0.01 0.96 
Cross directorships -0.05 0.01** 0.00 0.96 -0.03 0.29 -0.03 0.22 
Percentage of family members on the board -0.03 0.38 0.01 0.77 0.05 0.23   0.03 0.54 
Board size -0.02 0.00*** -0.01 0.16 0.01 0.37 -0.01 0.06* 
Percentage of government ownership  0.10 0.40 0.21 0.22 -0.27 0.10   0.76 0.00*** 
Role duality -0.02 0.13 0.00 0.84 -0.02 0.36 -0.04 0.02** 
The existence of audit committee  0.00 0.86 0.08       0.00*** 0.06 0.01** -0.02 0.32 
The presence of ruling family on the board  0.05 0.00*** -0.04 0.15 0.06 0.01** -0.05 0.02** 
Cross listing  0.01 0.68 0.01 0.67 0.06 0.05*   0.07 0.02** 
Company size
®
   0.03 0.00*** 0.04       0.00*** 0.01 0.20   0.02 0.02** 
Leverage -0.02 0.64 0.10 0.12 0.04 0.49   0.07 0.21 
Company growth
®
  -0.05 0.00*** -0.02 0.35 0.00 0.91  -0.02 0.25 
Profitability -0.01 0.87 -0.15  0.07* 0.06 0.43   0.14 0.06* 
Type of industry   0.00 0.90 0.01 0.51 0.00 0.80  -0.02 0.42 
Type of auditor -0.01 0.52 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.52    0.04 0.05* 
R
2
 0.25 0. 34 0.23 0.37 
Note. * p < 0.10;  ** p < 0.05; and ***p < 0.01  
® The company size and company growth variables are expressed in natural logarithm. 
Robust standard error is applied in all models.
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7.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the extent and trend of voluntary disclosure 
levels as well as the categories of information in the annual reports for a sample of 
Kuwaiti listed companies over the period of the study (2005-2008) by the application of 
the voluntary disclosure index.  
The results of the study revealed that the mean overall voluntary disclosure level over 
the four years is 23%, which is considered relatively low, as expected in Kuwait as an 
example of an emerging capital market. However, the overall level of voluntary 
disclosure gradually improves over the examined period. With respect to the assessment 
of the disclosure of the index items, the results indicate that there is a remarkable 
variation in disclosure at this level, leading to the conclusion that there was variation in 
the level of disclosure practice among Kuwaiti companies listed on the KSE. On 
average, a company releases 23% of the index items, and only seven items on the index 
had a disclosure level of 80% or more. Further, 31 items, representing 63% of the index, 
had a disclosure level of around 17% or less. There was a considerable variation in the 
disclosure among categories of information. Categories concerning corporate financial 
performance and prospects (B) and corporate environment (A) were considered the 
most important types of information that Kuwaiti companies often provide to their 
shareholders and other stakeholder groups.  
The second purpose of this chapter is to identify the factors that affect voluntary 
disclosure practices in the annual reports of non-financial companies. Using 
multivariate regression analysis, a number of corporate governance mechanisms were 
shown to be related with the extent of voluntary disclosure in CARs over the examined 
period. ―Cross directorship‖ was negatively related to the overall level of voluntary 
disclosure. This result suggests that company board members, who are also members of 
boards of other listed companies, in the present study, pay little attention to the level of 
voluntary disclosure and types of information released in the annual reports. The results 
support the hypothesis that level of voluntary disclosure is associated with ―board size‖. 
However, the results indicated that ―board size‖ was negatively associated with the 
overall level of voluntary disclosure. In the case of Kuwait, the results do not support 
the view that the large board would be an effective mechanism to boost the corporate 
disclosure practices and information transparency released to the public. These results 
raise some doubts about the role of boards of Kuwaiti companies listed on the KSE, in 
the adoption of better disclosure practices.  
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Companies with higher levels of government ownership have significantly higher levels 
of voluntary disclosure as compared to companies with lower government ownership. 
This result suggests a trend toward the need to endorse the vital role of government in 
influencing the decisions and strategies of the boards regarding the adoption of better 
disclosure policies through their representatives on the boards. As expected, a company 
with role duality may tend to withhold information from shareholders and have less 
incentive to voluntarily disclose information in their annual reports. Based on this result, 
it may be proposed that the appointment of an independent chairman may encourage 
companies to increase the amount of disclosed information voluntarily to their 
shareholders, as well as strengthening the board‘s role in monitoring the CEO‘s 
activities. This is consistent with the view of Collier and Gregory (1999).  
Other corporate governance variables (―percentage of non-executive directors on the 
board‖, ―percentage of family members on the board‖, ―the existence of an audit 
committee‖, and ―the presence of the ruling family on the board‖) were not significant. 
This insignificant relationship regarding non-executive directors and the audit 
committee raises a question about the independence of non-executive directors, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4, and the composition of the board and sub-committees in 
developing countries. 
Out of seven company characteristics used in this study, ―cross listing‖ and ―company 
size‖ were found to have a positively significant influence on the overall level of 
voluntary disclosure only, while ―company growth‖ was the only variable to have a 
negatively significant impact on the extent of voluntary disclosure.  
The findings of the current study also revealed that the explanatory power of the 
regression models differed among the categories of information. In addition, the 
determinants of disclosure varied among categories of information. Most importantly, 
no single explanatory variable can explain the variation in the overall voluntary 
disclosure and all four categories of information. In addition, some explanatory 
variables were not associated with the level of overall disclosure; these were positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure of CG information such as (―percentage of non-
executive directors‖ and ―the presence of the ruling family on the board‖). 
It is important to mention that the perspective of agency, political cost, signalling, or 
legitimacy theory were employed in this study to explain the significant association 
(should it exist) between the voluntary disclosure practices and independent variables.   
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Table 7.12: The Association between Objectives, the Related Research Questions 
 and the Developed Hypotheses 
The objective The related research question The developed  
Hypothesis 
To track changes in the 
level and categories of 
voluntary information 
disclosure during the study 
periods (2005, 2006, 
 2007 and 2008).  
10. How does the overall level of voluntary  
disclosure in the annual reports of Kuwaiti  
companies change during the study period? 
 
11. How do the four groups of information  
in the  level of voluntary disclosure trend for  
Kuwaiti companies in the years 2005-2008?  
 
To explore how the overall 
level of voluntary 
disclosure depends on the 
categories of information.  
12. How do the levels of voluntary disclosure for the 
four groups of information correlate with the overall 
level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
listed companies? 
 
To examine the 
hypothesized influence of 
company and corporate 
governance variables in 
explaining the variations in 
the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual 
reports of non-financial 
companies.   
13. To what extent do corporate characteristics and 
corporate governance mechanisms contribute to 
explaining the variations in the overall level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports? 
14. To what extent do corporate characteristics and 
corporate governance mechanisms contribute to 
explaining the variations in the voluntary disclosure 
levels of each group of information? 
H11, H12, H13, 
H14, H15, H16, 
H17, H18, H19, 
H20, H21, H22, 
H23, H24, and 
H25 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this research has been the voluntary disclosure of information in annual 
reports.  More specifically, it has four dimensions. These dimensions are: [1] and [2] to 
explore the views of user groups of the annual reports concerning the current voluntary 
disclosure practices and their perceptions toward the usefulness of proposed information 
in improving the quality and usefulness of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of 
Kuwaiti companies listed on the KSE; [3] to evaluate the level of voluntary disclosure 
and its evolution over the time studied; [4] to determine the impact of a combined set of 
company characteristics and corporate governance attributes on explaining variations in 
the extent of disclosure in annual reports. To explore or reach the first two dimensions, 
a questionnaire survey is used as the primary data source, whilst the secondary data is 
used to achieve the last two dimensions.  
The objective of this chapter is to summarise the main outcomes of the study. In 
addition, implications and limitations of the current study will be addressed. 
Suggestions for future research will be stated at the end of this chapter.  
 
8.2 REVIEW OF THE MAIN FINDINGS  
 
8.2.1 Questionnaire Survey [Phase I]   
A self-administered questionnaire was designed to achieve the first two above-
mentioned objectives. Four major groups were invited to participate in this study: 
financial advisors, external auditors, market regulators, and accounting academics.  
The majority of stakeholders rated CARs (as expected), interim reports, and advice from 
specialists, as the three most important sources of information for making judgments (in 
that order). However, the annual report stood as the most important source of 
information among other examined sources. On the other hand, participants had a 
neutral opinion on the importance of the company‘s website as a source of information, 
implying that this source does not provide current information to Kuwaiti users. Three 
forms of financial statements (the statement of financial position, the income statement, 
and the statement of cash flow) are considered the most important sections of annual 
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reports in the view of the stakeholder groups. This indicates that the user groups 
concentrate more on financial information than on non-financial since this is audited 
based on a sophisticated system and by professional firms. This result also may reflect 
the low level of information quality provided in other sections. 
Based on the questionnaire results, the issue of timeliness in publishing annual reports is 
becoming a matter of great concern, which could affect the quality of annual reports as 
an information source. This also opens the door to thinking about the role of regulatory 
bodies with respect to this problem. The results also suggest that respondents are neutral 
in their views regarding the reliability of the contents of annual reports in Kuwait; this 
could be a potential problem that may undermine the annual report as a communication 
device between preparers and users.  
Concerning the level of voluntary disclosure, most members of stakeholder groups do 
not feel satisfied with the quantity and/or quality of information provided by companies 
in their annual reports. User groups also show their desire for more information than 
companies currently disclose, to improve their decision making and the usefulness of 
CARs. It may suggest an urgent need for the disclosure gap between users and preparers 
to be filled. This includes information related to corporate governance (e.g. biographies 
of board members, key management, and sub-committees), and more details on the 
company‘s products/services and corporate environmental and social responsibility. The 
analysis of collected data indicates a relatively high consensus between user groups 
concerning most of the items examined. However, disclosure of human resources 
information (part-time employment of students, number of training hours covered by 
each employee, and providing low cost health insurance for employees) is considered 
the least useful in the opinion of user groups.  
The study shows a relatively high level of agreement between groups with regard to 
factors affecting the degree of information transparency provided by listed companies. 
However, ―increasing mandatory disclosure requirements‖, ―application of best 
corporate governance practice‖ and ―external auditors‘ reputation‖ are rated the most 
significant factors affecting the degree of information transparency provided by 
companies to the KSE. Consequently, transparency could be useful because it provides 
a good opportunity for market participants to have equal access to information. It has 
been argued that transparency is an important mechanism to promote the orderly and 
efficient functioning of capital markets (IMF, 2001).  
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Finally, building a good capital market legal and regulatory framework is considered a 
prerequisite to any successful capital market, since, by imposing proper penalties, it can 
provide the required protection of market participants against any violation in practices. 
The results suggest consensus among groups regarding the need for a sophisticated 
capital market infrastructure as well as for comprehensive regulations to help foster 
confidence in the capital market and protect market participants. Respondents perceive 
the presence of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) as an independent body, the 
improvement of skills of regulatory bodies‘ staff, an increase in national disclosure 
requirements regarding ownership structure and related-party transactions to be the most 
important procedures for enhancing confidence in the KSE. With regard to the ability to 
implement proposed corporate governance mechanisms, responses show serious 
concern about the ability to apply some proposed issues such as restriction of family 
members‘ role in senior management.    
 
8.2.2 Disclosure Level and its Determinants − Secondary Data (Phase II)   
To achieve the last two main objectives of this study, an unweighted disclosure index 
was constructed and developed through several stages and this includes the selection of 
index items which may be relevant to practices in the Kuwaiti business environment. 
The analysis of the scoring sheet of 49 voluntary disclosure items took place on three 
different levels: overall level of voluntary disclosure, item by item, and types of 
voluntary disclosure as the sub-indices. Data on voluntary disclosure and independent 
variables were hand-collected for 52 listed companies (206 observations) from annual 
reports and from other complementary sources for the years 2005-2008. Random effects 
regression, the main model, was used to check the research hypotheses.  
Concerning the evaluation of voluntary disclosure practices, the level of overall 
voluntary disclosure was 23% which is considered relatively low as compared with 
other studies conducted in developing countries. This could be attributed to the culture 
of secrecy inherent in Arab communities. However, the overall level of voluntary 
disclosure gradually improved over the examined period. Moreover, the longitudinal 
data analysis provides some important insights in that, in 2007 and 2008, the extent of 
voluntary disclosure was higher than in previous years (2005 and 2006). In terms of 
information categories, there are remarkable differences in the extent of disclosure 
among them, with the overall mean of Category B being much higher than those of the 
others, showing that Kuwaiti companies tend to disclose more information about their 
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financial performance than about other areas. There is also a remarkable variation 
among the extent of disclosure of individual items on the index and the extent of 
disclosure over a sample of non-financial companies. Based on these results, it can be 
stated that annual reports may not provide sufficient information to meet users‘ needs. 
Consequently, there is significant room for further disclosure in the annual reports of 
Kuwaiti listed companies; this could ultimately improve the transparency level of these 
reports.  
With regard to variables significantly associated with variation in disclosure practices, 
the multivariate analysis reveals that corporate governance attributes affect the 
disclosure practices adopted by listed companies at the KSE. Four out of eight CG 
mechanisms are found to be associated with the overall level of voluntary disclosure, 
three negatively, one positively. Cross directorship, board size, and dualities in positions 
are negatively related to total voluntary disclosure. In contrast, companies with a high 
percentage of government ownership tend to disclose more information in their reports. 
On the other side, disclosure practices are insignificantly influenced by a number of CG 
attributes (the proportion of non-executive directors, family members on the board, the 
presence of an audit committee, and the presence of the ruling family on the board). 
Among company characteristics, company size, cross listing, and company growth are 
found to be associated with the variation in voluntary disclosure. While the coefficients 
of the first two variables are positive, and company size is considered to be the most 
powerful explanatory variable, the coefficient of the third is negative.  
Table 8.1 presents a summary of research hypotheses and variables which are found to 
be significant at the 10% level or less, and the others are not significant at any level 
under the multivariate analysis.    
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Table 8.1: A Summary of the Results of Research Hypotheses 
Research Hypotheses Expected Sign Findings 
H11: Board size
® 
  Supported 
H12: Cross directorships  + Not supported 
H13: Role duality  - Supported 
H14: The proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board  
+ Not supported 
H15: The presence of an audit committee  + Not supported 
H16: The percentage of family members on the 
board 
- Not supported 
H17: Government ownership  + Supported 
H18: The presence of ruling family members on the 
board  
+ Not supported 
H19: Company size  + Supported 
H20: Type of auditor  + Not supported 
H21: Leverage  + Not supported 
H22: Type of industry
® 
   Not supported 
H23: Profitability  + Not supported 
H24: Company growth  + Not supported 
H25: Cross listing + Supported 
®According to disclosure literature, it has been suggested that these variables have significant effect on 
the voluntary disclosure practices, however, since the results of previous studies are mixed, the current 
study did not give the direction of this association. 
 
At the type of disclosure level, the study‘s outcomes suggest that the explanatory power 
of regression models differed among the categories of information. In addition, the 
determinants of disclosure vary among the categories of information. Most importantly, 
no single explanatory variable can explain the variation in the overall level of voluntary 
disclosure and all categories of information. Family member on the board, leverage, and 
type of industry are found to be insignificant factors in explaining variation among 
companies concerning the overall total voluntary disclosure and all 
components/categories of disclosure (Category A: corporate environment, Category B: 
corporate financial performance and prospects, Category C: corporate governance 
information, Category D: corporate social and environment information). However, 
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other factors have a clear bearing on the variation in the extent of voluntary disclosure 
in different categories.  
 
8.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The current study has several important implications. It contributes to the existing 
disclosure and corporate governance literature. In terms of annual reports, the study has 
shown that CARs are rated as the most important source of information for decision 
making by different user groups. Thus the regulatory bodies in Kuwait should pay more 
attention to improving the status of such reports and their usefulness to stakeholders 
such as investors. This may have a positive impact on the quality of decisions.   
Knowing the strengths and weaknesses in the qualitative aspects of information may 
help to upgrade the usefulness of CARs as an information source. In this regard, a 
considerable number of respondents show a neutral attitude regarding the reliability of 
the contents of annual reports; and here the role of the authorities and preparers of 
reports lies in addressing these deficiencies. On the other hand, respondents show 
concern about the long delay in publishing CARs and the lack of availability of 
information, which may lead to increased rumours and insider trading. The timely 
availability of the annual report would reduce unfavourable dealings so market 
regulations should be strengthened regarding these issues. This will inevitably lead to 
The majority of users show a high level of agreement regarding the proposed voluntary 
information items to be included in CARs in order to upgrade the quality of voluntary 
disclosure. This indicates that the level of voluntary disclosure in CARs does not meet 
the needs and requirements of users in the Kuwaiti business environment, such as in 
corporate governance disclosures. In other words, there is a low degree of harmony 
between the demand for and supply of information. To reduce this gap and provide 
sufficient information, disclosure requirements should be increased.  
The outcomes of the first empirical study are consistent with those of the second one 
regarding the need for listed companies to disclose much more voluntary information in 
their annual reports to meet the requirements of stakeholder groups. These two studies 
may help to determine ―what type of disclosure is required‖. As such, they may serve as 
standards-setters in formulating appropriate disclosure requirements for companies on 
the one side and aid the selection process of items to be released and the design of 
preparers‘ disclosure strategy on the other. Moreover, it can assist preparers to confirm 
the importance participants attach to voluntary disclosures in their reports.    
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In order to improve the quality of CARs and enhance the degree of information 
transparency in the KSE, a strong regulatory system and effective enforcement 
mechanism is required to ensure compliance with regulations (Rahman et al., 2002). 
However, this cannot work without the existence of qualified staff with adequate 
practical experience to take over these tasks. Hence, Kuwaiti regulatory should work to 
improve their staff‘s skills by involving them in intensive educational and training 
programmes. This may improve the implementation of regulations and so increase 
confidence in the capital market as well as investment rates in the market. On the other 
hand, Kuwaiti policy makers should also provide educational programmes for 
shareholders, since they suffer from lack of experience and awareness regarding capital 
market issues, their duties and rights as shareholders, and the best corporate governance 
practices and benefits. This may help to strengthen the stability of the investment 
environment. 
Respondents appear encouraged by the existence of the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA) as an independent body, but Kuwaiti policy makers should take into account the 
need to revise some existing resolutions, such as some of the provisions included in the 
CCL, to avoid any potential contradiction. In addition, the CMA should work away 
from any potential overlaps in the supervision and monitoring activities with other 
bodies such as the Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK).  
The study provides new evidence on the determinants of the variation in the overall 
level of disclosure in annual reports in an emerging market that has not been widely 
examined. Government ownership is significantly and positively associated with higher 
levels of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, Kuwaiti governmental bodies should play an 
important role in the companies in which they own a significant stake to make them 
more transparent in their disclosure and ensure they follow better governance through 
the presence of governmental representatives on their boards.  
Unexpectedly, the results of multivariate analysis show two corporate governance 
mechanisms (cross directorship and board size) are negatively associated with the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. This may suggest that directors are more concerned about 
monitoring their interests in other companies than improving the voluntary adoption of 
better disclosure policies. As expected, role duality is negatively related to the overall 
level of disclosure, suggesting that the regulatory bodies should require companies to 
separate the role of chairman and CEO.  
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Among the corporate governance attributes, the proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board and the existence of an audit committee play no effective role in improving 
voluntary disclosure practices amongst listed companies in Kuwait. This may refer to 
some obstacles which were concluded directly from the main outcomes of Chapter 4. In 
general, the Kuwaiti legislator does not identify the number of non-executive directors, 
the balance between executive and non-executive directors, or the concept of 
independence of non-executive directors. Moreover, an individual can be appointed as a 
member of the board once s/he owns 1% of the company‘s capital and/or has family ties 
with management; these situations open the door for major shareholders to control the 
appointment of companies‘ boards in Kuwait. These facts embody the shifting of power 
from company shareholders, specifically minority shareholders, to the board. 
Concerning the audit committee, its lack of effectiveness could be attributed to the fact 
that its appointment may be subject to nepotism since the law remains silent on the 
establishment and composition of this committee. Thus, these combined factors may 
undermine the effectiveness of non-executive directors in improving the quality and 
quantity of disclosure.   
These findings have an important implication for improving the role of non-executive 
directors and audit committees in Kuwait. The time has come to accomplish that; 
regulatory bodies need to revise regulations concerning board structure and to set up 
regulations for the establishment and composition of audit committees. These should 
include a new criterion for the appointment of directors: their independence should be 
precisely and clearly defined. Directors should also be required to have practical 
experience and academic qualifications, and to undergo continuous learning and 
training programmes. These two important corporate mechanisms could strengthen the 
quality of disclosure in annual reports and their transparency. Based on the above, these 
outcomes contribute to attracting policy makers‘ attention to the aspects that should be 
concentrated on when setting a CG code for directors of listed companies.           
The auditor firm size variable also plays no effective role in improving the extent of 
voluntary disclosure and its transparency, which may be due to the fact that although 
external auditors are appointed by shareholders during the annual general meeting,  
majority shareholders control the voting process as they own a significant stake in these 
companies. Consequently, the appointment of the external auditor is under the control of 
these shareholders, who are in most cases company directors. The appointment of 
external auditors may be based on family ties with the board, which is considered 
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another example of a violation of auditor independence. These facts exemplify the shift 
of power from company shareholders to the board. Therefore, this finding has a major 
implication for the development of the auditing and accounting profession in Kuwait as 
an example of an emerging market. To achieve that, the Kuwaiti legislator and regulator 
should take the necessary steps to stop these practices. 
Finally, the results obtained from the panel analysis, as new evidence from a developing 
country that has not been studied as intensively, indicate that the cross listing and 
company growth variables are significant at the 5% level. While the coefficient of the 
former variable is positive as expected, that of the latter is negative, which is opposite to 
what was expected. This result is inconsistent with signalling theory perspective, which 
expects high growth companies to disclose more information voluntarily (for more 
details see Chapter 7, Sections 7.6 and 7.7).       
To summarise, the Kuwaiti authorities are advised to take into consideration the above 
implications, as recommendations, reached after four years of painstaking efforts and 
careful research. They illustrate the need for an appropriate legal framework and the 
establishment of a sound CG regime. This may lead to the achievement of three 
important issues: enhancing the level of confidence in the capital market, providing 
good protection for market participants‘ rights, ―especially minority shareholders‖, and 
encouraging more capital to flow into the KSE. Thus, the Kuwaiti government may 
qualify as one of the best markets on entering the competition with other emerging 
markets.    
 
8.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Despite taking systematic stages into consideration when conducting this study, it 
nevertheless has some limitations, something considered commonplace in social science 
research. These limitations can be split into two divisions based on the research 
instruments.    
 
8.4.1 Questionnaire Survey (Phase I)  
The survey questionnaire was adopted to elicit the perceptions and beliefs of user 
groups of annual reports toward the voluntary disclosure information. Only four major 
groups participated in this study, and other users of CARs were not involved, such as 
credit bank officers, since the number of banks operating in Kuwait is limited and also 
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banks cannot provide the required number of respondents to make the results 
statistically meaningful. 
Of the 220 questionnaires distributed, 143 were returned with useable responses. This 
response rate is considered normal when adopting such a research method to assess the 
perceptions of respondents and in the case where the questionnaire discusses some 
sensitive issues in the view of subject groups. Moreover, it is a normal reaction in a 
community which tends to be conservative in expressing opinions, as mentioned in 
Chapter 6 (see Section 6.2). On the other hand, response bias exists in such a method 
and so the responses do not necessarily reflect exact beliefs. 
It is noteworthy that the outcomes of the questionnaire may not reflect the perspective 
of the whole accounting community in Kuwait concerning the issues discussed; 
however, it still represents a valid sample. A number of members of user groups were 
also not involved as a result of lack of knowledge of the corporate governance concept 
and its importance or for personal reasons.  
 
8.4.2 Secondary Data (Phase II) 
The study was aimed at the whole population of non-financial companies in the KSE, 
but some companies were excluded for  not meeting the study criteria, restricting the 
total number of companies involved in the current study (for more details, see Section 
5.12). Moreover, caution needs to be exercised in attempting in generalise the outcomes 
of the study beyond the scope of the study population.  
The findings of this study need to be interpreted more cautiously since there are a 
number of limitations associated with this type of research: [1] the personal subjectivity 
involved in deciding the selection of index items may influence the level of company 
disclosure and so the index may not cover all items required to evaluate the disclosure. 
Thus, the comprehensiveness of company disclosures may not be fully and/properly 
captured by the index (Alzarouni, et al., 2011); [2] personal subjectivity inherent  in 
scoring  the  annual  reports  of  the  sample  companies  may  not  be  completely 
prevented, and therefore there is unavoidable  subjectivity  in  the  scoring  process 
(Owsus-Ansah, 1998); [3] the comparison of the current study‘s results with previous 
disclosure studies should be interpreted with care as a result of their employing different 
indexes; this includes the difference in classification of disclosure types and the number 
of items included in each type. [4] in conducting the regression analysis for the sampled 
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companies, there was relatively low number of sample companies that had established 
an audit committee. This was due to the fact that the CCL did not obligate the listed 
companies to establish such a committee. However, those companies which regulated 
by the CBK were obligated to form audit committees. Therefore, this may affect the 
effectiveness of ―the existence of audit committee‖ in explaining the deviations in 
annual reports‘ disclosures. In addition, the results of cross listing variable should be 
treated with caution due to the limited number of companies in the sample which are 
cross listing. 
 
8.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
The previous discussion of the study‘s main outcomes and limitations gives a good 
opportunity to recommend future research streams. However, most of the ideas for 
future research are derived directly from the main conclusions of the current study. The 
following paragraphs present some suggestions for conducting future research on CARs 
and voluntary disclosure practices.  
A study should be directed to make a comparison between the information needs of 
various user groups and the views and perceptions of preparers of CARs. Further insight 
could also be gained by comparing Kuwait with other Gulf countries or with Middle 
Eastern countries with similar socio-cultural, economic, and political attributes. More 
research is needed to obtain an understanding of the voluntary disclosure behaviour of 
financial companies.  
The notion of the establishment of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) was in its very 
early stages when this study was conducted; therefore it is important to expand our 
research, after a reasonable period of time, by assessing the effect of the establishment 
of the CMA on the extent of voluntary disclosure, as the outcomes of the first phase 
may be confirmed by examining the perception of users of annual reports toward 
voluntary disclosure information. This study may include a large number of user groups 
with a large number of participants in each, who have appropriate knowledge of 
accounting practices, in order to gain valuable insight to the views and attitudes of 
diverse user groups in emerging markets such as Kuwait. In addition, this may improve 
our knowledge on which voluntary items, and why these items, are rated more highly 
than others by users.   
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Another potential future research stream is the impact of the chairman‘s letter or 
auditors‘ reports on the judgement and perspective of users, despite their not being rated 
highly by respondents.     
Again, after the CMA has been operating for a reasonable period of time, it is crucial to 
conduct similar research to gain further understanding of the association between CG 
mechanisms and voluntary disclosure practices. More specifically, the results of the 
current study encourage further investigation of the impact of different types of 
government ownership on the extent of voluntary disclosure. It is interesting in this case 
to employ panel data to get a full picture amongst these variables. It is important to 
extend our research by also investigating financial companies, since this research 
focused on non-financial ones. Further research could be conducted by using similar 
variables; however, it may examine a larger sample size of non-financial companies. In 
addition, independent variables that are beyond the scope of the current research (e.g. 
block holders, or the competence of board members, or the board meetings) could be 
included.     
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APPENDIX 1: Examples of Studies Investigating the Association between Voluntary Disclosure and Company Characteristics 
Study and year   Country    No. of items Basis of items’ selection and type of index used 
 
Variable examined Major results  
McNally et al. (1982) 
 
New Zealand 
 
 
 
41 Previous studies in USA and UK, examination of 
CARs, reviewing the selected items by 
stockbrokers. Weighted index.  
 
Company size, 
profitability, growth, audit 
size, and type of industry 
The disclosure level by 
companies was significantly 
lower than desirable for 
external users. In addition, 
company size was the only 
significant variable. 
Cooke (1989a)  
 
 
Sweden 146 Previous studies and recommendations issued by 
IASC and FAR (the Swedish Institute of Authorised 
Public Accountants). Unweighted index. 
Company size, quotation 
status, parent company 
relationship, and industry 
type  
There was a significant 
association between a 
number of variables 
[company size, quotation 
status, and industry type] and 
the VD level. 
Cooke (1991) 
 
 
Japan 106 Literature and recommendations issued by IASC 
and the Japanese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants. Unweighted index.  
Size, quotation status, and 
industry type 
Disclosure behaviour was 
significantly related to all 
variables.  
Hossain et al. (1994) 
 
Malaysia 78 
 
Similar adapted from Gray et al. (1992) and other 
previous research. Unweighted index. 
Company size, ownership 
structure, leverage, assets-
in-place, size of audit, and 
listing status   
Disclosure of information 
was statistically correlated 
with company size, 
ownership structure, and 
foreign listing status.  
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Hossain et al. (1995) 
 
 
New Zealand 95 
 
Following earlier studies (e.g. Cooke, 1989a; Chow 
and Wong-Boren, 1987; McNally et al., 1982; Gray 
et al., 1992). Unweighted index. 
 
Company size, leverage, 
assets-in-place, type of 
auditor, and foreign listing 
status 
Significance association for 
company size, leverage and 
listing status.  
Raffournier (1995) 
 
Switzerland 30 
 
Using a list of items derived from the Fourth and 
Seventh EC Directives. Weighted index.  
Size, leverage, profitability, 
share listing, ownership 
structure, auditor‘s size, 
industry type, 
internationality 
―Large‖ and ―international‖ 
play a significant role in 
disclosure practices. 
Gray et al. (1995c) 
 
 
 
 
US and UK 
 
128 
 
Following previous studies such as Gray et al. 
(1984) and Tonkin (1989). Unweighted index. 
Listing status  Significant variations in 
disclosure practices among 
international listed and 
domestic listed companies. 
Also, international listing had 
a significant effect on 
strategic information 
disclosure. 
Meek et al. (1995) 
 
 
US, UK and 
Continental Europe 
85 
 
Based on an analysis of international trends and 
observations of standard reporting practices and 
taking into account relevant research studies such as 
Gray et al. (1984) and Tonkin (1989). Unweighted 
score. 
Size, country/region of 
origin, industry, leverage, 
multinationality, 
profitability, and 
international listing status 
Significance for company 
size, country/region, listing 
status, and industry. Also, the 
variables explaining 
voluntary disclosures vary by 
information type. 
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Naser and Al-Khatib (2000)  
 
 
 
 
 
Jordan 30 
 
Following a set of previous studies. Unweighted 
score.  
Size, profitability, 
ownership structure, 
gearing ratio 
The depth of disclosure in the 
board of directors‘ statement 
was positively and 
significantly related to 
company size, profitability, 
and gearing, while negatively 
associated with individual 
ownership. 
 
Chau and Gray (2002)  
 
 
 
 
Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
 
113 
 
Following Meek et al.‘s (1995) study. Equally 
weighted index.  
Company size, leverage, 
size of auditors, ownership 
structure, profitability, 
multi-nationality  
A positive association 
between the extents of 
outside ownership with 
voluntary disclosure, whereas  
insider and 
family controlled companies 
were likely to be associated 
with lower information 
disclosure. 
Ferguson et al. (2002)  
 
 
Hong Kong 102 
 
Using lists developed by Meek et al. (1995); Gray 
et al. (1995) and Hossain et al. (1995). Unweighted 
disclosure scores. 
Company type, size, 
leverage, industry type, and 
multiple-listing status  
Company size was 
significantly and positively 
related to the overall level of 
disclosure and three types of 
information (strategic, 
financial, and non-financial). 
Also, leverage was 
significantly and positively 
related to overall level of 
disclosure and only with 
financial information. 
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Leventis and Weetman (2004) 
 
 
 
 
Greece 72 
 
Based on the disclosure list of Meek et al. (1995) 
and other prior studies.  Unweighted disclosure 
index.  
Corporate size, gearing,  
profitability, liquidity, 
industry type, share return, 
and listing status 
The level of disclosure was 
relatively low. Size had an 
explanatory power in overall 
disclosure and in each of the 
three categories of 
information. Industry type, 
share return, and listing 
status were shown to be 
associated with different 
disclosure categories. 
Suwaidan et al. (2004) Jordan 
 
37 The checklist is well reported in previous studies 
(e.g.  Buzby, 1974; Trotman and Bradley, 1981; Al-
Basteki, 1997). Equally weighted index.  
Company size, 
profitability, government 
ownership, risk   
The survey companies 
disclosed roughly 13 % of 
checklist. Size, profitability 
and risk 
were considered explanatory 
variables to explain the 
variation in  disclosure of 
social responsibility 
information.   
Naser et al. (2006) 
 
 
 
Qatar 34 Drawing from the work of Abu-Baker and Naser 
(2000) and other studies. Equally weighted index. 
Company size, growth, 
dividends paid, leverage, 
ownership structure  
Variations in social 
disclosure were associated 
with company size, leverage, 
and growth. 
 
Alsaeed (2006) 
 
Saudi Arabia 20 
 
Guided by Meek et al. (1995); Botosan (1997) and 
Naser and Nuseibeh (2003). Unweighted index. 
Company size, debt, 
ownership dispersion, 
company age,  profitability,  
liquidity, industry type, 
auditor type  
The level of disclosure lower 
than the average. 
Significance for large 
companies only.  
328 
 
Agca and Onder (2007) 
 
Turkey 87 
 
Following Meek et al. (1995) and Chau and Gray 
(2002). Unweighted approach. 
Company size, leverage, 
auditor type, ownership 
structure, profitability, 
multinationality 
All variables, with exception 
of  multinationality, differed 
in explaining variations in 
information groups 
Al-Shammari (2008) 
 
 
Kuwait 76 
 
Prior research (e.g. Leventis and Weetman, 2004; 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). Binary approach.    
Company size, leverage, 
profitability, ownership 
structure, assets-in-place, 
company age, complexity, 
internationality, auditor 
type, industry type 
 
Different explanatory factors 
(company size, leverage, 
auditor type, industry type, 
complexity, and company 
age) appeared to be 
associated with different 
disclosure categories. 
 
Wang et al. (2008) 
 
 
China 79 
 
Based on earlier studies (e.g. Gray et al., 1995). 
Unweighted disclosure index. 
Company size, leverage, 
ownership structure, 
company performance, 
type of auditor  
 
Voluntary disclosure was 
positively correlated with the 
proportion of state 
ownership, foreign 
ownership, company 
performance, and auditor 
type. 
Aljifri (2008) 
 
 
United Arab 
Emirates 
73 
 
Following the approach of Cooke (1989a). Company size, debt equity 
ratio, industry type, 
profitability 
 
The level of annual report 
disclosure significantly 
differs among industrial 
sectors. 
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Rizk et al. (2008) 
 
Egypt 34 
 
Previous researches. Equally weighted index.  Type of industry, 
ownership structure 
Significant differences in 
corporate social disclosure 
(CSD) among the companies 
of different industry 
segments surveyed and 
variations in CSD were 
associated with ownership 
structure. 
Hossain and Hammami (2009) 
 
Qatar 44 
 
Disclosure literature and recommended by 
international financial institutions.  
Age, size, profitability, 
complexity, assets-in-place 
Significance association for 
age, size, complexity, and 
assets-in-place. 
 
Khasharmeh and Suwaidan 
(2010) 
GCC 45 Relevant literature (e.g. Abu-Baker and Naser, 2000; 
Suwaidan et al., 2004; Hossain et al., 2006).  
Size of the company, 
government ownership, 
audit firm, profitability,  
and risk 
Company size and type of 
auditor were significant 
factors in explaining 
variation in disclosure 
practices.  
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APPENDIX 2: Examples of Studies Investigating the Association between Voluntary Disclosure in CARs and Governance Characteristics 
Study and Year Country No. of 
items 
Basis of items’ selection 
 
Variable examined Major results 
Ho and Wong (2001)  
 
Hong Kong 
 
 
 
 
20 Deriving from previous literature. 
Surveying analyst users using five-
point scale 
The % of independent non-
executive directors, the existence 
of an audit committee, the % of 
family members, assets-in-place, 
leverage, industry type, size  
The existence of an audit committee, 
size, and industry were positively related 
to the extent of voluntary disclosure, 
while the % of family members on the 
board negatively influenced disclosure 
practices. 
 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
Malaysia 65 Prior studies (e.g. Hossain et al., 
1994; Soh, 1996). Unweighted 
disclosure index 
Board composition, the % of 
family members, ownership, 
cultural, assets -in-place, size, 
profitability, industry, type of 
auditor, listing status 
Disclosure differs in response to family 
members sitting on the board and non-
executive chairman. Disclosure increase 
was associated with ownership by top 
10, foreign investors, size, profitability, 
and assets–in-place. 
   
Eng and Mak (2003) 
 
 
 
Singapore 42 Similar checklists to those of Eng 
and Teo‘s (1999) and Eng et al.‘s 
(2001) studies were employed. 
Weighted disclosure approach 
Ownership structure 
(government and managerial), 
non-executive directors, growth, 
company size, leverage, industry 
type,  auditor type, profitability,   
 
Companies with lower managerial 
ownership and with significant 
government ownership appeared to 
disclose more information. However, % 
of outside directors was negatively 
associated with disclosure practices.  
Larger companies and companies with 
lower debts were more likely to provide 
more voluntary information in CARs. 
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Gul and Leung (2004) 
 
 
Hong Kong 44 Following previous studies 
(Botosan, 1997; Meek et al., 1995 
; Hossain et al., 1995)  
and reviewing International 
Accounting Standards (IASs) and 
local listing requirements. Equally 
weighted disclosure index 
Board composition (including 
also proportion of experienced 
non-executive directors) 
directors, audit committee, 
directors‘ ownership, company 
size, leverage, liquidity, 
profitability, type of auditors, 
domestic/international listing 
status, industry type  
Companies with CEO duality were 
associated with lower disclosure; 
however, the higher expert outside 
directors on the board moderate this 
association. 
 
 
 
  
 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) 
  
 
Malaysia 53 A set of previous studies (e.g. 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Hossain 
et al., 1994). A weighted index  
Ownership structure (top 10 
shareholders, number of 
shareholders, directors‘ 
ownership, and government 
ownership), family members on 
the board, % of  non-executive 
directors (NED), role duality, 
size, profitability, and leverage  
 
Overall level of disclosure and three 
categories of information were 
statistically related to director ownership. 
Moreover, the extent of voluntary 
disclosure was associated with family 
directors as well as company size and 
profitability. 
Barako et al. (2006) 
 
Kenya 47 Based on previous studies such 
as Hossain et al. (1994) 
Board composition, board 
leadership structure, board size, 
audit committee, ownership 
structure, company size, 
leverage, audit firm, 
proﬁtability, liquidity, industry 
type  
Voluntary disclosure practices in the 
annual reports are influenced by 
corporate governance attributes, 
ownership structure, and company 
characteristics.  
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) 
 
 
Singapore 72 Based on Luo et al. (2006). 
Unweighted index.  
Board composition, board size, 
ownership structure, size, 
company performance, growth, 
leverage, listing status  
 
Companies with a higher proportion of 
independent directors tend to disclose 
more. In addition, companies with 
boards dominated by a majority of 
independent directors were expected to 
disclose more voluntary information. 
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Huafang and Jianguo (2007) 
 
China 30 Following previous studies 
(Botosan, 1997; Meek et al., 1995). 
Equally weighted index 
Ownership structure (block 
holder, government, 
managerial), board composition 
(independent directors, CEO 
duality), foreign listing, 
company size leverage, auditor 
reputation, growth  
Companies with higher block holder 
ownership and foreign listing and large 
companies had practices of greater 
disclosure as well as an increase in the % 
of independent directors on the board, 
while CEO duality as well companies 
with growth opportunities were 
negatively associated with corporate 
disclosure.   
Ghazali (2010) 
 
Malaysia 52 
 
 
 
Adopting of Ghazali and 
Weetman‘s (2006) checklist. An 
unweighted disclosure index  
Board composition (role duality 
and NED), family member, 
board size, government 
ownership, size, leverage, 
profitability, and industry 
Significance for the % of family 
members, board size, and the 
government ownership.  
Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) 
 
 
Kuwait 76 Relevant studies (e.g. Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006; Al-Shammari, 
2008). An unweighted disclosure 
index 
Board structure (NED and role 
duality), audit committee, family 
members, company size, 
leverage, auditor type, industry 
Significant association for the existence 
of an audit committee, industry type, and 
company size. 
Samaha and Dahawy 
(2010) 
 
Egypt   Based on earlier research (Chau 
and Gray, 2002; Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006). Dichotomous 
procedures   
 
 
 
No. of shareholders, block 
holder ownership, managerial 
ownership, government 
ownership, independent non-
executive directors, audit 
committee,  profitability, 
industry type, leverage, type of 
auditor, company size, liquidity 
Lower block holder ownership and 
managerial ownership, greater 
independent directors, and the presence 
of audit committee are linked to greater 
voluntary disclosure.  
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Alanezi (2011) Kuwait 51 
 
Based on previous studies  
(e.g. Hossain and Hammami, 
2009; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008 ; Barako et al., 2006;  
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) 
 
Cross directorships, CEO 
duality, board size 
size, age, leverage, 
industry 
A significant association between only 
one corporate governance (CG) variable: 
cross directorships and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. Also, company size 
and age, and leverage were significantly 
related to voluntary disclosure.    
Samaha et al. (2012) Egypt 53 Using a corporate governance 
checklist developed by the           
Intergovernmental Working  
Group of Experts on International 
Standards of Accounting and 
Reporting (ISARs) 
Board composition, board size, 
duality in position, ownership 
structure (director ownership 
and blockholder ownership, 
number of shareholders), audit 
committee   
The extent of CG disclosure is lower for 
companies with a role duality, while is 
higher for companies with a higher % of 
NED as well as with a higher % of 
blockholder ownership.  
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APPENDIX 3: Comparison of IIF Code and Kuwait’s Commercial Companies 
Law (CCL) & KSE Listing Requirements 
 
 
 
IIF 
Kuwait Commercial 
Companies Law (CCL) and 
KSE Listing Requirements 
Minority Shareholder Protection 
Voting rights 
Proxy voting Firms are encouraged to 
allow proxy voting. 
 
A shareholder may appoint 
another person to attend the 
meeting as proxy. 
(CCL Article 155) 
One share, one vote 
principle 
 
―One share, one vote‖ should 
be a threshold requirement 
for new issues. 
 
Every shareholder has a 
number of votes equal to the 
number of shares he/she 
holds.  
(CCL Article 156)  
Cumulative voting Cumulative voting should be 
permitted 
No provision. 
Capital structure 
Takeover/buyout/mer
ger procedures on 
major corporate 
changes 
Shareholder approval of 
mergers and major asset 
transactions should be 
required. 
If an offer is made above a 
reasonable minimum 
threshold of outstanding 
stock, a significant portion of 
that purchase must be 
through a public offer. 
Ownership exceeding 35% 
triggers a public offer in 
which all shareholders are 
treated equally. 
Under a merger or takeover, 
minority shareholders should 
have a legal right to sell 
shares at appraised value. 
Mergers, acquisitions and 
major asset transaction 
decisions should be passed - 
only by the general assembly 
in - extraordinary meetings 
and require approval from 
shareholders representing 
three-fourths of the shares of 
the company. 
(CCL Articles 222 to 225) 
Takeover/buyout/mer
ger procedures on 
major corporate 
changes 
Shareholder approval of 
mergers and major asset 
transactions should be 
required. 
If an offer is made above a 
reasonable minimum 
threshold of outstanding 
stock, a significant portion of 
that purchase must be 
through a public offer. 
Ownership exceeding 35% 
Mergers, acquisitions and 
major asset transaction 
decisions should be passed - 
only by the general assembly 
in - extraordinary meetings 
and require approval from 
shareholders representing 
three-fourths of the shares of 
the company. 
(CCL Articles 222 to 225) 
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triggers a public offer in 
which all shareholders are 
treated equally. 
Under a merger or takeover, 
minority shareholders should 
have a legal right to sell 
shares at appraised value. 
Capital increases 
(preemptive 
rights) 
Shareholder approval is 
required. Any capital 
increase over a period of one 
year and above a minimum 
threshold must first be 
offered to all existing 
shareholders. 
Shareholder approval is 
required on any capital 
increase. In addition, every 
shareholder has the right to 
subscribe number of the new 
shares proportionate the 
number of shares he/she 
already holds, in priority to 
all other applicants. 
(CCL Articles III, 158) 
Share buybacks Details of share buybacks 
should be fully disclosed to 
shareholders. 
The company can buy back 
its shares (Treasury stock) at 
the available price, provided 
it does not exceed 10% of 
outstanding capital. 
(CCL Article 115) 
In accordance with the 
Director General resolution 
No. (22) of 1987, all listed 
companies should inform the 
market immediately (next 
day) about the general 
assembly approval, and 
obtain market approval 
before any sale or purchase 
transaction, as well as 
provide a detailed schedule 
showing the movement of all 
sales and purchase 
transactions every three 
months. 
Also see the Ministerial 
Resolution No. 10 of 1988 
which regulates treasury 
stock transactions. 
Shareholder meeting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meeting notice and agenda 
should be sent to 
shareholders within a 
reasonable amount of time 
prior to meetings. 
The shareholders shall hold a 
general assembly meeting at 
least once a year. The board 
of directors however, may 
call a meeting of the 
assembly whenever it sees 
fit. 
Notice of the meeting shall 
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be sent to all shareholders 
either by registered mail or 
by advertising in two daily 
newspapers. The 
advertisement shall contain 
an accurate summary of the 
meeting agenda. The 
advertisement should be 
repeated twice. The second 
advertisement should be 
published at least one week 
after the first advertisement, 
and at least one week prior to 
the company‘s general 
assembly meeting. 
(CL Article 154). 
In addition, and as part of the 
listing requirements, the 
company must hold its 
general assembly meeting 
within 45 days from the 
approval of its audited 
financial statements by the 
stock exchange. The 
distribution of proposed 
dividends to all shareholders 
registered at the general 
assembly date should be 
made within 45 days 
following the general 
assembly meeting. 
Special meetings Minority shareholders should 
be able to call special 
meetings with some 
minimum threshold of the 
outstanding shares, 
The board of directors should 
call for a general assembly 
meeting whenever requested 
by a number of shareholders 
holding not less than one-
tenth of the capital. 
(CCL Article 154) 
An extraordinary meeting 
may be called by the board 
when an application in 
writing is made by 
shareholders holding not less 
than one- fourth of the shares 
of the company. 
(CCL Article 159) 
Treatment of foreign 
shareholders 
Foreign shareholders should 
be treated equally with 
domestic shareholders. 
The holders of the company‘s 
shares shall be deemed 
members of that company. 
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 They shall have the same 
rights and obligations, 
subject to law. 
(CCL Article 130) 
Conflicts between  
shareholders 
 
Should have mechanisms 
whereby a majority of 
minority shareholders can 
trigger an arbitration 
procedure to resolve conflicts 
between minority and 
controlling shareholders. 
Every shareholder has votes 
equal to the number of shares 
he holds and resolutions shall 
be passed by the absolute 
majority of the shares 
represented. Prejudiced 
parties can refer to the courts. 
(CCL Article 155) 
Quorum 
 
Should not be set too high or 
too low. Suggested level 
would be about 30% and 
should include some 
independent non-majority- 
owning shareholders. 
The quorum of the general 
assembly meeting shall be a 
number of shareholders 
holding more than half the 
total number of shares. If this 
quorum is not present, notice 
shall be given of a second 
meeting. The member present 
at the second meeting, 
whatever their number may 
be, shall be a quorum. 
(CCL Article 155) 
The quorum of an 
extraordinary meeting of the 
general assembly shall be 
shareholders representing 
three-fourths of the shares of 
the company. If this quorum 
is not present, notice shall be 
given of a second meeting. 
The quorum of the second 
meeting shall be shareholders 
representing more than half 
of the shares. 
(CCL Article 160) 
Petition rules/ 
objection to majority 
shareholder actions 
Minority shareholders should 
have the right to formally 
present a view to the board if 
they own some predefined 
minimum threshold of 
outstanding shares. 
It is a member‘s right, to 
apply to the court for 
nullifying any resolution of 
the general assembly or the 
board of directors which 
infringes the law, public 
policy or the articles of the 
company or its memorandum 
of association. 
(CCL item 5 of Article 131) 
Structure and Responsibility of the Board of Directors 
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Board  structure 
Definition of 
independence 
Cannot have a business or 
personal relationship with the 
management or company, 
and cannot be a controlling 
shareholder such that 
independence, or appearance 
of independence, is 
jeopardized. 
CCL regulates the board of 
directors. 
(CCL Articles no. 138 to 
153) 
Share of independent 
directors 
 
At least one-third of the 
board should be non-
executive, a majority of 
whom should be 
independent. 
 
No provision. 
Frequency and record 
of meetings 
 
For large companies, board 
meetings every quarter, audit 
committee meetings every 6 
months.  
Minutes of meetings should 
become part of public record. 
The board shall meet at least 
four times every fiscal year, 
unless the articles of the 
company provide for more. 
(CCL Article 144) 
A copy of the general 
assembly minutes of 
meetings signed by the 
official authority should be 
provided to the Stock 
Exchange within two weeks. 
The Stock Exchange must 
immediately disclose to the 
public all of the significant 
decisions made. 
(KLR) 
Quorum 
 
Should consist of executive, 
non- executive, and 
independent non- executive 
members. 
Unless the articles provide 
for a greater number or 
percentage, the quorum of 
the board of directors shall be 
half the members of the 
board, or three members, 
whichever is greater. 
(CCL Article 144) 
Nomination and 
election of directors 
Should be done by 
nomination committee 
chaired by art independent 
director. Minority 
shareholders should have 
mechanism for putting 
forward directors at Annual 
General Meeting (AGM) and 
No provision for a 
nomination committee. 
The members of the board of 
directors shall be elected by 
ballot; but the memorandum 
of association of the 
company may provide that a 
number of the members of 
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Extraordinary General 
Meeting (EGM). 
the company‘s first board of 
directors, not exceeding half 
of them, shall be elected from 
among the founders. 
(CCL Article 141) 
Term limits for 
independent directors 
For large companies, re-
election should be every 3 
years with specified term 
limits. 
Period the articles of the 
company. The board of 
directors shall consist of not 
less than three members and 
the period of membership 
shall not exceed three years. 
This period may be renewed. 
(CCL Article 538) 
Board committees The board should set up 3 
essential committees: 
nomination, compensation 
and audit. 
Except for audit committees 
in all companies under the 
Central Bank‘s supervision, 
such committees are not 
required. 
Formal evaluation of 
board 
 
For large companies, 
nomination committee must 
review directors ahead of 
formal re-election at AGM. 
No provision. 
Disclosure 
Immediate disclosure 
of information that 
affects share prices, 
including major asset 
sales or pledges 
 
 
Any material information 
that could affect share prices 
should be disclosed through 
stock exchange. Material 
information includes 
acquisition/disposal of assets, 
board changes, related- party 
deals, ownership changes, 
directors‘ shareholdings, etc. 
Each company is liable to 
inform the market directly 
and immediately about all 
material information before 
disclosing the same to the 
public through newspapers or 
other media. The company is 
liable to confirm or deny any 
news published through 
media when it may affect 
share prices. 
Also under listing 
requirements, certain major 
matters require disclosure: 
The acquisition or disposal of 
a subsidiary or an associate 
by the company or any of its 
unlisted subsidiaries; 
• The acquisition or disposal 
of an asset by an amount 
equivalent to 5% or more of 
its total assets; 
• Any contract by an amount 
of 5% or more of the 
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company‘s paid up capital, 
and any subsequent 
amendments; 
• Any amendments to the 
company‘s articles of 
association; 
• Any changes in accounting 
policies, provided that 
approval from the stock 
exchange is received; 
• Any outstanding court cases 
in which the company is 
plaintiff or defendant, as well 
as any court decision taken; 
• Any changes in the 
collateral or mortgages of 
long-term loans, or any loans 
settled before the due date, or 
rescheduled. This disclosure 
is required for any loan 
equivalent to 5% or more of 
the company‘s total 
liabilities; 
• Any changes in board 
members or executive 
managers; Related-party 
transactions; 
• Changes in ownership. 
Procedures for 
information release 
Through local exchanges, 
and as best practice, through 
company website. 
No provision. 
Remuneration of 
directors 
 
 
Should be disclosed in annual 
report. All major 
compensation schemes, 
including stock options, 
should be fully disclosed and 
subject to shareholder 
approval, 
Directors‘ remuneration 
should be disclosed in the 
board of directors‘ report and 
the audited financial 
statements, and it is subject 
to shareholders‘ approval in 
the annual general assembly 
meeting. 
In addition, and in the 
absence of a compensation 
committee, the CCL 
determines the maximum and 
the minimum amount of such 
remuneration. 
(CCL Article 150) 
Regarding stock options, 
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both the Ministerial decision 
no. 337 of 2004, and the 
Market Director decision no. 
2 of 2005 require the prior 
approval of the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry as 
well as shareholder approval 
in the general assembly 
meeting. Also, full details 
about the stock option 
program, including the board 
members share, exercise 
date, number, of shares 
assigned, the expected cost 
upon the exercise of the 
option, and all other major 
terms should be disclosed to 
shareholders in the annual 
general assembly meeting. 
Other responsibilities 
Conflict of interest 
 
Any potential or actual 
conflicts of interest on the 
part of directors should be 
disclosed. Board members 
should abstain from voting if 
they have a conflict of 
interest pertaining to that 
matter, 
The Chairman or other 
members of the board may 
not have direct or indirect 
benefit in the contracts and 
transactions of the company, 
unless so authorized by the 
general assembly. Neither 
can they participate in the 
management of a similar 
company.  
(CCL Article 151) 
Integrity of internal 
control and risk 
management system 
Should be a function of the 
audit committee. 
As indicated earlier, except 
for banks and financial 
institutions audit committee 
requirements do not exist - 
however, it is the 
responsibility of the 
company‘s management to 
maintain art adequate internal 
control system, and to 
evaluate and improve the risk 
management system. In 
addition, it is the external 
auditors‘ responsibility to 
ensure that a proper internal 
control system is adopted as 
well as to evaluate the risk 
management system. 
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Investor relations Should have an investor 
relations program. 
No provision. 
Social responsibility 
and ethics 
Make a statement on policy 
concerning environmental 
issues and social 
responsibility. 
No provision. 
Accounting/Auditing 
Standards 
National/International 
GAAP 
Identify accounting standard 
used. Comply with local 
practices and use 
consolidated accounting 
(annually) for all subsidiaries 
in which sizable ownership 
exists. 
As per Ministerial decision 
no. 18 of 1990, all Kuwaiti 
companies must adopt the 
International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
in preparing financial 
statements. 
Audits should be performed 
in accordance with the 
International Standard on 
Auditing (ISA). 
In addition, and provided that 
the disclosure requirement 
under (IFRS) covers all 
significant issues in the 
financial statement, the stock 
exchange may require 
additional disclosure (if 
necessary) in order to 
improve transparency and to 
protect shareholders and 
dealers. 
Frequency Semi-annually audited report 
at end-FY. 
Each company should submit 
a quarterly condensed 
reviewed financial statement 
within. 45 days from the 
reporting date and a jointly 
audited financial statement at 
the end of each fiscal year, 
which should be submitted 
within three months from the 
year end date. 
(Listing Requirements) 
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Audit quality Independent public 
accountant. As a best 
practice, auditors should 
adhere to the global standards 
devised by the International 
Forum on Accountancy 
Development (IFAD). 
Under stock exchange 
requirements, each company 
should have at least two 
independent auditors (joint 
audit), and as indicated above 
audit should be performed in 
accordance with the 
International Standard on 
Auditing (ISA). 
(CCL Article 161) 
Off-balance sheet 
transactions 
Listing requirements should 
specify disclosure of off-
balance- sheet transactions in 
the annual report with 
materiality level for 
disclosure. 
Full details of off-balance 
sheet transactions should be 
disclosed in the interim and 
annual financial statements. 
(IFRS Disclosure 
Requirements) 
The stock exchange has the 
right to check and investigate 
the company‘s books and 
records, as well as any 
supporting documents in case 
any doubt exists or any 
further information is 
required. Also, it should be 
taken into consideration that 
all banks and financial 
institutions which represent a 
major portion of market 
activities are subject to 
detailed review by the 
Central Bank of Kuwait. 
(KSE Listing Requirements) 
Risk factors/ 
monitoring procedures 
Should be statement from 
audit committee in reports 
and accounts addressing 
business risks. Need a 
mechanism for review by 
auditors. 
No provision. 
Audit committee 
Audit committee For large firms, must be 
chaired by qualified 
independent director with a 
financial background. 
Audit committees exist only 
in banks and financial 
institutions under the 
supervision of Central Bank 
of Kuwait. 
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Relationship/commun
ication with internal 
and external auditors 
Committee should approve 
services provided by external 
auditor. Breakdown of 
proportion of fees paid for 
each service should be made 
available in annual report. As 
a best practice, 
communication with auditors 
should be without executives 
present. Contemporaneous 
provision of audit and non-
audit services from the same 
entity should be prohibited 
Please see the above item. 
Contemporaneous provision 
of audit and non-audit 
services from the same entity 
is prohibited. 
Transparency of Ownership and Control 
Majority ownership Significant ownership (20-
50% including cross-
holdings) is deemed to be 
control.  
Law No. 2 of 1999 regulates 
the disclosure of interest of 
5% and above. 
Director General Resolution 
No. 2 of 2006 was issued to 
regulate the sale procedures 
for deals that exceed 5% of 
the company‘s share capital. 
Buyout offer to 
minority shareholders 
Ownership exceeding 35% 
triggers a buyout offer in 
which all shareholders are 
treated equally. 
No provision. 
Related-party 
ownership 
Companies should disclose 
directors‘ and senior 
executives‘ shareholdings, 
and all insider dealings by 
directors and senior 
executives should be 
disclosed. 
The company undertakes that 
the board of directors or any 
other independent committee 
(such as an audit committee) 
will review and approve all 
material related-party 
transactions and ensure that 
they are performed on an 
arms‘ length basis. 
Also, the company is liable to 
present a full disclosure 
based on the requirement of 
IAS 24. 
In addition, related-party 
transactions should be 
approved by shareholders in 
the general assembly 
meeting. 
The company should 
establish rules in order to 
prohibit directors and senior 
345 
 
 
 
 
IIF 
Kuwait Commercial 
Companies Law (CCL) and 
KSE Listing Requirements 
executives from benefiting 
from any information before 
it is announced to the public 
or other parties.  
(KSE Listing Requirements 
and CCL Article 140) 
Minimally significant 
shareholders 
Shareholders with minimally 
significant ownership 
(greater than 3-10%) of 
outstanding shares must 
disclose their holdings. 
Please refer to the above item 
―Majority ownership‖ under 
Transparency of Ownership 
and Control. 
Regulatory Environment 
Enforcement powers The supervisory authority 
and the exchange must have 
adequate enforcement 
powers. Exchanges should 
have the power to grant, 
review, suspend, or terminate 
the listing of securities. 
Enforcement authorities 
should have adequate 
training and an understanding 
of the judicial process. 
Under Article 14 of the 
Amiri Decree‘s & By-Law 
organizing Kuwait Stock 
Exchange, it is clearly 
indicated that the violation 
committee has such 
enforcement powers. 
Independence of 
supervisory body and 
of exchange 
The supervisory body and the 
exchange should be 
independent from 
government and industry. 
Article 1 of the Amiri 
Decree‘s & By-Law 
organizing Kuwait Stock 
Exchange states that ―the 
Kuwait Stock Exchange 
enjoys an independent 
judicial entity with 
competence and capacity to 
dispose of its property and 
funds besides managing the 
same and shall have the right 
of litigation. 
Source: Commercial Companies Law (CCL) No. 15 of 1960 (as amended) and The HI and The 
IIF Report (2007) 
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Reports: Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
347 
 
Dear Sir 
I am a PhD student at Durham University in England. Currently, I am conducting 
research into voluntary disclosure by companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange. 
The objective of this questionnaire is to elicit the perceptions and expectations of 
different stakeholder groups of annual reports regarding the importance and usefulness 
of voluntary information items. The study also examines the perceptions of various 
users regarding corporate governance best practices. This survey is an important part of 
the study so your co-operation and participation in answering these questions will be 
very valuable. I would like to confirm that responses and personal opinions obtained 
from this questionnaire are for research purposes only and will be treated in the strictest 
confidence. Finally, please accept my appreciation for your cooperation.   
 
Yours faithfully  
Abdullah Al Mutawaa 
Lecturer at the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training (PAAET) 
Email: Abdullah.almutawaa@durham.ac.uk 
Tel:   
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Section One: Background Information:  
JOB DESCRIPTION 
1. Please indicate your main place of work  
 
[    ]   Government; if yes, please specify     ____________________ 
[    ]   Private sector; if yes, please specify ____________________ 
 
2. Type of job (Choose one)  
 
[    ] Financial Advisory              [    ] Market Regulator 
[    ] External Auditor              [    ] Academic 
  
3. Employment record (years) [    ]  0 - 5 [    ]  6 - 10 [    ]  more than 10 
 
4. The main activities involved in your job:  
 
 
5. Academic qualifications: (the highest degree or diploma earned) 
 
[    ]   Diploma  [    ] Bachelor [    ] Master          [    ] PhD                       
[    ] Other (please specify) ____________________ 
 
6. Professional qualifications (any professional certificate earned such as CPA, CMA, etc.); if yes, 
please specify ____________________ 
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Section Two: 
Sources of Information and their Importance 
1. Please indicate the degree of importance that you perceive the following sources of 
information might have in affecting your decisions 
 
 
 
Sou                                                 Sources of Information 
Not  at 
all 
important 
Of  
 little 
importance 
 
Neutral Important Extremely 
important 
 
 
1 Corporate annual report      
2 Corporate interim report      
3 Company‘s website      
4 KSE‘s website      
5 Newspapers and magazines      
6 Market rumours      
7 Personal expectations      
8 Recommendations from a friend       
9 Advice from specialists      
10 Other sources (please specify) 
 
1. _____________________________ 
 
2. _____________________________ 
 
3. _____________________________ 
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Content of Annual Reports 
2. To what extent do you believe the following sections of corporate annual reports are 
useful for making decisions? 
 
 
 
 
 
       Different Sections of Corporate  
                    Annual Reports 
Not  at  
all 
important 
Of  
 little 
importance 
 
Neutral Important Extremely 
important 
 
1 
Chairman‘s letter/message       
2 
Management report / management 
discussion and analysis (MD&A)  
     
3 Independent auditors‘ reports      
4 Statement of financial position      
5 Income statement        
6 Statement of cash flow      
7 
Statement of changes in owners‘ 
equity 
     
8 Accounting policies      
9 Notes to the financial statements      
        10 Other (please specify) 
 
1. __________________________ 
 
2.  __________________________ 
 
3. __________________________ 
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The Qualitative Characteristics of Corporate Information 
3. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree that information provided in 
the annual reports of Kuwaiti listed companies has the following features: 
 
  Characteristics Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 Capable of making a difference to your 
decision 
     
2 Available on a timely basis      
3 Faithfully represents what really happened or 
existed 
     
4 Unbiased (neutral: cannot favour one user 
group over another) 
     
5 Comparable (you can compare one company 
with another) 
     
6 Consistent with accounting methods over time      
 
If you have any further critical comments about the sources of information in Kuwait 
and/or your rating of the importance for previous items, please provide them here. 
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Section Three: Different Aspects of Voluntary Disclosure Practices in the KSE 
1. Please use the scale below to rate your perception of level of voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports. 
 
Very low       Low           Neutral    
 
 
 High  Very high 
   
 
2. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the voluntary information 
disclosed in the annual reports would be useful in the following areas: 
 
 Statements Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 Improving the usefulness of the annual 
report as a source of information for 
decision making 
     
2 Improving the level of confidence in 
decision making 
     
3 Supporting investors in monitoring their 
investments   
     
4 Assisting in making new or additional 
investments 
     
5 Helping users to make comparisons 
regarding a specific company‘s 
performance over periods of time, such as 
the last five fiscal years 
     
6 A tool used as a benchmark in comparing 
the company‘s performance with that of 
competitors  
     
7 A tool used as a benchmark in comparing 
companies‘ performance on the KSE 
     
8 Aiding in the preparation of more ratios 
and analysis 
     
9 Enhancing the ability of users to forecast 
the expected revenues, profits, and cash 
flow of a company  
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10 Other (please specify) 
 
1. __________________________ 
 
2. __________________________ 
 
3. __________________________ 
 
     
 
 
3. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following information 
items would improve the quality of voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports. 
 
                                           Items of information  Strongly 
disagree 
 Disagree Neutral Agree   Strongly 
agree 
A Information related to board 
 
 
     
1 Names of non-executive board members 
 
 
 
     
2 Biography of board members (education and 
practical experience qualifications)      
3 Names of board members who have directorships in 
other Kuwaiti and/or overseas listed companies 
and/or overseas listed companies 
 
     
4 Remuneration and benefits per member   
     
5 Types of board committees      
6 Board committees‘ responsibilities      
7 Name of board committees‘ members      
8 Process for appointing board committees‘  
Members      
B Information related to key management      
9 Names of senior executive management       
10 Biography of senior executive management  
(education and practical experience qualifications)       
11 Responsibilities assigned to executive members      
12 Top management‘s salaries and other benefits per 
key manager       
C Information related to employees      
13 Complying with national standards and national 
regulations concerning health and safety at work      
14 Providing low cost health insurance for employees      
15 Giving financial support to employees to obtain or 
build upon academic/professional qualifications      
16 Number of training hours of each employee 
     
17 Budget assigned to training and development 
programmes 
     
18 Number of employees trained yearly      
D Social and environmental information      
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19 Conservation of natural resources (e.g. recycling) 
and waste management  
     
20 Conservation of energy and material resources‘ 
consumption in the company operations  
     
21 International Organization for Standardisation (ISO) 
regarding  environmental audit/ISO 14000 
     
22 Sponsoring  public health and social projects      
23 Part-time employment of students      
24 Sponsoring educational seminars and/conferences 
     
E Information related to products/services      
25 Description of major products/services produced and 
delivered 
     
26 Description of marketing network for finished 
goods/services  
     
27 Contribution by companies of   products/services to 
support the national economy 
     
28 Developments regarding  products or services       
29 Receiving awards as a result of increase in the 
quality of the company‘s products/services 
     
30 If there is any other information, please list 
 
1. _____________________________ 
 
2. _____________________________ 
 
3. _____________________________ 
 
4. _____________________________ 
 
5. _____________________________ 
 
     
 
If you have any further critical comments to improve voluntary disclosure (e.g. other 
voluntary items that should be disclosed in corporate annual reports) and/or your rating 
of the agreement for previous items, please provide them here. 
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Section Four: Factors that Might Affect Company’s Information Transparency  
1. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the following factors have an 
effect on companies‘ information transparency.  
 
 
Statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 Board reputation        
2 Senior executive management  
Reputation 
 
     
3 Company reputation      
4 External auditors‘ reputation      
5 Capital market confidence      
6 Source of information      
7 Increasing mandatory disclosure 
requirements  
     
8 The ability of market participants to  
assess the reliability of companies‘  
disclosure policies 
 
     
9 Application of corporate governance   
Best practices 
 
     
10 Any other factors, please specify 
1. ____________________________ 
2. ____________________________ 
3. ____________________________ 
 
     
 
Section Five: Accounting Regulations and KSE’s Growth 
1. From your point of view, is it important to reduce overlapping in the surveillance and 
enforcement functions among regulatory bodies?    
   
Of little importance Not at all important    Neutral           
   
  
 
                 Important                                               Extremely important  
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2. It has been suggested that the level of confidence and investment in the capital 
markets as well as the level of competitive capital markets are influenced by the rules 
and regulations set by regulatory bodies. Indicate to what extent you agree or disagree 
that the following procedures should be set in Kuwait: 
 
 
                                                     Statements 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 The Capital Market Authority should act as an  
independent body to give strength to the monitoring  
function of the KSE‘s performance  
 
     
2 The improvement of skills of regulatory bodies‘ 
staff that enhance the bodies‘ abilities to 
supervise and monitor in order to verify the 
extent of compliance by  
KSE participants  
 
     
3 An increase in the national disclosure 
requirements (e.g. ownership structure and 
related-party transactions)  
 
     
4 An upgrade of the KSE website that provides 
financial data on a more timely basis and other 
up-to-date company-specific information 
 
     
5 Setting more precise/systematic procedures for 
listed companies to disclose information through 
the company/KSE‘s website   
 
     
6 Any other issues, please specify  
 
1. ______________________________ 
 
2. ______________________________ 
 
3. _______________________________ 
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3. Corporate governance codes have a positive effect on building up the relationships 
between company management, its board, and all stakeholders, such as shareholders. 
The following have been recommended by some reports in order to improve capital 
market confidence as well as to boost investment and the competitive environment in 
the KSE. Please indicate, by choosing the appropriate number, the degree of difficulty 
associated with their application in the Kuwaiti business environment. 
 
Statements 
           Degree of difficulty  
Very 
difficult 
Difficult Moderate Limited No 
difficulties 
 
1 Corporate governance codes that 
are designed to strengthen board 
practices should be implemented, 
and they should be modified to 
match the Kuwaiti business 
environment, if necessary  
 
     
2 The Kuwaiti Association of 
Accountants and  Auditors should 
be  involved in the process of 
adopting governance codes 
 
     
3 Education programmes should be 
set to enhance the education and 
awareness of boards regarding the 
importance of corporate 
governance 
 
     
4 Education programmes should be 
set to foster a culture of shared 
awareness among investors  
     
5 A mechanism should be established 
that would stimulate a public offer 
when ownership exceeds 35%   
  
     
6 Senior management and board 
remuneration should be linked 
with company performance  
 
     
7 One third of board members 
should be non-executive, and the 
majority of them should be 
independent   
 
     
8 Independent and non-executive 
directors should be present to form 
a quorum for board meetings 
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9 There should be audit, nomination 
and compensation committees for 
all companies listed in the KSE 
 
     
10 Restriction of family members‘ 
role in senior management  
 
     
 
 If you have any further critical comments about the issue of regulations (e.g. corporate 
governance) in Kuwait and/or your rating for previous statements, please provide them 
here. 
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APPENDIX 5: Questions Submitted to Listed Companies 
 
1. What are the types of board committees (e.g. audit committee) that the 
company had in the years 2005-2008? 
 
2. Is your company cross-listed with another stock market besides the Kuwait 
Stock Exchange? If so, please give the year and stock market name. 
 
3. What is the percentage of directors (regardless of whether executive/non-
executive) on the board with directorships in other Kuwaiti listed companies, 
out of the total number of directors in the years 2005-2008? 
360 
 
APPENDIX 6: The Auditors’ Recommendations Regarding the Preliminary 
Checklist 
Serial Items of Information Auditors’ Recommendations 
1 Discussion of financial strength of the 
company 
Eliminating  
2 Brief narrative history of company Brief narrative history of company [other 
than legal history] 
 
Items of Information Eliminated from the Checklist 
Serial Items of Information Serial Items of Information 
1 Earnings per share forecast 7 Top management‘s salaries per key manager 
and other benefits per key manager  
2 Remuneration and other benefits 
per director    
8 Reasons for employee turnover 
3 Responsibilities and authorities 
assigned to executive directors  
9 Number of training hours needed to be 
covered by each employee  
4 Age of the directors 10 Sponsoring employees‘ education 
5 Directors‘ interests in significant 
contracts 
11 Information on providing of health services 
for employees 
6 Directors‘ interests in competing 
businesses 
  
 
The Accounting Academics’ Recommendations Regarding the Preliminary 
Checklist 
Serial Items of Information Accounting Academics’ 
Recommendations 
1 Photo of chairperson only  Names of  board of directors  
2 Photo of all directors Same as above 
3 Picture of major types of 
products/services 
Information on major types of 
products/services 
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APPENDIX 7: Checklist of Company's Voluntary Disclosures 
  Company name:                                                                             Code: 
A Corporate Environment 
  General Information about the Surrounding Environment 
1 General outlook of the economy 
2 General outlook of the industry 
3 Information about political developments  
Subtotal 3 
  General Corporate Information 
4 Brief narrative history of company/company profile (other than legal history) 
5 Description of organizational structure 
Subtotal 2 
  Specific Corporate Information and Strategy 
6 Statement of strategy and objectives  
7 Discussion of competitive position of the company 
Subtotal 2 
  Market-Related Information and Investor Relations 
8 Market capitalization at year end 
9 Market capitalization trend  
10 Share price at year end 
11 Share price trend   
12 Web page address 
13 Geographical distributions of shareholders 
Subtotal 6 
B Corporate Financial Performance and Future Prospects 
  Financial Review Information  
1 Profitability ratios    
2 Liquidity ratios  
3 Leverage ratios  
4 Financial highlights / Financial summary (3 yrs / +) 
5 Information on the company‘s dividends policy 
Subtotal 5 
  Forward-Looking Information  
6 Sales (revenues)/profit forecast 
7 Adopted basis underlying the forecasts 
8 Planning for introducing new products / services development  
9 Planned capital expenditure  
Subtotal 4 
C Corporate Governance Information 
  Information about Board of Directors  
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1 Name of directors 
2 Education  and/or professional qualifications of the executive directors 
3 Education and/or professional qualifications of the non-executive directors 
4 Business experience of the non-executive directors 
5 Business experience of the executive directors 
6 Positions held by executive directors    
Subtotal 6 
  Information about Top Management  
7 
Top management's names (e.g. CEO, CFO, COO [Operating Officer], FM, Head of 
Internal Audit [HID])  
8 Management's education and/or professional qualifications  
9 Business experience of top management 
10 Positions held by top management  
11 Responsibilities and authorities assigned to top management  
Subtotal 5 
D Corporate Social and Environment Information  
  Employee Information 
1 Recruitment policies (e.g. equal opportunity, diversity, supporting national manpower)  
2 Number and categories of employees by department for the last two years / + 
3 Percentage of Kuwaiti employees in the company  
4 
Company policy on learning & education programme (L & E) and required continuous 
education programme (CEP) points for each employee  
5 Statement on employees' training programme provided by the company 
6 Number of employees trained yearly 
7 
Information about employees' workplace health and safety, also data on workplace 
accidents 
Subtotal 7 
  Community Involvement and Environmental  Information  
8 Statement of corporate social responsibility 
9 
Information on community involvement/participation (e.g. sponsoring/donations of 
social, education, health campaigns/programmes)  
10 Statement of environmental policy 
11 
Information on environmental activities/participations (e.g. ISO/environmental, energy, 
and recycle campaigns/programmes) 
Subtotal 4 
  Product / Service Information 
12 Information on major types of products/services produced 
13 Description of marketing network for finished goods/services  
14 Contribution by companies of products/services to support the national economy  
15 Developments regarding  products / services 
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16 
Receiving quality awards as a result of increase in the quality of the company‘s 
products /services 
Subtotal 5 
Total 49 
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 اٌّذزشَ                                          / اٌغ١ذ
 
 رذ١خ ط١جخ ٚ ثؼذ ،،،
 
. ٔشغت فٟ إجشاء ثذش ثخظٛص الإفظبح الأخز١بسٜ ٌٍششوبد اٌّذسجخ فٟ عٛق اٌىٛ٠ذ ٌلأٚساق اٌّبٌ١خ
ٚاٌٙذف ِٓ ٘زا الاعزج١بْ ٘ٛ اٌذظٛي ػٍٝ رظٛساد ٚرٛلؼبد ِغزخذِٟ اٌزمبس٠ش اٌغٕٛ٠خ ف١ّب ٠زؼٍك ثؤّ٘١خ 
اعخ أ٠ضب رظٛساد ِغزخذِٟ اٌزمبس٠ش اٌغٕٛ٠خ ف١ّب ٠زؼٍك ثّٛضٛع ٚرجذش اٌذس. الاخز١بس٠خٚفبئذح اٌّؼٍِٛبد 
ٚ ٠ؼزجش الاعزج١بْ جضء ُِٙ ِٓ ٘زٖ اٌذساعخ، ٚثبٌزبٌٟ فؤْ رؼبٚٔىُ ِؼٕب ثبٌّشبسوخ فٟ الإجبثخ . دٛوّخ اٌششوبد
اٌزٟ عٛف  ساءا٢ ٚ ػٍّب ثؤْ جّ١غ الإجبثبد. ػٍٝ ٘زٖ الأعئٍخ ع١ىْٛ ٌٗ رؤص١شٖ الأ٠جبثٝ فٟ رذم١ك أ٘ذاف اٌذساعخ
 .ٔذظً ػٍ١ٙب ِٓ خلاي الاعزج١بْ عٛف رىْٛ لأ٘ذاف اٌذساعخ فمط ٚ رؼبًِ ثغش٠خ ربِخ
 
 
 ٚ رفضٍٛا ثمجٛي فبئك الادزشاَ ٚ اٌزمذ٠ش
 
 
 
 ػجذالله اٌّطٛع
 :٘برف
 :ثش٠ذ اٌىزشٟٚٔ
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 :معلىمبث أسبسيت: القسم الأول 
 :ٚطف اٌٛظ١فخ
 ِىبْ اٌؼًّ اٌشئ١غٝ  .1
 ----------------------ٟ ، ٚإرا وبٔذ الإجبثخ ثٕؼُ ، ٠شجٝ رذذ٠ذ اٌجٙخ اٌمطبع اٌذىِٛ]    [ 
 --------------------اٌمطبع اٌخبص ،  ٚإرا وبٔذ الإجبثخ ثٕؼُ ،  ٠شجٝ رذذ٠ذ اٌمطبع   ]    [
 أخشٜ  ]    [
 
 :ٔٛع اٌٛظ١فخ. 2
                  ِشاجغ دغبثبد خبسجٟ [    ]    جٙبد رٕظ١ّ١خ[    ] 
           ِذ٠ش ِذبفظ ِبٌ١خ[    ]      ػضٛ ٘١ئخ رذس٠غ١خ]    [ 
    )٠شجٝ اٌزذذ٠ذ(أخشٜ ،   [    ]
                                     
 عٕٛاد اٌخجشح. 3
 عٕٛاد 01أوضش ِٓ  ]    [   01-6  ]    [   ]    [ 5 – 0
 
 :اٌّٙبَ ٚالأٔشطخ اٌشئ١غ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثبٌٛظ١فخ. 4
 
 
 
 
 ) أػٍٝ شٙبدح أوبد٠ّ١خ رُ اٌذظٛي ػٍ١ٙب(ٌّؤ٘لاد اٌؼٍّ١خ ا. 5
 دوزٛساٖ   ]    [  ِبجغز١ش   ]    [ ثىبٌٛس٠ٛط   ]    [ دثٍَٛ ]    [
------------------------------------   )٠شجٝ اٌزذذ٠ذ(أخشٜ ،    ]    [
 
 ٔذ الإجبثخ ٔؼُ ٠شجٝ اٌزذذ٠ذ، إرا وب) AMC ,APCِضً (اٌشٙبداد إٌّٙ١خ اٌزٟ رُ اٌذظٛي ػٍ١ٙب . 6
------------------------------------ 
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 مصبدر المعلىمبث وأهميتهب: القسم الثبني 
  ٠شجٝ رذذ٠ذ ِذٜ أّ٘١خ ِظبدس اٌّؼٍِٛبد اٌزٟ لذ رؤصش ػٍٝ لشاساره. 1
غ١ش ُِٙ  ِظبدس اٌّؼٍِٛبد 
ػٍٝ 
 الإطلاق
 
لٍ١ً 
 الأّ٘١خ
ُِٙ  ُِٙ   ِذب٠ذ 
 ٌٍغب٠خ
      ششوبدٌٍ اٌزمبس٠ش اٌغٕٛ٠خ 1
      ٌٍششوبد اٌفظٍ١خ اٌزمبس٠ش 2
      ىزشٌٟٚٔالاِٛلغ اٌششوخ  3
      الاٌىزشِٟٚٔٛلغ عٛق اٌىٛ٠ذ ٌلأٚساق اٌّبٌ١خ  4
      اٌجشائذ ٚاٌّجلاد 5
      اٌشبئؼبد 6
      اٌزٛلؼبد اٌشخظ١خ 7
      اٌزٛط١بد ِٓ  لجً الأطذلبء 8
      ٓ لجً اٌّزخظظ١ٓٔظبئخ ِ 9
 01
 
 
 )٠شجٝ اٌزذذ٠ذ(ِظبدس أخشٜ 
 
 _______________________________. 1
 
 _______________________________. 2
 
 _______________________________               . 3
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 محتىي التقبريز السنىيت
 ِف١ذح لارخبر اٌمشاساد؟٘بِخ ٚ اٌزبٌ١خ ٌٍزمبس٠ش اٌغٕٛ٠خ ٌٍششوبد إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رؼزمذ أْ الألغبَ . 2
غ١ش ُِٙ  ألغبَ اٌزمبس٠ش اٌّبٌ١خ اٌغٕٛ٠خ 
ػٍٝ 
 الإطلاق
لٍ١ً 
 الأّ٘١خ
 ِذب٠ذ 
 
ُِٙ  ُِٙ  
 ٌٍغب٠خ
      وٍّخ سئ١ظ ِجٍظ الإداسح 1
      رمش٠ش الإداسح 2
      رمش٠ش اٌّشاجغ اٌخبسجٟ 3
      ٌٟلبئّخ اٌّشوض اٌّب 4
      لبئّخ اٌذخً 5
      لبئّخ اٌزذفمبد إٌمذ٠خ 6
      لبئّخ اٌزغ١شاد فٟ دمٛق اٌٍّى١خ 7
      اٌغ١بعبد اٌّذبعج١خ 8
      إ٠ضبدبد دٛي اٌمٛائُ اٌّبٌ١خ 9
 01
 
 
 )٠شجٝ اٌزذذ٠ذ(أخشٜ 
 
 _______________________________. 1
 
 _______________________________. 2
 
 _______________________________               . 3
 
     
 
 
 المحبسبيت الخصبئص النىعيت للمعلىمبث
وبد اٌّذسجخ ٠شجٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك أٚ لا رٛافك ػٍٝ أْ اٌّؼٍِٛبد اٌٛاسدح فٟ اٌزمبس٠ش اٌغٕٛ٠خ ٌٍشش. 3
 :فٟ عٛق اٌىٛ٠ذ ٌلأٚساق اٌّبٌ١خ رذًّ اٌخظبئض أٚ اٌّ١ضاد اٌزبٌ١خ
 لا أٚافك اٌخظبئض 
 ثشذح
أٚافك  أٚافك ِذب٠ذ لا أٚافك
 ثشذح
      لبدسح ػٍٝ إدذاس رجب٠ٓ فٟ ػٍّ١خ طٕغ لشاسوُ 1
      ِزٛفشح فٟ اٌٛلذ إٌّبعت 2
      ذذس٠رّضً ثظذق ٚٚالؼ١خ ِب  3
      )ّغزخذِ١ٓ ػٍٝ أخشٜاٌأٞ ػذَ رفض١ً ِجّٛػخ ِٓ (اٌذ١بد  4
      )ششوخ ِغ أخشٜ ِؼٍِٛبد ٠ّىٓ ِمبسٔخ(لبثٍخ ٌٍّمبسٔخ  5
      اٌفزشاد اٌّبٌ١خ  ِذٜ صجبد اٌّجبدئ اٌّذبعج١خ ػٍٝ 6
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أٚ ثخظٛص رم١١ّه لأّ٘١خ / إرا وبْ ٌذ٠ه أٞ رؼٍ١مبد أخشٜ ِّٙخ دٛي ِظبدس اٌّؼٍِٛبد فٟ اٌىٛ٠ذ ٚ 
 .اٌؼٕبطش اٌغبثمخ، ٠شجٝ روش٘ب
 
 )التطىعً( الإفصبح الأختيبري: القسم الثبلث 
ثٕبء ػٍٝ رظٛسوُ ٚأطجبػىُ اٌشخظٟ ٠شجٝ رم١١ُ ِغزٜٛ الإفظبح الأخز١بسٜ فٟ اٌزمبس٠ش اٌغٕٛ٠خ ٌٍششوبد . 1
 .اٌّذسجخ فٟ عٛق اٌىٛ٠ذ ٌلأٚساق اٌّبٌ١خ
 
 ِٕخفض                             ِذب٠ذ     ِٕخفض جذا                                
 
 ِشرفغ جذا                                     ِشرفغ         
 
فٟ اٌزمبس٠ش  اٌّذبعج١خ ّؼٍِٛبداٌ٠شجٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك أٚ لا رٛافك ػٍٝ أْ الإفظبح الأخز١بسٜ ػٓ . 2
 :فٟ اٌّجبلاد اٌزبٌ١خ  رف١ذاٌغٕٛ٠خ 
 لا أٚافك لاداٌّجب 
    ثشذح 
أٚافك  أٚافك ِذب٠ذ لا أٚافك
 ثشذح
فبئذح اٌزمش٠ش اٌغٕٛٞ وّظذس ٌٍّؼٍِٛبد اٌّغزخذِخ جٛدح ٚ رذغ١ٓ 1
 فٟ طٕغ اٌمشاس
     
      رذغ١ٓ ِغزٜٛ اٌضمخ فٟ ػٍّ١خ طٕغ اٌمشاس 2
      فٟ ِشالجخ اعزضّبسارُٙ) دمٛق الألٍ١خ(رذػُ اٌّغزضّش٠ٓ   3
      رذم١ك فشص اعزضّبس٠خ جذ٠ذح أٚ إضبف١خ اٌّغبػذح فٟ 4
 ّغبػذح ِغزخذِٟ اٌزمبس٠ش اٌغٕٛ٠خ ػٍٝ إجشاء ِمبسٔبد ثشؤْ أداءاٌ 5
ششوخ ِؼ١ٕخ ػٍٝ ِذٜ فزشاد ِٓ اٌضِٓ ، ِضلا خلاي اٌغٕٛاد 
 اٌخّظ اٌّبٌ١خ اٌّبض١خ 
     
      اٌّغبػذح فٟ ِمبسٔخ أداء اٌششوخ ِغ اٌششوبد الأخشٜ إٌّبفغخ 6
اٌّغبػذح فٟ ِمبسٔخ أداء اٌششوخ ِغ اٌششوبد اٌّذسجخ فٟ عٛق  7
 اٌىٛ٠ذ ٌلأٚساق اٌّبٌ١خ 
     
      فٟ إػذاد اٌّض٠ذ ِٓ إٌغت ٚاٌزذٍ١لاد اٌّبٌ١خ اٌّغبػذح 8
لذسح ِغزخذِٟ اٌزمبس٠ش اٌغٕٛ٠خ ػٍٝ اٌزٕجؤ ثبلإ٠شاداد  رؼض٠ض 9
 اٌزذفمبد إٌمذ٠خ اٌّزٛلؼخ ٚالأسثبح ٚ
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 01
 
 
 )٠شجٝ اٌزذذ٠ذ(أخشٜ 
 
 _______________________________. 1
 
 _______________________________. 2
 
 _______________________________               . 3
 
     
 
 
ِٓ شؤٔٙب أْ رذغٓ ٔٛػ١خ الإفظبح اٌزبٌ١خ ٠شجٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك أٚ لا رٛافك ػٍٝ أْ اٌّؼٍِٛبد . 3
 ؟ اٌّذسجخ فٟ عٛق اٌىٛ٠ذ ٌلأٚساق اٌّبٌ١خلأخز١بسٜ فٝ اٌزمبس٠ش اٌّبٌ١خ اٌغٕٛ٠خ ٌٍششوبد ا
 لا أٚافك ثٕٛد اٌّؼٍِٛبد 
    ثشذح 
أٚافك  أٚافك ِذب٠ذ لا أٚافك
 ثشذح
      المعلىمبث المتعلقت بمجبلس الإداراث 
      أعّبء أػضبء ِجٍظ الإداسح اٌغ١ش رٕف١ز٠١ٓ 1
اٌّؤ٘لاد اٌؼٍّ١خ (خ لأػضبء ِجٍظ الإداسح اٌغ١شح اٌزار١ 2
 )ٚاٌخجشح اٌؼٍّ١خ
     
أعّبء أػضبء ِجٍظ الإداسح اٌز٠ٓ ُ٘ أػضبء فٟ ِجبٌظ  3
 أٚ أجٕج١خ أخشٜ /إداساد ششوبد ِغبّ٘خ وٛ٠ز١خ ٚ
     
ثبلإضبفخ إٌٝ  اداسح اٌّىبفؤح اٌزٟ ٠ذظً ػٍ١ٙب وً ػضٛ ِجٍظ 4
 رٌه اٌّّ١ضاد الأخشٜ ٌىً ػضٛ 
     
      أٔٛاع ٌجبْ ِجٍظ الإداسح  5
      اٌّغئٌٛ١بد اٌّزؼٍمخ ثٙزٖ اٌٍجبْ 6
      أعّبء أػضبء ٘زٖ اٌٍجبْ 7
      الإجشاءاد اٌّزجؼخ فٟ رؼ١١ٓ أػضبء ٘زٖ اٌٍجبْ 8
      بلإدارة التنفيذيت بالمعلىمبث المتعلقت  
      أعّبء وجبس ِٛظفٟ الإداسح اٌزٕف١ز٠١ٓ 9
اٌّؤ٘لاد (ح اٌزار١خ ٌىجبس ِٛظفٟ الإداسح اٌزٕف١ز٠١ٓ  اٌغ١ش 01
  )اٌؼٍّ١خ ٚاٌخجشح اٌؼٍّ١خ
     
      اٌّغئٌٛ١بد اٌّغٕذح إٌٝ أػضبء الإداسح اٌزٕف١ز٠١ٓ 11
وً (وجبس ِٛظفٟ الإداسح اٌزٕف١ز٠١ٓ اٌشٚارت اٌزٟ ٠ذظً ػٍ١ٙب  21
  ب ثبلإضبفخ إٌٝ اٌّّ١ضاد الأخشٜ اٌزٟ ٠ذظٍْٛ ػٍ١ٙ) ػٍٝ دذا
     
      المعلىمبث المتعلقت ببلمىظفين              
     الاٌزضاَ ثبٌّؼب٠١ش ٚاٌٍٛائخ اٌّذٍ١خ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثبٌظذخ ٚاٌغلاِخ فٟ  31
 173
 
 ِىبْ اٌؼًّ
      رٛف١ش اٌزؤِ١ٓ اٌظذٟ ٌٍّٛظف١ٓ 41
ٌذظٛي ػٍٝ ثبرمذ٠ُ اٌّغبػذاد اٌّبٌ١خ ٌٍّٛظف١ٓ ٌٍزطٛ٠ش  51
 أٚ إٌّٙ١خ اٌشٙبداد الأوبد٠ّ١خ
     
      ػذد اٌغبػبد اٌزذس٠ج١خ اٌزٟ ٠ذظً ػٍ١ٙب وً ِٛظف 61
      اٌّ١ضأ١خ اٌّخظظخ ٌجشاِج اٌزذس٠ت ٚاٌزطٛ٠ش 71
      ػذد اٌّٛظف١ٓ اٌز٠ٓ ٠زُ رذس٠جُٙ عٕٛ٠ب 81
مسئىليت (المعلىمبث المتعلقت ببلقضبيب الاجتمبعيت والبيئيت  
 )الشزكت الاجتمبعيت والبيئيت
     
ٚإداسح  ِضلا إػبدح رظٕ١غ (اٌّذبفظخ ػٍٝ اٌّٛاسد اٌطج١ؼ١خ  91
  ) إٌفب٠بد
     
اٌطبلخ ٚ اٌّٛاد اٌّغزخذِخ فٟ اٌؼٍّ١بد  ِظبدساٌّذبفظخ ػٍٝ  02
  اٌّزؼٍمخ ثبٌششوخ
     
دظٛي اٌششوخ ػٍٝ شٙبداد ػبٌّ١خ ٚرٌه ٌّطبثمزٙب ِؼب٠١ش  12
 )   OSI اٌّضبيػٍٝ عج١ً (اٌجٛدح اٌؼبٌّ١خ 
     
      دػُ اٌّشبس٠غ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثبٌظذخ اٌؼبِخ ٚإٌٛادٟ الاجزّبػ١خ 22
      دػُ اٌطلاة ٚرٌه ِٓ خلاي رؼ١١ُٕٙ ػٍٝ ٔظبَ اٌؼًّ اٌجضئٟ 32
      دػُ ٚسػب٠خ اٌذٍمبد إٌمبش١خ ٚاٌّؤرّشاد الأوبد٠ّ١خ 42
      المعلىمبث المتعلقت ببلمنتجبث أو الخذمبث      
      طف لأُ٘ ِٕزجبد أٚ خذِبد ششوخ ٚ 52
      ٚطف ٌلأعٛاق إٌّبعجخ ٌزغٛ٠ك ِٕزجبد أٚ خذِبد ششوخ  62
      ِغبّ٘خ ِٕزجبد أٚ خذِبد اٌششوبد فٟ دػُ الالزظبد اٌٛطٕٟ   72
      ششوخ  اٌاٌزطٛساد اٌّزؼٍمخ ثّٕزجبد أٚ خذِبد  82
ِٕزجبد أٚ اٌذظٛي ػٍٝ جٛائض ٔز١جخ ص٠بدح دسجبد جٛدح  92
 ششوخ اٌخذِبد 
     
 إرا وبْ ٕ٘بن أٞ ِؼٍِٛبد أخشٜ ، ٠شجٝ روش٘ب 03
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ػٍٝ عج١ً اٌّضبي ِؼٍِٛبد اخز١بس٠خ أخشٜ (بح الأخز١بسٜ إرا وبْ ٌذ٠ه أٞ رؼٍ١مبد أخشٜ ِّٙخ دٛي رذغ١ٓ الإفظ
 . أٚ ثخظٛص رم١١ّه ٌٍجٕٛد اٌغبثمخ ، ٠شجٝ روش٘ب/ ٚ )٠ٛطٝ ثبلإفظبح ػٕٙب فٟ رمبس٠ش اٌششوبد اٌغٕٛ٠خ
 
  شفبفيت معلىمبث الشزكبث: القسم الزابع
ّؼٍِٛبد ٌٍ ش فٟ ِغزٜٛ اٌشفبف١خرؤص لذ ٠شجٝ الإشبسح إٌٟ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك أٚ لا رٛافك ثؤْ اٌؼٛاًِ اٌزبٌ١خ. 1
 .عٛق اٌىٛ٠ذ الأٚساق اٌّبٌ١خ اٌخبطخ ثبٌششوبد اٌّذسجخ فٟ
لا أٚافك  اٌؼٛاًِ 
  ثشذح
 
أٚافك  أٚافك   ِذب٠ذ   لا أٚافك
 ثشذح
      عّؼخ ِجٍظ الإداسح  1
      عّؼخ الإداسح اٌزٕف١ز٠خ ٌٍششوخ 2
      ثشىً ػبَ عّؼخ اٌششوخ 3
      ذغبثبد اٌخبسجِٟشاجغ اٌ عّؼخ 4
      ِغزٜٛ اٌضمخ فٟ عٛق اٌّبي 5
      ِظذس اٌّؼٍِٛبد 6
      ص٠بدح ِزطٍجبد الإفظبح الإججبسٞ 7
فٟ ع١بعبد  اٌضمخلذسح اٌّشبسو١ٓ فٟ اٌغٛق ػٍٝ رم١١ُ ِذٜ  8
 الإفظبح اٌّزجؼخ ِٓ لجً اٌششوخ 
     
      رطج١ك ِؼب٠١ش دٛوّخ اٌششوبد 9
 01
 
 
 ً أخشٜ ، ٠شجٝ اٌزذذ٠ذأٞ ػٛاِ
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 اللىائخ المحبسبيت و نمى سىق الكىيج للأوراق المبليت:  القسم الخبمس
 ِٓ رذاخً ِٙبَ الأششاف ٚ اٌشلبثخ ث١ٓ اٌجٙبد إٌّظّخ ٌٍغٛق؟  ُّٙ اٌذذ اٌ ِٓ ِٓ ٚجٙخ ٔظشوُ، ً٘. 1
 ٌ١ظ ِّٙب ػٍٝ الإطلاق                         لٍ١ً الأّ٘١خ                                              ِذب٠ذ              
                 
 فٟ غب٠خ الأّ٘١خ        ُِٙ                                                 
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مٛاػذ ثبٌأْ دسجخ اٌضمخ فٝ عٛق اٌّبي ثبلإضبفخ اٌٝ ِغزٜٛ إٌّبفغخ ث١ٓ الأعٛاق اٌّبٌ١خ رزؤصش  اٌّؼٍَِٛٓ . 2
٠شجٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ أٞ ِذٜ رٛافك أٚ لا رٛافك ػٍٝ ضشٚسح ٚضغ . ٚاٌضٛاثط اٌزٝ رذذد٘ب اٌٙ١ئبد اٌزٕظ١ّ١خ
 :بٌمضب٠ب اٌزبٌ١خالإجشاءاد فٟ اٌىٛ٠ذ ف١ّب ٠زؼٍك ث
 
لا أٚافك  اٌمضب٠ب 
   ثشذح
أٚافك  أٚافك ِذب٠ذ لا أٚافك
 ثشذح
ٚجٛد ٘١ئخ ِغزمٍخ ٌغٛق اٌّبي ِٓ أجً رؼض٠ض اٌشلبثخ ػٍٝ أداء  1
 عٛق اٌىٛ٠ذ ٌلأٚساق اٌّبٌ١خ
     
رذغ١ٓ ِٙبساد ِٛظفٟ اٌجٙبد إٌّظّخ ٌٍغٛق ثذ١ش ٠ؼضص لذسح  2
خ ٚرٌه ٌٍزذمك ِٓ ِذٜ اٌزضاَ رٍه اٌجٙبد ػٍٝ الأششاف ٚاٌشلبث
 اٌّشبسو١ٓ فٟ اٌغٛق ثبٌمٛأ١ٓ ٚ اٌٍٛائخ اٌظبدسح
     
ِضلا ٘١ىً اٌٍّى١خ  ٚ الأطشاف (ص٠بدح اٌّزطٍجبد اٌّذٍ١خ ٌلإفظبح  3
  ) راد اٌؼلالخ
     
رطٛ٠ش اٌّٛلغ اٌلأوزشٚٔٝ ٌغٛق اٌىٛ٠ذ ٌلأٚساق اٌّبٌ١خ ثذ١ش  4
اٌّؼٍِٛبد الأخشٜ اٌّزؼٍمخ  ٠ٛفش ِؼٍِٛبد دذ٠ضخ ثبلإضبفخ إٌٝ
 ثبٌششوبد 
     
 ٚضغ إجشاءاد أوضش دلخ ٚٔظبِ١خ ٌٍششوبد ِٓ اجً أْ 5
 رفظخ ػٓ ِؼٍِٛبرٙب ػٍٝ  ِٛلغ عٛق اٌىٛ٠ذ ٌلأٚساق 
 اٌّبٌ١خ أٚ اٌّٛلغ اٌخبص ثبٌششوخ 
     
 6
 
 
  أٞ ِٛاض١غ أخشٜ، ٠شجٝ اٌزذذ٠ذ
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ششوخ ِٚجٍظ إداسرٙب ، ٌٍ اٌزٕف١ز٠خ داسحالإِؼب٠١ش دٛوّخ اٌششوبد ٌٙب رؤص١ش إ٠جبثٟ ػٍٝ ثٕبء اٌؼلالبد ث١ٓ . 3
ثؼض اٌزمبس٠ش ِٓ أجً رذغ١ٓ دسجخ  ثٙباٌزبٌ١خ أٚطذ  اٌزٛط١بدٚ . ٚجّ١غ أطذبة اٌّظٍذخ، ِضً اٌّغبّ٘١ٓ
ج١ئخ اٌظؼٛثخ اٌّزؼٍمخ ثزطج١ك رٍه اٌزٛط١بد فٟ اٌ٠شجٝ الإشبسح إٌٝ دسجخ . اٌضمخ ٚالاعزضّبس فٟ اٌغٛق اٌّبٌٟ
 .اٌزجبس٠خ اٌىٛ٠ز١خ
  
 دسجخ اٌظؼٛثخ اٌزٛط١بد
 
طؼٛثخ  ِؼزذي طؼت طؼت جذا
 ِذذٚدح
 لا 
 رٛجذ
 طؼٛثبد
ِؼب٠١ش دٛوّخ اٌششوبد اٌزٟ رٙذف إٌٝ رؼض٠ض ِّبسعبد ِجٍظ  1
الإداسح ٠جت رطج١مٙب، ِغ ِشاػبح أْ ٠زُ رٕم١ذٙب ٌزٕبعت اٌج١ئخ 
  اٌىٛ٠ز١خ إرا ٌضَ الأِش 
     
ٝ ٠ٕجغٟ ػٍٝ جّؼ١خ اٌّذبعج١١ٓ اٌىٛ٠ز١خ أْ رشبسن فٟ ػٍّ١خ رجٕ 2
 ِؼب٠١ش دٛوّخ اٌششوبد
     
ٚرٌه ثٙذف ص٠بدح اٌٛػٟ ٌّجبٌظ  رضم١ف١خ٠ٕجغٟ ٚضغ ثشاِج  3
 اٌششوبد ثخظٛص أّ٘١خ ِؼب٠١ش دٛوّخ اٌششوبد اد إداس
     
٠ٕجغٟ ٚضغ ثشاِج رضم١ف١خ ٚرٌه ثٙذف ص٠بدح اٌٛػٟ ث١ٓ  4
 اٌّغزضّش٠ٓ ف١ّب ٠زؼٍك ثبٌزؼبًِ فٟ أعٛاق اٌّبي
     
 ٌلاوززبة اٌؼبَ ػٕذِب اعُٙ ششوبد جغ ػٍٝ طشحٚضغ آٌ١خ رش 5
  %53رظً اٌٍّى١خ فٟ اٌششوبد اٌّغبّ٘خ إٌٝ أوضش ِٓ  
     
ِجٍظ الإداسح ٚالإداسح اٌؼٍ١ب  اػضبء ٠جت اٌشثط ث١ٓ ِىبفآد 6
  ٌٍششوخ ِغ أداء اٌششوخ
     
٠جت أْ ٠ىْٛ صٍش أػضبء ِجٍظ الإداسح أػضبء غ١ش رٕف١ز٠١ٓ  7
  ِغزمٍ١ٓ  ٚرىْٛ غبٌج١زُٙ
     
٠جت دضٛس  الأػضبء اٌغ١ش رٕف١ز٠١ٓ ٚاٌّغزمٍ١ٓ دزٝ ٠زذمك  8
 إٌظبة اٌمبٟٔٛٔ لاجزّبػبد ِجٍظ الإداسح 
     
٠زٛجت ػٍٝ جّ١غ اٌششوبد اٌّذسجخ أْ ٠ىْٛ ٌذ٠ٙب  ٌجبْ  9
 ) اٌزذل١ك،رؼ١١ٕبد،ِىبفآد(ِجٍظ الإداسح 
     
 01
 
 
د ٠جت أْ ٠ىْٛ دٚس فٟ اٌششوبد اٌزٟ رغ١طش ػٍ١ٙب اٌؼبئلا
الأػضبء اٌز٠ٓ ٠ٕزّْٛ ٌٙزٖ اٌؼبئلاد ِذذٚد ف١ّب ٠زؼٍك ثبلإداسح 
 )  أٜ رم١١ذ دٚسُ٘ فٝ الأداسح) (اٌزٕف١ز٠خ(اٌؼٍ١ب 
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أٚ / فٟ اٌىٛ٠ذ ٚ ) ِضً  ِجبدئ دٛوّخ اٌششوبد(إرا وبْ ٌذ٠ه أٞ ِض٠ذ ِٓ اٌزؼٍ١مبد اٌٙبِخ ثخظٛص اٌمٛأ١ٓ 
 .بثمخ، ٠شجٝ روش٘بغاٌرم١١ّه ٌٍّٛاض١غ 
 
 
 
 
